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ABSTRACT 
Japanese--style management has attracted a lot of attention 
from managers, business executives and scholars worldwide. 
The sudden intensity of'Interest in the so-called Japanese 
Management Model has been partly due to the rapid 
ascendancy of Japan as, a leading economic superpower In a 
relatively short period after her humiliating defeat in 
the Second World War. 
In 1982, Malaysiaý officially launched-- the "Look East" 
policy to emulate the Japanese by adopting Japanese-style 
management practices. It was believed that by adopting 
Japanese-style management techniques, the Malaysians can 
replicate the Japanese success. This study aims to discuss 
what constitutes Japanese-style management and also to 
determine If it can be transferred to the Malaysian public 
enterprise sector. 
From this study, it was revealed that only some elements 
of. Japanese-style management are transferable to Malaysian 
public enterprises. There is a number of problems 
encountered in trying to transfer the Japanese practices 
to Malaysian public enterprise sector, especially If they 
are not compatible with the Malaysian values. The problems 
of transferring Japanese management techniques across 
(ii) 
national boundaries are further compounded when the 
transfer is from private sector to public sector. Even In 
the case of Japan, her public enterprise sector does not 
even have a reputation of efficient management. It was 
also found that despite the official policy and persistent 
effort towards "Japanisation" by the government, the 
majority of Malaysian workforce still prefer the present 
existing management system. 
To some extent, the study has provided some answers to 
questions regarding the feasibility of adopting the 
Japanese-style management. But most important of allt the 
study has revealed that Japanese-style management is not a 
panacea to the problems confronting the public enterprise 
sector in Malaysia. 
(iii) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Purposes of the Study 
This study has two modest objectives. Firstly, the study 
attempts to undertake an indepth analysis of the various 
elements that comprise the so called- Japanese-style 
management. Specifically, 'the emphasis of the- study will 
be concentrated on the major Japanese management practices 
and policies adopted by major Japanese firms in Japan. 
This topic is. chosen partly because of the, tremendous 
interest that has been generated towards the Japanese- 
style management for the last decade. Managers, business 
executives, and management scholars from all parts of the 
world flock in great number to the city of Tokyo with some 
common pursuits: to study more about how the Japanese have 
managed their organisations successfully and also to 
determine if these practices can be applied to their 
organisations in their own countries. This sudden shift of 
attention in the study of management science from the West 
to the Orient is due to Japan's phenomenal success as a 
new world economic and industrial power. 
It is hoped that some secrets (if there areý, indeed any) 
that contribute to Japanese's success would be uncovered 
by the time, this study is completed. This would be carried 
-2- 
out by discussing' some major characteristics of the 
management system and styles found in typical, big 
companies in Japan. Analysis of both the strengths and 
weaknesses of Japanese-style management is also attempted, 
to provide a clearer picture to the reader as to what 
Japanese-style management is really about., 
The second objective that this study aspires to achieve is 
to find out whether the Japanese-style management or the 
so-called. Japanese Management Model can be transplanted to 
other countries. Specifically, this particular study tries 
to'determine--whether the successful practices and policies 
of Japanese enterprisesý in Japan can be transferred to 
Malaysia for adoption in public sector. The issues of 
transferability of Japanese-style' management to other 
countries have been of particular interest to the author 
of this'study. It becomes even more interesting now that 
it relates to -his own country, Malaysia. This is 
especially so because Malaysia is the only country in the 
world that officially tries to emulate the Japanese via 
the launching of its "Look East" policy in 1982 by the 
Malaysian government. 
Except for some journalistic articles which naturally are 
highly opinionated, there is no known research work done 
yet in Malaysia regarding the transferability, let alone 
the applicability of Japanese-style management to the 
-3- 
country. The majority of the Malaysians seem to take for 
granted that Malaysia canýreplicate the Japanese formula 
of success. This study can therefore be used as an 
instrument to find out if this is the case in actuality. 
It is the desire of the author to find out what many other 
eager Malaysians have been anxious to know, that is; "Can 
Japanese-style management be transferred and practised in 
Malaysia? ". If this is so, can it be adopted in the public 
enterprises of Malaysia? ". "Hopefully some answers to those 
questions will emerge, from this-study. 
1.2. Significance of the Study 
1.2.1. In Terms of Research Undertaking 
During the first two decades after World War II, Japan 
began to emerge as a great-economic and industrial power. 
From the ashes of the atomic bomb as a result of her 
humiliating defeat by the Allied Forces during the war, 
she has once again become a major power. An enormous 
volume of literature on Japanese management has been 
written chronicling the outstanding feats achieved by the 
Japanese. It is widely believed, that one of the important 
factors responsible for Japan's economic success and 
technological advancement lies in her Management Model, 
popularly known as Japanese-style management. This 
research study will hopefully -provide some insight as to 
how and why Japan has become a superpower that, it is 
-4- 
today. It will be hopefully of some value and interest -to 
those in the field of management science. 
The Japanese Management Model has created a lot of 
controversy. The group who believes strongly- in it has 
claimed it as unique and superior to those management 
systems and styles originating from the West. ' Its critics 
find nothing special or superior about the model for it 
has also many drawbacks. Despite the vast differences in 
opinion, one thing cannot be disputed about the management 
style practised by Japanese managers. The Japanese-style 
management in private sector has proved to be an 
important, if not major factor responsible forý higher 
productivity of workers at work in Japan, although other 
factors cannot be dismissed or underrated. - In view of 
this, Japanese-style 'management- deserves an - indepth 
research study as it will surely contribute towards the 
enrichment of the existing management literature in the 
quest for effective and efficient management. 
1.2.2. In Terms of Malaysia's "Look'East" Policy ' 
This study is very important to readers in 'the author's 
own country, Malaysia because of the official "Look East" 
policy whereby the government 'of Malaysia instructs all 
Malaysians to emulate the Japanese people. The Malaysian 
work force, especially in the public sector, has been 
asked to learn and adopt Japanese work ethics, work 
-5- 
philosophy and management approach to their jobs, , When 
this 'Japanisation' policy was introduced, it was 
enthusiastically supported by those in the management 
circles from both the public and private sectors although 
at the same time, they were anxious to know about the 
feasibility of such a novel policy. The findings of -this 
study willý be most meaningful to the initiators and 
implementors of the "Look East" policy as they can be 
used as a guide in, pinpointing as well as correcting any 
loopholes thatý "Look East" policy may have, if the policy 
is to be carried out successfully. 
The study of Japanese-style ýmanagement and its possible 
adoption by Malaysian public enterprises is also highly 
significant to the present Malaysian government which is 
vigorously, albeit, systematically, seeking -to reduce the 
size of her workforce. It is the contention, of the 
Malaysian government that a reduced workforce in the 
public sector necessitates a higher per worker 
productivity-in 'the future. It means the workforce has to 
be effective and efficient in its discharge of duties. The 
Japanese-style management seems very impressive and 
therefore a natural choice to the Malaysian government. 
This study will endeavour to find out if this is so in 
actuality. 
-6- 
This subject has been selected because of its importance 
in addressing the question of Malaysia's action in 
emulating other country's management models. Must the 
Malaysians look to the East for the solutions of striving 
towards effectiveness and efficiency when their existing 
problems have been created-by practising Western model? 
The fact that Malaysia has a long association with 'the 
Western management system brought mainly by the British 
managers, and is now suddenly switching to the Japanese 
model, is indeed a challenging subject to study. 
There is also another aspect of this study which makes it 
a worthwhile venture. Malaysia is a plural society that 
consists of the Malays, Chinese, Indians and sixteen other 
indigenous groups, while Japan by, comparison is relatively 
homogeneous ý (besides the Japanese, ' there are also some 
other minority groups namely the Koreans, Chinese and 
Ainu inhabitants) (Gow, 1987). The majority of the people 
in -Malaysia are Muslims and the others are either 
Christians or Buddhists. On the other hand, the Japanese 
people are mostly Buddhist and Shinto worshippers -and a 
minority are christians. There are bound to be problems 
regarding the transfer of managerial elements from Japan 
to Malaysia in view *of the vast cultural differences 
between the two countries. Problems of this nature will be 
of great value to the those involved in "Look East" 
policy. It will also provide valuable information to other 
-7- 
countries which aspire to adopt -, the , Japanese-style 
management. 
Lastly, this study is considered important to those 
managers of the public enterprises who had officially been 
instructed to introduce the Japanese-style management 
through the "Look East" policy in running their 
respective organisations. This study will discuss the 
elements of the Japanese Management ModeL that can and 
cannot be transferred to the public enterprises in. 
Malaysia. 
1.3. Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study has been confined mainly to, some major aspects 
of, traditional Japanese-style management. Some topics like 
Japanese sogo shosha, and Japanese trade policies will not 
be discussed in detail because these are not considered so 
relevant to the theme, of this thesis. The coverage has 
instead concentrated mainly on the Japanese human 
resources and personnel management aspects of management, 
because when the Prime, Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir, 
announced the "Look East" policy in 1982, what he really 
wanted was for Malaysians from all walks of life in 
general, and the workforce in -the public sector, in 
particular, 'to emulate the work ethics, methods and 
philosophy of Japanese personnel management. He said; - 
-8- 
"Now, if it is the Japanese work ethic that has 
contributed to the economic and commercial success of 
post-war Japan, and if this work ethic can be acquired and 
developed artificially, it follows that Malaysians too can 
shape and develop their own work ethics. That is precisely 
what the Look East policy is all about" (Mahathir, 
1985: p. 157) I 
From the tone of his numerous speeches, throughout the 
"Look East" policy campaign in 1982, he was obviously not 
happy with the attitudes of the public sector's employees 
and the productivity level achieved by them. Accordinglys 
he believes that the personnel management practices and 
policies of the Japanese would - provide the cure to the 
ills diagnosed among the Malaysians. 
The study on the issues of transferability - (and also the 
applications) of Japanese-style management is confined to 
Malaysian public enterprises only. There is a reason for 
this. The public enterprises have been chosen for study 
because, the efficiency of these enterprises, which form 
the largest sector (i. e. in term of employment) in 
Malaysia, has been severely criticised. The majority of 
them are reported to be very disorganised and badly 
managed. If the -"Look East" policy is to be pursued with 
the intention of bringing about efficiency, public 
enterprises may be a good starting point. 
-9- 
Since Malaysia gained her independence, there has been a 
rapid growth of public enterprises created 'by the 
government to speed up the various development projects in 
the country. In order to achieve the goals of the 
government towards the nation-building processo these 
enterprises have been allocated generous grants, yet many 
seem to be badly managed 'and*, incur yearly losses, 
indicating some sort-, of management problems. Against the 
backdrop of such circumstances, the study of Japanese- 
style management and its ý transferability to the public 
enterprises in Malaysia is an appropriate undertaking. 
A major limitation of the study is the fact' that the 
discussion on Japanese-style management is focussed on the 
traditional or stereo-type Japanese management practices. 
This means the latest management practices (neo-Japanese 
style management) which have recently emerged in Japan 
will not be given great emphasis. 
The fact that the transferability of Japanese management 
practices to Malaysia is being confined only to public 
enterprise sector also constitutes a limitation. Being 
public 'agencies which have been created as instruments 
mainly to achieve government's political objective-Pý one 
may question the suitability of using public enterprises 
in determining the feasibility -of practising Japanese 
management practices, when one takes into account that in 
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Japan, the successful Japanese techniques are found in 
private rather than public sector. The practices which 
are said to be very effective in private firms have not 
shown the same degree of effectiveness in- the public 
enterprises. 
1.4. Structure and Contents of the'Thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts comprising nine 
chapters. Part One contains Chapters One to Six and they 
form the theoretical framework of the study. Part Two 
consists of the remaining Chapters Seven to Nine and they 
consist of the research methodology, research survey, 
findings and analysis of -survey , and conclusions of the 
s tudy. 
Chapter One begins with the purposes, significance, scope, 
limitation and lastly the structure and contents of the 
study. This gives the readers some indication ý of the 
overall direction'' of the study. 
I 
Chapter Two discusses the Malaysian setting. It' covers 
areas such as the plural society, the economy, the socio- 
political system, the government, the New Economic Policy, 
the "Look' East" policy and finally, the Malays ian-Japanese 
relationship. The chapter aims to provideý background 
information to the subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Three dwells on some major management practices 
especially 'the personnel aspects 'that are found in 
Malaysia. The main discussion consists of the development, 
features and factors 'affecting the management system in 
the country. In the same chapter, the ýprofiles of 
Malaysian managers and employees are also discussed. This 
chapter is also intended as a background study for the 
subsequent chapters. 
Chapter Four highlights the prevalent situation in public 
enterprises. A typical enterprise is first discussed. Then 
a more detailed discussion of Japanese and Malaysian 
public enterprises follows. Among the issues discussed 
include the reasons for creating ýpublic enterprises; 
organisational structure; control and accountability and 
major problems confronting public enterprises. 
Chapter Five is the core chapter of the thesis whereby the 
literature review on Japanese Management Model is 
presented in detail. The major features, strengths, 
weaknesses and the future of Japanese-style management 
will be thoroughly analysed. 
Chapter Six deals with another important theme of the 
thesis; that is, the issues of transferability of the 
Japanese Management Model to foreign countries. In this 
chapter, effort of introducing Japanese-style management 
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practices especially by Japanese firms and joint-venture 
firms in the 1970s and 1980s in Malaysia are examined. 
Then, experiences of some countries which import and 
experiment with some Japanese elements of management are 
discussed. This marks the end the literature review 
section of the thesis. 
The next three remaining chapters constitute Part Two of 
the thesis. Chapter Seven discusses the research 
methodology used in the study whereby explanation 
regarding research's objectives and research process is 
attempted. 
The actual research survey is described in Chapter Eight. 
Included in this chapter are the survey's findings and 
analysis concerning Japanese-style management and the 
issues of its transferability to the Malaysian public 
enterprises. 
Chapter Nine contains the concluding remarks and 
recommendations made based on the research study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE MALAYSIAN SCENARIO 
2.1. Objective of the chapter 
Before any discussion on the transferability of Japanese- 
style management to the public enterprises in Malaysia is 
attempted, it is felt -that a background discussion on 
Malaysia particularly in areas of social, cultural, 
economic and political settings is deemed necessary. This 
will familiarise the reader with the past- historical 
events, the on-going developments and also the future 
trends in the country. Such background information 
provides the reader with a wider perspective regarding the 
issues under study and therefore relates to the reader 
the relationships, if any, between the prevailing 
variables (culture, social, economic and political) and 
the findings of the study. 
2.2. General Background of Malaysia 
Malaysia was born as a federation of fourteen states in 
1963. Singapore"Ieft in 1965 due to political differences. 
Today, in addition to the existing thirteen states, there 
are two federal territories. Eleven of the states are in 
Peninsular Malaysia, formerly known as Malaya while the 
other two states of Sabah and Sarawak are several hundred 
miles away in the North West part of the island of Borneo. 
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Exhibit 2.1: Location of Malaysia 
JRMA 
AUSTRALI,,, 
-15- 
The federal territory of Kuala Lumpur, which is also the 
nation's capital city, is in Peninsular Malaysia, while 
the federal territory of Labuan is in the state'of Sabah. 
Malaysia covers an area of about 340,434 ' square 
kilometres; Peninsular Malaysia making up a total of 
131,587 squares kilometres; Sarawak , 124,449 square 
kilometres and Sabah 74,394 square kilometres. 
The population of Malaysia at present, is estimated to be 
around 17.4 million comprising people of diverse ethnic 
origins, namely the Bumiputras (Malays and other 
indigenous groups), Chinese, Indians, and others 
(Information Malaysia Yearbook, 1989: p. 17). About 83% of 
the population live in Peninsula Malaysia. Malaysia has a 
young population with 70% of the people under 30 years 
old. Until the 1980s, it was the official policy to 
encourage a slow growth rate in the population, but this 
has now been reversed, due to the recent announcement of 
government policy to achieve a population target of 70 
million by 2095. The current population growth rate is 
3.2%. Although more than 50% of the people are literate, 
there is 'a shortage of professional, technical, and 
management skills. 
2.3. The Plural Society 
The most notable characteristic of the country's 
population is her highly variegated ethnic mix, which can 
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be divided into three- broad categories, namely the 
Bumiputras; the Chinese and the Indians (Information 
Malaysia Yearbook, 1989: p. 15). The Bumiputras ( meaning 
sons of soil) refers to the Malays and 16 other indigenous 
groups namely the Ibans, Bidayuhs, Melanaus, Kayans, 
Kenyahs and others of Sarawak and Kadazans, Bajaus, 
Bisayas and Muruts 'etc. of Sabah. Together the 
indigenous-or the Bumiputra groups form about 54% of the 
population, with Malay constituting about A8% of the 
Malaysia's population. The Chinese and the Indians form 
34% and 9% of the population respectively. These different 
groups differ sharply from each other in religions, 
cultures, languages, customs, -food habits and dress. 
Before further, discussion is carried out, it is pertinent 
at this juncture, to point out that in Malaysia, as a 
result of historical events, there exists a positive 
discrimination in Malaysia. For instance, the Bumiputras 
are ' given some special privileges under the country's 
constitution. These privileges are meant to protect the 
Bumiputras' interests and also their dominant political 
power which was deemed necessary to counter the, Non- 
Bumiputras' economic dominance in the country. 
Malaysia is indeed a plural society. A plural society is' 
defined as a -society comprising two or more elements of 
social orders which live side by side, yet without 
mingling, in one political unit. A plural society is 
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characterised by (1) cultural diversity, (2) politically 
organised cultural communities, and' (3) the salience of 
ethnicity (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: p. 21). 'Therefore, 
like many other plural societies, the overriding objective 
of the Malaysian government is, to achieve national unity 
It can be 'said that, communal, pluralism is the "essential 
reality of the, Malaysian society and the government. 
Communal divisions appear -not only on specific issues 
regarding the economic, social and cultural benefits but 
also , in many facets of Malaysian life. Each race 
communicates in its own language and adheres to its 
customs and traditions strongly. Thus, the relationship 
tends to follow ethnic and religious linesý There is the 
expectation in society that one will favour members of 
one Is own ethnic group. Friendship ties acro'ss , ethnic 
border lines are , possible but more difficult. 
Traditionally, friends from different ethnic origins as a 
rule are not invited-together to some, special functions .' 
Relations between the various ethnic groups can sometimes 
be strained by sensitive issues relating to race, religion 
and language. In, 1969, there was a serious racial conflict 
known as the May 13th incident involvingý the Chinese and 
the Malays. which resulted in loss of many lives. The 
conflict arose mainly due to the dissatisfaction of the 
Malays with, the Chinese regarding the inequality of 
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economic power in the country. The Chinese. control the 
economy while the Malays are politically dominant and this 
is where the problem began. , Vigorous efforts however, 
have been taken (i. e the restructuring of society through 
NEP) to rectify this problem and to a certain degree, 
relations between the various ethnic groups in -Malaysia 
has improved. Also, the present Malaysians of various 
origins are relatively more understanding and tolerant of 
each other, although outburst of racial sentiments by some 
ethnic groups (especially during election times) in 
matters of regarding educational and job opportunities are 
quite a common occurrence. The solidarity between the 
various ethnic groups is clearly seen during festive 
seasons when the - Chinese and Indians enthusiastically 
visit the homes of their Malay colleagues during Hari Raya 
(Muslim Celebration). Likewise when the Chinese have their 
New Year celebration, the Malays and Indians will look 
forward-to making a reciprocal visit. The Indians also 
will have, lopen houses' to their Malay and Chinese friends 
during their, Depavali Celebration. Such is the Malaysian 
way of-life today. 
2.3.1. The Malays 
Of the three major races, the -Malays are ý considered the 
most backward because the majority of them live in rural 
areas doing agricultural farming, or at coastal areas, 
engaged in small-scale fishing. The rural Malays live for 
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the most part in village communities. The old semi- 
subsistence economy based on rice and fruit-growing has 
widened into smallholder production of rubber, copra and 
recently of palm oil, as well as the production of rice on 
vast new areas of padi land irrigated by modern 
engineering works. The other group of the Malay 
population, the urban Malays, consist of those who are top 
administrators in the civil services or executives in 
private firms and the ordinary workers (comprising of the 
clerks, technicians, police and armed forces, blue collar 
workers etc) of both the public and private sectors. The 
Malays are Muslims of the Sunni sect-and are tolerant -in 
their observances. The school teachers, the mosque 
officials, some prominent hajis, - (those who have made the 
pilgrimage to Mecca) and the retired government servants 
are considered men of influence in their villages. 
2.3.2. The Chinese 
The majority of the early Malaysian Chinese arrived over 
the 1830-1930 period. They came almost entirely from the 
south-eastern provinces of China, - notably Kwangtung and 
Fukien and they are subdivided by local dialects of 
Chinese (Cantonese, Hokkien, Foochow, etc. ) which they 
speak. The first immigrants came as labourers with the 
intention of returning to China with their savings - as 
most of them in fact did (Ping, 1985: p. 139). However, some 
prospered, having accumulated their fortunes by operating 
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mines, plantations, trading houses, factories and shops. 
Out of their immense stake in 'Malaya came their first 
attachment to it and a resultant inclination to settle 
permanently. 
Although they were of peasant stock, the Chinese came to 
Malaysia to make money, for which - they show a remarkable 
aptitude. The majority of the Chinese live in , the major 
cities and towns of Malaysia. They lead in almost 
everything, ranging from dominance in business and 
commercial activities to occupying the top professional 
and technical positions in the private sector. If it were 
not- for the provision of the constitution of Malaysia, 
they would eventually dominate the top positions in the 
civil service also, since the Chinese community has the 
highest number of educated people 'with -ýuniversity and 
college qualifications. 
The Chinese are divided into various clans or groups such 
as Hokkien, Teochiew, Hailam, Hakka, Cantonese and many 
others. Most Hailese are involved in restaurants or 
coffee-shops, while the Hokkien and Teochew are involved 
in rubber plantations and retail provisions or product 
distributorships. The Hokkiens are penetrating and 
expanding into hotelsl restaurants and coffee-houses, an 
area dominated by the Hailanese (Mong and Ghani, 
1979: p. 69). 
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Chinese religion is a blend of many elements' of which 
Buddhism and Ancestor 'worship' are perhaps the main 
elements. (Sarachek; Hamid; and Ismail, 1984: p. 182) Every 
dwelling however humble has its domestic shrine. However, 
compared to the Malays, the Chinese appear less concerned 
or less interested in matters of religion. Chinese 
religious tolerance often borders -on indifference (Wu, 
1980: p. 38). At the same time, however ý Chinese, culture 
harbours a healthy respect for superstitions. 
2.3.3. The Indians 
The Indian community in Malaysia comprises of the Tamils 
(eighty percent) who migrated from Tamil Nadu state of 
Southern India, and also the Telegu, Malayalis and Sikhs 
who make up the remaining percentage of the Indian 
population. The vast majority of Indians are Hindu while 
the rest are either Muslims or Christians. They were 
brought to Malaya as "cheap labour" or coolies under the 
indenture and kangkani systems of immigration and they 
worked in estates although a minority of them who arrived 
later came to work in the lower rung of the British Civil 
Service as policeman or in army, and clerical jobs etc 
(Rajoo, 1985: p. 149). 
Today the Indians can be divided into two major 
categories; the plantation workers and the urban dwellers. 
About 60% of the Indian population in Malaysia' is 
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concentrated in the plantation estates where they had were 
recruited as coolies by the British as estate workers. 
These Indians are simple people, not well-educated, and 
they are generally happy as evidenced from their over- 
indulgence in todi (Indian alcohol drink). They are not 
normally concerned with world affairs for their world 
revolves around the estates. The other group, the urban 
Indians constitute the educated and the commercial class. 
Broadly, they, are classified as the South Indians 
(Malayanis and Tamils); the North Indians -(Punjabis, 
Sikhs, Sinhis, Gujeratis, Bengalis and Marwaris) and the 
Ceylon Tamils. Except for the Sikhs who are mostly in the 
police force, the North Indians are 'engaged in business. 
The Malayalis and Ceylonese normally work as white-collar 
workers both in private and government sector. - 
The religion of the majority of Indian workers is a 
combination of peasant Hinduism and folk religion. Kinship 
ties among Indians are strong and non-conformity to family 
norms would result in total exclusion from all kinship 
ties. 
2.3.4. The Other Bumiputras 
The other Bumiputras consists of 16 ethnic groups. They 
are the -minority group but the Constitution provided them 
special privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Malays. 
Dominant -ones among these ethnic groups are the Ibans, 
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Dayaks and Melanaus of Sarawak and the Kadazans, ' Bajaus 
and Muruts of Sabah. Generally, they are more like the 
Malays in their cultures and occupations but unlike the 
Malays, they normally practise shifting cultivation. 
The Dayaks and the Bidayuhs for example, live in rural 
areas and some still liveý in longhouses. Most of them are 
hill rice cultivators although many youngsters are now 
flocking to the major towns to look for work. The Melanau 
are normally fishermen. The Muruts, Kayans and Kenyahs 
live in the interior parts of Sarawak, and until recently, 
they were among the most primitive groups leading a simple 
lives living in longhouses. The Kadazans, Bisayahs and 
Muruts are also rice cultivators, cash-crop growers and 
fishermen. It must be noted however that times, have 
changed, and many of, these ethnic people are now migrating 
to towns penetrating the white collar Jobs, which were 
once dominated by non-indigenous people. 
The indigenous groups are simple people and the majority 
of them are not well-educated. This is the main reason for 
their backwardness compared to ý the other ethnic groups. 
With the New Economic Policyq remedial actions such as 
providing low-interest loans for Bumiputras to engage in 
business, setting certain quota for Bumiputra students im 
university, reserving certain important posts in certain 
sector for Bumiputra groups etc., have been aggressively 
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pursued by the government to assist them to catch up with 
the other groups. 
The Ibans and Bidayuhs, who are also broadly known as 
the Dayaks of Sarawak are mostly Christians although a 
minority still practise animistic religion or paganism. 
The majority of Melanaus are Christians; others are 
Muslims while some are also pagans. The Kadazans mostly 
follow the Christian faith, while Bajaus are followers of 
Islamic religion. 
2.4. The Government 
Malaysia has a constitutional elective Monarchy 
(Information Malaysia Yearbook, 1989: p. 85-103). To some 
extent, the Government is patterned along the British 
system, with legislative powers vested in two houses of 
Parliament: the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) 
and the Dewan Negara (Senate). The supreme Head of the 
State is the King, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, who is 
elected by the nine state rulers, to a five-year term. In 
the Malaysian system , each of the nine royal states has a 
ruler, the Sultan, while in each of the four remaining 
non-royal states, there is a Governor, usually referred 
to as the Yang di-Pertua Negeri who is elected to office 
for a four-year term by the King after consultation with 
the Chief Minister of the state concerned. National 
executive power is vested in the Prime Minister- and the 
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Cabinet. The Prime Minister is a member of the Dewan 
Rakyat who commands the confidence of that House, and he 
is appointed by the Head of , the State. Ministers 
constituting the cabinet may, with the consent of the 
Supreme Head- of State, be appointed from either House. 
Unicameral legislative assemblies of elected 
representatives govern the states; A Chief Minister is 
drawn from each assembly to appoint an executive council, 
which manages the state affairs within its purview. 
The constitution lays down a strong central government 
responsible for most matters, including health', education, 
finance, external' affairs, internal security, and civil 
laws. Certain powers, especially those relating to land, 
agriculture and forestry are given to the states. 
Constitutionally, Malaysia is quite unique in that she has 
special provisions granting some powers on certain matters 
such as immigration, forestry etc. to the the States of 
Sabah and Sarawak. The justification for this arrangement 
is to allow for differences in culture and level of 
development -in Sabah and Sarawak compared to the other 
states in Peninsular Malaysia. 
Further, the constitution of Malaysia safeguards the 
position of the Bumiputras by giving them special 
privileges, such as providing financial assistance in the 
form of flexible loans and preferential treatment over 
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others in business and commercial undertakings; reserves 
of places in certain positions in the civil service and 
places of higher institutions of learning; and 
reservations of native lands which are non-transferable'in 
titles to the Non-Bumiputras. Such provisions are deemed 
necessary to help alleviate the poor state of Bumiputras 
who still lag behind the other races in many aspects, 
especially in economic and educational development. This 
is very crucial for national unity and communal harmony 
given the multi-racial nature that exists in the plural 
society of Malaysia. The May 13th incident of racial 
violence was a good enough example to the leaders of this 
nation that racial imbalance in opportunities in ownership 
of assets, commercial activities, educational pursuits 'at 
tertiary level, etc is not healthy for the stability of a 
multi-racial society. Therefore, efforts have been made, 
sometimes at the expense of one group, to ensure that the 
country's wealth is distributed fairly between the various 
races in Malaysia. 
2.5. The Malaysian Economy 
Despite the prolonged world economic recessions, which 
began in 1979 and continued into the early 1980s, the 
Malaysian economy is doing very well. Overall, the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 5.8% per 
annum in real terms during the period 1981-1985. In real 
terms of current prices, the GDP grew by 7.9% per annum, 
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enabling the per capita income to rise by 4.4% per annum 
from M$3,719 in 1980 to M$4,609 in 1985. The growth of the 
Malaysian economy (refer to Table 2A below) is projected 
to be at 5.0% per annum for the Fifth Plan period (Fifth 
Malaysia Plan, 1986: p. 71). 
Table 2A: Malaysia's Gross Domestic Product by 
Expenditure Category, 1985 and 1990 (in M$million). 
Expenditure Category 1985 1 1990 
Private Consumption 39,832 51,320 
Private Investment 11,903 189009 
Private Consumption 11,750 15,274 
Public Investment 11,700 11,467 
Change in Stocks -307 +628 
Exports of goods and 42,881 50,252 
non-factor services 
Imports of goods and 39,289 47,115 
non-factor services 
Gross Domestic Product 78,470 99,835 
Net factor Payments -5,692 -7,115 
Gross National Product 72,778 92,720 
Average annual growth rate for 1981-85 = 7.1 
Average annual growth rite for 1986-90 = 5.0% 
Source: Fifth Malaysian Plan, 1986) 
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The primary sector, comprising agriculture and mining and 
quarrying, grew at a rate of 4.2%. They account for 31% of 
the total output of the country's economy. The agriculture 
sector currently accounts for 20.3% of the total output in 
the economy. Its output is dominated by the production of 
rubber and palm oil which comprises 48.3% of the total 
production in this sector. The secondary sector, 
comprising of manufacturing and construction activities, 
expanded by 5.5% per annum and accounted for 23.3% of 
output growth. The sector contributed 24.3% of the total 
output in the economy in 1985. It is projected to grow at 
6.4% per annum during the 1986-1990 period. 
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It is said Malaysia has always been the "Lucky Country" of 
Asia. ' Balakrishnan (1989: p. 96) said; 
"its soil produces more palm oil and rubber than any 
other country in the world, though neither crop is 
indigenous. Oil Wells off its coast yield petroluem so 
'light' that it commands a premium price. Timber companies 
have been logging Malaysia's forests with such vigour that 
it is the world's largest source of commercial hardwood". 
Malaysia is the world's largest producer and exporter of 
rubber. The production of rubber for 1985 was 1,624,000 
tonnes and this represented 33.6% of the world production 
(Information Malaysia Yearbook 1989: p. 301-302). For the 
same year, production of crude palm oil was recorded to be 
5,400,000 tonnes and this accounted for about 59% of the 
world production Information Malaysia Yearbook, 
1989: p. 303). 
Malaysia is also a'net exporter of petroleum and liquefied 
natural gas which are now the country's top earners. 
Malaysia's estimated recoverable reserves of crude oil 
were 3.1 billion barrels at January, 1986. 
Malaysia has been doing well economically as a result of 
her diversification programmes into the manufacturing 
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sector. Unlike other commodity-based countries whose 
fortunesý fluctuate with the erratic world commodity 
prices, Malaysia adopts the tactic of pursuing export- 
oriented manufacturing. This has paid dividends, for 
Malaysia's main export items are no longer commodities, 
which still bring in substantial revenue, but manufactured 
products. Exports of manufactured goods grew 28.9% in 1988 
and accounted for 49% of export earnings, up from 33% in 
1985 (Balakrishnan, 1989: p. 96). The balance of trade of 
Malaysia is quite sound as shown in Exhibit below: 
Exhibit 2.3: Malaysia's Balance of Trade, 1985-88 
Ye2r Exports Imports Balance of Trade 
growth S growth S C000,000) % ý000,000) % C0001000) 
19881') 54.4 +20.6 42.8 +34.3 11 5 1987 45.1 +26.4 31.9 +14.4 . 13.2 1986 35.7 - 6.0 27.9 - 8.3 3 8 1 1985 38.0 - 1.6 30.4 - 7.6 
. 7.5 10) - estimatel 
aource: ministry or tinance, Economic Report 1988189 - 
ASEAN COUNTRIES 
Balance of Trade 1986 & 1987 (USS million) 
Year Brunei Indonesia Malaysia I Philippines Singapore I Thailand 
1987 
1986 
499.3 
1,144.2 
6,314.0 
347.0 
5,303.0 
3,000.0 -1,200.8 
- 404.3 
-3,902.0 
-3,016.0 
1,7-01. -1 
016 -1301.6 
'3 
Source: Ministry of Finance. Economic Repor, 1988189 
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Malaysia Is per capita GNP based on data of 1988 is 
US$2,079 (MIDA 1988) and this is nearly twice that of her 
neighbour, Thailand; about three times that of the 
Philippines; and six times that of Indonesia. The GDP 
growth rate in Malaysia in. 1988 was 8.1%, the best in the 
decade and for 1989, it has been projected to be around 
8.5% (Balakrishnan, 1989: p. 97). 
. 
Exhibit 2.4: Export of Malaysia by Commodity, ý1985-88 
Year Volume Value Growth Share Total 
Commodity V000 $ (Value) Exports (Value) Position 
tonnes) VOOO, 000) M M 
Electrical & Electronic 1988 - 7,579 . 26 13.9 1 
Products 1987 - 10,251 +28.7 22.7 1 
1986 - 7,976 +32.3 22.3 
1 
1985 - 6,028 - 4.5 15.8 
2 
Crude Petroleum 1988 19,987 6,329 - 0.8 11.7 2 
Petroleum 1987 18,039 6,290 +16.5 13.9 2 
1986 18,792 5,408 -37.9 15.1 2 
1985 16.701 8,697 - 0.4 22.8 
1 
Natural Rubber 1988 1,655 5,095 +30.1 9.4 3 
1987 1,662 3917 +23.1 8.6 4 
1986 1,516 , 3: 183 +10.8 8.3 4 
1985 1,497 2,872 -21.8 7.5 
4 
Palm Oil 1988 4.490 4,626 +42.3 8.5 4 
1987 4,044 3,250 + 8.0 7.2 5 
1986 4,305 3,010 +23.8 8.4 3 
1985 3,215 3,951 . 12.8 10.4 
3 
Timber (Sawlogs) 1988 21,000 3,990. - 6.8 7.1 
5 
(production in '000 cu. m) 1987 23,001 4.280 +48.8 9.5 
3 
1986 19,055 2,876 + 3.8 8.0 5 
1985 19.360 2,771 - 1.3 7.3 
5 
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) 1988 6,100 1,800 - 3.3 3.3 
6 
1987 6,014 1,742 - 8.1 3.8 - 
1986 5,285 1,895 -17.6 5.3 
6 
1 1985 4.389 2,300 +29.6 6.0 
6 
" Texitics 11.1 1".. 
(Source: Malaysia Information Year Book, 
. 
1988: p. 422) 
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2.6. The New Economic Policy 
Despite Malaysia's rapid rate of economic growth, in the 
years after independence, two 'fundamental problems 
persist: widespread poverty and serious racial imbalances 
(Young; Bussink; and Hasan, 1980). To a large extent, this 
was cited as the root cause that led to the racial riot, 
the infamous May 13 incident where the Malays and! Chinese 
clashed, resulting in unnecessary loss of lives. In 
response to these problems, the government embarked upon a 
policy called the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. 
In 1971 when the NEP was inaugurated, the Malaysian 
economy was mostly in the hands of foreigners whose 
controlling interests amounted to 62%. Of the remaining 
share, the Non-Bumiputras own 34% while the Bumiputras 
have only a mere 4%. This ethnic distribution according to 
occupation or economic activity was the norm of the day. 
More than two-third of the Malays were in agriculture, 
while less than a third of them were involved in mining, 
construction and , trade. The Chinese were mainly 
concentrated in commerce, manufacturing, mining and 
construction. The Indians were found to be mostly estate 
workers, although some of them were, successful in 
professional fields as lawyers and commercial 
entrepreneurs. The pattern of occupations in both private 
and public sectors on the whole indicate that the 
professional and technical occupations, such as 
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engineers, doctors and accountants are the monopoly! of 
Chinese and Indians, while the clerical jobs are dominated 
by the Malays. The political and governmental 
administrative positions, due to the provision of the 
country's Constitution, are mainly controlled by the 
Malays. The NEP was especially -formulated, to rectify the 
situation to redress the racial imbalances that, are 
considered unhealthy. 
The NEP, in aiming for national unity, carries a two- 
pronged policy namely: 
(a) eradicabing, poverty and providing more, employment 
opportunities for the people irrespective of their ethnic 
origin; and 
(b) accelerating the process of restructuring society in 
order to correct the existing economic imbalances, so that 
the identification of certain economic roles by race could 
be reduced and finally eliminated (Second Malaysia Plan, 
1976: p. 7). 
In trying to achieve the objective of reducing the 
imbalance through the restructuring -of " society, some of 
the steps to be taken are: 
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(1) to increase the share of the Malays and other 
indigenous people in employment in mining, manufacturing 
and construction and the share of the other Malaysians in 
agriculture and services; 
(2) to raise the share of the Malays and other indigenous 
people in the ownership of productive wealth including 
land, fixed assets and equity capital. The target is that 
by 1990 they will own at least 30% of equity capital with 
40% being owned by other Malaysians; 
(3) to foster the development of entrepreneurship among 
the Malays and other indigenous people so as to contribute 
effectively towards the creation by 1990 of a strong and 
viable commercial and industrial community among them and 
(4) to encourage and support private investment both 
domestic and foreign ((Second Malaysia Plan, 1976: p. 9). 
NEP has been misunderstood by the Non-Bumiputras and 
Bumiputras alike. The Non-Bumiputras tend to see it as a 
threat to them, to discriminate against them, and even see 
the apportioned quota of 30% participation of Bumiputras 
in business 'and commercial activities as denying them of 
their existing share. The Bumiputras, on the other hand, 
tend to be overcontented and believe that the magicýfigure 
of 30% will be theirs without effort. 
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Many economic observers have agreed that the NEP has been 
quite successful in poverty eradication and the 
restructuring of society, even though the achievements of 
Bumiputras (aiming for a 30% share of the nation's 
economy) still fall short -of - targets. For example, for 
the period of 1979-84, all ethnic groups experienced 
increases in incomes. In real terms. the Bumiputras' mean 
household income increased by 30% over the period, with 
20% for the Chinese and 9% for the Indians. For the same 
period, the rate of employment for the Bumiputras 
increased by 2.6% annually, while that of Chinese and 
Indians, each rose by 2.5%. Although still comparatively 
low, in terms of category of, occupations, the number of 
Bumiputras in the professional and ý technical field 
increased from 155,000 in 1980 to 194,000 in 1985. With 
regards to the ownership of share capital, the Bumiputras 
are doing quite well because their share in 1985 was 
estimated to be about 18%. Ownership by Bumiputra 
individuals grew at a fast rate of 32%, thereby closing 
the gap between the Bumiputras and the Non-Bumiputras 
(Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986: p. 125). 
2.7. The "Look East"-Policy 
The 1970s were years where Malaysia was preoccupied with. 
policies aimed at bringing national unity through 
restructuring of economic and - social structure of the 
nation and the eradication of poverty amongst the 
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Malaysians irrespective of races. The 1980s, however, 
witnessed another era where the government made efforts to 
strive towards productivity and efficiency to meet the new 
economic challenges which, initially appeared unfavourable 
to Malaysia. In 1982, the government of Malaysia launched 
the "Look East" policy to be used as a tool in facing the 
new economic realities. It was also believed that the 
"Look East' policy would be in line with the government's 
desire to make 'Malaysia a progressive and successful 
nation and also perhaps provide the answer to the somewhat 
oversized Malaysian public sector which, some quarters 
pointed out, had been unproductive and inefficient in its 
discharge of public duties (Drummond, 1984: p. 9). Working 
and institutional arrangements needed to be made and new 
values had to be adopted. Only by implementing new 
approaches and blending existing values with new ones can 
the nation hopes to build a better society which will be 
united, ý resilient, self-reliant and progressive. Thus, 
"Look East" policy, the brainchild of Dr. Mahathir, the 
present Prime Minister of Malaysia, was born. 
"Look East", according -to Dr. Mahathir, means emulating 
the rapidly developing countries of the East, namely, 
Japan and Korea, in the effort to develop Malaysia. 
Matters deserving attention were thought to be diligence 
and discipline in work, loyalty to the nation and to the 
enterprise or business where the worker is employed, 
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priority of groups over individual interests, emphasis on 
productivity and high quality, upgrading efficiency, 
narrowing differentials and gaps between executives and 
workers, management systems which concentrate on long term 
achievement and not solely on increases in dividends or 
staff incomes in the short term, and other factors which 
can contribute to progress for Malaysia (iomo, 
1985: p. 304). He further explained that "Looking East" 
does not mean begging from the East or shifting the 
responsibility for. developing Malaysia to them. Instead 
that responsibility should be that of all Malaysians. 
"Looking East" also does not mean buying all goods from or 
granting all contracts to companies of -the East, unless 
their offer is the best. 
When launching the "Look East" policy, Dr. Mahathir always 
stressed that Malaysia is not breaking its relationship 
with the West by saying: 
"Whatever you used to do before with the West I think you 
should also with the East ....... Look East means we should 
resort to other sources than the West and this doesn't 
mean that we are going to give up the West entirely. What 
is good in the West, we still follow but here is a source 
of ethical valuesp systems and everything else which are 
useful to us. So why shouldn't we make a deliberate effort 
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to acquire this from the East? "(New Straits Times, July 
16,1982) 
There are some major factors that are detrimental to the 
adoption of "Look East" policy. ýFirstly, Malaysia realises 
that she no longer, enjoys the economic prosperity that she 
once had. She' finds that with the global recession 
widespread, the prices of primary commodities like tin, 
rubber and palm oil, of which she is the main world 
supplier, have -not been too favourable., She 
has to 
transform herself from an, agro-based. to an industrial 
nation if the country is to be competitive with others in 
the region. - Malaysia has to search for a new strategy and 
look for a model to base herself upon. Malaysia is trying 
to be not too dependent on 'her natural resources which 
have been adversely affected by world's fluctuating 
market. What she needs is a- new approach, - that is, to 
diversify into into manufacturing industries. A new model 
is necessary. 
Secondly, Malaysia which has always carried out policies 
based on Western model, principally the British management 
style, ý finds that the Western model is no longer adequate 
for her development purposes. Western countries are having 
many economical and socio-political problems themselves. 
The "Look East" policy can be interpreted as a response 
emanating from the disillusionment with the western model 
-39- 
of development. Britain, for example, whose post-economic 
exploitation of the colonies and overall superiority in 
maritime power, provided her, with all the grandeur of a 
superpower, seems to be in decline. The once proud lion is 
now ageing, so they say. Because Great Britain herself is 
no longer that 'great', Malaysia needs to turn to- other 
countries for a model of development. It also has become 
clear that there is not much point in looking to the West 
since the values, cultures and religions of the East and 
the West differ, greatly. So Japan, being a new successful 
economic power with Oriental values, is an ideal country 
to learn from. It is argued that similarities in culture 
and value systems will help to resolve'the; conflicts which 
always occurred when Malaysia -was in the process of 
learning from the West in the earlier period. Japan is 
considered by Dr. Mahathir as a model nation. He said in 
one of his interview sessions regarding the "Look East" 
policy: 
"We see the Japanese have made headway while, the 
West ... appears to be regressing. So in order for Malaysia 
to progress, we have to learn from the better example, the 
Japanese example" (Das, 1982: p. 39) 
Incidently, Malaysia Is relationship with Britain - at this 
time was at its lowest ebb. Malaysia was also very 
unhappy, for a number of reasons, with Britain. The first 
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event was the raising of tuition fees of foreign students 
by the British government. At -that time, the Malaysians 
comprised the largest number of foreign students -in 
England with 13,000 - students. Being a member of the 
Commonwealth 
. 
countries, Malaysia expected some 
preferential treatment. It was felt that if tuition fees 
were to be increased, it should be done over the years so 
as not to' inconvenience the 'government of Malaysia, the 
main sponsor of the students studying overseas, and also 
the parents of those students affected. The second episode 
that led to deteriorating relationship 'concerned a 
deadlock in -air flight negotiation between ýMalaysia and 
Britain. Britain refused to give additional landing rights 
in Britain. What actually happened was that Britain had 
suggested that Malaysia purchase 4 surplus Boeing 747s 
from, Britain in order that a favourable attitude towards 
Malaysia's request be considered. When Malaysian Airlines 
System (MAS) did buy-four aircrafts,, but found that 
landing, rights were still not, approved by Britain, 
Malaysia was naturally disappointed. The last straw was 
over what is better known as the "dawn raid". As part of 
the Malaysianisation process 1ý under the NEP and the 
restructuring , of the economy, the Malaysian government 
bought out the stocks of an English company, Guthrie, 
which engaged in a variety of enterprises in Malaysia. It 
was said that Malaysia was able to do this in just four 
hours. In response to , this,, the English Stock Exchange 
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took a' similar "dawn attack" by revising regulations on 
the exchange. The regulations were revised so that a-seven 
days grace period must 'be given if stocks over a certain 
standard were purchased. Malaysia was infuriated by such 
action because it was seen clearly as an attempt to block 
the Malaysian government's aspiration towards its nation 
building process. The Prime Minister immediately launched 
a "Buy British ý Goods -Last" directive. Any contract that 
was to be awarded to a British company in Malaysia had to 
get the approval of the Prime Minister's Department. All 
the events above culminated into an open conflict causing 
Malaysia to drift further away from her one time colonial 
master. I 
The third underlying cause for the sudden "Look, East" 
policy is prompted by Malaysia's desire to be economically 
and technologically successful like the Eastern countries 
of Japan and Korea, As regards Japan, Dr. Mahathir is very 
impressed with her ability to come out from the debris of 
the atomic bomb which shattered the whole economic 
machinery, to become the world superpower. She has no 
natural resources -like Malaysia; and the land is mostly 
hilly-and so uncultivatable; but yet she has been 
successful. The success seems-to lie, for the most part, 
in its highly disciplined, and hardworking people. This is 
what Malaysia wants to be. By emulating Japanese work 
ethics, Dr. Mahathir wants the Malaysians- to be a hard 
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working society like Japan. If Malaysia is to be 
successful economically and technologically, then Japan is 
the ideal country to model herself upon. 
The last major factor which has been said to be the 
ultimate, impetus for the "Look East" policy has to do 
with the personality of the present Prime Minister, Dr. 
Mahathir. He personally believes that the ills confronting 
Malaysian society, particularly of the Malays, can be 
solved by emulating the Japanese. He is of the opinion 
that the characteristics of the Japanese workers, such as 
dedication, discipline and strong work ethics are good for 
Malaysians to emulate. 'The -"Look East" policy is also the 
result of his anti-Westernism ori- more correctly, his 
disillusion with the Western model of development 
(Saravanamuttu, 1984: p. 456). Unlike his three 
predecessors, he never had any tertiary- education in the 
West, and this background is said to have accounted for 
his lacklustre attitude towards the Western model. At this 
time also Japanese economic success ý was at its height. 
Many business executives and managers flocked to Tokyo to 
find out the secret -of Japanese "economic miracle". 
Japanese management seemed to be the in-thing then. Dr. 
Mahathir, being newly installed ý to the Premiership, 
naturally found this a golden opportunity to try a new 
model, to replace the obviously ineffective Western model 
for the industrial development of his nation. In term of 
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transferability issue, the Malaysian management system is 
unusual in that it has already adopted and adapted another 
culturally determined model from the UK. Therefore, it has 
to consciously discard that model or key elements of it in 
order to proceed. Far from being a constraint however, the 
fact that Malaysia has already adopted the model makes it 
more experienced and more open to the transfer of the 
strengths of another non-Malaysian model. 
Dr. Mahathir is also said to have been disillusioned by 
Western leaders who are not so sympathetic to developing 
countries like Malaysia. -This was made evident when he 
began his premier's term by his snubbing, of the 
Commonwealth Conference in Melbourne, followed by his 
famous, call of "Buy British Goods Last". 
The "Look East" policy is being pursued at two levels, 
namely; 
f 
(i) the level' of external 'economic policy, whereby 
Japanese-cum-Korean, governmental and private sector aid, 
technical assistance and training are being sought and 
contracted for in Malaysia. As an extension of this, 
students are also to be sent to both Japan and South Korea 
for vocational and tertiary education as a deliberate 
policy, and 
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(ii) the level of domestic policy wherein the Malaysian 
government itself seeks to-inculcate the 'Eastern' work 
ethic through various propaganda devices and through 
concrete promotion and implementation of policy in the 
private and public sector- (Lean and Lim,. 1984: p. 457). 
In the spirit of the "Look East'! policy, many government 
officials such as engineers, technicians and heads of 
departments are being sent to Japan for training for a 
period -of one month to three years. Malaysian students 
have 'also started flocking -to Japanese universities in 
significant numbers for the first time. By 1983, there was 
a total of 1719 Malaysians sent for training to Japan. 
2.8. Malaysia-Japan'Relationship 
2.8.1. The Past and Present Relationship 
Historically, - Japan hasý never had a good image among the 
Malaysians. This is the result of the brief but bitter 
military rule in Malaysia (at that time called Malaya, 
Sarawak and North Borneo) by the Japanese from 1942-1945. 
The notorious behaviour, of the Japanese soldiers during 
their three and half years occupation were full of 
atrocities. The people were mercilessly manipulated -and 
maltreated, for the Japanese were very brutal in dealing 
with those who disobeyed them. The Japanese made 
themselves so hated that for a decade after the war it was 
deemed unsafe for individual Japanese to visit Malaya 
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(Gullick, 1968). Even to this day, the older generation of 
the Malaysians who ex1perienced the brief occupation are 
said to be not enthusiastic at all about the Japanese. On 
account of Japanese aggression during the Second World 
War, the Malaysians sustained not only physical damages, 
but also "moral trauma". Animosity towards Japan amongst 
the older generation in Malaysia is still strong. 
As for the Japanese, they did not try to establish a 
relationship with Malaysia immediately after Independence. 
The Japanese low profile and slow contact in Malaysia 
prior to 1970 was understandable. She was busy 
reconstructing her war-torn economy. On the other hand, 
Malaysia, like other Southeast Asia countries, still had 
memories of the harsh brutality of what the Japanese did 
to them before. Furthermore, there were unresolved 
problems regarding negotiation of the reparation 
repayment by Japan to Southeast Asian countries, including 
Malaysia. 
Such a poor image of Japan, and the cold relationship 
between the two countries took a U-turn in the early 
1970s. This was a period where the Japanese again invaded 
Malaysia in great numbers, but this time as civilians. 
They came as investors, signing contracts for mineral and 
timber concessions, foreign investmentso joint-ventures in 
car assembly and electronics etc. As a result, their 
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products also began to flood the Malaysian markets and 
more and more British and American products were pushed 
aside from the shelves of the popular stores, 
The Japanese are coming again. This marks a new era 
whereby they are heartily welcome. Today, there is always 
a Japanese community in Malaysian major cities comprising 
mainly of business executives who are stationed at their 
company's subsidiaries based in Malaysia. There are more 
than 300 Japanese firms in the country. There are a number 
of Japanese restaurants in major cities (14 in Kuala 
Lumpur alone) catering for their needs. The government of 
Malaysia is even said to''have employed one ver Iy renowned 
Japanese consultant, by the name of Kenichi Ohmae, with 
whom the Prime Minister is - said to occasionally consult, 
especially in matters relating to the "Look East" policy. 
Between 1980-1986, an average of 115,000 Japanese visited 
Malaysia annually (MAJECA-JAMECA Joint Conference, 
1988: p. 1). In 1985 Japan represented the largest tourist 
generating market outside the Asean region with 117,250 
arrivals. This constituted 4% of the total arrivals. 
Malaysia earned M$129,771,000 from Japanese tourists that 
year. There has never been a period which witnessed a very 
close relationship between Japan and Malaysia as that of 
today. 
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2.8.2. Japan-Malaysia Trade Relationship 
Presently, Japan is the No. 1 trade partner of Malaysia. 
In 1987, exports from Malaysia to Japan totalled M$8.8 
billion (MAJECA-JAMECA Joint Conference, 1988: p. 8-15). 
This represented 20% of all exports from Malaysia and was 
the largest share for any trading partner. Imports to 
Malaysia from Japan constituted of M$6.9 billion for the 
same year. This amounted to 22% of the total Malaysian 
import from all countries. It was also the largest amount 
for any trading partner. 
Japan is considered a particularly important trading 
partner for Malaysia because in terms of revenue and 
expenditure, Malaysia has shown a substantial increase in 
exports since 1985. They amounted to M$2.3 billion in both 
1985 and 1986 and M$1.9 billion in 1987. The Japan- 
Malaysia trade showed that it had been in Malaysia's 
favour. The details of the statistics concerning the 
trading volumes and export and import of Malaysia is 
produced in Table 2B and Table 2C. 
Table 2B: Exports and Imports of 
Malaysia to and From Japan 
T 1983.1984 1985 1986 1987 
Malaysian exports 
to Japan 6,429.2 8,632.9 9,272.0 8,116.7 8,827.5 
Malaysian imports 
from Japan 7,768.4 8,646.1 7,006.0 5,736.2 6,925.5 
Trade balance -1.339.2 -13.2 2,266.0 2,380.5 1,902.0 
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Table 2C: Exports andImports of . 
Malaysia to and,, From Selected Countries 
(unit: - in million Malaysia Ringgit M$) 
Trading partners 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
4J Total'value 32,771.2 38,646.9 38,016.7 35,720.9 45,175.7 
0 Japan -value 6tý29.2 8,632.9- 9,272.0 8,116.7 _8,827.5 
x 19.6 22.3 24.4 22.7 19.5 
Po USA 13.3 13.6 12.9 16.6 16.6 
EEC 14.6 12.6 14.1 14.6 14.3 
ASEAN nations 28.5 26.7 25.8 22.1 24.2 
Cd (inclusive of ý4 
. %v 
Singapore) (19-5) (20.4) (19.4) (17.0) (18.2) 
0 Total value 30,795.2 32,925.9 30,437.8 27,921.3 31,982.6 
0 Japan - value 7,768.4 8,646.1 7,006.0 5,736.2 6; 925., 5 In. M % 25.2 26.3 23.0 20.5 21. -6 
-HO-. 44 USA 16.2 16.3 15.2 . 18.8 18.6 0 0-4 EEC 14.0 13.4 14.2 14.6 13.4 
ASEAN nations 18.7 19.4 22.4 21.5 20.8 
(inclusive of 
Cd Singapore) (13.9) (13.0) (15.9) (15.0) (14.7) 
Trade balance 1,976.0 5,721.0 7,578.9 7.799.6 13,193.1 
(Source: Statistics Bureau, Malaysian Prime Minister's Office) 
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Out of M$8.8 billion -of-Malaysia's total exports to Japan 
in' 1987, the value of various manufactured products was 
M$1.3 billion which showed a 13% increase from the 
previous year., The export from 'Malaysia to Japan consists 
mainly of primary commodities such as petroleum, gas, palm 
oil, wood, timber, rubber and tin. Recently, there has 
been an 'increase in export of electrical-and electronic 
components, and other manufactured products. In fact in 
1986, there was a record of M$1,149 worth of manufactured 
products exported Malaysia to"Japan. 
The major items of Malaysia Is import from Japan, consist 
of intermediate products and components such as light 
industry products, chemicals, textiles, heavy industrial 
products, iron and steel and machinery and equipment. 
According the Chairman of the Committee on Trade and 
Investment- at the MAJECA-JAMECA's llth Annual Conference 
held at' Kuala Lumpur in 1988, the growth rate in 
Malaysia's total trade with Japan in 1987 was 13.7%. 
Certain export items increased in much greater quantities 
in 1987 -ý than the previous year, although the, overall 
exports did not increase significantly. Malaysian imports 
from Japan increase slightly especially those of 
intermediate products and materials components. 
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A research study by the Master Builders Association 
Malaysia on the Japanese participation and competition in 
the construction industry in 1983-84 showed that estimated 
total amount of contracts awarded to Japanese contractors 
and joint ventures from January, 1980-to December 1984 
exceeded M$3.8 billion; Malaysia was the second biggest 
client of Japanese contractors in 1983 after Singapore, 
according to the Japanese Construction Ministry. 
2.8.3. Japan's Investment in Malaysia 
The latest statistics from MIDA (1989) regarding foreign 
investment in Malaysia states that in the first six months 
of 1989, Japan led the foreign investors with M$1-2 
billion. 
Baed on available data, it is found that the Japanese 
investments in companies of manufacturing production in 
Malaysia as at December 1986, totalled M$1.8 billion. 
Hence, Japan ranked as the leading -foreign investor 
followed by Singapore and the United Kingdom. Based on 
equity in approved projects by MIDA in 1987, Japan also 
topped the list with M$230.9 million representing 31% of 
the overall total. It is also expected that, Japan would 
continue to be the leading investor in Malaysia based on 
the first five months of 1988 investment figure. (MAJECA- 
JAMECA Conference, 1988). It is also observed that so far 
the inflow -of Japanese investment is most conspicuous 
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amongst the Japanese multi-nationals like Matsushita, 
Sharp Corporationg Mitsubishi, NEC and Ajinomoto. 
According to Mr. Kazumasa Suzukij the president of JACTIM, 
the Japanese investment in Malaysia among other things, 
has been due to the following: 
a. Malaysia is politically stable compared with other 
Asian countries in the region; 
b. Abundant labour forces with reasonable wage 
c. Infrastructure, especially in Industrial' areas is very 
good; 
d. Abundant natural resources. 
As mentioned earlier, the Japanese ý, did not make 
significant inroads in Malaysia until after 1970, there 
being only 37 joint ventures in 1964 and 46 by 1969. One 
reason for this was due to the unresolved reparation issue 
which was settled only in 1967 with donation of two ships 
to the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation. 
Thereafter, Japanese Joint ventures appeared to have 
picked up to the extent of more than 100 out of 189 joint 
ventures in the country in 1978 (Saravanamuttu, 
1984: p. 465). The great numbers in joint ventures has been 
due to the government policy which attempt to 
industrialise the country. By having joint-ventures with 
the Japanese, Malaysia hopes to learn the advance 
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technology from their Japanese counterparts in line with 
the country's industrialisation effort. 
According to the sources compiled 'bý Japanese External 
Trade organisation (JETRO) in 1978, there was a total of 
368 Japanese firms in Malaysia, of which 191 or 51.9% of 
them are located in Selangor; 47 each in Penang and Sabah 
while the rest were scattered all over. the states in 
Malaysia. 
According to the latest statistics compiled by the author 
based on sources from JETRO as of December 1988, there are 
440 Japanese companies (including joint-venture companies 
with Malaysian government) in Malaysia. About 170 are 
engaged in manufacturing and found in Petaling Jaya and 
Klang valley regions of Selangor, while the rest are 
scattered in other major cities like Penang, Johore Bahru 
and Kuching. The total sales of Japanese enterprises in 
1986 was M$3,770 million which is an equivalent of the 
total sales of manufacturers in Malaysia for that year. 
The number of employees employed in Japanese companies was 
around 40,000, of which 99% of them are Malaysians. 
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Exhibit 2.5: Location of Japanese Companies in, Malaysia, 
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There is a number of reasons that can explain the immense 
presence of Japanese firms in Malaysia in the 1970s. At 
this period,, - Malaysia was vigorously carrying out- her 
development policies as under the New -Economic Policy. It 
was the era where numerous public enterprises were formed 
and the government being hard-pressed for capital and 
expertise to run these enterprises welcomed foreign 
investors as partners. The Japanese responded well to such 
invitation and in fact out of the - 189 joint ventures set 
up in 1978,100 of them are the joint ventures between 
Malaysia and Japan. 
Malaysia succeeded in attracting the Japanese to invest, in 
the country because of her overly liberal ý and attractive 
terms she which offers under the-1968 and 1980 (Amendment) 
Investment Incentive Act. Malaysia's specific fiscal and 
other incentives, designed to provide tax relief to new 
enterprises or expanding ones, are: pioneer status that 
exempts companies from, 40% company tax, and 5% development 
tax; labour utilisation relief; ý special incentives for 
export-oriented industries and locational incentives with 
'tax holidays' of 5-10 years (Saravanamuttu, 1984: p. 465). 
There is also a provision of appropriate tariff protection 
and duty exemptions on raw materials and machineries 
required by manufacturing industries. Malaysia is also 
noted for her generosity by, providing 50 industrial 
estates and 7 Free Trade Zones totalling 9,649.2 hectares 
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in various parts of the, country. - Another ,I pull 'f actor is 
the fact that Malaysia imposes no restrictions whatsoever 
on the reparation of profits by foreign investors. Japan 
gladly took advantage of such excellent incentives and 
conducive investment climate found in Malaysia. 
Malaysia is a natural choice for Japanese economic 
invasion because of the rich natural resources that she 
has. ' She is the world's leading producer of tin, rubber', 
palm oil, timber and also pepper. In, 1981, for instance, 
Japan consumed, 30% of Malaysian mineral products (oil) and 
49% of Malaysian 'wood and paper. With a closer trade ties 
with Malaysia, 'not only would Japan be assured of-the raw 
materials her industries badly need, but she would also be 
able to export her finished products ý to the promising 
Malaysian market. 
Since, the racial riot of 1969, Malaysia's priority has 
been national unity. Various efforts under the NEP had 
been' made'' to achieve this aim thereby creating 'a 
political stability in the country. Among the Southeast 
Asia countries, Malaysia is the most politically stable 
country after Singapore and this is the main reason why 
the Japanese find it very safe to invest in the country. 
This helps explain 'why foreign investment especially from 
Japan increased significantly during the, 1970s., 
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2.8.4. Cooperation Between Japan and Malaysia Since the 
"Look East" Policy. 
2.8.4.1. Trade and Export Promotions. 
The most important cooperation between Japan and Malaysia 
is found -in the area of trade and export promotions-. 
Malaysia' efforts consists of (Kaneko, 1988: p. 3): 
a. Assistance is being given, to exporters, with the 
Malaysian Expo (MEXPO) playing a central role. For 
example, some 9,000 exporters visited ., MEXPO, indicating 
their strong interests in the program;, 
b. Malaysia has been sending its trade missions to Japan. 
In 1987, Japan received the delegations from Malaysia's 
textile, and furniture industries; 
c. The stabilisation of the export loan system through 
Export Credit Refinance (ECR). The ECR's financing program 
has now achieved widespread prevalence among Malaysian 
entrepreneurs wishing to-export their products to Japan . 
On the Japanese side, the following efforts have been 
undertaken (Masuoka, 1988: p. 2): 
a. The preferential tariff system was revised to increase 
the limit of preferential tariff treatment in 1988; 
b. Investment promotion by the AJDC; 
c. Dispatch of experts for technical guidance and-business 
management training and; 
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d. Various services ýincluding information,, *consulting, 
business referral, and receiving trade missions, are 
provided by the JETROASEAN centre. 
2A. 4.2. Provision of Technical Expertises to Public 
Enterprises Sector. 
Responding to call by the Malaysian government to help in 
ensuring the success of the "Look 'East" policy, Japan has 
dispatched some technical' experts to various government 
agencies. For example, the Japanese personnel from the 
Japan Electric Components Testing Institute (JET) have 
worked closely with the SIRIM on technical cooperation 
regarding inspection and testing of, electric' household 
machinery and equipment. 4' - 
JICA has been sending its experts on oleochemical to 
another- public enterprise in Malaysia, 'the -Palm Oil 
Research Institute of Malaysia (PORIM) on a long-term 
basis. These experts are now assisting the institute 
personnel in their studies' of various ý techniques such as 
for separation of useful ingredients from palm oil, 
synthesis and analysis, and extraction and concentration 
of vitamin E. 
JICA' is also providing ' technical assistance' to another 
government' enterprises, the' Forestry Research Institute of 
Malaysia (FRIM) in a research project concerning 
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techniques for processing lumber, into composite products 
and wood based panel products, and for drying and 
preservation of lumber. There is a three-year JETRO-ASEAN 
Corporation joint project in progress to improve rattan 
and rubber tree household furnishings. 
JICA is at present, furnishing technical assistance to the 
Department of Oceanography and Fisheries, and Agriculture 
University in a project design to train researchers in the 
fields of fisheries and oceanography. 
Financial and technical assistance are also given by the 
Japanese to Veterinary Research Institute (VRI) to help 
the centre build the necessary facilities for researches 
into poultry diseases. 
Since the inception of "Look East policy, Japan has 
accepted 15,000 Malaysian trainees since the first group 
arrived in 1982. Beginning 1988, Japan will start 
receiving 206 trainees each year. This forms of training 
will extent until 1992. There are an annual intake of 130 
students to the Japanese technical colleges or four-year 
universities. 
To summarise this chapter, it can be said that Malaysia 
has been undergoing a lot of changes in reaching the state 
of what she is today. From being a backward, agricultural 
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colony of the British empire, she has transformed herself 
into a politically stable and newly industrialised nation. 
In pursuit of her industrialisation programme, she 
launched the "Look East" policy, making her becoming more 
closer to Japan than to- countries in the West. How far 
this new pattern of relationship will continue to last, 
and whether it will bring about the desired outcome 
Malaysia hopes to achieve, remains to be seen in the 
future. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MALAYSIAN MANAGEMENT PRACTICES , 
3.1. Objective of the Chapter 
This chapter highlights the evolution of management 
development in Malaysia. This includes a brief discussion 
on the major management practices found in Malaysian 
organisations, the major management training institutions 
and their roles towards the development, of Malaysian 
managers and also the examination of factors that 
influence the management patterns in the country. It is 
hoped that by providing the reader with this background, 
he or she will be to some extent, acquainted with the 
origin of the present management practices commonly 
adopted in Malaysian organisations which can help him to 
follow subsequent discussion regarding the transferability 
of Japanese-style management to Malaysian public 
enterprises. 
3.2. Introduction I 
The concept of management science - is relatively new in 
Malaysia and literature on management in the country is 
therefore not well-developed. This is not surprising since 
Malaysia is a newly independent, nation which only, achieved 
full independence from colonial rule in 1957 for 
Peninsular Malaysia (formerly Malaya) and in 1963 for East 
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Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). Presently, there is no one 
distinct management system- found in Malaysia. Rather, the 
management practices found in Malaysia have been the end 
results of a combination of many management systems 
imported mainly from advanced countries. These practices 
have been preferred by the'top executives who manage the 
organisations' at a particular point of time to be 
continued, or replaced, or partly discarded or modified by 
those who succeed them. The existing trend seems to 
indicate that management styles which are practical or 
acceptable to the local environment are adopted. They are 
replaced when and where they are no longer useful and 
relevant. Most new management styles or-practices that are 
incorporated into the existing ones would be modified 
so as to suit the Malaysian situation. Generally 
speaking, the most common management features practised in 
i4alaysia consist of elements which- come from the United 
Kingdom - (UK), the United States (us) and Japan 
respectively. Most recently as a result of a surge in 
Islamic revival, some islamic-oriented management 
practices (said to have ; been brought by the Malaysians 
who, studied in Middle East institutions, i. e. Cairo 
University) have'been introduced. 
3.3. An Overviev of the Malaysian Managerial Development 
The early days of management practices were naturally 
based on the British-style management since the - early 
-62- 
managers in Malaysia consisted of the British people who 
were then the ruling group in 'the country. The British 
administrators ran the government machinery while the 
British managers ran the rubber estates and big tin mines. 
The administrative and management system were therefore 
those of the British system. -When the British left after 
the country's independence from Britain, the British 
managerial ' traditions were left behind and they , were 
continued by the new Malaysian managers who had been under 
the guidance and apprenticeship - of their British masters. 
Today, the continuity of the British management, system in 
Malaysia is 
I 
being reinforced , by the 
fact that some 
multinational firms in Malaysia are still headed by the 
British expatriates. 
Other ý forms of management system are also present in 
Malaysia, particularly among, big international companies. 
American-style management for example, had made'inroads in 
Malaysia as early as' the 1970s. This has been for two 
reasons. Firstly, there 'were a number of American-owned 
companies established in Malaysia during the 1970s and 
with them came the American executives, who were 
stationed in Malaysia 'to run these ýcompanies. The 
American managers brought along withý them American 
management culture. For instance, when -an American 
company, IBM began its operation in Malaysia, the firm 
practised the American-style management ýas the majority 
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of its top managerial staff were then Americans. When 
these American executives returned to their home office 
to make way for the locals with the "Malays ianisa tion" of 
the management staff at the subsidiary office in Malaysia, 
the Malaysian managers who took over also continued their 
predecessors' styles of management. This is largely 
because they were still under the control of their 
superiors in the main office in United States., Secondly, 
around the mid-1970s, more and more Malaysians started to 
go to the US for tertiary education ranging from business 
administration to computer science. When they came back to 
work in their country, they brought with them elements of 
American management system. 
Towards the beginning" of the 1980s, another management 
development began to make its presence felt in Malaysia. 
This was Japanese-style management. The Japanese-style 
management was then- the in-thing among managers all over 
the world as the result, of the phenomenal Japanese 
economic 'success. The craze for Japanese-style management 
also spread rapidly in Malaysia. The entry of the Japanese 
Management Model had been brought to Malaysia in two ways. 
The first method was- through the Japanese firms operating 
in Malaysia. The Japanese ý firml Matsushita for example 
introduced Japanese-style management. The second and most 
powerful method was , through the "Look East" policy 
introduced by; the government of Malaysia which instructs 
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all Malaysians to. adopt some relevant Japanese-style 
techniques in their workplaces. 
A few -years after the "Look East" policy was introduced, 
i. e in 1985, another development took place. This time, 
the government initiated the Islamic-oriented management 
practices among the Malaysians whereby it suggested the 
incorporation of Islamic values at work. This new policy 
is in line with the fact that Islam is the *official 
religion in the country. - The policy is 'also the 
consequence of a sudden strong revival of Islamic movement 
in the country that strongly calls for more Islamic 
approaches to doing things. What - this means is- that in 
running their organisations, the Malaysian managers are 
asked to -manage in accordance with the Islamic way of 
teachings such as being honest, uncorrupted, etc. The 
subsequent impact resulting, from such developmentý on 
managers and ordinary workers of Malaysian organisations 
is showing today. For example, one will observe that a 
number of young executives have discarded the fashionable 
tie and bush jacket attire (of the British tradition) 
during special official functions but instead dress ' in 
the ordinary batik shirt or baju melayu (Malay dress, 
which is also the Malaysian national attire) with kupiah 
(white hat) or songkok (black hat). It seems quite 
fashionable among the men to put on a kupiah and women ýa 
tudong (veil) or head scarf. 
-65- 
The call for the incorporation of more Islamic values in 
the running of Malaysian organisations -is said to have 
been brought about partly 'by' the failure of the Western 
management system to solve the present management problems 
in Malaysia. The incompatibility of the western modes of 
behaviours , and ways of thinking which were - believed to 
have caused breakdowns in traditional values , had become 
increasingly prominent. At the same time, it was also 
discovered that some aspects of the newly introduced 
Japanese-style management were found unsuitable for 
Malaysians and proponents of Islamic fundamentalism are 
quick to point out that management with the emphasis on 
Islamic values are what Malaysian, organisations need. 
3.4. Management-Training Centres 
The development of management 'science in Malaysia began 
seriously two decades ago, initiated by the Government 
through the National Institute of Public Administration 
(INTAN) and and other government agencies like Majlis 
Amanah Rakyat (MARA), The - National -Institute, of 
Educational Educational Management (NIEM), The National 
Productivity Centres (NPC) and later joined by private 
sector organisations such as the Malaysian Institute of 
Management (MIM) as there was a realisation then of a 
pressing need to , develop a pool of trained and 
professional managers to meet the country's growing needs 
that had been brought about as a result of the country's 
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development after achieving her independence from Great 
Britain. ýLocal universities and Institutes of higher 
learning like the Institute Technology of MARA (ITM) also 
help in the development of training managerial needs by 
offering management sciences disciplines in the form of 
business,, accountancy, economic and public administration 
of undergraduate and post-graduate/post-experience courses 
to Ph. D level (Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986: p. 561). 
3.4.1. The National Institute of Public Administration 
(INTAN) 
INTAN was created in 1972 with the main objective of 
developing managerial talents that were badly needed then 
to meet the rapidly growing needs of theýnew nation which 
had just achieved - its independence. The government, 
through, INTAN, aimed at increasing the effectiveness of 
the public administrative system in developing and 
implementing national policies and programmes as embodied 
in the nation's Five Year Plan. Towards this end, INTAN's 
focal point is the training, development and application 
of new concepts and approaches to management. The other 
objectives of INTAN are as follows : 
(a). to increase the capacity for action of the 
administrative system in terms of its ability to develop 
and implement national policies and programmes; 
(b). to enhance the knowledge, skill and understanding of 
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civil servants relating to the processes in management of 
public policies and programmes; 
(C). to promote a' deeper understanding of the 
interrelationship between the government and the 
political, economic and social environment and of the 
implications of governmental action on the nation's socio- 
political systems and; 
(d). to develop progressive approaches and attitudes among 
the civil servants in performing their leadership role as 
the primary agents of change ' in Malaysia's multi-racial 
society (Berita Intan, 1985: p. 1-6). 
At present, INTAN conducts both short and long-term 
courses mainly for civil servants ranging from a day to 
six months. The types of courses conducted at INTAN can be 
conveniently classified according to the schools namely: 
(1) Development Administration, (2) Land, Management, (3) 
Local Government and Urban Development, (4) Community and 
Rural Development, (5) Management* Science, (6) Financial 
Management,, (7) Personnel Management, (8) General 
Management and (9) Supervisory and Office Management. In 
addition, INTAN has a Diploma in Public Administration 
program for civil servants, after which they are eligible 
to, pursue M. B. A. or M. P. A. degrees straight away in some 
universities overseas that have some special arrangement 
with INTAN. 
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Although INTAN is mainly concerned with the managerial 
development of public sector's manpower, its contribution 
to the development of Management Science in Malaysia is 
significant. This is reflected in the numbers of people it 
has trained. For instance, during the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
period of 1981-1985, INTAN trained a total of 79,100 
personnel from the public sector (Fifth Malaysia Plan, 
1986: p. 555). Training of administrative and managerial 
personnel in the, public sector will continue to be 
reviewed and organised with a. view to increasing 
efficiency and productivity. INTAN has been expanding its 
training programmes and for the Fifth Malaysia Plan 
period, it aims to provide training for 20,000 personnel. 
3.4.2. The Maj1is Amanah Rakyat (MARA) 
MARA has, one division that concentrates on the education 
and training of the ethnic groups who are considered more 
educationally backward than other races in Malaysia (MARA 
Annual Report 1976). The mainý objectives of MARA's 
Training and Education Division are (1) to increase 
skilled , manpower in professional and sub-professional 
fields; (2) to develop a group of Bumiputra managers and 
(3) to, develop Bumiputra entrepreneurs. In the - 1981-85 
period, the educational and training program budget of 
MARA was M$679.09 million while the for the 1986-1990, the 
budget allocated is M$690million(Fifth Malaysia Plan, 
1986: p. 564). 
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MARA established the Institute Technology of MARA (ITM) in 
1967 whereby professional 'and sub-professional courses 
such as business, accountancy, engineering, architecture 
etc. were offered. To date, this institution offers 113 
professional and sub-professional courses that prepare the 
young Malaysians for work in managerial and junior 
executives positions. In ITM, there is also a special 
managerial training programme -conducted -for Bumiputra 
entrepreneurs called Entrepreneur Development Programme 
and up to time of this study, 700 Bumiputra entrepreneurs 
and personnel from the public and private sectors have 
been trained. 
In 1986 MARA created the MARA Education Foundation' (YPM) 
whereby a MARA Yayasan College was established -in Pahang 
to train Bumiputra students in various professional 
fields. This college conducts an American Associate degree 
program in which students are sent to American 
universities to complete their respective degree courses 
after undergoing the first two years of studies at MARA 
Yayasan College. 
According to the record available from the Trainning 
Division of MARA, it can 'be said- that contributed 
tremendously to the Bumiputra Is manpower training in the 
country by providing, scholarships and student loans to 
pursue tertiary studies both locally and overseas. More 
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than 219000 students have been given, this type of 
educational opportunity by MARA. Presently about 8,000ýare 
still receiving their scholarship and loan, of which 6,000 
are in various institutions overseas and the remaining 
2,000 are with the local institutions (MARA Student 
Scholarship and Loan, Report, 1988: p. 5) 
3.4.3. The National Institute of Educational 'Management 
(NIEM) 
The objective of NIEM is to train key personnel, in 
education service in management. These key personnel 
include headmasters, senior assistants of schools, 
officers in the States and District Education Departments 
as well as principals, heads of departments, and lecturers 
in teacher training colleges and polytechnics, and 
officers in the Malaysian Students - Departments overseas. 
During the fourth Malaysia Plan period, a total of 10,500 
education staff was trained at NIEM (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 
1981: p. 452). -The managerial training offered, at NIEM has 
indeed helped to - contribute in a small way towards the 
improvement of management efficiency among the academic 
community in the country 
3.4.4. The National Productivity Centre (NPC) 
NPC was established in 1962 as a joint project by the 
United Nations Special Fund-and the Federal Government 
with the International Labour Organisation as the 
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executive agency. In the NPC Annual Report for 1986, it 
has a reporte& staff strength of 298 personnel and has a 
budget of M$14,209,200 for the year to run its activities. 
The three main objectives of the organisation are (a). to 
be a productivity centre and becomes a leader, promoter 
and disseminator of productivity; (b). to establish itself 
as a centre for human resource development ad its image as 
a premier supervisory, management and entrepreneurship 
training institution in the country; and (c). to fulfil 
its rightful role as a generator of local experts and 
expertise in the fields of productivity, management and 
entrepreneurship (Pusat Daya Pengeluaran Negaral 
1986: p. 1). 
Specificallyq among the functions that are entrusted 'to 
the NPC are'as follows: 
(a). -, raising the standard of management, including 
supervision at all levels in commerce and and industry; 
(b). improving the efficiency of industrial operations, 
sales and marketing, with, particular reference to methods 
of increasing productivity, improving quality output, of 
lowering costs and giving training and advice on labour- 
management relations; 
(c). serving as a forum for discussing organisational, 
managerial and supervisory problems in commerce and 
-72- 
industry; 
(d). undertaking and performing consultancy services and 
(e) . initiating training and other programmes that would 
best serve specific and local requirements of the country 
as a whole. 
In line with its objectives, NPC today conducts - short 
courses ranging from one day to three months in various 
management disciplines such as Work Ethics, Productivity, 
Motivation, Interpersonal Communication, Human Relations 
etc. As of 1986, it has conducted training for about 
14,700 personnel in managerial courses and 18,100 in 
entrepreneurial development courses. 
3.4.5. The Malaysian Institute of Management (MIM) 
MIM was founded in 1966 by a group of senior managers from 
both the public and private sectors to provide managerial 
training and development in Malaysia. 'It is the national 
professional management ý organisation representing - the 
voice of management 'in Malaysia. It aims to develop 
managers and to enhance the status of management in 
Malaysia (MIM Annual Report, 1986: p. 1). It 'receives no 
government funding and must rely for its revenue on 
membership subscriptions and the income from courses it 
conducts. From a small organisation with a tiny office in 
1972, it has now a big, permanent office building with a 
full-time manager and a highly qualified team of trainers. 
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Today, it conducts a Diploma An, Management course for the 
currently employed middle and junior-level managers and 
technical supervisors as well as the Basic Management 
Programme specially designed for people new to management. 
The organisation also conducts seminars on the latest 
issues in management to meet the needs of the executives 
who wish to keep abreast of the latest developments , in 
their fields, and the less experienced executives who wish 
to familiarise themselves with the fundamentals of a 
particular area of management. I 
The other functions of MIM include the following: 
(a). Managerial development through planned programmes for 
middle and senior manager in private and public sectors; 
(b). In-company training programmes tailored to suit an 
individual company's need and; 
(C). publication of Malaysian Management Review and 
Newsletter to update managers ý on -current developments in 
the field of management. 
3.5. ' Factors That Influence 
Malaysia 
3.5.1. Impact of the British Rul 
Before Independence, Malaysia 
British. As had been said, most 
rubber estates had been run by 
'Management Patterns in 
Le 
was administered by the 
of the large tin mines and 
, British managers. However, 
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a small fraction of family-owned business organisations 
were owned and run by the Chinese. 'The management 
practices and policies then were not surprisingly based on 
the British - management system, Elements of British 
management styles still remain to this day even though 
almost all of the British administrators left the country 
after the formation of Malaysia. An example of such 
practice is the top-down decision making in a typical 
government agency. The British tradition continues to 
dominate the present day managers because those who took 
over from the British have been inculcated into the 
British system in that the majority of them have been 
trained and educated in Britain. For example, of theý-four 
Prime Ministers since Malaysia obtained her 'independences 
three of them were British-trained lawyers. When, they 
returned from their studies in the UK, it was only natural 
for them to favour British-style management during their 
tenure of office. Those under them (senior government 
officials and heads of departments) had to follow suit. , 
The educational system in Malaysia has been strongly 
modelled on the English curricula. Only in the last decade 
or so were attempts vigorously carried out to make the 
educational policies more Malaysian. In line with the 
national unity objective, the English language . -was 
replaced, only recently' by Bahasa Malaysia (National 
Language) as an official language of the, country but -the 
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English language continues to be a second language. It 
must be stressed here that English language still remains 
the widely used medium of communication in business and 
commercial sector in Malaysia. The Bahasa, Malaysia or the 
Malay language must be used in official written 
communication in public enterprises. This means all 
employees regardless of ethnic origins, must be proficient 
in Malay language., Amidst this development, the core of 
educationists in higher institutions of learning, such as 
the University of Malaya - are still comprised of those 
who were trained in the Western institutions, especially 
from Britain. Only in the late '1970s when Britain 
increased their university' -fees did Malaysia start 
sending their students in thousands to United States (US). 
As the US was at one time a British, colony, some may say 
the education system there has some similarities with that 
of Britain. This perpetuates the Anglo-American influence 
on the way of life in Malaysia. Even though the, influences 
of British elements have been substantiallyýeroded among 
the present generation, they are nevertheless-- still 
dominant in the private sector (especially in the 
multinational firms)-J, in which the majority of the top 
management group happens to be Western-educated. 
3.5ý2. The Top Management Group in 'Malaysia and their 
Impact on the Pattern of Management Practices. 
It'has been said that Malaysia does not have any specific 
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management system, although most -of what are presently 
practised reflect- the characteristics of a Western 
Management Model. In most cases, the management, practices 
which are adopted in Malaysia consist of a mixture ý of 
management , systems which are adopted because ý they are 
considered appropriateby the chief executive and managers 
for the organisations. This being the case, it appears 
that the management styles and practices can be'said to be 
influenced by the backgrounds of the chief executives' 
training and earlier education. Thus, if the boss of an 
organisation has had his, early tertiarial training in say, 
Britain, he might be more inclined to practise a British 
management style in his -organisation when he assumes the 
managerial position. If an organisation is under an 
Ameri can- trained chief executive, -there tends to be, many 
American elements in his management style. Likewise, if 
the head of an organisation has been educated at a local 
university, his style of management-,, would be more likely 
be influenced by -local values, which are mainly Islamic 
values if he is a devout Muslim. -Thus, befitting a country 
which is multi-racial ,, the management system in Malaysia 
is very much 'multi-nationall, in nature.. 
It can be generally assumed that immediately After 
Independence, the management style seen in Malaysia was 
strongly British-type. With the establishment of some 
American giant companies in Malaysia in the 1970's, there 
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were some elements of American management in use. This 
American management system became more evident and 
popular in many organisations with the return of some 
young Malaysian graduates from American universities who 
mostly started as the middle-management executives. ' A 
good example was the introduction of the semester system 
and American-based syllabus by ITM, whose faculty members 
have been mostly trained in institutions in the US. 
In the early 1980s, there was a strong enthusiasm for 
Japanese-style , management- as a result of the Japanese 
economic miracle. This is also- the period when the 
government 'introduced the, "Look East"' policy whereby 
students, government ýofficers and also technical people 
were sent in large numbers to, Japan to study the Japanese 
system., 
The year 1985 marked a tide of change again in which the 
Islamic-type of management developed. While still slowly 
replacing the Western , management stylesý that are 
incompatible with Malaysian culture and while still 
experimenting with the, Japanese-style management there is 
yet another development of management which is Islamic- 
oriented; this calls. for the incorporation of Islamic 
values while at work. It is said that this latest 
development has been the result of the Islamic revival 
which had been partly brought about by those Malaysian who 
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had studied as ustaq ( religious teachers) in the Middle 
East. 
It is very interesting to observe the evolution of 
managerial development in Malaysia. If one, can sum up the 
whole scenario, the -management system in Malaysia can be 
likened to a ship in. an open sea drifting from one 
direction, to another in the hope of finding a suitable 
harbour., 
3.5.3. The Impact of Diverse Cultures in Malaysia 
The study of management system in Malaysia will not be 
complete without looking, at the cultural aspects of the 
Malaysian community. In Chapter, 2, At has been shown that 
Malaysia has a diverse ethnic groups with rich cultural 
heritages. 
(i). The Bumiputras' Cultures 
The Bumiputras, especially the Malays have strong 
reverence for elders and traditional leaders. It is 
considered derhaka (sinful) to be rude and impolite to the 
elderly whose old age and wide experience are to be 
respected. Thus, unlike in western-society, old people for 
instance, are never sent to senior citizen centres in the 
Malay or other indigenous society, but instead they would 
to be looked after with greatest love and affection until 
they die. At home, their advice on 'family matters is 
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always sought. At place of work if an elder person makes 
mistakes, he would not be reprimanded the way younger 
people would have been treated. The implication of this 
aspect of Malay culture is that the wisdom ofý the elders 
can sometimes unjustifiably override rational decisions 
and technological assertions. A Bumiputra manager for 
example may be soft and forgiving in dealing with his 
subordinates who are much older-than him while he will be 
professional and firm with the younger subordinates. There 
is always a double standard in his management style, and it 
is quite accepted by everybody in the organisation. 
The Bumiputras are also said to be hospitablep 
accommodating, forgiving, peace-loving and. charitable 
(Maniam, 1986: p. 9). This has led many. ý Western writers, to 
conclude the natives would not make good managers. This 
follows the argument that to, be a manager, one must have 
the qualities to be ruthless rather than hospitable; firm 
rather than accommodating; mean rather than forgiving; 
serious rather than peace-loving; and frugal rather than 
charitable. 
It is also observed the Bumiputras of, Muslim faith 
strongly believe that success does not lie entirely in the 
accumulation of wealth 'in this world, for life in this 
world is transitory. Muslims generally are not very keen 
to acquire material wealth believing that they have 
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another better and permanent world to live. For them this 
world is not very important being transitory as revealed 
in their pantun: (poem) "Dunia ini pinjam-pinjaman, 
Akhirat juga akan sesungguhnya". (This world is temporary, 
the hereafter is the real world). It is the goal of a good 
Muslim to lead a simple life and enjoy an honest living. 
Any form of worldly pursuit is to be avoided as it can 
corrupt the minds and therefore leads one's life astray. 
Such cultural philosophy towards life to a certain degree 
has great impact on Muslim Bumiputra managers. In fact 
this value has been criticised as the greatest obstacle to 
the success of developing modern Bumiputra managers. 
t 
Malay values give the highest priority to getting along- 
with others, and Malay social behaviour is concerned with 
ways of showing mutual respect between persons according 
to a carefully calibrated scale of social status, with 
highest status given to a traditional ruling group or 
chief. Other indigenous races like the Dayaks of Sarawak 
and the Bajaus of Sabah also display similar values. 
Public shaming is the major form of punishment inflicted 
on family members or neighbours who. have misbehaved. Thus 
executives or managers of indigenous origins would prefer 
to avoid confrontation with their staff that can cause 
'shame' and embarrassment. 
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True feelings are sometimes hidden and instructionsý from 
superior to employees are transmitted through sindiran 
(indirect message) that are easily picked up and 
understood. It is for this reason that led many observers 
to label Bumiputra managers as soft and weak. 
The Malays also believe in fate. This deters them actively 
from planning and directing their lives. The other 
indigenous ethnic groups are, by nature superstitious 
people. The Dayaks in Sarawak for instance, observe many 
customs and 'taboos that are sometimes in conflict, with 
modern management practices, i. e never challenging ideas 
of someone who is older as it is considered improper;, -or 
the tendency to keep one's knowledge or expertise' to 
himself rather than sharing it others because of one's 
culture which considers it not acceptble to appear 
knowledgeable and show it off. -So are the Kadazan and 
Bajau ethnic groups of - Sabah. Such attitude sometimes 
makes it difficult to accept 'new management thinking 
because the society in which they are living'in is always 
suspicious*of unfamiliar ideas and would vehementlyýresist 
any visible attempt to practice -new things, that are 
considered 'contradictory to their customs and cultures. 
Any endeavour towards change, new ideas or modernisation 
have to take into account such cultural consideration. 
Thus many new concepts have to be modified if it is to be 
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accepted. Managers from this community cannot freely 
divorce themselves from their long-rooted traditions, 
customs and cultures. 
(ii). The Chinese Culture 
The Chinese are said to be hardworking and thrifty. These 
traits have led many of those poor immigrants to survive 
and become successful in the commerce and economic sectors 
of the country. Most of the business activities have been 
run and managed by Chinese. They like to occupy themselves 
by doing something worthwhile when they are free. It is 
their willingness to learn, inquisitiveness and initiative 
that reward them with additional knowledge, skill and 
experience which make them economically ahead ofý other 
ethnic groups. This also partly explains why most 
successful Malaysian managers are of Chinese origin. 
Chinese values are primarily oriented towards contributing 
to the success and prestige , of patrilineal family, with 
effective competition and skill at accumulating wealth 
receiving the greatest social reward. The Chinese believe 
in the pursuit of worldly material wealth because they 
believe money and wealth can guarantee happiness in this 
world. They can be very ruthless and - shrewd in their 
quest to accumulate wealth. This accounts -for their 
aggressive behaviour in the business field. It is the 
ambition of every chinese to work hard and become wealthy. 
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Some even resort to gambling such as Four digit (a 
popular form of gambling in which a punter buys four digit 
numbers), Toto (an equivalent of British-bingo game), 
horse racing and a chinese betting game, mahjong to make 
it rich quicki even though the majority of the Chinese 
consider gambling as a pastime. In this respect, the 
Chinese can be considered as,, risk-takers. 
In contrast to the Malays who hold strong values 
favourable to religion and religious identity, the Chinese 
are less concerned or less interested on matters 
pertaining to religion. Chinese religious tolerance often 
borders on indifference (Sarachek, Hamid and Ismail, 
1984: p. 182). At the same time, however Chinese culture 
harbours a healthy' respect for superstitions. In this 
perspective, such a culture no doubt plays a very 
important role in moulding a progressive manager. 
According to one writer, the traits associated with the 
chinese "are stamina, resistance, frugality, power, 
vitality, common sense and the will to survive" (Maniam, 
1986: p. 5). It. has been also observed by the same writer 
that business acumen has always been ingrained in Chinese 
philosophy and culture. No wonder, -on the whole, the 
Chinese in Malaysia are economically better off than the 
other ethnic groups. 
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(iii). -The Indian Culture 
The Indians especially those who live in the estates are 
simple people and not well-educated. They are portrayed by 
some writers as generally happy people as evidenced from 
their over-indulgence in todi (Indian alcohol drink). They 
are not normally concerned in world affairs for their 
world- revolve, around the estates. They work hard and if 
they do not get what they want in life they leave it to 
karma or fate to console themselves. They are also said 
to be generally religious and believe in mysticism, and 
have a fatalistic attitude toward their conditions. 
Unlike the Malays, the Indians measure success in terms of 
material comfort and social influence they have. The poor 
Indian family considers and relates success with having a 
good job, financially stable and high education. 
Consequently, the majority of Indians prefer to work with 
the government or public sector rather than private sector 
in order to get job security and financial stability. The 
values of the Indians are based on a pleasantly joyful and 
spiritually pious life, thus making them more resistant to 
modern business values but did not stop them being 
successful entrepreneursý next to the chinese (Maniam, 
1986: p. 5). A number of Indians are successful businessmen 
and lawyers. They are inclined towards the earthly life, 
characterised byý good ýconduct, material success, and 
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physical pleasure as a method of attaining the ultimate 
union of the soul with God (Mong, 1979: p. 72). 
On the whole, the' Malaysians 'regardless of their ethnic 
origins, prefer harmony over confrontation in dealing with 
each other. Conflicts and confrontations are avoided and 
dignity is preserved. In case' of contention which cannot 
be resolved by discussion, reference would be made to 
higher authority, who may-be the ketua kampung (head) in 
the village. 
From the above discussion, the Malaysiansq true to Asian 
traditions, place great emphasis on group effort. This is 
especially true among the Malays and other Bumiputra 
groups who lend a helping hand to each other in task- 
performing like building a house in the form of gotong- 
royong . (doing a task collectively). Individualistic 
gesture is being scorn at and any member who attempts to 
do so will be -boycotted bylthe society in which he lives 
in. 
The Malaysian society also places great emphasis on man as 
part of a larger grouping. He belongs to his family, to 
his kinship group, to wider regional or communal entities 
- all an extension of himself, based on human and natural 
affinities and not on superficial economic, con-sideration. 
An-individual who prefers to be, independent is branded as 
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proud and arrogant, and if one prefers privacy, he is 
considered selfish. 
The Malaysians also strongly believe in consultation. For 
example, a mesyuarah ( discussion or consultation-type of 
meeting) is held when matters of great concern to the 
village arise, in which everybody has the chance to voice 
his opinion. Even though, more often-than not, it is the 
elder members of the community who normally make the final 
decision, nevertheless, the process of feedback and 
opinion-seeking has been carried out. 
Traditionally, -Malaysians view ethnic, moral, and - other 
social values as governing behaviour within their , group 
and inapplicable , outside it. ý However, the urbanised 
Malaysians and those who had travelled abroad are to some 
an exception to this. in Thus, although in both Malay 
and Chinese societies., there are many similar ideas , and 
values, such as high value placed on kin loyalty or-friend 
loyalty, and 'a preference for ý settling disputes and 
solving problems through the, use of a respected mediator 
rather than through formal legal means, these values are 
not usually applied by Malays to Chinese or by Chinese to 
Malays 
Communal pluralism is the essential reality of Malaysian 
society -and government (Esman, 1972: p. 17). Communal 
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divisions appear not only on specific issues regarding the 
economics, social, and cultural benefits but also in many 
facets of Malaysian life. Each race communicates in its 
own language and adheres to its custom and tradition 
strongly. Thus the relationship tends to follow ethnic and 
religious lines. There is the expectation in society that 
one will favour members of one's ethnic group. Friendship 
ties across ethnic border lines are possible but more 
difficult and friends from different ethnic origins as a 
rule are not invited together to some special functions. 
To conclude the scenario of the multi-racial society in 
Malaysia, it can be summed up like this. The Chinese are 
are achievement-oriented, industrious',, opportunistict 
avaricious, -and sharp businessmen. Malays-are held to lack 
achievement orientation, to be lazy, and to show a 
distaste of hard, labour. At the same time they are 
believed to be loyal, polite, and proud. Other Bumiputra 
ethnic groups are also found to be similar in character 
and culture to the Malays --except that some are not 
practising -Islam- as their religion. While the Chinese are 
considered to be -self-reliant, the Malays and other 
Bumiputra groups have a tendency to rely upon the 
government assistance and protection. The estate Indians 
are generally considered to be low -in mental ' ability, 
lacking in self-reliance and achievement orientation. The' 
urban commercial class of Indians, on ' the other hand, 
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share many of the characteristics of the chinese, 
especially in commercial and financial matters; they are 
not, however, thought to be as Industrious or as work- 
oriented as the Chinese. 
The management practices that exist in Malaysia are to a 
certain extent, the products of diverse cultures that 
exist in the country. This is the unique part of , the 
existing management practices that operate in Malaysia 
that may not be found elsewhere in the world. 
3.6. The Profile of Malaysian Managers 
The, Dictionary of Occupational Classification, published 
by the Malaysian Ministry of Labour,, defines a manager as 
one who plans, organises and directs, on his own account 
or within delegated powers, activities of private or 
public outlineg the efficient use of manpower, equipments, 
facilities and finances, controls -the activities of the 
organisation in accordance with the formulated plans and 
policies and ý prescribed standards and - regulations, 
establishes and maintains a'chain of, command through which 
undertakings '-can be effectively operated and controlled, 
develops financial policies and, exercises general control 
over costs. The term 'manager' used in this study will 
adopt this definition. In this -context, a -Malaysian 
manager may ýbe, a general manager in a trading company; an 
executive, chairman in a public enterprise; a director or 
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head of department in the -civil service, or someone 
occupying a senior position, (such as financial, controller, 
marketing manager, production director etc. ), who is 
assisted by some other junior staff in the running of his 
department or unit and has a substantial number of workers 
under his direct chain of command. 
Generally, most managers in Malaysia are quite young. A 
survey conducted in-1977 on 30 managers revealed that 73% 
of them are from 31 to 40 years old (Ismail, 1979: p. 73- 
89). Another survey of managers in Sarawak in 1989 by the 
author found that 64% of the managers were below 45 of age 
(Yasin, 1989: p. 15). The young -age of Malaysian managers 
has been mainly due -to the 'young age of the nation and 
also the subsequent government's NEP which created a lot 
of management positions especially for those of Bumiputra 
origins. They are quite highly educated, with at least 
basic degree qualifications. While the -younger managers 
have outstanding academic and professional qualifications, 
the older-generation managers, who either are the owners 
of their own companies or those who have worked themselves 
up through the ranks tend to have only high - school 
education. 'The Malaysian managers in the private- sector 
are highly mobile and on average, before reaching their 
present positions, have been working with at least three 
different companies., Better financial prospects. in term of 
pay and perks and dissatisfaction with the ýprevious job 
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are quoted as the major reasons for moving from one 
company to another. In the public or government sector, 
those who have reached the managerial level have also been 
widely moved to various departmental units to assume 
various positions before assuming their present positions. 
The mobility of those in this sector is more of a normal 
transfer exercise by those in authority for the purpose of 
gaining wider experience and knowledge in preparation for 
a more responsible position. 
Typical Malaysian managers, be they Malays, Chinese or 
others have expressed a similar view with regard to their 
preference of work: they seem to prefer the kind of work 
that offers them a good salary; one which is challenging; 
and also a job which requires imagination and initiative. 
They have low preference for the kind of work that ties 
them down, but they do it if they have to, in order to earn 
a living; however, they will leave once they find a job to 
their liking (Ismail, 1978: p. 75-83). 
3.7. The Profile of Malaysian workers 
Traditionally Malaysian workers of Bumiputra origins and 
also Indians prefer secure government public sector jobs 
to private sector jobs. This is because they are attracted 
by the security of a pension scheme and are not 
subjected to layoffs which are a common occurrence in the 
private sector during poor business years. Such an 
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attitude is especially true in the Malay community who 
feel insecure working in private firms and would seldom 
think of doing their own business as it would be 
considered risky. By contrast, the Chinese normally avoid 
public sector jobs, preferring instead to work for private 
companies or become self-employed in small business as 
vendors, shopkeepers, carpenters etc. 
The new generation of Malaysians is showing a new trend 
which indicates a preference for work in the private 
sector as opposed to the public sectorl the reason quoted 
being better pay. Organisations which are most sought 
after'by workers if they haveýan opportunity to get a new 
job are the banking and financial ýinstitutions and multi- 
national firms -like Sarawak Shell Company, all -of which 
offer generous salaries. 
I 
Malaysian workers especially blue collar workers are not 
highly educated with the majority of them having completed 
nine years ofý primary and secondary education. They are 
not substantially skilled except those 'who have gone to 
technical and vocational schools. White collar jobs are 
considered prestigious and, every 'Malaysian worker would 
normally go for white collar position over the blue collar 
job even-if the latter pays better. 
-92- 
Malaysian workers claim the right to move freely from one 
job to another rather than remain with one particular 
organisation. They readily leave if they find their 
personal interests are not compatible with those of'their 
organisations. This often happens when the organisation's 
goal contradicts with their religious and cultural views* 
In other words, personal interests supersede loyalty to 
the employer. 
Typically, Malaysian workers, are found to prefer being 
told what -to do. , They are not punctual when reporting - for 
work. Until the recent introduction of punch card system 
whereby the worker has to clocký in for work before 8.00 
P. M., and clock out at 4.15 P. M. a typical Malaysian worker 
usually reported for work late and headed for home 
earlier than the specified closing 'time. For this reasons 
Malaysian workers are often described by foreigners to be 
lacking in dedication to their-work. Dr. Mahathirg in many 
of his speeches and broadcasts, has criticised the 
Malaysians for this weakness and-suggested thatý they 
should emulate the work ethics of the Japanese. workers. 
3.8. Some Major Features of, the - Management Practices in 
Malaysia 
3.8.1.; Recruitment and Job Structure 
In the public- sector, academic. qualifications and to a 
lesser extent, the earlier working experience of an 
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individualýnormally determine the type and category of the 
job he will be placed in. Basically there are four major 
categories of job ranks starting from Division One at, the 
top to Division Four at the bottom most level. . In 
principle, Division One covers professional and 
administrative work for which a university general degree 
in any discipline is required. A new recruit-is placed on 
the A22 scale with a basic salary of M$820 per month. 
However an individual with an honours degree qualification 
will be placed on the A20 scale with starting salary of 
M$1000 per month. ' Division Two position ýis essentially 
office-management' post. 'In order to be considered, the 
candidates must have at least an A- level - school 
certificate but the tendency, is to recruit * those with 
professional college diplomas, i. e Diploma in 1 Business 
Studies from ITM. A Division Two officer starts onýthe Bll 
scale with a monthly salary of, M$750. A Division Three job 
category requires an 0 level certificate, and it consists 
of clerical, sub professional or technical jobs. A new 
recruit gets a salary M$380 per month. A Division Four 
job category, which is - the lowest , paid group with a 
monthly starting -salary of M$215 is meant for blue, collar 
positions and so the workers in this category perform 
relatively unskilled office jobs. The qualification 
required is a minimum of six years of school education, 
but those with Lower School Certificates would be "given 
priority in their applications. This recruitment system 
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and job structure is the official policy of the government 
and also the private sector, the difference being that the 
private companies and corporations offer very -much better 
remuneration. For instance a newly recruited, individual 
with a professional accounting background, i. e. ICMA or 
CACA can earn as much as M$1800 as starting salary in a 
private firm whereas in the government or in public 
corporation, he -will be placed on the A19 scale with a 
starting salary of M1300 per month. 
The recruitment pattern in some organisations - in the 
private or commercial sector however does, not follow a 
rigid structure, and is normally quite flexible. A person 
may be recruited based on his skills and experience rather 
than on his academic qualifications. The pay system 
depends on the size of-the organisation and is based also 
on the needs of the company. An, established company gives 
a good salary package that includes medical expenses and 
bonus in addition to salary while a small firm - tends to 
underpay their staff and only gives salary increment 
during good business- year. If the expertise of an 
individual is badly needed by a particular company, 
normally that person can command a very high starting 
salary. 
In a family-owned business concern, members of the 'family 
usually run the company and hence management positions are 
-95- 
filled by them first, regardless of their academic 
achievements or abilities. Some may just have, primary 
education only and yet, they hold managerial positions. If 
there are positions that their family, members and 
relatives cannot fill, only then would there be an opening 
for outsiders. Usually, an outsider has to -- prove he is 
trustworthy, loyal and valuable in order to be promoted to 
a managerial position. 
On the wholeg-a Malaysian worker is recruited based on the 
level of education he has completed. The-rationale is that 
a highly educated individual- is considered capable of 
handling a more difficult job than one whose educational 
background is lower. Such 'a system has led to fierce 
competition among many -parents to ensure that their 
children reach universities for a 'degree is considered a 
passport to higher paid jobs. Even a poor fisherman 
realises the importance of providing his children good 
education as a form of investment and he will make many 
sacrifices to see his that' children'-do well in school by 
sending them for tuitions and extra classes. It is the 
dream of every Malaysian parent to have a son or daughter 
obtaining a university degree. 
3.8.2. Employment System 
An individual can be employed if, he'is eighteen and above 
whether in public or private sector. In the government 
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public sector, there is a pensionable scheme -which is 
mandatory at the age of 55 for male and 50 for female 
worker respectively. An employee can opt to resign and go 
for other job at any point of time by giving three months' 
notice if he is confirmed in his post and has a permanent 
status and one month's notice if he is still a temporary 
or probationary employee. The employer also can terminate 
their employee's job by giving similar notices on grounds 
of bad performance and also other reasonable reasons 
(i. e. criminal conduct etc. ) that may tarnish the good 
name of the organisation. If the employee -feels his 
dismissal is without valid reason, he can challenge -the 
decision through his , union which will- refer it to 
industrial tribunal for settlement. All blue workers 
normally belong to unions representing their professions 
and they are normally very vocal in protecting their 
workers's rights. The management cadres in -public sector 
are not allowed to, become union members. J -1 
In the private sector, there is no pensionable scheme. 
There is always a bonus given from time to time and also 
when the employee reach retirement. Shell Company, a 
Netherlands-owned firm for example, gives a huge lump sum 
bonus to an employee who retires. Bank Bumiputra normally 
gives a two-month bonus in the month of December during a 
good business year, i. e. profitable year to employees as a 
sort of reward. I 
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The relationship between the employer-and his employees is 
normally similar to Western-style system where workers 
normally treat their jobs as a source of income. -If they 
are' unhappy with their state of affairs at their 
workplace, 'they will not hesitate to 'challenge the 
management, through their unions and should they fail to 
achieve concessions, they will normally strike or indulge 
in "go-slow" activities at their workplaces'- to back their 
demand 'or show their displeasure. Those who prefer not to 
confront the employer normally option'other jobs which fit 
their aspirations even if it means a lower position and 
less earnings, , The loyalty that is present in Japanese 
firms is not clearly, evident in Malaysians organisationse 
This is ý why a lot of Malaysianý workersý change jobs two ýor 
three times before they finally settle -and retire from 
their present jobs. This is the case in the private sector 
but not so much in the public sector since quitting half- 
way would mean foregoing claims to a substantial amount in 
pension payment. It must also be noted that Malaysian 
managers and workers also tend to 'leave their jobs in 
search of a more conducive environments that accommodate 
their cultural and religious values. 
IIý 
3.8.3. Dual Career System 
Malaysia adopts both the closed career system and the open 
career system. The closed career system is widely 
practised in government -owned - public enterprises and 
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family-owned companies. The close career system is 
inherited from the British colonial administrative pattern 
which discourages lateral entry recruitment and that 
promotion follows the rigid rule of 'seniority' although 
some lip service is paid to meritocracy. Also here, upper 
level positions, are filled almost entirely from within. In 
a number of instances, the rank and files are encouraged 
to obtain higher -qualifications -and some are given 
scholarship and granted study ýleave to, pursue higher 
education overseas or locally. When they return with the 
necessary. qualification, , they , fill, the managerial 
positions. -that are vacant. One common feature 
in this 
system is that the top managerial position-is rarely given 
to youngý individuals since posts in the, organisation are 
well-structured and that bypassing one's seniors is not 
the norm. This may not be the case in private sector, 
where promotion of promising -young executives occurs 
frequently. 
In family business type-of organisations, the promotion 
system is very predictable in that top positions are the 
monopoly of family members and a few trusted, ýcolleagues 
and if there is ever a promotion exercise, the principle 
of merit is not strictly adhered to.. Family members such 
as brothersq nephews, in-laws, , cousins, relatives and 
close friends , to those at the top will be the likely 
candidates to be promoted before others. Familialism and 
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nepotism seem to dictate the promotion scene in this 
sector. I? I 
The firms that practice an open career -system are the 
newly formed joint ventures between local and foreign 
firms, multinational firms, (i. e. the American firms) and 
also local companies that urgently require talented 
manpower -to run their organisations. Under this system, 
these organisations normally bring outsiders into middle 
and upper level management positions although opportunity 
for advancement is also afforded to the 'inside' staff 
with proven capabilities. Promising executives from rival 
companies are offered positions with a promise of better 
financial rewards. This-process of "pinching" competitors' 
employees, popularly known as 'headhunting' is so rampant 
in the banking industry at one time a few years ago that 
the Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank of Malaysia) 
was forced to make a ruling that "poaching"rof staff among 
banking, circles especially from the public sector to 
private sector was prohibited. 
As far as promotion, is concerned, family -connections -with 
someone 'at 'the top level in the organisation is very 
important. Because of the strong influence of Malaysian 
culture,, there is a great expectation to help one's own 
circle of family members. A top executive will tend to 
promote those who are related'to him by blood even-if it 
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means selecting a less qualified individual. If there are 
job openings,, his priority would normally be to fill these 
vacancies with his family members who are eligible for the 
job. This mentality has something to do with the Malaysian 
sense of family loyalty and is part ýand parcel of the 
Malaysian way of life. Politicians are also often used to 
influence promotion decision and they are sometimes very 
influential indeed , in getting certain individuals 
promoted. This 'pull string' syndrome as it is often 
called is - not, only found in the private sector but also 
occurs in the public sector to secure jobs and secure 
promotion. However, the degiee of such unethical practice 
is slowly declining as Malaysia enters the new -era of 
modern - managerial development that stresses more 
professionalism. 
3.9. Malaysian-style Management Functional Areas 
It is really difficult to describe what Malaysian 
management -is. -It -is a mixed bag type of management,, the 
rojak management style as it is locally referred to. 
Briefly a rojak type of management is defined as a 
combination of many different management systems which 
have been brought and practised in' the country. Most 
practices-are from the West, being brought to the country 
by the early British administrators. Recently, the 
Malaysian-style management has expanded to include some 
management practices imported from the-Middle East and the 
-101- 
Orient. These practices do not necessarily take the 
original forms of those found in the 'countries of origin. 
More often than not, they'have been modified to suit the 
Malaysian environment. Some generalisations with regards 
to the execution of management -functions like planning, 
organising. - leading, communicating and control in a 
typical Malaysian organisation (foreign and multinational 
firms exclude'd) can be observed. They are: 
3.9.1. Planning 
In the. government agencies and public enterprises, the 
British-style: 'management still dominates the planning 
process. This, is evident from the fact that- strategic 
planning in most organisations is the monopoly of top 
management group. Tactical and short-term plans are 
carried'out at departmental or unit level. 
Planning objectives- of --most Malaysian firms are 
exclusively, concerned with making a profit. - Quality-of- 
life objectives such as pollution control and safety of 
consumers are not yet an important' issue in the Malaysian 
society. 
3.9.2. Organising 
A typical Malaysian organisation is well-structured like 
those, practised in the'UK and, the US., Responsibilities are 
spelled out clearly and each individual is made aware of 
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his responsibilities. -As a result, Malaysian managers are 
fond ýof using organisation charts that describe in minute 
detail the structure of their organisations. This also 
explains why Malaysian executives are fond of issuing 
their business/name cards to others io show, off their 
important positions. i 
Junior managers and even senior executives prefer to wait 
for instructions before they act, and it is not *discreet 
to press seniors for instructions. Frequently, they 'ask 
for instructions, 'not by presenting an analysis of 
alternatives plus recommended decision, but by presenting 
raw problem and expecting their chiefs to provide' the 
answers. 
3.9.3. Leading 
Malaysian administrators tend not to be democrats (Esman, 
1972: p. 120). They are said to be ýstrong believers in 
legitimacy of-statusýdifferences and in the superiority of 
some, men over others., This is also true in most instances 
of the , Malaysian : managers,, of the public sector 
corporations. Superiority is normally gained by formal 
qualifications and experience and is measured by the rank 
one holds in the official hierarchy. Rank creates -formal 
authority and expectation of , deference, which is 
respected. Passive obedience to the superior is one of the 
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core values of Malay society. It is, inculcated and 
enforced among children, at home and at school. 
3.9.3. Communicating 
Communication is-bounded by hierarchical channels, so 
little authority is delegated, and subordinates are so 
disinclined to take initiative that any matter not of a 
routine--character is delayed. Official communication 
rather- than informal, communication - is the norm in the 
organisation. It is common to see - two executives whose 
offices . adjoin each other ý and who also share a 
stenographer communicate to each other through memos. It 
can, be been said, that Malaysia is, a, "memo society". It is 
said that one's conduct of responsibilities is safeguarded 
from possible future problem: this way since a reference 
can always be made if something is put in writing. 
Status and official- standing is closely observed in any 
form of communication at-workplace. In a meeting for. 
example, a junior officer is expected to talk less, and 
even if he has good ideas to, present, he must 'not appear 
toý be vocal especially in the presence of other senior 
members. Otherwise, he may be considered kurang ajar (bad 
mannered). In this respect, communication can be described 
as a one-way traffic, i. e. top-down communication. 
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Another characteristic that can be observed is that the 
channel of communication ''is - often clogged both 
horizontally, and vertically by the culturally status- 
conscious Malaysian society. This is easy to explain in a 
society that encourages young people to talk less than the 
elders. 
3.9.4 Controlling 
Management control of workers is regulated by clear-cut 
rules and regulations. Anybody who breaks the rule will be 
punished. It may be in the form of written reprimand, 
administrative probationary status (i. e. not a confirmed 
worker), suspension without pay and even termination of 
employment if the case is serious. This style can be said 
to be that of western management style. 
Thus it can be seen that the Malaysian management system 
has evolved through many phases of development. The 
management system is a reflection of historical events, 
the result of different cultures and the impact of 
different backgrounds of the management elite in the 
country. 
To summarise this chapter, it can be said that Malaysian 
management system is a composite of some major management 
practices. The Malaysians have been very good at 
incorporating other practices or systems namely the 
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Western system, the Japanese ý, system and more recently the 
so-called Islamic management system and this has resulted 
in the Malaysian rojak-style, management. 
-106- 
CHAPTER FOUR 
AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
AND SOME MAJOR ISSUES 
Objective of the Chapter 
This chapter focuses on the discussion pertaining to: (i) 
public , enterprises in general; (ii)Malaysian public 
enterprises and; (iii). Japanese public enterprises. Th6 
major part of the discussion is confined to the 'formation; 
objectives and some major problems faced by the public 
enterprise sector. More emphasis is given to the analysis 
of public enterprises in Malaysia, whose senior managers 
and employees form the sampling units of ýthe study's 
survey. This chapter aims to familiarise the -reader as 
much as possible with the set-up of the public enterprises 
in Japan and in Malaysia in order to enable him to follow 
the subsequent discussion regarding , the transferring of 
Japanese-style management - to the Malaysian public 
enterprises. It is the contention here that an examination 
of some major issues, especially the problems concerning 
the inefficiencies of Malaysian, public , enterprises is 
considered very relevant in providing a framework for the 
main discussion of transferability, issues. 
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4.2. A Typical Public Enterprise 
4.2.1. Definition 
What is a public enterprise? A public enterprise can be an 
industrial, agricultural, financial and commercial 
undertaking which is owned and controlled by the central 
government, in a unitary state, or by the central and 
regional governments in a federation (Hanson, 1968: p. 3). 
It sometimes has commercial characteristics in that it 
sells goods and services and is expected to finance all or 
part of its operations out of such sales. 
A public enterprise must not be confused with an entity in 
the public sector such as defence - forces, the police or 
the local authority schools forý' the later -derive their 
income from taxation rather than marketing services. 
Shepherd (1976: p. 41-42) described that a public enterprise 
is surrounded by interest groups, including various parts 
of the government itself (refer to Exhibit 4.1 next page). 
In many cases, a public enterprise has to bow reluctantly 
to the pressures exerted by forces around it. 
Consequently, this leads to the change in the form and 
setting of that public enterprise. 
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Exhibit 4.1: The Setting of. a 
I 
Typical Public Enterprise 
Cabinet 
Legislatures Financial Markets 
I 
Treasury J-04 Ministry 
Public Firm 
Board I Managers 
Local Other Related Employees ! 
rms Governments Public Fi 
I Industrial and Competitors, 
Commercial Actual and 
Users Potential 
I 
Residential Consumers 
(Source: Shepherd, 1976: p. 42) 
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4.2.2. Classification of Public Enterprises - 
With regards to the -types of public enterprises, Shepherd 
also made an interesting comment by saying that: 
". .. the possible varieties of -- public enterprises - are 
nearly infinite, and the actual cases are diverse" 
(Shepherd,. 1976: p. 37). 
He identified-three, common -versions namely, M. the 
conventional public corporations; (ii). the financial 
public enterprises and (iii). the social enterprises. ý The 
conventional public corporations are those enterprises 
found commonly in ý utility or heavy industry, with high 
capital -intensity. The. degree of public ownership and 
monopoly is total, or nearly so. Their capital are 
usually supplied directly by the Treasury, and despite a 
degree- of formal autonomy the government -does influence 
and control some major policies considered to be in the 
national, interests. The financial public enterprises are 
public banks - that; range - from -standard deposits and 
clearing banks to special lending units and insurance 
systems. ' Ihey 'can also be ' public investment- banks. The 
social enterprises come in a wide array of purposes and 
conditions, -often withý a degree of subsidy and direct 
governmental control. 
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Parris; ', Pestieu; ý and Saynor (1987: p. 23) however classified 
public enterprises into three main, forms namely: 
W. those departmental undertakings run by -government 
departments with finances and accounts at least partly 
integrated with those of the government. They are referred 
as state enterprises; 
(ii).. those public corporations that operate-under special 
legal provisions. They are commonly called state-sponsored 
enterprises and; 
(iii). companies- created under ! law of the country 
concerned whereby the - said government has a controlling 
interest, i. e the majority shareholderý They are popularly 
termed state-owned companies. 
Professor- Robson - had distinguished five main 
characteristics of public enterprises as follows: 
M. Freedom from parliamentary ýinquiry into the 
management of the concern as distinct from its policy; 
(ii). Disinterestedness; II 
(iii). Independence in finance,, namely disassociation from 
the general budget; 
(iv). Appointment of chairman and board of directors by 
the responsible ministerý for, a fixed term of years 
(Robson, 1960: p. 64-69). 
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The principles above regarding public enterprises are not 
necessarily binding and more often than nots subject to 
question. A close scrutiny on the present public 
enterprises all over the world -will reveal that some of 
them violate some characteristics (i), (ii) and- (iii) 
identified by Robson., -This , happens in a number of 
developing countries especially where public enterprises 
had been traditionally created by government to achieve 
certain national objectives. 
4.2.3. Reasons For the Creation of a Public Enterprise 
It is universally agreed that a public enterprise, in 
theory, operates to serve the public interest and general 
welfare. A public enterprise may be established for 
political or' economic reasons or both, the purpose being 
the pursuit of social goals. It is for this reason that 
some proponents of public enterprises have suggested that 
public enterprises should therefore not be criticised if 
they incur financial losses as long as they help to meet 
important social objectives (Baumol, 1980: p. 34). Although 
almost all public enterprises are formed to achieve social 
objectives and are deemed to be not so concerned about 
making- profit as the private enterprises do, modern day 
public enterprises are in fact always geared towards 
making profit whenever possible. 
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The public enterprises are sometimes formed because of 
historical 'events. In fact the purposes of public 
enterprise in less developed countries are sometimes found 
to have little or no direct connection with the growth of 
national income. For the developing countries, it has been 
mentioned that in many cases, they have been more 
historical accidents than results of economic or social 
purposes (Sheahan, 1976: p. 205). Some were formed when 
foreign owners fled the country after unsuccessful 
resistance to national independence, or because foreign- 
owned industries had been nationalised as a result of 
political conflict. 
The existence of huge natural resources that require big 
capital investment and proper strategic planning also have 
led to the formation of some public enterprises in a 
number' of countries. For example, the exploration of 
natural resources requires a sizable amount of capital and 
sophisticated technology which is beyond the capability of 
private investors to handle. It therefore became necessary 
for the 'governments of the said countries to form public 
enterprises in order to carry out the necessary projects 
successfully. This is true in case of PERTAMINA of 
Indonesia and PETRONAS of Malaysia (Tze, 1978: p. 5). 
It is also argued that 'some public enterprises such as 
state oil 'companies have been established because 
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governments did not consider market forces and private 
enterprises in the countries concerned have the 
appropriate instruments for solving certain problems 
judged to be, of prime importance. 
I 
Public enterprises especially in undeveloped as well as 
developing countries, are, often used as instruments to 
carry out economic programmes, For instance, in 
agricultural countries, they are formed to open up new 
lands for farmers to improve their living standards, or to 
provide credit for fishermen to buy boats, or, provide. loan 
as well as professional advice to petty traders who lack 
business capital and expertise. Tery often these 
enterprises have been formed with the intention of helping 
the people to improve their economic standing as is in the 
case of Malaysia. In fact, Malaysia goes a step further. 
A number of public enterprises have been purposely created 
by the Malaysian government in the early 1970s to redress 
the economic imbalance between the racial groups namely 
the poor Bumiputras and the rich Chinese in the country. 
Public enterprises are used as a bridge to close the gap 
between them especially in- the commercial sector (Fifth 
Malaysia Plan, 1986: p. 253). 
4.2.4. The Set-up of a Public Enterprise 
A public enterprises is usually managed by a board, whose 
members including the chairman, are appointed by the 
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sponsoring Minister. Sponsorship of the public enterprises 
is distributed among the various ministers and their 
departments. In most cases, the chairman is a personal 
friend of the minister and normally a politician himself. 
The board members are always , political appointees who 
represent a wide section of the community. 
The chief executive (sometimes called managing director or 
general manager), upon the recommendation of his chairman, 
is also 'appointed by the Minister. The appointment- of the 
senior management group of public 'enterprises,, though 
formally appointed by boards of directors, is made upon 
recommendation by the chief executive. It must be made 
clear here that this may not the case in some countries in 
which only the chairman and board of'directors only are 
political posts. 
The-selection of chairman and the board members and to-a 
lesser extent, chief executive of public enterprises 
therefore involves political considerations. Because of 
this political link, political influences and constraints 
on managerial decisions play an important role in public 
enterprises. In Italy, for example politicians asked 
managers, of public enterprises toýrespond to the four main 
areas of concern: creating new jobs and avoiding firings; 
responding to labour needs in' 'specific geographic areas; 
filling ýpositions for political patronage; and financing 
-115- 
political campaigns (Grassini, 1981). Company managers 
know that, to retain their pos I itions, to be confirmed, or 
to be promoted, no employees' should be dismissed. On the 
other hand, whenever and wherever possible, managers' 
should create new factories or expand existing 'ones. Thus, " 
Grassini further observed, no large Italian company, 
private or public, has been able to shut down 'plants in, 
the last ten years unless it was, certain that its 'workers 
would be given new jobs. In an Italian' case; 'it 'was 
observed that managers"of state-owned enterprises are'able 
to take higher risks in their investments than managers of 
private enterprises as a result of state, laws and 
political and financial incentives. 
One good ihing about this is that since the high level 
managers of enterprises who are appointed or confirmed 
often received their appointments through political 
patronage, theý are freer to take' the risks 'requested by' 
government. The economic performance 'Of the company does 
not reflect substantially on its capabilities; losses are' 
seen as the consequences of poor political' choices or 
imposed social objectives. ' The 'only indicator of 
successful management 'is' an increase in employment which, 
inevitably, 'requires an: increase in investment. 
4.2.5. Problems Encountered in Public Enterprises 
A common problem associated with public enterpr . ises as a 
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whole is their tendency to have a loosely set of defined 
goals. Managers according to Vernon and Aharoni (1981), 
find themselves struggling with generalized, vague and 
conflicting interests due to the generalised nature of the 
goals of their organisations. A good example of this is 
the statutes jaying out the responsibilities of the 
British Steel Corporation and National Coal Board in the 
UK. This could be seen as the fault of those governments 
which have a tendency to formulate (- maybe due -to 
political motive) these goals in general, vague-ý and 
conflicting terms thereby causing problems in the 
subsequent measurement of performance of the said public 
enterprises. Such -a situation increases , the, possibility 
of managerial discretion which can result in a disastrous 
management blunder. 
Some public enterprises are found to have a multitude of 
objectives which sometimes are contradictory to each 
other. It must be very difficult for managers to manage 
effectively with a diffuse set of objectives. -- Private 
enterprise managers, usually have a bottom-line figure that 
holds them accountable . to some extent. In private 
enterprises, the profit motive is strong and serves as a 
sieve through which gross incompetents are weeded out and 
others rewarded. If public enterprises were able to 
evaluate their performance in terms of a relatively few 
composite, measurable objectives, their efficiency could 
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be enhanced. A multiplicity of vague objectives serves tom 
protect the inefficient and perhaps this has always been 
the dilemma of the management -, in, many public 
enterprises. 
A number of scholars observed that the state-owned 
enterprises operate in economies in which there is-, a great 
deal of managerial slack, inefficiency and oligopolistic, 
independence. Outputs are not everywhere produces at 
minimum attainable costs. The ineffectiveness of public 
enterprises is due to bureaucratic control. This type of 
control is very dominant especially in the older public 
enterprises (Hanson, 1968). In most countries, public 
enterprises are controlled byimore than one ministry and 
this causes serious management problems. 
In some countries, one of the problems with the public 
enterprise sector has been traced to the lack . of a 
practical workable government policy concerning the 'entry 
and exit'- of public enterprises (Tze, 1978: p. 33). An 
obvious case in point happened in the Philippines, where. 
because of the economic philosophy of the, country, public 
enterprises have been considered as a "regrettable 
necessity", which are to be disposed of as soon as private 
capital is'ready to take over. 
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There is also a mounting criticism of the management group 
in public enterprises who are accused of being readily 
used as government puppets and because of this they cannot 
discharge their duties as efficiently as their 
counterparts in private sector. This is not wholly the 
fault of these managers who are in fact political 
appointees themselves. Rather it is the system that is at 
fault. Recognising that political connections are 
necessary to secure top managerial appointments, many 
managers cultivate a good relationship with the Minister 
responsible for the public enterprises and they are overly 
accommodating to other politicians. Effective ties are 
established by performing favours ranging from gathering 
data for speeches' to giving helicopter or aeroplane rides 
in company helicopters or planes. In return, they expect 
to be protected should there arise any crisis -involving 
them. This is often the root cause of mismanagement. It 
has been pointed by many analysts of public enterprises 
that, no matter how capable the management team of a 
public enterprise may be, there is no way the enterprise 
can be managed efficiently from profit point of view as 
long as these managers continue to remain under political 
pressure and are in receipt of political favours. 
Because of the prevailing system surrounding the public 
enterprises,. managers of public enterprises are able to 
expand into new areas without fear of losing profits or 
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their positions. This'' resulted in many - state-owned 
enterprises losing money-without a change in management as 
long as its losses can be attributed to the cost of 
responding to social objectives. (In a typical -private 
enterprise, -ineffective manager whose financial 
performance is poor will be fired-immediately)-. 
Some observer criticised managers of state-owned 
enterprises as docile! and passive receivers of 
governmental orders and parliamentary requests. There 
existed, a ., "don't rock-the-boat" syndrome 
(Phataks 
1969: p*-347), ý in ýwhich managers avoid changes that may 
alienate any powerful -, groups. Redundant workers are, not 
dismissed; erring staff are not disciplineds obsolete 
plants remain open and faulty organisational structures 
remain unchanged. Managers simply develop apathy. 
Because -the appointment of those entrusted to manage 
public -enterprises is based, on a political consideration, 
it is to be expected that the managers of public 
enterprisesý are -not, as competent as they should' be. 
However, it must be pointed out that private, enterprises 
managers are also selected on criteria other than 
competence, such as inheritanceg nepotism, friendship and 
loyalty. In this respect, it is neither fair nor correct 
to view the management problems in public - enterprises as 
the result of inefficiency onýmanagers alone. 
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It has been suggested by proponents ý of public enterprises 
that not - all managers of the public, enterprises are 
inefficient as generally claimed. For example, in the 
British- and American public enterprises especially in the 
utility industry, the motivation and: performance of 
managers appear, to be roughly the same as it is in private 
firms (Shepherd 1976: p. 118). it is largely the 
differences in incentives and surroundings that may, induce 
firm managers to give distinct results. It may be said 
based on the above observation that, the extent--to which 
public enterprises are subject to specific requirements of 
various kinds, is extremely, ý difficult- to evaluate' in 
relation to-the performance of managers and operational 
efficiency., 3 
There is yet another reason identified ýas the cause for 
public ý enterprises being less efficient , than the private 
enterprises from the management point of view. One factor 
which affects public enterprises more than their private 
counterpart is the inability of management to resist 
labour demands. In the case of private enterprises, labour 
and management are opposingý interests, and this normally 
leads to a degree of equilibrium in collective bargaining 
in the long-run. 'The management of public enterprises -do 
not enjoy this privilege because they do not serve 
capitalistic"interests but are answerable primarily to the 
government. Subsequently, the public enterprises- cannot 
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easily check workers' demand andmay have problems if the 
unions representing the workers become very strong., 
Corruption is another factor that has been responsible for 
some of the problems in public enterprises, rendering them 
less efficient and productive than the private 
enterprises. Corruption can be in many forms such as 
misuse of fund and resources for unjustified projects by 
those who , run - the enterprise (i. e huge political 
contributions 'to ruling party in return for person gain, 
or lavish refurbishing, - of chief executive's office' for 
self glory ýbut made under , the pretext of enhancing 
corporate image). The -resources which should, have been 
used for productive purposes or -reinvestment,, to generate 
capital formation are thus unnecessarily diverted away 
from the productive process that can cause, financial 
catastrophe. Tze (1978: p. 32) bluntly exposed this nature 
of corruption in Indonesia where public enterprises are 
inefficient because they ' are , corrupt and run by 
unqualified management personnel; 
The problem of, public enterprises has also been due to 
lack of qualified management personnel. This is the case 
in Malaysian public enterprises where the problem stems 
from the government's effort to achieve ethnic economic 
balance. Preference is given to economically disadvantaged 
ethnic group, i. e. the Bumiputras in managerial 
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appointment. Through the government's policy, the 
Bumiputras are placed in senior positions over sometimes 
more capable Non-Bumiputras and this has resulted in the 
said public enterprises having poor management personnel 
in terms of quality and quantity. 
There is yet another constraint experienced by public 
enterprises. The managers are often handicapped An that 
unlike their private sector counterparts9 they must 
recognise employment, pricing and other government 
policies. If they stray from the national policies of the 
ruling government, the government will be quick to check 
on them through the various processes of control. One 
favourite weapon used to keep the non-conforming 
enterprise in line would be to limit the budget of the 
said public enterprise when time for yearly budget request 
comes. 
Public enterprises also face the problem of public 
accountability. A question often asked. is to what extent 
should they be accountable to the public in order to be 
able to conduct their state of affairs efficiently? An 
examination of public enterprises reveals that there are 
two extreme schools of thoughts regarding public 
accountability in public enterprises (Curwen, 1986; 
Aharoni, 1981; Hanson, 1968; Sheahan, 1976). 
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Firstly there is a widespread feeling, an assumption, that 
public' enterprises should be subjected to a degree' of 
public accountability. They do not enjoy the independence 
and secrecy of decision making as private enterprises. 
Another 'school' of thoughts is 'of"" opinion that the 
management 'group which has been appointed with a 
commercial objective needs a degree of freedom to make' 
decisions, take risks and confront potential competitors. 
They should, it is felt have a wider independence than 
that of'traditional: departments of state, which owe direct 
T 
obedience to a minister who himself is'responsible to his 
political'chiefsý and often to'the . Parliament. 
Regarding the control mechanisrý, it has 'been poin-te'd by 
public enterprise scholars that -a 6ontrol sysiem which' is 
administered essentially by government'and parliament-P and 
relies upon' qualitative "standards which rest 'on political 
values, can conceivably reduce the power of the 
enterprises to dominate control process. 
The ' problems relating to' 'inefficiency - in public 
enterprises clearly indicate tha ta new approach in their 
management system is needed, In this particular respect, 
it is the intention of this, study to determine if 
Japanese-style management can be used as one of the 
solutions for redressing public enterprises' problems. 
Before this matter is dealt with, let find out what the 
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situation is, like in Malaysian and., Japanese public 
enterprises respectively. 
4.3. The Malaysian Public Enterprises 
4.3.1. Introduction 
In developing countries, it is a common practice for the 
governments to create public organisations known as either 
public corporations or enterprises as development 
instruments for carrying out -governmental 
functions of a 
social and economic nature. A United Nations Research 
Group Report issued in 1973 observed that: 
"among developing countries there is hardly a government 
that is not managing an expanding public enterprise sector 
on one scale or another, with a view to accelerating 
national economic development" (United Nations, 1973: p. 9). 
Although they are being supervised by their governments 
because of their public responsibilities, these 
enterprises are given a substantial amount of autonomy and 
also flexibility, not normally enjoyed by the ordinary 
government departments so as to carry out their operations 
efficiently. Malaysia, like other developing countries in 
the region has relied heavily on public enterprises as 
instruments of development programmes. 
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The importance of public enterprises in Malaysia in the 
context of nation-building and development can be seen 
from the country's large investment in the public sector's 
expenditure (refer to Table ). For example, for the Fourth 
Plan Period of 1980-1985, the expenditure amounted to 
M$80,331 million, which is high compared to other 
developing countries. It accounts for 43% of Gross 
National Product (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981: p. 345). Like 
other newly emerging nations in Southeast Asia, the 
Malaysian government resorts to forming public enterprises 
in order to accelerate the pace of -various development 
programmes. In 1975, there was a total of 251 public 
enterprises, and at present the number has reached more 
than 300 involved in economic, social, agricultural, 
commercial and industrial activities. The public sector 
enterprises in Malaysia can be said to have been 
established for a multitude of reasons ranging from the 
provision of the basic. infrastructure to the restructuring 
of the country's economy. 
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Table 4A: Malaysian Public Sector Development 
Expenditure By Sector 
Sector 5th Plan 4th Plan 
S mil % of total S Mil % of total 
ECONOMIC 52,473 76.1 55,778 75.3 
Agriculture and rural development 11,828 17.1 8,714 11.8 
Mineral resources development 48 07 28 04 
Commerce and industry 9,752 14.0 20,212 27.3 
Transport 10,789 15.6 12,966 17.5 
Communications 9,706 14.1 5,033 6.8 
Energy and public utilities 9,895 14.3 8,644 11.7 
Feasibility study 54 08 65 09 
Research and development 400 58 116 16 
SOCIAL 9,035 13.1 9,980 13.5 
Education and training 5,583 8.1 4,687 6.3 
Health and population 715 1.0 736 1.0 
Housing 1,980 2.9 3,935 5.3 
Others 757 1.1 621 0.8 
SECURITY 4,704 6.8 7,495 10.1 
ADMINISTRATION 2,788 4.0 811 1.1 
Federal Government and NFPEs 69,000 100 74,063 100 
State 5,000 - 6,268 - 
TOTAL for Public sector 74,000 80,331 
198690 
1981 85 
M Economic Efl Social F-I Security 121 Administration 
(Source: Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986: p. 478) 
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4.3.2. Reasons for Creation , of Malaysian ýPublic 
Enterprises. 
Traditionally, theý -establishment- of' the earlier public 
enterprises in " Malaysia was 'mainly confined to-, public 
utility bodies. For example, ' the - Malayan- Railway 
established An 1949 was to provide 'transport and that the 
National Electricity, Board was created also in the same 
year to provide electricityýservices. rl- 
After Malaysia achieved 'independence from Great, 'Britain, 
more public corporations were , formed especially, to 
implement various development projects of the government. 
It was alleged that , as a result' of colonial rule, the 
Malays and other indigenous groups-in-the country remained 
poor- and were mostly engaged in subsistence agricultural 
activities. There was an- outcry especially by Malay 
politicians for a better deal for the Malays. As a result 
of this growing pressure, the Council of Trust for 
Indigenous People (MARA) was set up to help the government 
implement commercial and industrial, ý developments ýfor the 
Bumiputras, who are by, far behind- theirý Chinese and Indian 
counterparts, 
The most 'significant, period in the growth of" the public 
enterprise sector was in the years before and-after the 
launching of, the New Economic Policy (NEP); 'The two main 
objectives, of NEP - are the eradication of, poverty, 
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irrespective of race, and restructuring Malaysian society 
to- reduce -and eventually eliminate ethnic-based poverty 
(for detail see the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976). Towards 
this end, the Plan* outlined various strategies 
particularly the participation by theý government in 
commerce and industry. -The government, used public 
enterprises as instruments to achieve these objectives. 
Large number of public corporations were formed at federal 
and state levels. It was observed that out of 82 public 
enterprises at the end of 1974, moreý than 88% were set up 
since 1965 while 35% were created since ý 1971 (Affandi, 
1975: p. 99-105) From - 1969 to -1972, a total- of 67 new 
public corporations were createdt (Abdul-,, 1979: p. 50). They 
were -mostly established to, pursue commercial, -financial, 
commercial and industrial ventures. The more recent 
corporations 'were'' thus , formed -- to, help ý achieve the 
government objectives 'in redressing racial and regional 
economic imbalances in the multi-racial Malaysian society. 
Another reason why public corporations mushroomed in the 
19701 s period , has been the government Is ef f ort in the 
planningý-, and , 
development of selected regions of the 
country. A number of underdeveloped regions have been 
selected, for integrated development and these regions have 
been subjected to comprehensive master planning. Because 
of the enormous size of lands to be developed, it was felt 
that a corporation would be more capable of undertaking 
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the tasks that a normal agency would 'not be capable of 
handling. Thus, the' Pahang Tenggara Development, Authority 
was- established to develop the underdeveloped region of 
2.5 million acres in Pahang. Other corporations set up for 
similar purposes include Federal ý, Land Development 
Authority (FELDA), Federal , Land.. Consolidation , and 
Rehabilitation- Authority (FELCRA) and Rubber Industry 
Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA). 
During, the Fifth Malaysia Plan period, i. e. 'the '1986-1990 
period, 'the objectives of public enterprises focus on 
growth with stability and improvement in the quality of 
life through the provision of basic amenities as well as 
the strengthening of economic base * (Fifth Malaysia ý Plan, 
1986: p. 271). The establishment of public enterprises 
during this period therefore 'is , the function 'of this 
objective. - In addition to 'providing publicý- services, 
public enterprises' major task continues to be as a 
vehicle of achieving the New Economic Policy (NEP). With 
the objective of NEP to -transfer 30 percent of the 
nation! s wealth to the indigenous groups by 1990 still yet 
to-, be achieved, the activities of public enterprises will 
be carried out with more intensity now that '1990 is 
nearing-'to an end. 
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4.3.3. Types of Malaysian Public Enterprises 
The public enterprises in Malaysia are broadly divided 
into three categories namely: 
W. Enterprises which are set up and -managed by 
government departments*, They are required by law to keep 
their accounts on commercial lines. Examples of these 
public enterprises include 'National Electricity Board 
(LLN), Civil Aviation and Highway Authority Malaysia. They 
are referred to as departmental form of public 
enterprises; 
(ii). ýPublic corporations which are established under the 
different statutes both at federal and state levels. They 
are commonly known as statutory bodies and examples of 
such. - corporations -are the State Economic Development 
Corporation (SEDC), Council of Trust for Indigenous People 
(MARA) and Bank of Agriculture and; 
(iii). Government companies which are , formed under - the 
Companies Act-1965. They are just like ordinary companies, 
the, difference being that they are owned by government, 
e. g. National Corporation (PERNAS) and National Oil 
Corporation (PETRONAS). 
In view, of this, the definition of public enterprises as 
used in this study, will refer to government departmental 
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corporations; 'statutory bodies -or corporations and 
government-owned companies. 
Public enterprises in Malaysia are further categorised 
according to the nature of their activities listed below: - 
(i). Public utility corporations which provide utilities 
such as water and -electricity services. The examples of 
such enterprises include National Electricity Board, 
Penang. Port Commission and National Water, Board; 
(ii). Transportation, -and Communication enterprises such as 
Malaysian Airlines System (MAS), Malayan Railway (KTM) and 
Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC); 
(iii). Land and Regional Development bodies such as 
Federal'Land Development Authority (FELDA),; ý National Land 
Rehabilitation and Consolidation Authority (FELCRA) and 
Pahang Tenggara; 
(iv). Social bodies and Welfare organisations' such as 
Lembaga, Tabung Haji (LUTH) and Pertubuhan Kebajikan 
Pekerja (SOCSO); 
(v). Financial corporations and institutions such as 
Central Bank, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia and Public Bank of 
Malaysia; ý . 11 1. Iýý1 .1ýI. I 
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(vi) . Strategic enterprises ý such as National Oil 
Corporation (PETRONAS), Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) -and 
Malaysian Explosive Weapon Company; 
(vii). Production enterprises such as Food Industries of 
Malaysia (FIMA), Cement Industries of Malaysia (CIMA) and 
Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM); 
(viii). Commercial and Industrial corporations such as 
National Corporation (PERNAS), Council of Trust for 
Indigenous People (MARA) etc.; 
(ix). ý Agricultural bodies - such as Rubber Industry 
Shareholders ' Development Authority (RISDA), Muda 
Agricultural Development Authority (MADA) and Malaysia 
Fisheries Development Authority (MAJUIKAN) and 
(x). Educational Institutions and Research Agencies like 
I 
University of, Malaya (UM), Institute Technology of MARA 
(ITM) and Standard and Industrial -Research Institute of 
Malaysia (SIRIM). I 
4.3.4. Financing of Malaysian Public Enterprises 
Most 'of the public enterprises are either financed by 
government grants or loans. The government grants are 
provided normally to meet the administrative costs of the 
public corporations I and -also to carry out their 
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operations. Among the public enterprises 'which are 
financed this way are MARA, UDA and FELDA. Government 
loans are given to public enterprises to finance the 
actual 'development costs' of programmes, schemes or 
projects undertaken by them. A government loan, provided to 
an enterprise can take any of the following forms: 
(i). as an interest-bearing and repayable loan; 
(ii). as an interest-bearing but non-repayable loan and; 
(iii). as a non-interest bearing but repayable loan. 
In Malaysia, it normally takes the form of an interest- 
bearing and repayable loan with interest charge&at around 
6% per annum, although there ' can be a small variation 
depending on the type of enterprise to which the loan is 
given to (Throungt 1976: p. 96-99). 
The provision of - loan is part of the government's 
Development Budget and to be considered for the loan, the 
respective enterprise, has-to submit its proposal for 
inclusion in the Five Year Plan and have to be justified 
on a project basis (Abdul, 1979: p. 61). These proposals are 
first examined by the Economic Planning Unit and approved 
by the National Development Planning Committee. Funds are 
then released by the Treasury as and when required. 
In the company-form public enterprises, the sources of 
financing normally take the form of government share 
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participation in the enterprises. This is clearly the case 
with PERNAS, Malayata Steel, Malayan Banking and PETRONAS. 
The government- may later sell her shares when share 
ownership of the enterprises are thought to be better in 
the hands of the public, especially those ethnic'-groups 
which, in the government's view need -to have their 
economic imbalance remedied. 
The. public enterprises, also ý borrow from commercial banks 
and, financial institutions, local or foreign on a short- 
term basis -for financing their working capital 
requirements- from time-- to time. Prior approval from 
Federal government via the Minister of Finance must be 
obtained before an enterprise can borrow money for its 
operations. MAS borrowed M$132 million from the US Export- 
Import Bankj' the FNCB New York and the 'Banca Commercial 
Italiania to purchase seven Boeing 737-200s. LLN borrowed 
55% of its finance between 1949-1969 from financial 
institutions-, like the Commonwealth Development Bank and 
others. 
Some -public-enterprises like PETRONAS and SEDC which 
indulge in profitable commercial activities are self- 
supportive. , The- impressive yearly profits are used to 
self-finance their operations. 
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In some instances, public corporations derive their 
funding 'from special taxes (cesses). For instancep there 
is a special týx on rubber exports imposed by RISDAt 'a 
corporation that administers rubber replanting in order to 
finance rubber replanting scheme. The Rubber Research 
Institute (RRI) also gets a special tax on rubber export 
for the purpose of financing research works on rubber. 
4.3.5. Financial' Accountability and Control of Malaysian 
Public Enterprises 
The major financial rules applicable to the majority of 
public enterprises according to Zakaria (1984: p. 242-244) 
are as follows: 
(a). submission of annual' and supplementary budgets to the 
responsible Minister for approval; 
(b). duty of the Board to 'c'onserve 'the fund' so 'as to 
ensure that' its income ''is sufficient 'to meet its 
expenditure outlays; 
(C). establishment of reserve fund for specific purposes; ' 
(d). power to invest monies subject to certain conditions; 
(e). power to borrow monies for carrying out its-functions 
with the approval of the Minister of Finance and; 
(f). submis sion 'of annual reports of activities together 
with audited * financial statements to be responsible 
Minister for tabling in Parliament. 
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Statutory bodies and also public enterprises are required 
, 
by law (i. e. the Statutory Bodies Act, 1980) to render 
audited statements of accounts in respect of each 
financial year within six months thereafter., If a 
particular corporation is unable to do so, itýmay ask-for 
another three months' extension from the responsible 
Minister. The Act also empowers to the responsible 
Minister to make rules for the purpose of the Act, which 
includes providing guidelines relating to the accounting 
policies and. procedures to be followed. - 
The justification for financial accountability in the 
Malaysian public enterprises is that it safeguards the 
public interests by ensuring that the accounts and other 
records are reliable and that all financial transactions 
are conducted with integrity and in accordance with 
applicable laws and regulations. Financial accountability 
means also managerial , accountability and programme 
accountability. The former refers to that which calls for 
public enterprises to be efficient in the discharge of 
their duties and the exercise of prudence in the handling 
of money and other finance-related matters. The latter-is 
concerned with the undertaking of the programmes; 
whether the stated objectives have been achieved, and 
whether they are achieved by the best available 
alternatives in terms of costs and benefits. 
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Public enterprises are granted a certain degree of freedom 
not normally enjoyed by government departments. It is 
believed 'that these powers are necessary to carry out 
certain functions effectively and efficiently. But 
nevertheless, as government agencies,, there, are some 
regulations and rules they have to abide to. -, In the words 
of one observer: 
"In, some way a public corporation may be likened to an 
amphibian having -toý work in the waters of the private 
sector, but is -expected to behave as a government agency 
on the land of the -public sector where it belongs" 
(Zakaria, 1984: p. 244) 
Zakaria concluded that the public-enterprises cannot 
therefore -run away from the reality of- the situation that 
they must be subjected to a certain degree of, control by 
higher levels of authority. He went on to say that public 
enterprises are subject to three levels of control. - They 
are: 
W. At the Parliament and State Assembly Level in the 
form of: 
-Legislative process -in making laws governing public 
enterprises; 
-Parliamentary questions; 
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-Debates on government, budget estimates, pertaining to 
allocation of funds for public enterprises' activities 
-Examination - of Accounts and Reports by the Public 
Accounts Committee. 
(ii). At the Cabinet or Minister Level in-the, form of: 
-Appointment of Board of Management - and some key 
executives; 
-Approval of financial allocations in -the five- Year 
Development Plan; II 
-Approval of the corporation's-annual estimates of revenue 
and, expenditure; 
-Review of audited accounts and reports; 
-General -ýor specific- directions on important policy 
matters- such, as relating' to programmes -and projects, 
performance targets, terms of service of employees, 
purchase- of goods and services, financial and accounting 
procedures and'draft answers to Parliamentary questions. 
(iii). Central --Controlling - Agencies Level (eg. Treasury, 
Economic Planning Unit, Public Service Department, 
Implementation and Coordination Unit) in the form of: 
-Policy advice on administrative matters; , 
-Processing proposals for approval by higher authorities;, 
-Evaluation, of performance against stated objectives and 
targets (Zakaria, 1984, p. 245-6)0 
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4.3.6. Managerial Organisation Structure in Malaysian 
Public Enterprises 
A public corporation or enterprise is managed by a board 
of directors which is responsible for the policy and 
general direction of the organisation. The board members 
are appointed by the Minister of relevant ministry or the 
Prime Minister for a fixed numbers of years. In statutory 
bodies, the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of the state in 
which those bodies are established, is normally appointed 
the chairman of the board. The Chief Minister's influence 
is"expected to be used to speed up the development and 
solve whatever bureaucratic problems encountered in the 
state. In a company-form enterprises, a politician who is 
usually a 'party member of the ruling governmentp or 
sometimes a Minister normally is appointed as the board's 
chairman. In a departmental form of public enterprise, 
there is no board but instead the said organisation is 
headed 'by a director-general, who is normally a senior 
civil' servant or in some cases, a political appointee who 
is responsible to the Minister. 
The average number of board members is between 10 to 15, 
although there are cases where there are as few as 6 and 
as many as 29 members. The membership of the board 
normallycomprises of'the following: 
(a). chairman and the managing director or manager; 
(b). representatives of the Federal or State Treasury, 
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(C). representatives -of supervising organisation or 
ministry; 
(d). representatives of related organisations and 
shareholders; 
(e). members appointed for their special competence in 
certain fields; 
(f). political appointees. 
Thus,., in the composition of board of directors, the 
government is careful to create a -balance 
based -on three 
consideration namely control; representativeness; and 
competence (Affandi, 1976: p. 8). To -ensure , control 
especially in financial matters, -representatives 'from the 
Treasury and relevant ministry are appointed. To ensure 
representativeness, people from, certain sectors and also 
politicians representing certain- interests are appointed 
to sit on the board. To ensure competence; 'the government 
nominates professionals in relevant- fieldsý to be board 
members so that they-can provide their expert opinions for 
the benefits of the organisation. 
It must be. noted that in , Malaysia - several managerial 
structure patterns can be observed in the different public 
enterprises. jor examplet in many of the corporations 
undertaking industrial activities,, the chief, executive is 
normally the general manager. Often he is also the full 
chairman of the board, as in the case in UDA and PERNAS., 
-141- 
However, in some cases, the chairman is a 'part-time' 
chairman while the deputy chairman or managing director is 
the chief executive, as in the case of MARA and, most of 
the agricultural development corporations, (Abdul, 
1979: P. 64) ' 
Below the chief'executive, the organisational structure of 
a public enterprise is departmentalised according to the 
''Each department is nature of the respective'organisationsO 
under the director, 'or' head of department or a manager who 
is responsible to' the' chief executive. Personnel from the 
departmental heads' downwards are normally recruited 
through the normal government procedures that are 
specified under the jurisdiction of I the Malaysian Public 
Services'Commission. There is an-exception in the company- 
form enterprises whereby they 'are given,,, the -autonomy to 
hire and fire their staff. The appointment of public 
employees in departmental corporations and statutory 
bodies closely resemble those of regular. government 
departments or ministries. 
A -very common feature of Malaysian public enterprises is 
the secondment of civil servants and the retired armed 
forces personnel to man public sector posts especially at 
managerial level. Even though a common practice is to 
pinch senior civilýservants, there are, cases however where 
managers from the private sector have been recruited for 
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the public enterprises when there is no qualified persons 
to, assume certain positions from the public'seýctor. When' a 
civil servant or ex-armed forces personnel so seconded to 
public enterprise retires, his place is taken by another 
colleague. Because of this practice', it has been argued 
that Malaysia has yet to breed new managers from within 
the public enterprise itself. 
4.3.7. Personnel Management Practices and 'Policies in 
Malaysian Public Enterprises. 
There is no uniformity in personnel policies across the 
Malaysian public enterprises. Flexibility in' personnel, 
management policies- is at its- maximum in the'company-form 
enterprises and at its'minimum, in the departmental type of 
enterprises, ' with the corporation type enterprises 
(statutory- bodies) in ` between. The departmental 
enterprises are considered, an extension of government 
departments ýand 'therefoie ' whatever procedures and- 
regulations -apply- to the ''departments also apply to them. 
Hence, personnel 'matter's', covering recruitment-, 
remuneration, training and promotion for government'' 
employees and public enterprises are similar 
4.3.7.1. Recruitment 
The Malaysian public enterprises are empowere'd to''appoint 
their own staff but 'they have to abide by conditions of 
services , as approved ' by ' the Minister. '' Unlike 'the 
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departmental enterprisesl they have the power to recruit 
employees and do not have to depend on the Public Services 
Commission to select employees on their behalf. The 
company-form public enterprises enjoy the greatest-freedom 
in structuring personnel policies as they are given 
complete power to handle their own personnel matters as 
deemed fit. Of the- three forms of public enterprises, 
these so-calledý government companies attract the most 
talents as a result of their flexible personnel policies. 
The junior management staff are recruited either directly 
from the universities and colleges or are those presently 
working elsewhere at the management level. To be eligible 
for management positions in the-Division One categoryt the 
candidates must possess a minimum general degree and to be 
considered for junior management job of -Division Two 
group, the candidates must have a diploma qualification, 
although holders of an A level Certificate, can be 
considered for the said posts. It is to be stressed here 
that management positions may be given to those without 
diploma or tertiary qualifications as long as they are of 
the required calibre and possess the necessary experience. 
Job mobility among managers is rampant. The reason for 
this is - that in Malaysia it is common to recruit an 
individual who has worked elsewhere first. It is, sometimes 
observed that a person has changed jobs two or three times 
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before finally settling in the present occupation. In fact 
many executives are recruited this way by - their 
organisations who normally offer them better pay and other 
perks like housing allowances, company cars, free medical 
expenses, etc. as an incentive to lure them from -their 
former employers. It is an open secret that a person who 
yearns to switch career for a better job leaves when he 
gets such an opportunity. In fact many Malaysians use this 
job-hopping strategy as a stepping stone in their career 
development. 
For clerical and blue-collar jobs, recruits are high 
school leavers and also technical or vocational school 
graduates who normally would have finished nine to twelve 
years of education. There are also cases where some 
employees at this level being recruited from some other 
organisations. Like - their counterparts - in the management 
group, they change jobs mainly for, better ones. Sometimes 
however, the change -of - job by these employees may be due 
to reasons such as dissatisfaction with former employers 
or former jobs or personal, problems such as the akward 
location of the workplace. 
4.3.7.2. Salaries and Wages 
Salaries and wages in public enterprises are comparatively 
lower than in the private enterprises. In the managerial 
positions, the gap is highly discernible. For example, a 
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newly recruited accountant with a Malaysian Chartered 
Public Accountant. (MCPA) "qualification but no working 
experience can command only a basic' salary of M$1,300 'per 
mon-th in the department form of public enterprise- like the" 
National Electricity Board and about M$1,600 per month in 
the government company like PETRONAS, 'while in the private 
company like 'Sarawak Shell Berhad, that same individual 
can command a salary of about M$2,200 to M$2,600 Per 
month. -I 
There is also a disparity in salaries among the non- 
managerial employees between' the public sector and' the 
private sector in the favour of 'those in the latter. A 
newly recruited clerk fresh from, high school normally gets 
about M$800 perýmonth in Sarawak Shell Berhad, while in the 
departmental corporations 'or statutory 'bodies, he will 
earn M$420 per month. ' In a company - type of enterprise, he 
can-learn about M$500-'- M$600 per month. Thust it can be 
said thaf there is no uniformity in salaries and wages of 
all levels of employment within the public enterprises 
themselves and 'that there is also an even further 
disparity "between those in the public' enterprises and 
their counterparts in'the private enterprises. 
4.3.7.3. Promotion 
The p. romotion system in' Malaysian public enterprises, 
especially in the departmental and corpora t ion-f orm, is 
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more oriented towards the closed career system. No lateral 
entry is allowed in the departmental and corpora tion-f orm 
enterprises. Seniority and length of service are the most 
important criteria in any promotion exercise. , The rank 
and file is encouraged to obtain higher qualifications by 
the provision of study leave and scholarships. When they 
return from their studies and have accumulated the 
necessary. experience and competence, they are promoted to 
a higher, more responsible position in their 
organisations. Such a practice , 
does not apply to the 
company-form enterprises where promotion is based more on 
merit and performance of the individual employees. 
Outsiders may be taken to assume . 
important positions if 
candidates from within cannot be found for such job. This 
practice is possible because the government company form 
of enterprises, being assigned to operate like private 
companies, are not subjected to government civil service 
jurisdiction of the close career promotion system. - 
In order to be promoted, an employee in a Malaysian public 
enterprise has to pass a number of examinations within a 
certain period of working, years and that his yearly report 
by his immediate superior must be satisfactory. The 
immediate superior normally recommends to the higher 
authority the names of potential candidates to be 
promoted. Seniority is an important criteria in each 
promotion exercise so that no junior worker or officer 
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will bypass his senior colleagues unnecessarily and 
withoutý reasonable justification. However, in recent 
years a gradual change . has occurreU in this respect 
whereby more and more younger and promising workers are 
promoted over their older and senior , colleagues. This 
suggests a recognition of merit as an equally important 
consideration in promoting an employee. .II 
4.3.7.4. Trade Union 
There is a craf t union movement in the Malaysian public 
sector and* membership is - based on the -, occupation of the 
employee. Thus'employees working-in the'same organisation 
often belong to different, ý trade'unions depending on the 
job classifications. However, - labour unions''An Malaysia 
are strictly- confined to their -activities in, collective 
bargaining due to the restrictive labour regulations in 
the country. The principle of workers' control or even 
for -that matter., workers' participation' iný the 
administration , of public enterprises 
has . not , been 
accepted.,,, -There is. accordingly no trade union's or 
workers' representatives inthe public enterprise board., 
Because of.. the rather severe 'control- imposed by the 
Malaysian labour, law, the wages and conditions, of service 
in public enterprise sector is not determined by a "free-- 
f or-all I, mechanism based on collective bargaining. An 
explanation for- this - by the government'ý I which is 
-148- 
acceptable,, is that public enterprises , are considered 
public utilities (at least originally), and a volatile 
labour market is not in the best interests of the people. 
4.1A. Major Issues and Problems Facing Malaysian Public 
Enterprises. 
The present Minister of Finance was highly critical during 
his 1990 Budget speech especially of public enterprise in 
Malaysia. The Minister's admission about. the public 
enterprises' weaknesses during his 1990 Budget speech 
(Straits Times, 29 October, 1989) demonstrates how serious 
the state of affairs -in Malaysian public enterprises was. 
The minister was quite unhappy at the performance of some 
of , them and had misgivings about the slowness of the 
implementation of some projects. It seems that like the 
Japanese public- enterprises, the inefficiency syndrome is 
also. a, major problem in Malaysian public enterprises. The 
minister also complained of the high rate of termination 
of contracts given to private tenderers to'do certain jobs 
for these enterprises. Also, there have been a number of 
cases where the implementation of projects were delayed 
because of ýthe ýinability-of contractors to fulfil their 
obligations. - It was suggested by many critics that this 
was been the result of some dubious or unsound decisions 
made by the board- members in the awarding of contracts. 
It is not the intention of the author to highlight this 
issue, but suffice to say that based on the feedbacks from 
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the survey on the operations of public enterprises 
recently, there is some truth in the allegation. Indeed, 
an* examifiýtion of 79 public enterprises' by a government- 
appointed, private consultant found that poor performances 
of these enterpris'es were" the' result of management errors 
and financial imprudence (New Straits Times, Oct., 28, 
1989). This is only one aspect of the problem and there 
are many'other causes to be identified. The most' obvious 
reason for the problem experienced in the public 
enterprises is that their objectives as defined under the 
instruments of, their creation are often abstract and lack 
concrete guidelines. Throung (1976: p. 121) is very critical 
of such problem and' highlights the weakness of three 
public'enterprises as follows: - 
Example 1: MARA's Objectives 
to promote, stimulate, " facilitate and undertake 
economic and social development in the'Federation and more 
particularly in the rural areas thereof" (Section 6(l) 
MARA Act). 
Example 2: FELDA's Objectives 
..... to promote and assist the investigation, formulation 
and carrying out of projects for the development and 
settlement of land in the federation"' (Section 3(2), 
Ordinance 20/1956. ) 
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In his observation, Throung criticised the fact that there 
is an ambiguity of goals and a failure in quantifying 
these objectives in measurable term. This he added, makes 
it very difficult to measure the performance of these 
enterprises. 
In the pursuit of achieving the goals of NEP and in the 
quest of speeding up the pace of development in the 
country, many public 
-enterprises 
have been created to the 
point that some, of them have the same general functions. 
Many intellectuals are now questioning . the wisdom of 
creating them in the first place. They see the 
proliferation of public -enterprises, in the 1970s as 
unnecessary wastage of funds because of duplication of 
operation and activities. For example, public enterprises 
such as MARA, PERNAS, UDA and FIMA have the same 
objectives to help the Bumiputras in their commercial and 
industrial undertakings. Seen from this angle, it may be 
necessary to review their roles and functions so as to 
prevent further duplication and wastage of money and time. 
The earlier problem associated with the loosely defined 
objectives of public enterprises have been blamed for 
having caused infighting and squabbling among public 
enterprises themselves. Because of similarities in their 
functions, there exists an unhealthy rivalry and conflict 
between them especially when requesting for fundsv which 
4 
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it was found to be at the expense of overall development 
for the people. In light of this, it is not possible to 
achieve an efficient utiltsation of available resources. 
A number of weaknesses. is also to be found in the 
personnel management policies and- practices presently 
found in Malaysia. Firstly, there is the double ý standard 
practice which pervades the public sector with -regards to 
recruitment, remuneration and . promotion policies. 
Departmental form, and' corpora tion-f orm enterprises have 
one system determined by the Public Services Commission on 
one hand, while the company-form enterprises have their 
own , system that As ý independent of , the Public 
Services 
Commission's jurisdiction on the other. This has been the 
subject of intense controversy. -The, proponents of the 
present practice justify each variation by pointing that 
it is necessary as a catalyst to attract the best brains 
- they to the company-form enterprises. Such concessionst 
maintain, are - needed to ensure company-form public 
enterprises would perform -like private companies 'to bring 
in the necessary profits. Their employees -have ' to be 
treated differently, i. e. more pay ý as 'a means of 
incentives and that if they do not perform satisfactorily, 
they would be fired. The employees! 'from the departmental 
as well as corporation-form enterprises, it is argued, are 
just like civil service employees-in that they are merely 
providing- essential public services and are not expected 
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to bring profit for their organisations. They are 
expected, however, to discharge ý their duties efficiently. 
The employees in the company-type public enterprises 
therefore, are given better-terms of employment in-respect 
of wages, promotion, perks - etc. From the viewpoint of 
management science, this practice of different personnel 
management policy- to employees in the same sector is not 
wrong but can breed a lot of dissatisfaction , and 
unhappiness amongst employees who happen to be An the 
enterprises-which pay lower wages and give lesser perks. 
Secondly, a major problem experienced 'by Malaysian public 
enterprises is one relating to the shortage -of -qualified 
and trained personnel to staff the numerous organisations. 
Traditionally, the shortage is alarming with many top 
position in the 'public enterprises being unfilledý But at 
present, with the influx of university graduates, the 
situation is 'improving although the search for 
professional talents , with the necessary experience is 
still a problem in some key areas. For normal job 
openings, there , is however, no shortage of candidates as 
there is a continuous supply of. graduates from the seven 
universities and also from ITM which currently produces 
about 11,000 degree and 7,000 diploma graduates each year. 
The, crux of the problems seems to be that there is not 
enough effort being made towards developing a pool of 
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managerial talents to manage the public as well as private 
sectors. This may be the byproducts of , the practice of 
seconding senior civil servants-and armed forces personnel 
to occupy the managerial positions in public enterprises. 
Such practices hinder the internal development, of managers 
in a particular organisation. Not only would, this hampers 
the growth of a pool of professional talents, but it would 
also causes discontinuity, in the organisation concerned. 
It is 'a good thing to bring , outsiders into the 
organisation to , inject new blood given the vast 
experiences the civil 'servant 'or armed forces personnel 
may have, but, there is a real danger that their experience 
may not be suitable and hence applicable to public 
enterprises. This leads to public enterprises in Malaysia 
being managed by people with the wrong experiences and 
irrelevant expertise which renders them ineffective at 
their jobs. Such a system also limits promotion prospects 
from below in public enterprise sector. This of course can 
be a disincentive to those below.. 
There is also another related problem. It concerns the 
lack of suitable professionals in the public sector due to 
low pay and resignation resulting in a brain drain of 
talented executive from'-public enterprises to private 
enterprises in 'the country. Only in the company-form 
enterprises where the pay and terms of "employment are 
relatively better is the problem not acute. 
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Thirdly, the industrial relations in the public 
enterprises leave much to be desired (Puthucheary, 
1984: p. 10). ý Because the unions are weakened by the 
unfavourable labour laws, the workers are not represented 
to protect their interests regarding their terms of 
employment. The state of affairs of the Malaysians at the 
lower echelon of the ladder according to Puthucheary's 
opinion, is that of hardship and day-to-day survival 
compared to those in the higher level employment group of 
the white, collar workers. Unlike Japan, the pay difference 
between the blue collar and the white collar employees in 
Malaysia is very wide. For example, an employee occupying 
the highest grade in the public enterprise is paid 40 
times more than another employee of the lowest job 
category in the same organisation according to the 
calculations based on government circular regarding 
salaries and wages paid , to public employees 
(Circular 
No. 4,1984). It may be true to say that each : of them is 
paid differently because 'of the different contribution or 
degree of importance of each job, but when the disparity 
in pay is so large, something is obviously wrong. 
Fourthly, there are signs of a poor relationship between 
management and the employees. There are many factors that 
have contributed to an environment of suspiciont hatred 
and animosity. One of them is the disparity in pay coupled 
with employment terms of conditions in favour of the 
-155- 
management group. There is the centralised organisational 
structure that exists in public enterprises which in a way 
retards communication between the two groups. Another 
criticism is that the practice which bans even junior 
management group of employees from joining ýtheir non- 
managerial colleagues in unions, thus bringing about 
further segregation between them. 
It has been observed that employees are fearful of their 
superiors. During coffee breaks, managerial group 
congregates among themselves while the non-managerial 
group tends to mix among themselves. In activities outside 
office hours, the pattern of relationship follows along 
the same lines. It'is further noticed that even if there 
is outdoor activities organised for all employees to 
socialise, one always sees the 'boundary of distance that 
separate these two groups. Both parties are to be blamed 
as it is obvious that there is a lack of effort or rather 
initiative by them to create a warmer working 
relationship. It seems here that there is a serious "us 
vs. them" problem. 
Fif thly, there is some concern for 'the lack of 
professionalism displayed at the higher levels of 
management. In cases where the chairman and the managing 
director of a public enterprise are political appointees, 
there is always a problem involving what might be termed 
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as "management conflict". Being appointed to the office 
because of his political affiliation, the chairman or 
managing director is naturally inclined to oblige to the 
demand of his patron or those who - supported his 
appointment earlier. it therefore becomes almost 
impossible for him to become objective and independent in 
carrying out his duties as the chief executive- of the 
public enterprise. This problem also applies to other 
members of the board and top management' group who have 
been put in their positions directly or indirectly through 
political support and connections. In return for the 
favours received by them earlier, they sometimes have to 
reciprocate these favours especially of those who 
sponsored them. Thus policies have more often than not, 
have to be compromised because there is a lot of outside 
pressure and interference from influential figures and 
politicians. 
Sixthly, there is another problem thatý always occurs when 
the chairman of a public enterprise is a full-time 
politician. In a number of Malaysian public enterprises, 
the chairman cannot become an effective chief executive 
since he is preoccupied with politics and not being a 
professional. He would not be familiar with the nature of 
the enterprise's business. He therefore will have to 
depend on his subordinates or other board members for the 
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actual running of the enterprise and has to be contented 
with the role of a figure head. 
Seventhly, there is a trend in Malaysia to appoint someone 
who 'is already a chairman of one public enterprise', to sit 
as a chairman or a board member in a number of other 
public enterprises. Whatever the reasons given for such 
appointmeiifs', one consequence is obvious: that the 
chairman will not be able to devote his time either in his 
capacity as chairman or as board member of an enterprise 
simply because he has theoretically, to divide his time 
between the public enterprises of which he, is chief 
executiv6 and -other public enterprises in which he is a 
member of the highest decision-making bodies. If he is a. 
politician, it will 'almost amount to a disaster because 
how couldýhe find enough time for the enterprise he is 
involved with, when he has other commitments of a 
political nature. But despite this problem, politicians 
continue to become chief executives and board members of 
almost all'public enterprises in Malaysia. 
Lastly, there is a major problem faced by public 
enterprise when its chairman happens to be a chief 
minister of a state in which the said enterprise 'is 
located. Because the chief minister is' a politiciant he 
may use the corporation to further his Political 
ambitions. He may use the enterprise for his own personal 
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interests and that of his family, and close friend's. There 
was a case involving the Public Bank of Malaysia which had 
to be rescued by the government from bankruptcy in 1973 as 
a result of misuse of power by some prominent politicians 
including a chief minister. One is, left to wonder if the 
existing practices , that are rampant. in -some Southeast 
Asian countries especially Malaysia of putting politicians 
and ministers as chairmans or board members of public 
enterprises is wise from the management point of view. 
The problem that normally, happens when the chairman's post 
is held by the chief minister is that the board of 
directors can be rendered ineffective by a strong, 
domineering chief minister. Being the most powerful man in 
his state, he can dictate terms and run the enterprise as 
a one-man show with nobody to check him. This was the 
case in the 1960s. It was found out that the rate of 
development that was to be carried out by one public 
enterprise in one state slowed down because of the 
chairman who was then the chief minister was very 
domineering and used his own political influence in 
distributing land. He was said to be opposed to 
developing lands -in other areas not of political benefit 
to him. In cases like this, the board members cannot 
realise their roles as decision-makers and are at the 
best, rubber stamps endorsing their chairman's decisions. 
-159- 
However, it must be stressed here that in making this 
critical observationt not all past and present chief 
ministers in the thirteen states of Malaysia have abused 
their powers for political gains. 'One thing that can be 
said for sure is. that public enterprises have been 
subjected to , serious abuses in the past. Despite ý efforts 
by the government to eradicate this practice, there is 
still strong evidence that indicates that some public 
enterprises are still being used by politicians for 
political purposes rather than for achieving the 
objectives for which they have been originally created. 
From the above discussion, -it can be concluded that the 
Malaysian public enterprises have indeed a lot 'of 
managementý and non-management problems. What about the 
Japanese public enterprises? Are, they more efficient and 
have less problems-than the Malaysian public enterprises? 
Are there similarities or differences in problems they 
face? 
4.4. The Japanese Public Enterprise 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The Public enterprise sector in Japan has not'attracted as 
much attention of outside observers as has been accorded 
to the Japanese private enterprise sector. This is partly 
due to the fact that the Japanese public corporations and 
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government agencies have not performed as well as their 
counterparts An the private sector. Like the rest of 
public ýenterprises worldwide, public enterprises in Japan 
have not been spared the inefficiency problems.,: A number 
of them, especially Japan National Railway (JNR), have 
been found to be constantly running heavy losses in their 
yearly operations -and some have been privatised in, an 
effort to save them from bankruptcy., 
Johnson (1978: p2l) made an observation that some Japanese 
. public enterprises 
do have functions similar to their 
equivalents in Western Europe and the US, although the 
majority do not. Many Japanese analysts have beený of 
opinion that their public enterprises are much less 
efficient than some of those in the, West. Some leading 
Japanese experts on Japanese -public enterprises such as 
Professor Ueno, Professor Yoshitake and Professor Imashiro 
from whom- the author had personally asked for opinion 
(through mail survey) in 1988 shared the prevailing view 
that public enterprises in Japan are indeed inefficient. 
They suggested possible reasons for this: public 
corporations are being used as extensions of overt 
bureaucracies; as lucrative retirement spots for 
government, officials, and-also as possible breeding 
grounds for corrupt relations between government and 
business. In addition, other reasons such as the creation 
of public enterprises to carry out social objective 
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regardless of profit; the use of public enterprises as an 
instrument to -create more *employment opportunities; and 
vagueness of goals etc. are also important factors in 
contributing to the inefficiency of public enterprise 
sector in Japaný 
Johnson further found that public enterprises in Japan 
perform many diverse functions. They make loans available 
for the implementation of official policies in order to 
avoid low productivity or declining sectors of the 
economy. They also spend ' money to strengthen the 
industrial infrastructure or to develop resources. The 
public enterprises are also used to stabilised prices; 
produce revenue; do research. Public' enterprises in Japan 
also play a role as a medium of governmental licensing and 
approval of private economic - activities, extensive 
consultation between the government and the private 
sector, so-called administrative guidance of the economy 
by, the . government, informal public-private 
interconnections through retired government officials who 
become executives for profit-making corporations, and 
other old-boy networks. 
4.4.2. History of Public Enterprises 
Like many other countries'in the worldq Japan has created 
public enterprises to carry out governmental functions' of 
a social and economic nature. These organisations are 
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called, the Tokushu or special corporations. Although, they 
are under the special supervision of the government 
because of their public responsibilities, they are granted 
autonomy and flexibilityin management for the purposes of 
performing their operations efficiently. 
The origin of the independent public organisations was in 
the government undertakings in the textile, steel, and 
shipping industries after the 1868 Meiji Restoration. They 
were subsequently converted into private enterprises in 
the early 1880's (Yoshitake, 1976: p. 44). ,I 
During the first ten years after the World War IIj large 
public corporations such . as the Japanese 
National 
Railways, the Japan, Tobacco & Salt Public Corporation, 
and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation 
were established. Financial organisations were also 
established. for aiding imports and exportsl industrial 
development,,, small and medium businesses, agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, and housing construction. Special 
companies such as the Electric Power Development Company, 
Japan Air Lines Co. Ltd. , and Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co. 
were also established during this period. 
The following ten years (1956-65) saw the establishment of 
the corporations in charge of public works, such as road 
construction, development of water resources, social and 
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economic programs, and research activities. As a result, 
the total number of public corporations increased to 104 
by 1965 compared to only 21 in 1946. The number of public 
corporations reached a peak of 113 in 1967. Since then, 
there have been some reorganisation, and a policy of 
restraint on the establishment of public corporations has 
been put into effect. 
Yoshit'ake (1976: p. 69) said that the rapid growth of public 
enterprises in 1960s in Japan was due ýto the rapid 
economic growth at that period which caused an imbalance 
between the private and public sectors. Many public 
enterprises were established to rectifyýthis imbalance. He 
also further suggested that a large number , of public 
enterprises was created because of the government's desire 
to create employment opportunities during the said period. 
4.4.3. Classification of Japanese Public Enterprises 
Jaýanese Public enterprises, according to a number of 
writers in Japan (Tsuji, 1984; Yoshitake, 1973) can be 
classified by'their titles namely: 
4.4.3.1. Kosha 
These are corporations which were once directly run by the 
national government and financed by special accounts. 
After the war, - they were established as independent 
organisations to perform their business in the form of 
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private concerns. They are fully financed by the 
government and their budget is subject to the approval of 
the Diet. The final accounts must also be submitted to the 
Diet. The employees are granted the right of collective 
bargaining but not the right to strike. There are 3 public 
corporations in this category namely the Japanese National 
Railways(JNR) - now renamed Japan Railway (JR), the Japan 
Tobacco & Salt Public Corporation, and the Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation. Deregulation 
and privatisation have occurred in Japan, as elsewhere in 
the world, and these three major corporations are now 
privatised. However, the nature of government control of 
these, organisations, is still under discussion -but it is 
still considerable and they might be best be regarded as 
hybrid corporations moving from public sector towards 
private sector (for a detail discussion on this, please 
refer to Gow, 1989). 
4.4.3.2. Kodan 
These are corporations which carry out publid works such 
as the- construction of roads and airports and the 
development of water resources and forest roads. Their 
main source of finance is capital investment and loans by 
the, national government. Some of. these corporations 
receive capital investments from local public entities. 
Those corporations include The Japan Highway, Public 
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Corporation and the Housing and Urban Development Public 
Corporation. 
I 
4.4.3.3. Jigyodan 
These are corporations created as instruments to implement 
social policy programs concerning welfare and employment, 
industrial policy programs for the ý development of 
agriculture, small and medium-sized enterprises, coal etc. 
They also implement various policy programs for technology 
development and technical cooperation abroad. They are 
smaller in size than kodan and their commercial character 
is weak. Their sources of capital vary: some are fully 
financed by the national government, while others receive 
capital investment from the local public . entities or from 
private sources. Examples' of such corporations are 
National Space Development Agency and the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency. 
4.4.3.4. Koko 
Koko are financial corporations which supplement the 
operation of commercial finance institutions by financing 
special projects such as agriculturel forest and fishing 
industries, small and medium-sized ''enterprises, and 
housing construction at a policy-oriented rate of 
interest. They are' fully financed by the national 
government. Their source for loans is capital and loans 
from the national government. The budget and financial 
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accounts of the koko are subject to the approval of the 
Diet, . as in the case of Kosha. An example of such a 
corporation is the Housing Loan Corporation. 
4.4.3.5. Ginko 
These are corporations which have much in common with Koko 
They play a supplementary role to commercial financial 
institutions. Their capital is fully financed by the 
national government and also their budgets as well as 
final accounts are under the control of the Diet. The only 
feature. that differentiates them, from koko is that they 
enjoy -more autonomy and operate more as enterprises than 
Kokos do for their - business plans. and operational 
procedures can be prepared independently without the 
approval of the sponsoring ministers. The Japan 
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Japan 
belong to this category of public enterprise. 
4.4.3.6. Kinko 
They are corporations set up for the purpose of financing 
cooperatives. They normally issue bonds to be used as 
sources - for loans. They maintain a strong autonomy in 
operations due to the fact that, unlike, koko and Ginko, 
they are free from government control- in preparing their 
business plans and budgets. Included in this category are 
the Central Cooperative Bank for Agriculture and Forestry 
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and the Central Bank for Commercial and Industrial 
Cooperatives. 
4.4.3.7. Eidan 
The Teito Rapid Transit Authority is the only corporation 
classified under this category. 
4.4.3.8. Tokushu-gaisha 
They are-often referred to as special companies. Japan Air 
Lines Co. Ltd. is one of them. They provide public 
services 'in the manner of a joint-stock corporation in 
fields such as international air transportationp electric 
power development, international electric' communication, 
and-' investment for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Some receive capital and loans directly from the national 
government, some indirectly, and some receive no aid. 
Although there are 'Certain legal provisions of government 
control over their business management, they maintain 
stronger autonomy than other public corporations. 
4.4.3.9. Others 
Corporations classified under this category have titles 
such as Kenkyusho (Research institute), Kumiai 
(association) Shinkokai (promotion society), and Kikin 
(foundation). These -corporations carry out research, 
mutual benefit payments, and related services to workers 
in certain occupational areas, maintenance of facilities, 
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inspection and authorisation, management of public races, 
insurance of loans, etc. Their source of capital and the 
extent of government control vary according to the type of 
business. 
4.4.4. Reasons for the Establishment of Public 
Corporations 
There are a number of reasons for the establishment of 
public enterprises in Japan. They include the following: 
M. Like the corporations of other countries, Japan 
created public corporations to perform- governmental 
functions with-more flexibility in financial or personnel 
management compared with direct operation by the national 
government. The- flexibility in the use-of funds, self- 
procurement of funds$ flexibility in contract procedure 
and autonomy in employment are some examples of the 
flexibility enjoyed by public corporations. 
(ii). Public-corporations may use the aid of local public 
entities or private sources in terms of finance and 
personnel. 
(iii). Independence from the national, government is 
assured especially in the important field of promotion of 
academic activities or research on labour relations. , 
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(iv). Public corporations are necessary to provide a 
continuous and stable service like electricity and water 
utilities. 
(v). The establishment of public corporations is also 
needed when the' amount 'of capital required for operation 
i-S too large for a private corporation or enterprise to 
handle. 
(vi). The creation 'of public, corporation also takes place 
when operation of projects by private institutions or 
organisations 'is difficult to undertake due to high risks 
involved or the small prospect of profit. 
(vii). The American Occupation-forces's desire to break up 
the militant labour movement in the public sector by the 
splitting of of the JNR and Tobacco & Salt , Public 
Corporation. ' 
4.4.5. Power and Government Control of Japanese Public 
Enterprises 
Public enterprises are given certain' powers and are 
supervised by the national government in the -conduct 'of 
their business as stipulated by law. The mode, of 
supervision by the national government and the power of 
public corporation -differ according to their' different 
functions. 
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In general, public enterprises conduct their business in 
accordance with a business plan, budget, and financial 
plan drawn up each year under the supervision of 
respective Ministers. They are given exclusive 'rights to 
the business. In order to implement their business 
operations, they are granted land expropriation rights and 
coercive collection rights. In, most cases., detailed 
business operations are prescribed in the operation 
procedure documents which must be approved by the 
Minister. "Compensation for services such as fees, loan 
interest rates etc. must also ýbe 'authorised by the 
Minister concerned. 
The Minister responsible for the''public enterprises have 
the power to appoint or authorise the selection of the 
officers of the corporations. Employees are recruited by 
the corporations themselves. In most cases, salaries of 
the officers and employees are paid according to the 
standards set by the minister. 
Yoshitake (1973: p. 257) gave a good description of the 
state of public enterprises in --Japan. He said the 
management of public enterprises can be classified into 
three, types namely -the policy board type; the functional 
board type and the monocratic type. Of the 108 enterprises 
in 1973,100 of them belonged to the last type and the 
rest were of the other two types. The reason for this can 
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be found in the multiplication of public enterprises - 
that is, public enterprises created as a branch office of 
government departments. He argued that they are "nothing 
but sources of re-employment for retired civil servants". 
4.4.6. The Present State of Japanese Enterprises and their 
Problems -,. A -Case Study of the Japanese National Railway 
(JNR). 
4.4.6.1ý History and Objective of the'Corporation 
JNR was established by the nationalisation of the railways 
in 1906 and was reformed as a Public Corporation in 1949. 
It has a total -track length of 20300 kilometre. As of 
March, 1981,, JNR employs 413,594 people. Since railroad 
has; been the backbone of'domestic transportation in Japan 
for more than a century, JNR became a very important 
public enterprise in the transportation industry. It 
carried 25 percent of the- passengers and 8 percent of the 
freight -handled by Japan's total, domestic transportation 
in 1980 (Tsuji, 1984: p. 47). However, faced by competition 
from the rapidly growing auto-transport in the 1960s, its 
dominance in transportation industry began to erode and 
soon it got into deep financial trouble. This led to its 
present restructuring. In April 1987, JNR was privatised 
and broken up into nine corporations, two special 
corporations and one foundation and renamed Japan Railway 
(JR) (Imashiro 1988: p. 1). 
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The objective of the JNR is the operation of the railway 
transportation system on the nationally-owned railroad 
network. JNR Act stated that it was established as tokushu 
houjin (special corporation) to improve the welfare of the 
general public. 
4.4.6.2. Accounting and Financial Set-up 
The accounting system of the Japanese public enterprise 
sector adopts a dual system of accounts. The present 
accounts of the JNR are made according to the trading 
principle, but not on a cash basis. At the same time, an 
additional report prepared according to the division of 
the national budget to which it applies. The two different 
kinds of reports are submitted to the Minister of 
Transport. The Auditing Committee which is established by 
JNR 'audits only 'the financial statements which is to be 
submitted to the Minister of Transport. Most of the 
enterprise's revenue is derived from the sale of 
passengers' tickets. Since 1964 the JNR has been operating 
in the red. JNR reported a loss of 1,847.8 billion yen in 
1985. (refer to Exhibit 4.2). 
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Exhibit 4.2: Income Statement of JNR for 1985 
Overall Balance (billion yen) 
-r General Account 
Details 
Expenses Revenue 
5.582.4 3.734.6 
Loss 
-1.847.8 
(Deducting Special 
Labor Lost and Others) 
General Loss 
1.530.0 Special Labor Cost and Shinkansen Capital Expenses 
Special Account 
347.7 1 347.7 
Interest Subsidy and 
and Others Others 
Exhibit 4.3: Balance Sheet of JNR for 1985 
General Account 
Tangible Long-ter 
Assets Debt 
9,829.5 18,240.9 
'r-- 2,073.3 
S? 
> Deferred 
Charges 
8,801.1 
r 1.625-5 
Other 
Liabilities 
- Equity 
Special Account 
Deferred Long-term 
Cbarges Debt 
5.320.1 5.320.1 
(billion yen) 
(Source: Report of JNR Audit 1985) 
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4.4.6.3. Organisational Structure 
The structure . of organisation -in public enterprises is 
based on the structure and relationship of the family 
group (Bird, 1983; Brosnan, 1982: Ozaki, 1978 and Nakane, 
1973). It is no exception in the case of JNR. Families 
have hierarchical, interdependent relationship within 
relatively small and intimate groups. A strong emphasis is 
placed in seeing to it that .' all employees in one get 
along with each other because the group ensures both rank 
and survival for the individual member. That being so, the 
Japanese employees in public enterprises, like their 
counterparts in private sector, work in groups. The 
success of, their organisation depends on each member 
contributing utmost in his capacity as an employee. As 
such, an individual who may not be able to perform 
adequately on certain occasion, may not be penalised for 
what is usually viewed as a temporary incapacity. The 
others in -the group normally cover the neglected duties. 
It was infact. pointed out that this type of understanding 
is best portrayed by the popular depiction of a Japanese 
festival called omikoshi (Brosnan, 1985: p. 89). 
As is the case in private companies, harmony among 
employees in public enterprises is stressed within the 
group. Internal bickering and disruptive competition are 
frowned upon so that the smooth running of Jobs ensured. 
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Harmony is also highlighted to help ensure the necessary 
staff continuity. 
4.4.6.4. JNR in Relation to the Government 
JNR) has been' operating on a self-supporting basis. 
However, many important management matters are subject to 
the decision of the Diet or to the supervision by the 
Ministry of Transport, though the powers and 
responsibilities to act on all matters are entrusted to 
the president of JNR. Matters subject to the Diet's 
decision include the compilation of annual budget and the 
basic rates of passenger fares and freight charges 
Appointment -and dismissal of officers such as the 
president, vice presidentq chief engineer and other board 
members- are under ' the jurisdiction of Minister of 
Transport. Other matters subject to the said Minister 'are 
the construction of new lines; suspension or abolishment 
of any of the routes under its operation; electrification 
and other major projects; disposal of any of its important 
assets; borrowing of operating funds and issuing railway 
bonds and investment in allied enterprises. 
4.4.6.5. Some Administrative Policies and Procedures 
Opinion polls in Japan ýrevealed that the general public 
have a low image of the performance by JNR employees. -The 
JNR's employees are accused -of being unprofessional in 
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discharging their services resulting in many delays of 
train departures. It 'has been also found out that other 
public enterprises' employees are not highly regarded too. 
They have been under attack by the press and publicly 
berated by politicians and , academics alike. Like JNR's 
employees. they are considered inept and inefficient and 
blamed for most of the shortcomings and failures of 
government-. JNR workers do not escape such criticism 
because the service-provided by JNR is very inefficient as 
compared to the private railway companies. Perhaps, an 
insight to the public enterprise's typical management 
practices would be useful to find why this has been so. 
(i). Recruitment - In Japanese public enterprise sector, 
recruitment and hiring of employees are conducted as two 
sides of the coin. This is especially true of in the case 
of JNR. Japanese are recruited and hired by organisations 
on the basis ýof educational level attained, school 
attended, and the reputation of employing organisation. An 
important , determinant of employment is the educational 
background of, the applicants (Brosnan, 1985: p. 90-95). 
The level. of education completed normally determines the 
placement level of the worker in the organisation as well 
as the track that will be followed for future advancement. 
Young men who complete junior high school are usually 
employed as clerks, assembly workers, or generally 
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unskilled labourers. High school and Vocational school 
leavers are employed as skilled craft workers, 
technicians, and eventually shop foreman while junior 
college graduate fill lower level posts in administrative 
operations. University graduates are hired to fill 
positions. of management level. The ý government has two 
levels of entrance examinations for university graduates 
who aspire to be government managers - the Senior Class A 
and the Senior Class B Examination (NPA,, 1981: p. 11-153). 
The individuals who get through the Class A examination 
may be considered for higher management positions while 
those who-pass the Class B examination may be eligible for 
junior management jobs up to the rank of section chief 
(NPAp 1981: p. 144-153). - 
(ii). Training - The training program -at JNR is not much 
different from its counterpart in the public enterprise 
sector. Training for specific jobs and skills required by 
the organisation is the responsibility of an employer. An 
employee usually has to undergo an initial three month 
orientation program consisting of classes and "boot camp" 
type exercise (Brosnan, 1985). Following orientation, the 
recruits are formally accepted into the organisation and 
the job-related training begins at this point and 
continues from time to time in the form of on the job 
training and job-rotation within the organisation. The 
job-rotation which normally occurs every two or three 
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years f or each employee, is most frequently used as a 
training tool because Japanese employer believes that it 
helps its employee to comprehend the total system of the 
organisation. With this type of arrangement, an individual 
employee would develop a clear understanding of the 
importance of every department within the context of the 
overall organisation. 
Another popular training method involves the Sempai-Kohai 
relationship. This ýprocedure, which literally means 
"Senior-Junior", assigns a new employee to an older, more 
senior member who will be a patron and mentor for the 
young man. This relationship is quite significant in 
determining the employee's future career. Promotion 
opportunities and also post retirement employments as well 
as introduction to prospective mates can all be 
significantly influenced by the success of this 
relationship. 
(M). Promotion - Promotion and wage decisions in 
Japanese organisations including JNR, are based primarily 
on seniority. Promotion is a slow process and systematic. 
There is -no such thing as "fast rising star" in the 
Japanese public enterprises. Promotion through the lower 
ranks is automatic and accomplished by class. The class 
consists of all the employees who are hired in the same 
year. Brosnan observed that: 
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loseniority is as much a matter of the number of years in 
the organisation as it is the chronological age of the 
employee, although, in this 'system ,* these characteristics 
correlate very closely" (Brosnan, 1985: p. 101)., 
He went on to say that as the class moves up through the 
organisational pyramid, higher positions would not be 
available to all. At this stage, criteria in'-addition to 
seniority have to be used. Merit is the criterion most 
frequently applied (NPA, 1981: p. 144-153). 
(iv). Salary and Wages - The amount of salary or wage paid 
to public enterprise employýes depends on the length of 
service they have been with the organisation. For 
instance, a newly recruited employee will earn very much 
less than another employee who is 5 years his senior in 
service. Likewise, the employee who is nearing the 
retirement age will earn the most compared to his 
colleagues of the same job'classification. Of course, for 
each job category, there is a different set of wages. In 
addition to the basic salary oIr wage, each 'employee 'is 
eligible for several allowances. These include family 
allowances, housing allowances, transportation allowances 
and special hardship allowance in the case where employees 
are sent to work places that are not convenience to them 
(i. e. for being tI ransferred to non-preferred or expensive 
areas). Compared to the employees in private industry, the 
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public enterprise employees receive less compensation. For 
example, they do not receive a summer and winter bonus as 
part of their wage package like their counterparts in the 
private enterprises. I 
4.4.6.6. Problems Faced by JNR? j 
The main problem with JNR is that it was constantly 
operating at a loss. It fell into the red from 1964. In 
1980, its capital stood at 456 billion yen; total business 
revenue. was 2,667.2 billion yen; the net loss was 1,008.4 
billion yen, and government subsidization amounted to 
676.1 billion yen. By 1985 it had accumulated debts of 23 
trillion yen (about US$130 million), with a peak single 
year loss of 1850 billion yen (about US$10 billion) in 
1985 (Imashiro, 1989: p. 1). The financial position of JNR 
was obviously not in good. shape as was evidenced from the 
JNR Audit of 1985 presented in- . Exhibit 
4.2 and Exhibit 
4.3. This led to its privatisation in 1987. 
Why did JNR accumulated, a large deficit? Three factors 
come , 
into play according to Imashiro (1988: p. 6-9). 
Firstly, there is a fierce competition from the growing 
road transport and airline industry coupled with the 
relatively efficient private rail lines which have taken 
much of the business away from JNR. This opinion is shared 
by Handa (1987: p. 6) who observed that JNR's most serious 
rival is automobile industry. Secondly, the growth in 
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volume of transportation industry has remained lacklustre. 
This is made' worst by the poor and unreliable services 
offered by JNR'(i. e. suspension of service due to internal 
problems) which produced great public discontent and hence 
sped the shift of passengers away from the rail system* 
Lastly the effect of inflation and the increasing labour 
costs have constantly pushed up the total operational cost 
of JNR. This caused financial burden to the enterprise and 
require'" drastic measures. But this was not done until it 
the situation became very critical in 1987. The reason for 
this is because, being a public enterprise with the 
interests'of public as the most important priority, JNR 
could not' take drastic measures such as discontinuing 
unprofitable lines like the private railway companies do. 
JNR's problem is further complicated due to its role as a 
national service enterprise. JNR was established mainly to 
cater for the transportation needs of the Japanese public 
especially in the countryside regions where it has to 
compete with private railway companies , and also' other 
forms of land transportations. In earlier days, there is 
no problem because most rural people depended on railway 
for travel. Today, ' the'Japanese do not depend very much on 
railways as they used to be. 'Imashiro (1989: p. 3) mentioned 
that in rural areas of Japan, each family owns more than 
one 'car and people rely less on public transport. He 
reasoned out that this is one of the causes of the 
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decline in rail usage -resulting in JNR to operate in a 
loss year after year. 
There is also another dimension to the problem faced by 
JNR. As an government enterprise, JNR can be considered 
as the victim of bureaucracy. With it comes the normal 
problem such as the lax office procedure and bureaucratic 
management. The public also never support the institution 
after the the raw treatment they get from JNR. The public 
were unhappy with the amateurish attitude, of customer 
service and relatively expensive fare compared to the 
private railway companies. This poor corporate image did 
not help JNR at all. 
The debt situation became so bad in 1971 with a huge 
operating loss before depreciation of 234 billion yen that 
there was an urgent necessity to reestablish soundness in 
its management. 1 
Numerous programs to get the JNR back on 
its feet are being implemented, such as better management 
environment, reduction in number of employees (70,000 by 
1985), and-switching local railway services to bus 
transportation via the privatisation which took place in 
1987. Although some management problems still remain and 
are yet to be ironed out, the newly revamped JR is 
operating profitably (Masatake and Taro, 1988: p. 65-69). 
For instance, East JR recorded a pretax of 60 billion yen 
and Central JR had a pretax of 50 billion yen (Togii, 
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1988: p. 29). It is not the intention of the author to 
discuss the restructuring and privatisation of JNR here 
for what is intended in this discussion is to provide a 
scenario of a typical Japanese public enterprise and some 
of the major problems it faces. Clearly, in the case of 
JNR, the problem does not -lie in the inefficient 
management system of the organisation alone for the 
situation there is- far more complex than the 
management/mismanagement issues. 
4.4.7. Problems Faced by Japanese Public Enterprises as a 
Whole 
To have a more up-to-date insights of the public present 
enterprises in Japan, mail questionnaires were sent, June, 
1989 to 50 Japanese scholars (mostly, management 
professors, management consultants and those in senior 
management positions in public enterprises). Eighteen of 
them replied and some of their personal comments- are 
presented-below. 
The Japanese management techniques and policies such as 
QCC, job-rotation, open office system which are used in 
private enterprises are 'also used in public enterprises. 
However, there are some substantial differences in 
approach and philosophy although the management 
techniques between the private and'public enterprises are 
not that much different. While private enterprises are 
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operated mostly for profit, public enterprises are 
established with the overriding objective of providing 
public services. The case of JNR whose main objective is 
to provide rail transport service is a manifestation of 
this. In striving to generate-, profit, the private 
enterprises have to be continually efficient and 
competitive. Their management style is therefore very 
dynamic, systematic and flexible to volatile environment. 
The public enterprises do not have these-elements in them 
because they are just instruments for the government to 
carry out service-oriented projects that are not 
profitable at all. 
The management styles witnessed in public enterprises are 
aligned with the established procedures that have been set 
up in the, pre-modern era. The executives are not so much 
concerned with profit as long as they are efficient in the 
discharge of public duties. In other words, unlike their 
counterparts in the private sectorg they do not normally 
create initiatives to face changing situation; rather they 
reacted to changing environments. This is where public 
enterprises are very weak at because by the time they try 
to respond to problems that have cropped up, -it will be 
too late. 
A number of. Japanese professors who participated in the 
author's mail survey were of opinion that Japanese public 
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enterprises are far from satisfactory because of two 
reasons namely; (i). they are initiated and controlled by 
bureaucracy and not by people as a whole and (ii). the 
people do not' have enough understanding about nor the 
sympathy for the public enterprises. It has been the views 
of most Japanese scholars that the. dilemma facing public 
enterprises in Japan has been due to the use of these 
corporations as extensions of overt bureaucracy, i. e as 
lucrative retirement spots for government officials. This 
leads to a possible breeding ground for corrupt relations 
between the government and business. 
There -are however some managers in Japanese public 
enterprises who realise that they must manage along the 
private line to be competitive and successful like the 
private enterprises, but it is difficult for them to do so 
with the so many restrictions, i. e. red tapes, imposed on 
them. Unless the bureaucratisation problem is tackled, 
there is not much these managers can do. 
It is clear from the discussion above, the public 
enterprises in Japan share the same dilemmas as the 
typical public enterprises. It might be thought that with 
Japan's much vaunted management style's excellencep the 
Japanese public sector enterprises would in fact be 
efficiently run. However, the reverse is the case and they 
manifest many of the weaknesses to be found in public 
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corporations elsewhere. This might be encouraging in one 
way but it does cause a problem if the Japanese have 
failed to transfer their best management techniques into 
their own public sector. 
In summary, it can be concluded that public enterprises, 
whether those in Malaysia or in Japan, face the same 
universal reality. They are government instruments created 
for achieving certain government purposes* Because these 
objectives more often than not, run counter to the 
objective of generating profit, they always face problems 
of low productivity, inefficiency and -mismanagement. It 
can be concluded from the above discussion, public 
enterprises worldwide including those in Japan and 
Malaysia, face similar problems although the magnitude of 
these problems may not necessarily be the same. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
JAPANESE-STYLE MANAGEMENT 
5.1. Objectives of the Chapter 
This chapter is the backbone of the thesis. It attempts to 
provide a literature review of Japanese-style 
management. The chapter begins with a brief history of 
Japan as a major economic power. This is followed by a 
discussion suggesting reasons for the recovery and success 
of Japan. -Lastly, this -study describes the various 
elements of Japanese management practices, - the merits and 
demerits of these practices, based on the available 
current literature. This part of the discussion would be 
addressed as follows; firstly, the functional aspects of 
Japanese-style management is discussed; then, the 
operational aspects; and finally, the major practices of 
stereo-typed Japanese-style management. 
What is being described here as the Japanese-style 
management represents the traditional Japanese management 
features and therefore, some may say, does not depict a 
true picture of ýJapanese-style management occurring in 
Japan today. The author agrees with this view. The 
discussion has been specifically confined to the stereo- 
typed Japanese-style management which, came into prominence 
in the last two decades. For the purpose of this study, 
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it is referred to as the traditional or stereo-typed 
Management Model which had developed mostly from the early 
days of post-war Japan's industrialisation period. The 
reason for choosing these traditional Japanese practices 
is that it is these Japanese practices that created a lot 
of interest 'among scholars, policy-makers and 
practitioners throughout the world, in the mid 1970s and 
also early 1980s. 
There is also a more important reason why the author has 
chosen to focus on the stereo-type Japanese management 
practices rather than the latest Japanese-style management 
(for detail, refer to Okazaki, 1989). When Malaysia first 
attempted to import Japanese-style management into the 
country, what policy-makers and leading politicians in the 
country were particularly keen to transfer was precisely 
those typical or stereo-typed Japanese management 
practices, which at that time, were said to have been 
used very successfully in Japanese firms. 
There will be however, some discussion throughout the 
chapter regarding some, new trends in the development of 
Japanese-style management which have occurred of late. 
The author is well aware that like any management system, 
the Japanese-style management is not static and -obviously 
it is undergoing some changes in response to a new social 
environment within and outside Japan to which Japan must 
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react. Such a development will not be given wide coverage 
as it constitutes a separate unit of study in itself. 
The main aim of of this chapter is to highlight in a 
simple manner the most common Japanese-style management 
practices used by the Japanese corporations especially in 
the 1970s and mid 1980s that catapulted Japan into 
prominence worldwide. This discussion together with other 
related discussions - in the remaining chapters, will be 
used by the author to address the transferability issues 
of Japanese-style management and subsequently to arrive 
at a conclusion regarding which of these practices would 
be transferable to or/and adopted by the Malaysian public 
enterprise sector. 
5.2. Japan as a Superpower 
Japan is an island nation lying off the east coast of 
Asia. It has the general shape of a crescent and extends 
1860 miles from tip to tip. The country is made up of four 
main lands namely Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and Hokaido 
which, together with more than 4,000 small islands are 
collectively referred to as the Japanese Archipelago. 
Japan has a land area of 146,000 sq. miles. For comparison 
purpose, Japan is slightly larger than the size of 
Malaysia, one twenty-sixth that of China and one twenty- 
fifth that of the United States (US). In this land of 
-190- 
rising sun, there lives about 120 million industrious 
people. 
Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan has used the 
advýnced countries of the West as its model for 
modernisation (Morishimas 1982: p. 52). The main goal of 
Japanese people then was to copy the western technologies 
of ýthe time. This they-did very well. Now, the Western 
countries are beginning to realise how fast Japan has 
caught up with them and in fact a number of western 
countries which taught the Japanese advanced technologies 
many years ago are learning the the latest technologies 
and managerial practices from Japan. 
The Japanese and theirý technology have not been highly 
regarded by people in the West until very recently. Hayes 
said that: 
it twenty years ago most Americans pictured the Japanese 
factory as a sweatshop, teeming with legions of low-paid, 
low skilled workers trying*to imitate by hand, with great 
effort and infrequent successes, what skilled American and 
European workers were doing with sophisticated equipments 
and procedures" (Hayes, 1981: p. 57). 
That image has long gone. Today, the Japanese have won the 
respect, admiration and perhaps envy of those who once 
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looked down on them as a result of their ability to flood 
the international markets with cheap but high quality 
products from Seiko quartz watches t'o Toyota cars. The 
idea that "Made in Japan" is synonymous with poor quality 
is long dead (The Star, June 26,1982). 
The pace of industrial isation in Japan during the last 
hundred years has been most remarkable, and this 
incredible achievement has attracted serious attention 
worldwide. -In a mere two. decades, -after the destruction 
caused by-World War II, Japan has again emerged as one of 
the world's great industrial nations. 
By the 1980s, Japan had become a leading ýeconomic, 
(especially manufacturing) industrial ýand also 
increasingly a technological, scientific and financial 
power. She has overtaken the US as a leading manufacturer 
of automobiles and consumer electronic goods. She was for 
sometime the leading shipbuilding country (only recently 
overtaken by South, Korea) in the world and constructs 
about half of the world tonnage. She also leads the world 
in the production and use of microcomputer-controlled 
robots. Japan has long replaced- West Germany as the 
leading manufacturer of high quality cameras and lenses. 
The Japanese have outstripped the Swiss as the global 
Titan in watch-making and are narrowly behind the, Germans 
as the world's largest exporter of textiles. 
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The GDP per capita in Japan today also is higher than that 
of US. The Japanese balance of trade surplus was at its 
highest in 1986, at approximately 5% of GNP (Giraud, 
1987: p. 385). In recent years, Japanese productivity has 
increased at some 400 percent of the rate enjoyed by the 
United States (Cosier and Dalton, 1986: p. 63). She is 
indeed the the new superpower. What are the key secrets 
for her enormity of success as a superpower? 
5.3. Factors Contributing to Japan's Success 
Before' focussing on Japanese-style management itself, 
there are many other factors or variables which would have 
to be taken into account, which underlie Japanese-style 
management. Many factors have been put forward explaining 
the reasons for the so-called Japanese miracle. The 
author would 'like to 'discuss some of the most important 
variables that have been most frequently quoted as 
contributing'to the Japan's postwar phenomenal'success. 
5.3.1. The Government-Business Collaboration. 
The cooperation between the government, the bureaucracy and 
the big -business in Japan is one of the contributing 
factors that has helped Japan to develop into a highly 
successful nation. The 'conspiracy' theorists'argued that 
the basis of Japan's success as a developed economy has 
been attributed to the very high degree of industrial co- 
ordination between producers, banks and government 
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(Bishop, 1981: p. 43). The role of government via the 
Ministry of International Trade Industry (MITI) which 
works closely with the industrialists has been 
instrumental in shaping, directing and assisting Japan's 
industrial development. Rosenberg (1986: p. 53) mentioned 
that the West has labelled the Japanese government- 
business cooperation-as "Japan Incorporated" whereby the 
government has manifested its serious committment to make 
Japanese industry competitive on the world market., 
The strong committment given especially by the early 
Japanese government to the industry is to be understood in 
view of the fact that Japan is comparatively a late 
starter in industrialisation. The government has not much 
choice but to encourage, guide and bully her 
industrialists into, channelling their efforts into areas 
which the state saw as the best for, the nation (Gow,, 
1987: p. 15). However Gow did not see this as a conspiracy. 
Such- allegations may be partiallyý true of the 1950's. 
However MITI moved from the key actor in a planned 
developmental stage in the 1950's to theý role of an 
indicative planner in the 19601s; but in 1970's and 1980's 
MITI had simply been content to provide a vision statement 
based on great - collaboration with industries (Johnson, 
1982: p. 25-28). Today the Japanese government takes a more 
advisory role in part because of the major changes in the 
external environment and to some extent, in the internal 
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environment. It is also said that Japanese have evolved a 
systems approach where' the joint objective of government 
and business has been to achieve the national and 
enterprise goal of economic development and higher 
productivity (Keegan, 1975: p. 66)ý- 
5.3.2. Historical Factor 
The success story of Japan could not have happened without 
the help of the historical events that she had undergone. 
This is what many writers called historical ýfactors. The 
defeat in World War II suffered by Japan was in fact -a 
blessing in disguise. From the debris of -major 
donventional and atomic bombing,, she was forced to start 
from scratch as she is poor in natural resources of her 
own. In order to survive, ' she had to devise an effective 
technological strategy to catch up with the West (Kassem, 
1974: p. 36). This was the second time 'that Japan has to 
adopt the pursuer model to catch up. Some writers believed 
strongly that' it , is , this "catch-up" mentality of the 
Japanese which has ý helped to drive the' Japanese to 
become a leading nation today. After the war, Japan was 
forbidden to rebuild her military strength. There is a 
school of thought which argues that had Japan not entered 
and subsequently lost the war, perhaps she would have 
become 'a strong military power today, 'like for instance 
the U. S. S. R, which is very powerful militarily -but is 
lacking behind economically. Such a hypothesis, may appear 
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extreme, but nevertheless, the fact remains that as a 
result of the imposed constitution (i. e Article 9) by the 
Allied Forces which prevented her from becoming a powerful 
military state, she was forced to chart a new course, 
i. e. the economic reconstruction, and has succeeded in 
becoming a powerful nation economically. , 
There is however another school of thought which claims 
that because of the humility suffered from the war, there 
has been a strong widespread feeling of anti-militarism 
among the new generation of the Japanese. They want 
nothing to do with war. However, they did not discard the 
ol& ambition of becoming a number one nation. This led 
some scholars to subscribe to the so-called New Co- 
Prosperity Sphere theory in explaining Japan's rise as an 
economic giant. The theory suggests that it has been the 
national -wish of the Japanese to conquer the world 
by 
economic means which she has failed to do-so by military 
might. Although this view is rather controversial, there 
are certainly some people (including the author of this 
study) who ascribe to being some truth in this particular 
interpretation., 
5.3.3. The United States's Postwar's Role. 
Japaný has every right to have been very bitter about the 
war she lost- and would never forget the catastrophic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans. But 
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Japan must also have been grateful for what the United 
States did for her during the reconstruction period after 
the conclusion of. the war. It was said earlier that the US 
had assisted greatly in providing political stability by 
introducing administrative reforms to the country. It was 
also the Americans who introduced to the Japanese some 
modern management techniques such as quality control and 
total quality control through the works of people -such as 
Dr. W. E. Deming and Dr. J. M. Juran. The, Americans also 
provided some economic assistance in the reconstruction of 
the war-torn empire from scratch. When the assistance from 
the American was drying up, the Korean War involving the 
Americans in the 1950s artificially boosted the Japanese 
economy as did the Vietnam War in the 1960s. 
But most important of all, many observers of Japanese 
management claim that it was the defence arrangement 
provided by the United States which was to benefit Japan 
tremendously. As the result of the Allied Forces' imposed 
constitution, the Japanese has not developed a major 
military force. In fact the Japanese have relied heavily 
on the Americans on the external security (Chapmang Drifte 
and Gow, 1983, p. 3-54). Until today, the national defence 
budget of Japan has been very small as compared to her 
prewar period (around 1% of, her? ýGNP), thus enabling her 
to channel her wealth more into commercial development. 
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Ironically, even today when the Japanese have almost 
surpassed the Americans on most fronts, the Americans 
still help the Japanese. ' at least indirectly. For example, 
the American government has continued to allow the 
Japanese favourable access to their markets with Japanese 
goods at the expense of the former's own industries. 
However; recently because of trade friction, Congress 
passed an omnibus trade bill called Super 301 which 
threaten to positively discriminate against Japanese 
import unless the Japanese open up certain key sectors of 
their own industries to the American goods. The US, has 
until recently liberally allowed the Japanese to buy 
real estate, but there is growing investment friction 
against ' the Japanese buying up American -properties. The 
fact remains that many Americans today feel that the 
Americans have assisted the Japanese far too much and far 
too long. The American government has not done enough to 
tip the scale in the American favour, although it. has 
been acknowledged that it has been trying for a very long 
time but with very little impact in some areas. 
5.3.4. Political'Stability 
The economic prosperity of a country cannot be sustained 
unless there is political stability. The same can be said 
of the Japanese nation which has hitherto ýenjoyed 
consistent political stability. In the 'initial period 
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after the war, the Americans- took the -- credit for 
introducing a more democratic form of government in Japan 
which provided her with the necessary stable political 
environment to industrialise rapidly. 
Today, Japan still enjoys that stability although there 
have been some 'political scandals leading , to the 
resignation of two prime ministers said to be involved in 
corruption and sex scandals respectively. The reason for 
this political stability according to Kaifu (1980: p. 212) 
is that there is only one political party, the Liberal 
Democratic Party, ýwhich has been in power almost 
continually in the post-war period (except one year in 
1948). The long-term economic planning -and other 
consistent -public policies were made possible because of 
there was no opposition and changes in national policies 
were not frequently made. One can take India as an 
example, to . realise the truth in this argument, where too 
much-politicking, and frequent changes of political parties 
controlling the government have caused chaos that made it 
impossible to establish a long-term policy. 
5.3.5. Japanese Culture 
It has often been - said that Japan is a successful nation 
because of her culture. The most important cultural aspect 
of Japan is the homogeneity of its people. Although there 
exists a small number of the Ainu (original inhabitants of 
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the islands), Koreans and Chinese, the fact that these 
groups form a minority and that they have assimilated 
easily into the Japanese mainstream population, makes, the 
Japanese the ' most homogenous people in the world. 
Professor Gow pointed out that: 
"In terms of shared aims, shared values and shared tastes 
this facilitates mass communication, mass education, and 
even mass motivation for political or economic nationalist 
purposes" (Gow, 1987: p. 1) 
Kassem (1974: p. 42) argued that Japan is a "we-oriented" 
culture which places a ýhigh, premium on consensus and 
loyalty as appropriate values. The Japanese readily 
identify with groupst and subordinate their- personal 
interests to the will of the whole group. Groupismq 
paternalism, worker's loyalty and a high level of work 
ethics are the 'variables which constitute the cornerstone 
of Japan's miracle. They are associated closely with the 
Japanese culture. 
The core values of the Japanese culture (Sethi et al' 
1984: p. 7) are Amae, 'which refers to a feeling o; 
dependence that describes a' desire to be passively loved 
and protected from the world of objective reality; On, 
which is an obligation passively incurred from the point 
of-view of the passive recipient; Giri, which means a bond 
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of moral obligation and debt that must , be repaid 
and; Ninjo, - which can be defined as human feelings that 
spontaneously occur and that include all the natural human 
impulses and inclinations. 
Some writers (Fukuda 1987; Nakane, ý 1973) explained that 
Ninjo and Amae may give an explanation for the elaborate 
system of decision-making by consensus commonly adoptedýby 
Japanese companies whereas On and Giri within a group are 
exacting and rigorously binding. Foreigners who want to 
study the success of the Japanese people would have to 
study the culture first in order to understand the 
mentality of the Japanese people who have been very 
successful. It is not the intention here -to say that 
Japanese culture is the most superior of all cultures in 
the world, but the fact of the matter is that there is a 
strong relationship between the success', achieved by the 
Japanese and the cultural environment they live in. 
Mathew (1989: p. 175) saw the Japanese supremacy in light of 
the way people have been regimentated. He observed that 
executives and families returning to Japan from abroad 
must conform to the constricting Japanese norm, or face 
opprobrium, condemnation, or even being ostracised, until 
recently. He further stated that Japan's post-war tack in 
educational and industrial policy has given individuals 
little choice but to conform, mainly because of social 
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pressures. This is of course, the essence of a Confucian- 
type society. 
5.3.6. Resource Scarcity 
As had been mentioned earlier, Japan is very poor in 
resources. She has to find other means to feed her people 
and to replace resources taken from her when her empire 
was- removed by the Allied Forces. Realising the perilous 
position she was in, she targeted value-added exports 
based on improved quality, ever increasing productivity, 
low prices and market share as her 'strategy to capture 
world markets. 
Because the Japanese, have no real natural resources except 
for human resources to depend upon, they are taught from 
an -early age to work harder in order to survive. If they 
falter, it would surely be a disaster for the nation. It 
is often said that, Japanese - workers are the most 
industrious people in the world. They are always referred 
to as workaholics who genuinely enjoy ý their jobs late 
into the evening long after their counterparts in other 
parts of the world have gone home. Japanese workers, work 
for about -2100 hours a year compared with the 1900 hours 
of British workers (Dore, 1985: p. 10). Unlike workers in 
Western countries, they often do not expect to be paid 
overtime for all -work done on behalf of the company 
outside working hours i. e, setting up machines, QCC'etc. 
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Such 'is the mentality of Japanese workers. -It must be 
mentioned however, the younger generation of the Japanese 
has often been accused by their older generation as not 
having the correct attitudes. The younger Japanese, 
probably because they' have not tasted the hardship and 
poverty of . the early post-war days, are said to be less 
patient with the slow promotion system and do not really 
identify '-themselves with the companies they work for, 
according'to the older Japanese. It was further suggested 
that this might have been the result of' an affluence 
society. However, despite this criticism the- Japanese 
companies should find some comfort in that the Japanese 
workers of today are still the most productive people in 
the world; and perhaps the most creative workers too. 
5.3.7. 'Late Development' Hypothesis 
Japan's ascendancy to a leading industrial power- is 
attributed to 'her status as a late starter, so said some 
scholars. Dore (1973) called this success factor the 'late 
development' hypothesis. He said that since Japan started 
to industrialise late compared with Great Britain, she was 
able to gain considerable advantages by learning from the 
earlier experiences of the already industrialised 
countries. 
According to 'Dore's arguments there''is a penalty for 
taking the lead in the -path to industrialisation. Japan 
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escaped this penalty and evidences suggested she benefited 
by applications of borrowed technologies she obtained from 
industrialised countries in the West. Many analysts 
concurred with this argument by observing that Japan has 
the advantage of learning from industrialised countries 
like United States, Germany and Britain. 
5.3.8. Competitive Market. 
The Japanese have been successful economically because 
they have been very competitive in business pursuit. For 
example, the competitiveness of the market can be seen 
best in the fact that Japan has 8 domestic car companies 
all fighting for the same market share and if one of 
those companies goes on-strike, because it only has 
enterprise union, the other companies go on overtime. 
Also, the Japanese firms are very competitive as a result 
of an atmosphere which is characterised by a highly 
competitive market where the fittest survives. The 
intensity of competition can be seen from the fact that 
there -are about 20,000 bankruptciesý a year reported in 
Japan. 
On the international front, some Japanese scholars have 
attributed the extra-ordinary feat of Japanese in 
dominating international markets not so much to the 
superior manufacturing techniques but rather to the 
superiority in her marketing strategy. Others especially 
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the Americans simply accused the Japanese of dumping 
tactics. There may be an element of truth in both claims. 
But what is also true is that Japanese products have 
proven to, be of high quality'when compared to products of 
other industrialised countries. This is what makes 
Japanese products attractive which in turn, entices stores 
in 'the major cities in the world' to stock them. The 
success of Japanese' goods in penetrating the world market 
has tremendously helped her in accumulating surpluses in 
the her balance of payments, thereby strengthening her 
economic position. Clearly, the reason for such a success 
enjoyed by the Japanese has been attributed to the strong 
competitive power of the Japanese firms, who make quality 
pro ducts; price them competitively; and market them 
extensively. 
With the value of yen increasing, one may argue that the 
Japanese goods are no longer as cheap as they used to be, 
but why are Japanese goods such as Canon cameras still 
capturing large world markets? The answer to this 'is that 
the Japanese, after having procured an established market 
at international level, continue to woo consumers by 
concentrating more on quality. With the emergence of more 
educated and affluent consumers, gone are the days when 
people were only attracted to goods with low price. 
Today, it is a consumer's market and the maJority ofthe 
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consumers of today are more quality conscious than ever 
before. 
5.3.9. The Japanese Trading Companies 
The discussion of, Japan as, a world ! economic power is 
incomplete if one excludes the role of her somewhat unique 
trading companies, the sogo shoshas. Hasegawa (1986) 
painted the following picture of the role of these trading 
companies by saying the following; 
" One 0f the outstanding characteristics of Japanese 
trading- companies is their wide, range of -products, 
reaching into the tens of thousands. Indeed, a common 
saying has it that they deal in everything from nuclear 
reactors to chinese noodles" (Hasegawa, 1986: p. 81) 
The sogo shoshas, as will be discussed in detail, later in 
the chapter, have made many important contributions, of 
which - the most important ones being (i). the handling - of 
information flows for import and export transactions; 
(ii). financing imports and exports; and (iii). providing 
transportation and, storage services. Suffice to say at 
this point that the sogo shoshas-. % are unique business 
institutions combining many -features of business that 
facilitate trade flows and develop trade and industrial 
activities. They are trade specialists which had obviously 
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helped Japan to override the 'turbulent waters of world 
economy, 
5.3.10. Big Business versus Big Business Group 
The success of Japan can be seen in the light of its large 
business group. The groupism found in Japanese society, 
is reflected also in the interrelationship between 
enterprises in Japan for it is the large corporate 
groupings rather than big. firms per se, which best reflects 
the unique nature of the company life (Gow, 1987: p. 1-3). 
He observed that the pre-war companiesq the zaibatsuo have 
been succeeded by large scale horizontal enterprise 
groupings, kigyo shudan, and vertically integrated 
enterprise . groupings, the keiretsu. They , provide a 
complexity of networks which are- mystifying to most 
Westerners. The economic miracle, of Japan have- been 
explained by Japanolists as the result of the strong ties 
and cooperation of companiesý within the big business 
groups, 
It has been observed that. there is considerable 
competition between these industrial groups. However, 
there is almost no, competition existing between companies 
within an industrial group. This is - because each group 
makes it a point. not to duplicate activities among member 
companies (Sethi, et al, 1984: p. 22). The industrial group, 
which mainly consist of large corporations combine their 
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resources to help each other. For instance, when a member 
company has excess labour, it can transfer it, either 
temporarily or permanently, to another company that needs 
them, thereby avoiding the laying off of the affected 
employees. 
5.3.11, Long-termism 
The Japanese decision-makers are noted , for their ability 
to adopt long term perspectives. Japanese companies have 
been noted for their preference for long-term growth 
(Bishop, 1981: p. 87). One reason for this is because in 
running their companies, they are not so dependent on 
shareholders as is the case in the West. The long-termism 
of the Japanese is also clearly illustrated, in the- nature 
of -the way the banks were constructed to help an 
industrialising state. These banking institutions provide 
strong - support to the business community. Banks in Japan 
have tremendously helped towards the development of the 
Japanese economy by channelling the limited capital 
accumulation to all the sectors and companies most in need 
of it - (Patrick, 1976: p. 97). Also, the fact that 
shareholders in any case normally have business with the 
firms they buy shares in, ý which make them more --stable, is 
a clear manifestation of long-termism of the Japanese. 
Having a "catch-up" mentality also enables Japanese to 
look long-term. The Japanese top management group of 
especially big business can be said to have far-sightness 
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in their planning and this is one of the reasons why Japan 
is veryýsuccessful today. 
5.3.12. Community-oriented Enterprises 
The concept of enterprise as the community, operated under 
a form of 'managerial familialism has often been used to 
explain Japan's success (Kono, 1984: p. 327). In the eyes of 
Japanese', an enterprise is considered as an assembly of 
people, each known as a sha-in, or member, not as an 
employee of the enterprise. The Japanese enterprises have 
certainly not suffered as much as- Western enterprises in 
terms of strikes, sabotages, and low morale although such 
things are not unknown in Japan*- As will be discussed 
later, the Japanese workers display theý highest job 
ethics, loyalty to the company - they work for, and 
consider their company as their family. The bond that 
binds the employees and the employer is one in which that 
the Japanese enterprises are considered as their family by 
the workers. The-Japanese enterprise- in turn look after 
the welfare of employees as a family head would normally 
treat his family members. There is no need for' fear of 
sabotage caused by each other, or confrontation between 
them. Thus, 'a Japanese enterprise continues to maintain 
stability and concentrates on more important matters for 
the benefit of every member in the organisation. Seen in 
this light, it can be said that the members see the 
organisation as an end in itself. They perceive a shared 
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fate and a common bond with all members; regard it as a 
long term committment, and allow the complete fit between 
personal and work life. I-- 
5.3.13. Technological Advancement 
Japan's success as a superpower is of course also due to 
the technological transformation she has undergone during 
the last thirty years. At the beginning of the Meiji 
Restoration, 120 years ago, Japan was very backward in 
scientific and technical knowledge. In the earlier days, 
Japan had benefited from her enormous spending on foreign 
technology, which she perfected for commercial use. She 
was branded a 'copycat' nation. But that has changed now. 
Professor Gow warned that,,, Japan no longer rests its 
manufacturing excellence on borrowed technology. He 
further said there is clear evidence of creativity and 
pioneering advance. in indigenous Japanese science and 
technology which is obviously seen from the strong support 
of the government towards the. technopolis concept (Gow,, 
1988a: p. 129). Japan has - -indeed assumed technological 
leadership. Japan's technological progress is attributable 
to the untiring efforts made by, Japanese engineers, 
technologists and scientists to remain in the forefront of 
technological advances. 
-210- 
It is also said that other factors such a high savings and 
investment, well-educated and motivated labour force, an 
intensely competitive domestic economy 'are also the 
driving force behind Japan's technological ý progress 
(Abbeglen, 1984: p. 219). 
Today Japan invests heavily in R&D to maintain her 
technological lead especially in civilian technology'. Sato 
(1987) pointed out that Japan's expenditure on R&D in 
1984 was US$30 billion, which is 2.6 % of the GNP. The 
Japanese R'&D expenditure has been expanding as her 
economy ýstrengthens. The realisation by the Japanese 
companies that R&D must be expanded at whatever cost in 
order to survive the fierce competition at domestic as 
well as international markets also increased R&D 
spending in Japan in the 1980s (Hasegawa, 1986: p. 103). 
It is widely acknowledged that Japan is particularly 
strong in technologies for mass production. This is echoed 
by some scholars who found that Japan is in "the lead in 
peripheral areas, but has a well-known weakness in the 
software sector. However, some western observers are quick 
to point out that Japan is quite ahead in the field of 
optics; electronics; miniaturization; advanced research in 
big--ý technology; fifth generation computers and composite 
materials. 
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5.3.14. EducatiOnal System 
The Japanese educational system is one area which is often 
overlooked in explaining the reasons for the success of 
the Japanese society as a world power. Yet, it is a very 
important one. Japan has about 450 four-year universities 
and even a larger number of two-year colleges (Okazaki, 
1989). Japan is reputed to have produced the most 
engineers in the world. But it is not so much these 
universities that make Japan so successful. In terms 'of 
number, 'the US has the most universities in the world. In 
term of standard, comments by visiting professors and 
educationists on the standard of Japanese universities are 
not encouraging. The best universities are comparable to 
their Western counterparts, but many -are much poorer. lt 
is difficult to' judge the quality of Japanese engineers 
that are produced by Japanese universities but in some 
cases, we are not so much talking about engineers being 
produced as graduates of engineering faculties which 
often include subjects such as urban planning which would 
not be recognised as engineering within the US. There are 
questions over 'the quality and the quantity of these 
engineers. 
The universities and colleges in Japan also cannot be 
really said to be the key educational establishment 
underpinning in Japan's post-war success for these 
institutions themselves do not believe in (and hence do 
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not provide) the training industry needs. For instance, 
there is only one university (Kieo University) known to 
offer a Harvard-style MBA course (although an MBA 
qualification does not necessarily make a good manager) 
and so, unlike the Western universities, the business 
faculties of Japanese universities cannot be said to be 
training avenues for future managers. In fact, business 
faculties only exist in private universitiesq not in the 
state universities. There are other MBA programs conducted 
for training business studies teachers going on to DBA and 
they are not use to prepare people for industry. Another 
interesting aspect- is, except for ý some prestigious 
universities such- as -Tokyo University, Kyoto National 
University, Waseda University and Kieo University to name 
a few'. many Westerners have loudly criticised Japanese 
universities as unimaginative and more of honeymoon havens 
for courting, Japanese youngsters to hibernate after having 
passed the so-called, "examination hell". 
It has been generally agreed that the educational system 
of Japan is particularly effective at the primary and 
secondary education levels. The government of Japan 
rightly considers education as, very important and it has 
made considerable investment in controlling and supportingý 
the primary- and secondary education system. Over 60% ofý 
new comers to elementary school attends at least one year, 
of kindergarten, according to a- report on School Basic, 
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Statistics 1988 of Ministry of Education. It also said 
almost 100% of children get lower secondary school 
education (up to 14 years). About 93% of Japanese 
children today go on af ter 16 years of higher secondary 
education making Japan the most literate nation in the 
world (Kato, 1985: p. 577). They receive a very thorough, 
very traditional education in the three R's. They attend 
school for longer hours; do more homeworks , and have 
shorter holidays than western school children. After 
school, children attend extra classes and have private 
tuition. The teachers are very- dedicated and, spend many 
hours on extra-curricular school- activities unmatched in 
other parts of the world. The parents compete against 
each other to send their children to the best schools and 
provide avid encouragement and facilities for their 
children so that they will go to the best universities. 
Such regimentation lies in the attitude of parents who 
consider that half the battle is won by having 
successfully ensured that their children reach university 
level for there awaits a stable job upon completion of a 
university education. 
The. Japanese are well educated. The level of education 
among the Japanese population is perhaps the highest in 
the world in that the Japanese are- almost one hundred 
percent literate. The Japanese are avid readers and Japan 
has probably the largest number of journals and magazines 
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in the world. It is said that there are about 3,500 
publishers; 25,000 full-service bookstores and each 
publisher is said to offer 50 to 80 new titles a year 
(Okazaki, 1990) 
It would not be inappropriate to say at this juncture the 
education system in Japan has been detrimental in moulding 
the Japanese society into a highly successful nation. 
Western educationists unanimously 'agreed that Japanese 
education is extremely competitive and some may consider 
it somewhat cruel to Japanese children. Nevertheless, 
this has given Japan a well-educated population. Today, 
the Japanese are the most well-read people in the world. 
The workforce found in Japan, is' better- educatedg when 
compared to their counterparts elsewhere. What are the 
implications of this? - The Japanese organisations have 
been placed at a much more advantageous' position than 
organisations in other parts of the world because by 
having educated workers (an average of about'18 years of 
schooling) they can cope better at work. For example, the 
time required to train and retrain them would be 
relatively shorter than to train workers with lesser 
educational backgrounds., 
Also, to'have workers -who all have completed at least high 
school education as is the case in Japan, is considered a 
great asset because these workers'would be able'to follow 
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instructions or adapt to changes regarding work relatively 
faster than a group of workers who are less educated. 
5.4. Japanese-style Management - An overview. In their 
book entitled "The Art of Japanese Management", Pascale 
and Athos (1981) concluded that "the major reason for the 
superiority of the Japanese is their managerial skill". In 
the previous pages, the author has tried to show that 
there may be other factors other than the managerial 
skills-. Nevertheless, managerial skills and systems have 
played an important role. 
One of the most important reasons behind the - Japanese 
success , has to be its management, style, the so-called 
"unique" management model. Although claiming Japanese- 
style -management as "unique" is very subjective to many; 
inaccurate to some; and provocative - to others, one can 
hardly dispute-_the fact that the Japanese-style management 
practices have played an important role in Japan so much 
so - that many, other countries have, 
for sometimes, been 
studying them seriously. When one carefully studies the 
impact of -consensus decision-making and group 
participation on employee Is morale; the display of high 
work ethics and loyalty which increase productivity; the 
production ýmethods like JIT, kanban, QCC which leads to 
almost,, zero-defect, high quality products in Japanese 
factory; the lifetime employment and seniority-wage system 
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that creates a stable workforce; the aggressive marketing 
strategies supported by the role of sogo shosha in helping 
Japan to maintain dominant position in world market, all 
of which ýare among major features of the Japanese 
management system, it is very difficult not to conclude 
that Japanese management methods are an'important (may be 
the most important) factor that has made Japan an economic 
superpower that it is today. Having said that, the author 
wishes to proceed with the discussion of what Japanese- 
style management is all about. 
5.4.1. Definition 
Various terminologies such as Japanese management; 
Japanese-style management; and Japanese management system 
have been used by different scholars to describe the 
management practices and policies used, by Japanese firms 
especially in Japan. It can be really confusing to 
readers as to whether they are referring to the same 
thing. The author will use the term Japanese-style 
management most frequently throughout this study. 
Japanese-style management is defined as the specific 
strategic and administrative process -that Japanese 
organisations in Japan have adopted in the course of their 
activities (Cynthia, 1985: p. 1). It will be used 
interchangeably with the term Japanese management. The 
term, Japanese, management system refers to the ecological, 
cultural and institutional environments, in which 'Japanese 
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organisations operate. It will also be used in this thesis 
interchangeably with the Japanese management model. 
As mentioned earlier, most of the sources of "references 
have been obtained from scholars of Japanese management 
whose articles or writings dated back, from the period of 
the mid 1970s to the early 1980s. Thus the Japanese-style 
management practices referred to in the study will be 
those of the early period, commonly known as -the stereo- 
type Japanese-style management. In view of the changing 
environment that has' taken place in Japan, some of them 
are perhaps Considered outdated and therefore may no 
longer be representative of the Japanese management 
picture in Japan today (neo-japanese-style management). 
5.4.2. Four Managerial Functions of ' Japanese-style 
Management' 
The basic concepts of Japanese-style management can be 
best described and understood by looking at the four basic 
functions of management namely planning, organising, 
leading and controlling, as well as the major operational 
elements namely decision', making, communication and 
leadership style that are 'Carried outs typically in large 
Japanese organisations. ' I 
5.4.2.1. Planning II 
It is said that Japanese executives excel in long-term 
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planning and give less emphasis to the rate of return on 
investment in the short run (see Kagono et -al, 
1984). 
Some critics however are of opinion that the Japanese top 
management are not so much planners as official., vision 
setters and facilitators. For example, the chief executive 
officer of a typical big firm in Japan would announce a 
long term vision of what the company wishes to achieve and 
the employees are expected to accomplish it. The stand 
taken by the author here is that the top executives of 
Japanese corporations are indeed both excellent planners 
and vision setters, because when they lay down the vision 
for their organisations, they are in fact doing a form of 
long-term planning. 
In fact, approximately 70 to 80% of large Japanese firms 
have some form of long range planning (Kono, 1984: p. 243). 
Yearly surveys carried out since 1973 by, Japan's Ministry 
of International Trade on the capability of 540 
corporations in Japan showed that 73% in 1974,71% in 
1975,64% in 1976,66% in 1977,67% in 1978, and 74% in 
1980 had long range plans. Kono also observed that in 
Japan two plans with different time horizons are becoming 
popular. The company has a medium range plan in addition 
to the long-term strategic plan. The long term plan which 
normally covers a five-year duration centres on the 
strategy of the organisation while the medium range plan, 
which covers two or three years, usually, consists of a 
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detailed schedule of projects, planning by products, 
capital investment and financial plans. In'the West, long- 
run planning is generally meant to be strategic in nature; 
and it is used to make strategic decisions based on a 
long-range forecast. However, in Japan, long-run planning 
seems to be used mainly for two purposes; namely (i). to 
clarify goals and policies of the company and (ii). ' to 
examine basic problems of the company. 
The planning process is of three types. They can be 
classified'as bottom-up, top-down and interactive (Kono, 
1984: p. 252). The bottom-up planning process is where the 
planning department, acting as a coordinating unit, 
colle'cts informationt goals, strategies of departments and 
presents them to the top management to be used as inpuf in 
the formulation of the corporate overall goal. In the top- 
down planning process, basic information, goals of each 
department and key strategies are decided at top corporate 
management level who then hand them down to operating 
units or departments as guidelines. These departments in 
turn build up tactical plans in line with those 
predetermined guidelines. It can be seen in this case that 
the operative departments have less say in the corporate 
strategic planning formulation. The interactive process of 
planning refers to the combination of the two above 
approaches. Here, ideas are formulated by interaction 
between top managementt planning department and operating 
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units or departments. The planning department collects 
environmental information and will submit strategic issues 
to the top management group, who in turn will decide the 
goals and 'broad direction of the organisation. The 
operating units or departments will follow the guidelines 
given from the top and build a strategy and- operational 
plans specific to them. 
5.4.2.2. Organising 
Japanese managers and workers can be considered to be very 
well organised when it comes to work ethics. The workers 
come to work early and return home late. Actually, 
absenteeism among workers is low and long strikes which 
interrupt production rarely occur. The organisational 
abilities of Japanese employees with regards to work 
methods is equally impressive. Work normally- start with a 
daily morning meeting before actual work and in some 
organisations there are of course the famous morning 
excercises. The organisational featuresý of a typical 
Japanese firm display an established communication network 
(i. e. quality circles, suggestion system and ringi system. 
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The predominant organisational structure of Japanese firms 
is that of an organic structure (Sato and Hoshino, 1984). 
An organic organisational structure refers to a structure 
which is characterised by a low degree of formalisation, 
standardisation, and centralisation (for detail, refer to 
Burns and Stalker, 1961). It has been maintained that this 
organic structure is superior in terms of its adaptability 
to environmental change. There is no clear-cut delineation 
between functions in Japanese firms (Bolwijn and Brinkman, 
1987: p. 33). 
The Japanese organisations appear to take a decentralised 
approach to self-management as evidenced by the use of QCC 
and bottom-up management techniques. The Japanese also 
tend to take on McGregor's Theory Y attitude easily 
whereby, they enjoy-work and responsibilities (Riehl and 
Kleiner, 1987: p. 4). Thus, employees have a capacity to 
exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, 
ingenuity and creativity in the solution of organisational 
problems. At the same time, the overall attitudes and 
values of the organisation are centralised in the finely 
tuned synchronisation of the plant's operations. Unlike 
that of Western companies, the structure of Japanese 
companies is such that functional areas are interconnected 
with each other as shown in Exhibit 5.1 (refer to next 
page). 
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Exhibit 5.1: Umparison of Organisational 
Structure of Western and Ja panese Companies 
Western Companies 
Chief Executive Officer 
fin e ing Manuf cturing 
Japanese Companies 
Chief Executive Off icer 
L--Lýýarkefipq k---------JFinance 
Mýanufacturing 
Source:: Keegan, 1975: P. 63- 
-223- 
5.4.2.3. Leading 
The leading characteristic of the Japanese Management 
Model tends to be that of country club-style or democratic 
style whereby the managers are not really assuming the 
leading role, but more a facilitator role. Many management 
experts suggest that- the Japanese are weak leaders 
because they do not really exercise their power and in 
fact, they are said to underutilise their authority. There 
is no justification for such a suggestion. since the 
leadership style of Japanese managers seems to work 
extremely well in, Japan. 
A Japanese manager in a large firm is normally highly 
educated, with a university level qualification either in 
engineering or the social sciences. He is more likely to 
join a private company rather than a public organisation, 
and he is -usually a generalist rather than a specialist 
like his counterpart in the West. He would have worked in 
one company for atýleast thirty years. He is hardworking 
and the, primary loyalty of a Japanese male manager 
loyalty is first to his company and then to his family. 
He would have-moved, from one department to another, from 
technical designing to production, or from marketing to 
personnel. Because of his background, he is a, man, -of 
diverse experience and has become accustomed to thinking 
on a, long term basis. 
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There are reasons why a Japanese manager normally adopts a 
democratic style of leadership. An aggressive leader is 
considered inappropriate , in a society like Japan because 
aggressiveness is very strongly- linked with individualism. 
Also, being aggressive is not suitable in Japan where 
elders are highly respected for their age and position. A 
manager or even a plant supervisor is always accorded a 
father figure and he in turn treats his subordinates as 
his children. The manager normally knows or remembers his 
workers'-names and if he walks past them, he, will be among 
the first ýto greet them. In return, he is highly 
respected, if not, well-liked by his subordinates. This 
is, in some ýrespect, similar to Peter's ýconcept of 
"Management By Walking, About". 
Another quality displayed by aý manager of a typical 
Japanese firm is the fact that he is not really a leader 
in the literal sense but more of a coordinator. In a 
comparative study', of 3641 managers from 14 countries, -it 
was found out that the, Japanese managers scored highest in 
advocating the subordinates' participation (Haire, 1966). 
In the organisation, the Japanese manager sees his task 
as that of . improving on the 
initiatives of others and 
creating an atmosphere in which subordinates are motivated 
to strive harder in-achieving organisational goals. So the 
responsibility for corporation's success rests not just 
with him but with all employees. As such he encourages an 
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open-door policy, in that an employee has access to him, 
regardless of the chain of command. Such access is 
facilitated by the manager spending less time in his 
office and more time in the large open work area with his 
subordinates. 
Smith (1984: p. 122) summarised the characteristics of -a 
Japanese manager as follows: he is a sensitive individual 
and cares for the workforce; he is open to, suggestion from 
below; he has detailed technical expertise; he usually 
displays overt criticism of task failures; he possesses a 
sense of personal accountability for failure of 
subordinates and he usually seeks out a consensus from 
subordinates in making a decision affecting them. Such 
leadership qualities have been praised- by Westerners 
because they can greatly, promote harmony in an 
organisation. 
On the other hand, the Japanese leadership style may not 
be appropriate at times. Because, he does not display firm 
and strong leadership quality, the manager would not be 
able to dictate - the tempo and direction of the 
organisation- that he personally desires. Giving too much 
freedom can diminish his already limited power' and 
authority. Ideal as it looks, low profile type of 
leadership style can backfire if one cannot handle it 
properly. This is not really the problem in Japan yet, but 
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matter is that it is , one of the weaknesses that is 
inherent in this style. 
5.4.2.4. Controlling 
The control mechanism in a typical Japanese management 
model is not as clearly defined, as those found in a 
typical management system in the West. The Japanese 
manager does not go to great lengths to be precise and 
definite in establishing, controls., This As because the 
relationship between -the workers and the management in 
Japanese organisations often assumes the , character of a 
family. -This makes the workers more committed, thus making 
a strict control system unnecessary. 
Fox (1977) depicted an interesting scenario of a control 
system in a typical Japanese firm. He was of opinion the 
traditional Japanese ýmanagement system depends to a large 
extent on internalised values and social ý pressure to 
discourage dishonesty. He said it is common for salesmen 
to handle bill orders and cash collection. He added 
further: 
",,, management seals may be duplicated easily, yet 
fidelity bonding is rarely used, for employees find it 
offensive. Independent audits are neither required nor 
made" (Foxg 1977: p. 80). 
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In as tudy which -compared American and Japanese 
organisations, it was found out, that the control process 
in, Japanese firms is characterised more by sharing of 
value and information and also by self-discipline, while 
the American control system depends more on output 
control, i. e. control on the basis of appraisal of 
performance output (Kagono, et al. 1984). 
5.4.3. Operational Elements of Japanese-style Management 
5.4.3.1. Decision-making 
One of the most prominent , operational elements of 
Japanese-style management that has attracted worldwide 
attention is its decision-making. The process of decision- 
making consists of two systematic procedures called 
nemawashi, and ringi. 
Nemawashi is - defined by Fukuda ý (1983: p. 22) ' as "a 
horticultural term, ýwhich refers to the cutting of roots 
and the rotation of, the trunk of a tree to free it for 
transplantation. When a tree , is transplanted, there must 
be preparations in- theý form of trimming the roots, 
wrapping the soil, and binding the branches. This is 
considered a critical, step, - and the greatest care is 
required to ensure subsequent success in moving a tree 
from one location to another. It is a process very similar 
in spirit to networking. The abrupt submission of a 
proposal without nemawashi is seen as lacking in 
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sensitivity and this is contrary to the Japanese spirit, 
which is based on the preservation of a harmonious 
atmosphere within an organisation. 
The actual decision-making which has attracted most 
attention in the West, is that of the ringi system. 
The author wish to stress here that this type of decision 
making has a very limited application in Japan but very 
much liked by people who want to transfer Japanese 
management practices to their countries. In term of 
application, ' ringi is most popular in the larger, older 
corporations and is more used for routine, decision. Rin 
means submitting a proposal to one's superior and 
receiving his approval. Gi means deliberations and 
decisions. In this system, the, responsibility for 
initiating actions rests with middle and lower-level 
managers who submit ringisho (proposal), while formal and 
ultimate authority to execute remains at the top (Fukuda, 
1983: p. 22-24). The ringi decision making process may begin 
when a section chief of a department (kacho) presents an 
idea by calling a' meeting in his section to discuss the 
idea. He, reports it to the department head (bucho) ifhis 
ideas are well-received by his section. After consultation 
and meeting with other members of the department,, - the 
bucho will try to obtain an overall consensus by floating 
the idea in other departments. This is carried out by 
circulating the printed document or proposal (ringisho) to 
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all groups at the level where it' is initiated and when it 
is approved (ie. by affixing one's seal), it is passed to 
the next higher level where the same process is repeated. 
Once it has been through this process, it is approved at 
the top. 
If any middle manager or executive is not receptive or 
find fault with the ringi, it is returned to- the person 
responsible, according to Hasegawa (1986: p. 29). - He would 
have to overcome the objection by persuasion or rewrite 
the ringi. It can be said that this Japanese decision- 
making process is a ývery thorough and systematic, one. Many 
experts argue that it reflects a participative, circular, 
bottom-up and consensual type of decision-making (Iwata, 
1982; Pascal and Athos, ' '1981; Hattori, 1978). 
Theoretically, no one who has seen the document and 
consulted it, can say he is not a party to a decision, 
once the decision is to be carried out. 
There are however, "some management experts who do not 
share the view which regards the decision-making process 
of Japanese firms '(especially the successful multi- 
national corporations) as being a bottom-upt consensus 
type of decision-making. Sato and Hoshino (1984) are of 
opinion that the practice--of ringi is actually confined 
mainly to the occupants -of low to mid-level position 
managers. Indeed, it is the view of some scholars that 
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ringi is not an important mode of, decision-making in major 
Japanese firms. Ringi, the proponents of this group 
argued, is more of a low-level, routine type-of decision. 
Kono (1984) in his study of successful Japanese 
corporations found out that in these corporations, the 
decision-making process was clearly of the top-down 
model. Such sentiment is supported by Gow (1987: p. 13-15) 
who observed that top-down decision-making is strongly the 
norm in the new, highly successful post-war -Japanese 
companies especially chuken kigyo (dynamic medium-sized 
firms) which he referred to, as Type I organisations. These 
organisations according to him, are firms managed by top 
executives who are either actual or de facto, founders who 
take the initiatives in creating managerial strategies. 
These executives are noted for, their ability to take 
risks, make strategic judgements and Implement these in 
top-down manner. With the passage of time and in an era 
which demands new creative strategies in the face of a 
highly competitive international scene, the top executives 
of big Japanese firms are using more top-down decision- 
making, leaving bottom-up decision-making to the lower 
managers. 
On the whole, the effectiveness of ringi system is clearly 
evident in getting workers' participation in providing 
input at, work in that they give feedback regarding work 
-231- 
methods or in how they perceive the organisation should be 
run. Viewed from- this perspective, ringi system can be a 
form of incentive, motivation and high morale for the 
workers in carrying out their jobs. Productivity of 
workers are often associated with these types of 
environment. 
As for the junior managers, the ringi type of decision- 
making is a way of sharing ideas and information in the 
organisation. It is 'a form of official practice where 
there will be consultations and discussions between the 
various departmental heads carried out prior to 
introducing anything that affects - them directly or 
indirectly. Unnecessary conflicts and misunderstandings 
are therefore avoided. This is especially true in the case 
of nemawashi whereby, opinion testing and behind-the-scene 
negotiations -take place first before' any decision is made 
so that no party is offended or loses face when that 
decision is finally introduced into the organisation. 
On the demerit side, as was explained earlier, the problem 
with ringi is that it is confined to the routine type of 
decision-making process, and is not the main mode used in 
big organisations iIn Japan. As such, ringi is sort of 
confined to les*s important matters only. Also, because the 
system aims at involving almost everybody 'who has some 
interests in it there seems to be a tendency among 
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Japanese to be so overtly concerned with their desire for 
smooth relationships that important issues fail to get a 
full airing (Johnson and Ouchi, 1974: p. 66). Managers who 
disagree with a proposal will in most cases, remain 
silent rather than upset the relationships they have so 
carefully cultivated. Afterall, the Confucian culture has 
always stressed the need of harmonious relationships 
among employees to prevail. This may have prompted some 
writers like Yoshino to suggest that ringi is inconsistent 
with the modern concept of managerial culture. It is not 
uncommon under, the system for the group sponsoring a 
particular -proposal to consult with others prior to 
preparation of ringisho. Thus a proposal may, to a degree, 
reflects the views and opinions of a number of managers 
concerned with a particular decision. 
Aanother defect of ringi system is that it is essentially 
a piecemeal approach. There is no prior planning to 
anticipate future decisions. A proposal is prepared and 
submitted only after the need to make decision becomes 
apparent. Each proposal is examined not against an overall 
policy or plan, but a case-by-case basis. Indeedq under 
the ringi system, the enterprise is not likely, to be 
managed according to a set of consistent -goals and 
strategies. Lacking an overall corporate objective, the 
optimum allocation of resources is difficult to achieve. 
The ringi system lacks a, control mechanism; once the final 
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approval is given, it is virtually impossible for the 
president or other members of top management to monitor 
how the decision will be carried out (Yoshino, 1968) 
The ringi form of decision-making avoids individual 
assumption of responsibility for mistakes, just as it 
denies credit for bold decisions. For Japanese, companies, 
this is not , considered a, problem but ý for a- normal non- 
Japanese organisation this could bring chaos. This is 
because mistakes made by some people may be shifted to 
others, and likewise, credit for good performance goes to 
the wrong group or person. 
Lastly, the process of reaching a decision by, " this 
approach is cumbersome and time consuming. By the time it 
is reached -and implemented, that particular decision is 
out-dated and of no valuable use any more. This perhaps 
explains why top-down decision-making rather than bottom- 
up - decision-making is the norm of major Japanese 
organisations today. 
5.4.3.2. Communication Networks 
The ý second operational element of the Japanese management 
system that also attracts attention is the communication 
network process. In any Japanese organisation, whether big 
or small, communication among workers and between workers' 
and their superiors is - very extensive - and multi- 
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directional. Regarding communicationq Japanese managers 
do not believe in writing a lot of memos but instead 
prefer. face-to-face meetings and discussions with their 
subordinates. Japanese managers in fact find it amusing to 
see 'American ýand British managers exchanging- memos even 
when they have adjacent offices and share a secretary. The 
Japanese ý are accustomed to extensive verbal consultation 
before a memorandum is drawn up outlining the agreed-on 
consensus (Tsurumi, 1978: p. 56-61). A Japanese manager or 
supervisor always shows a sincere willingness to accept 
his subordinates' ideas and he discusses matters related 
to work which can improve job performance. 
The most striking difference between the- Japanese and 
Western mode of communication in issuing directives is 
that the Japanese manager's ý style is covert and indirect. 
The less important the proposal or directive, the less 
clearly the superior makes his intention known to 
subordinates so that they can derive more satisfaction 
from taking the initiative. For important matters, however 
the superior becomes more direct. The American or British 
manager on the other hand tends to communicate directly by 
order and command. 
Open communication is also an inherent part of the 
Japanese work setting. Work -spaces are open and crowded 
with individuals from different levels in the, hierarchy. A 
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supervisor does not normally have a separate room and if 
he does, he will always work together with his 
subordinates'rather than confine himself to his room as is 
the case in the Western world. Even high ranking office 
managers seldom have -separate offices (Hatvany and Pucik, 
1981: p. 469-480). Such work setting is deliberately done to 
cultivate a good relationship and communication networks 
which are in line with the Japanese management philosophy 
which stresses ýharmony and groupism orientation. The 
workers are encouraged to give their ideasýand comments to 
the management, group to, help their organisation to improve 
existing work methods. This is bolstered by a continuing 
interaction between the plant's management and the workers 
via suggestionst bulletin board announcements, letters to 
employees and their families and candid interpersonal 
conversations (Torrence, 1984: p. 27) 
In so far as the communication process that exists in the 
Japanese management system is concerned, the greatest 
strength has to be that managers as well as- workers 
communicate frequently and extensively among themselves. 
The atmosphere at work, is naturally more lively and 
friendly because people do not keep to themselves when 
problems and doubts relating' to their work surface. A 
strong tendency towards, understanding and cooperation 
normally occurs. The high degree of immersion of Japanese 
to communicate quickly and easily up and down the 
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hierarchy is one reason why the Japanese workers! morale 
is very ýhigh. This is also the very reason why the 
Japanese workers are believed to be productive people too. 
In management there is a motto which says 'A happy worker 
is a productive worker'. 
The suggestion box system which is popular among 
Japanese organisations also helps create participation of 
employees in contributing ideas to the -company regarding 
their works or the running, of their organisation. This is 
a positive thing because once the employees are involved 
with the state of affairs in running the organisation, 
they would go at pain to make them succeed. They will be 
the first to come to company's aid should something go 
wrong because they are also party to those decisions or 
activities. 
The open door-policy by the superior of the Japanese 
organisation is also a big plus to ý Japanese- management. 
Problems that need immediate attention can go straight to 
the top level without the hassle of being scrutinised at 
the middle managerial level. What normally happens -with 
the management style in the West is that, problems at the 
lower level are always concealed by Junior-managers from 
the knowledge of those top people; only when they--become 
unmanageable would they be brought to their attention, 
only to find it is too late to rectify. Obviously, this 
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syndrome is not happening in Japan because their 
communication network is very well-established. 
There are of course,, some problems to be found in the 
communication system of the Japanese-style management. An 
employee must know how to read between the lines what is 
communicated to him because in a Japanese organisationt no 
clear-cut instruction or manual is given. It does not pose 
serious problem in the relatively homogenous Japanese 
society but in a non-Japanese environment where the work 
force consists of multi-ethnic groups (with different 
cultures) it can become a real big problem. The loosely 
defined job description of an -individual worker, in the 
opinion-of the author, . provides too much ambiguity as to 
one's role, and may not beý practical for non-Japanese 
f irms. 
5.4.3.3. Paternalism 
Another popular operational element of Japanese-style 
management that is admired by scholars of, management 
worldwide is the paternalistic 'relationship between the 
employer and regular employees. The employer takes care of 
the welfare of the employees and their families well, like 
a father who takes care of his own children's needs. A 
Japanese employee in return, is said to be very loyal to 
his company. He is always willing to sacrifice personal 
interests in order to keep the company prospers. He is 
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highly committed to his work; always maintains highest 
standard of work ethics; displays a willingness to accept 
reassignments; gives his fullest support and cooperation 
to' his colleagues; volunteers overtime working when 
necessary and participates in after hours socialising with 
workmates. These attributes seem to justify conventional 
view of Japanese being called an industrious people. 
It has been said that the Japanese worker is a workaholic 
and one who considers his job the most important thing in 
his life. In one survey which asked what Japanese workers 
would first do upon surviving an earthquake outburst -in 
Japan, most of them said they would call their offices 
first for 'further instructions rather than call their 
families (Watanabe, 1982). If a Japanese man were to be 
asked what'he does for a living, the typical reply would 
be that he works for such-and-such company. If the 'same 
question were asked in the West, the typical answer would 
be "I am an accountant" or "I am an engineer", etc. 
(Takayanagi, 1985). In other 'words, a Japanese worker 
identifies primary loyalty with that of the company he 
works for. 
-239- 
Regarding the relationship of a superior and, his 
subordinates, both at workplace and outside, the boss 
assumes the role of a mentor who would teach his 
subordinate through subtle cues rather than blunt feedback 
and will-, try to exercise great patience while the 
subordinate learns how to interpret the cues and develops 
his own skills, and reinforcing the basic company 
philosophy as a conceptual source that helps subordinate 
to decide what to do in a given situation (Schein, 
1981: p. 61). The paternal role displayed by. a Japanese 
manager has to be a plus factor. It promotes an atmosphere 
of family environment which results in-familial love and 
affection among workers at workplace. 
5.4.3.4. Groupism 
Another interesting feature of Japanese-style management 
is the tendency of Japanese workers for group work. An 
individual worker displays a high degree of cooperation in 
working with others and at the department level, 
harmonious relationships exist, each - department or 
division supporting each other when and where necessary. 
One writer observed the - strong presence of the groupism 
found among. the Japanese workers by saying: 
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" In a Japanese organisations where everybody thinks 
together and member of a section or department cooperates 
and makes efforts for his group, harmonious relations 
based on mutual goodwill and trust are considered the 
ideal and that requires each member to show 
cooperativeness, if not wholeheartedly, at least on the 
surface" (Iwata, 1984: p. 69). jý 
In Japan, groupism has been a powerful tool of control 
mechanism. The fear that an individual will be shun by the 
group acts as a form control on member's behaviour in the 
group. Each individual therefore has to conform to the 
group's expectation. This explains 'Why 'Japanese 
organisations do not rely heavily on formal rules and 
regulations as a form of control as Western organisations 
do. 
5.5. Major Japanese-style Management Practices 
5.5.1. Personnel Management 
5.5.1.1. Lifetime Employment 
One of the most popular topics regarding Japanese-style 
management concerns 'the practice of lifetime employment 
whereby a worker will join a firm and only leave upon 
retirement. This practice however has no legal basis 
because the Japanese employment philosophy is based upon 
familial model rather than on individualistic model. It is 
a moral or psychological contract, entered into between the 
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core employee and the employer at the time of recruitment 
(Cole, 1981; Iwata, 1982; Dore, 1973). 
Under the lifetime employment philosophy, the Japanese 
worker is seen as a permanent part of the company and his 
total loyalty is assumed. The members are expected to 
prosper or falter along with the company (Alston, 
1982: p. 47). Lifetime employment is thus to be considered 
as the mutual expectation by companies and employees 
because the employees once recruited into - the company 
will remain there until retirement. 
Regarding the number of people in the lifetime employment 
in Japan, estimates vary, but it is said to have covered 
30% of the -work force, in Japan namely the core employees 
of the large private sector firms and possibly in the 
public sector and local goverment (Maher, 1985a: p. 23). In 
reality, there exists what is known as a core and 
peripheral work force in Japan. 
5.5.4.1.1. Core Workforce 
The core work force consists of 'the elite labour workers 
who represent the regular workers that have been specially 
selected and this is the main reason they stay with their 
company until retirement. They are given a lot of 
additional welfare benefits such as better basic salary or 
bonus, subsidised housing etc. They are protected by the 
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companies and unions from being dismissed during hard 
times; they would rather be relocated to sister companies, 
or retrained for new jobs. Because they receive so many 
privileges, they are to some extent, controlled (i. e they 
cannot easily leave their companies as their Western 
counterparts) 
The degree of welfare benefits given to core workers 
varies from company to company, with bigger -companies 
being more generous than smaller ones. Three categories 
of benefits usually provided have been identified. The 
first category covers benefits to assist employees in 
situations such as sickness, accident, or death. For 
example, financial compensation (besides insurance 
coverage) will be given to the family members of an 
employee who have accident at work. There are some 
Japanese firms which even send gifts to their employees 
who just married or have' had a -newly born child. In the 
second category is the educational type of benefit given 
to the employee who wish to further his studies through 
correspondence or night classes. He may be given some 
subsidies to buy text books or may be given leave prior to 
sitting for the examination. The last category of company 
benefits is the provision of company facilities for the 
use of employees and sometimes their family members too. 
These include holiday homes, subsidised housing, etc. 
(Hirschmeirer and Yui, 1981). The ratio of enterprises 
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with various types of welfare facilities provided by 
Japanese companies are tabulated in Table 5A below: 
Table 5A: Ratio of Enterprises with Various 
Welfare Facilities System for Employees, 1983 
welfare Size of enterprise (number of employees) 
Facilities 5000 and, 1000-4999 300-999 100-299 30-99 
more 
Home ownership 98.1 88.8 65.2,43.5 20.1 
paid system 
Loan system 88.3 78.3 51.5 38.2 20.4 
Supplied house 97.7 94.5 84.2 67.6 44.5 
Health facilities 95.5 83.0 61.5 46.0 27.2 
Facilities for 95.1 86.2 64.6 55.0 28.0 
Physical training 
(gymnasium) 
Leisure facilities 98.9 86.8 ý1.4 40.9 15.6 
(recreation center) 
Source: Japan, Ministry of Labor: "Year Book of Labor Statistics". 1983. 
pp. 173-175. 
5.5.1.1.2. Peripheral Workforce 
This group of the labour force is made of the temporary 
workers, part-time workers, seasonal workers, day 
labourers. The longest legal contract,, for temporary 
workers is 'one 
year. Women workers in Japan are included 
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in the peripheral work force and they are expected to 
leave jobs when they get married to raise families. They 
work for the company on an on and off basis depending on 
the needs and seasonal demand of the company. They are 
paid a lesser basic salary 'and bonus and may not' enjoy 
perks as the regular workers. They do not belong to any 
union. This employment arrangement is very common in the 
automobile, electric, machine and construction industries., 
The other peripheral group consists of the sub-contract 
workers. It is necessary to distinguish the two major 
categories of sub-contract workers. The first group 
consists of individuals working on contract within the 
firm. This sub-contract labour force is normally provided 
by labour firms where semi-skilled and skilled workers 
are provided to supplement the core workers. The other 
group comprises of workers in sub-contracting firms. 
Regarding sub-contract workers, they are normally better 
trained than the temporary workers and are often' former 
regular employee status workers transferred from 
elsewhere. The use of peripheral worker system provides 
a lot of flexibility to the company which may use them 
during good time and likewise stop employing them during 
bad economic situation. Since there exists core and 
peripheral workers in Japan, the so-called Japanese 
lifetime employment is a misnomer and somewhat misleading 
as it does not represent the entire labour market. 
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What are the strengths and weaknesses of the so-called 
lifetime system in Japan? Western experts have not reached 
a consensus opinion on whether it is a good or bad system. 
Nevertheless, a number of them agree that the system is 
the factor responsible for explaining why employee's 
motivation is high in Japan. In addition, lifetime 
employment, although limited to the minority of workforce, 
i. e. 30%, has been successful to a large extent in 
moulding workforce's loyalty. According to Brown 
(1987: p. 22), this is because lifetime employees have a 
stake in the company's success. If the company is making 
profits, their jobs will be secured. They will work hard 
to ensure the company's success which will also bring 
security to their jobs. 
Lifetime employment is credited with being responsible for 
the manner in which new technologies, particularly those 
that are labour saving, can be introduced - to the 
manufacturing process with relative ease. Employees have 
no fear that the new process will result in job loss or a 
reduction in pay because they will be retained for other 
technicalt management, or sales positionst since the 
Japanese workforce is noted for its flexibility. if 
necessary, retraining will be given. This is made 
possible because the average Japanese worker is highly 
educated and hence, rqlatively open to retraining. 
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Limited inter-firm labour mobility among companies that 
results from lifetime employment practice also leads to 
lower costs of recruiting, screening and retaining 
employees. Under the lifetime employment system, the 
company will not hesitate to invest in its employees since 
it knows that the employees will stay with the company 
until retirement. The company is naturally willing to 
spend large amounts of money and time on worker's 
education and training programs because the benefits of 
that investment will eventually go to the company itself. 
A continually educated/trained worker is regarded by many 
as the explanation for worker productivity in Japan. 
The lifetime employment practices in Japan have 
contributed ýto low job mobility among career staff because 
of the reluctance of well-established companies to take in 
people who have previously worked for another firm. This 
is good for the employer because employees do not come and 
go as they please. - The employees will tend to endure 
whatever job assignments, the company gives themv even 
though it may entail temporary hardship and self sacrifice 
(Tung, 1982: p. 48). Lifetime employment therefore acts as'a 
major employee motivator since it creates the atmosphere 
in which all feel a mutual commitment to continued 
corporate success. 
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Lifetime employment in Japan is frequently cited as an 
example of the respect and consideration that the Japanese 
have for each other. Maher, in one of his articles, wrote: 
"certainly, the Japanese have a sensitivity in human 
relationships and an indirection and deference iný dealing 
with each other that are unique to their society" (Maher, 
1985a: p. 24). 
In a Confucian-oriented, society like Japan, human feelings 
are very important and lifetime employment recognises 
this. Perhaps, this explains why members of trade unions 
are not aggressive in their pursuit of claims for benefits 
and rights from the employer. In this respect, the system 
could be considered in a positive light. 
The use of peripheral employees, especially in the sub- 
contracting system helps the firm to meet the cyclical 
demand and at the same -time acts as a cushion during the 
period of economic decline. The companies which use this 
arrangement are relieved of the burden of having to keep 
redundant workers during slack periods. This 'explains the 
Japanese success in, the automobile industries where they 
are able to cut cost in the manufacture of automobile 
components by subcontracting them out to other smaller 
companies. 
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To many Western analysts, however, the lifetime employment 
has 'a lot of shortcomings. It is not a legal obligation. 
It is beginning to show sign of breaking up in Japan. Some 
have suggested that the Japanese firms practising , this 
system must manage their affairs with a relatively 
unflexible workforce in the short-term. This'could be very 
costly to- them especially in times of recession when under 
normal employment legislations, some workers would be made 
redundant and laid off. ' A lifetime system also creates 
problem for 'the firms with regards to termination of 
unsatisfactory employees. Brown (1987: p. 23) pointed out 
that ' many managers in Japanese org . anisations have 
expressed unhappiness with the system's inability to rid 
itself of workers whose performance is below the 
acceptable standard. 
The impression that Japanese workers ýare happy under the 
lifetime employment system is far from the truth. The 
feeling among the new-generation of the Japanese workforce 
towards lifetime employment is that if they could, they 
would do away with it. There are reasons for such 
resentment towards the system. , The Japanese are aware -of 
what their counterparts are getting in the West, -i. e 
opportunities to choose jobs of their preference and 'the 
freedom- to change careers, etc. The present employment 
system seriously hinders the Japanese employee who finds 
himself in the wrong company but cannot leave and join 
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another one. This causes frustration and undermines 
productivity. II 
Many Japanese workers and even managers, especially those 
at the middle level, privately view - lifetime employment 
as a form of imprisonment. If one is dissatisfied with a 
job assignment, or wants a faster promotion, or disagrees 
with a decision, one has no choice but to acquiesce. The 
system makes it almost impossible to change careers 
midway. (Cole, 1981; Tung, 1984). 
The fact that only 30% of the -total work force in Japan 
enjoys lifetime employment means that the majority of the 
Japanese labour force- is, being left out of whatever the 
benefits this system provides. Those worst hit are the 
employees of small and medium companies. So, here is a 
situation where on one hand, there are elite workers who 
are well-treated because they happen to be in the 
employment of big and successful companies, and on the 
other hand there are ordinary workers who are paid less 
and given less financial perks. It has been found that 
even for those regular lifetime workers, most of them are 
forced into retirement at age 55 with only modest company 
pensions and public social security that does not begin 
until the age 60. 
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The use of temporary workers (women and sub-contract 
labour) in Japan tends to benefit the big firms only. The 
workers are at the mercy of those firms as they can be 
recalled and reemployed during good times and laid off 
during poor periods. It may be considered 'a waste of 
manpower to exclude female labour especially when most of 
them are highly educated. In the West, such practices 
would surely cause a stir in the the woman's rights 
movement for it would be seen as being- sexist 
discrimination. A Japanese, -lady teacher, who played host 
to-, the author during the latter's visit to Japan 
vehemently condemned this practice of employment as 
'unfair, out of time and weird'. 
5.5.1.2. Recruitment Policy I 
Recruitment is done yearly by large companies whereby 
fresh* employees are hired after 'graduation from high 
schools or universities. Entry into a managerial career 
with a large corporation is 'highly competitive. A 
university-education constitutes, with few exceptions, the 
single most important prerequisite to qualifying for the 
managerial ranks. 
The selection process of new recruits begins during the 
summer when companies distribute recruitment, materials to 
collegeý or high school seniors. The selection process 
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depends on the student's areas of specialization (Pucik, 
1984: p. 265). Students who major in the social sciences, 
law or the humanities will enter jimukei (administrative 
jobs). Students majoring in technical disciplines will 
enter gijutsukei (technical jobs). The basic criteria for 
hiring, besides an employee potential or abilities, are 
"balanced" personality and moderate views. The evaluation 
of candidates is often supplemented by background checks 
assigned to private investigators who interview the 
candidates's neighbours and acquaintances, check local 
police records, and examine family histories. Those who 
pass the final round of interviews are invited to sit for 
the company entrance examination to determine who is best 
qualified for the jobs. 
Aspiring administrators are expected to apply directly to 
employers while the prospective technical employees are 
normally approached through their professors and 
universities or schools. The reason why technical students 
are given different, if not special treatmentj is due to 
the fact that prospective employers prefer to have the top 
technical talents. College grades are not an important 
selection criteria for either occupational class. What 
matters is the prestige of the school or university from 
which the student is graduating. The preference in favour 
of graduates from the more prestigious universities (i. e. 
Tokyo University) reinforces the competition to, enter the 
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appropriate college. It must also be emPhasised at this 
juncture that an MBA qualification, which is considered 
necessary and prestigious for aspiring, managers in Western 
societies in order to succeed in business- and managerial 
level career, does not carry much weight in the 
recruitment system of the - Japanese organisations (except 
in the International Division and sogo shoshas). 
The manner in which the Japanese -recruiters select 
employees for their companies suggests they have been very 
careful and extraordinarily meticulous in selecting the 
right candidates, reflecting the "get it right for first 
time" policy. This is not difficult to understand in a 
system where a firm hires an employee for life. - 
After the selection process has been completed, Japanese 
companies usually place a tremendous amount of emphasis on 
induction training in 'order to achieve a homogenous 
workforce. Induction training lasts anything between one 
or two weeks 'to more than a year (Okazaki, 1989). The 
content of the induction course varies but mainly it 
consists of the philos , ophy, objectives, corporate 
strategy, organisational' structure and commercial and 
industrial operations of the company. 
Japanese workers at early stages of their careers are 
underpaid relative to what they contribute (Cole, 1979). 
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They are compensated for this at a later stages in their 
tenure with the firm, in that the wages of the most senior 
class of workers may surpass the pay of new employees by 
200-400%, depending on the company concerned (Haitani, 
1978). Upon reaching the age of fifty-five, ýall employees 
except the top few who are the managing directors of the 
firm must retire. The company pays each retiree a lump sum 
money amounting to five or six years' salary (Ouchi, 
1981). 
A caveat must be applied regarding some recruitment 
features of traditional Japanese-style management that 
have been portrayed by a number of scholars. The 
recruitment pattern in Japan has undergone significant 
changes of late and a number of recruitment practices are 
discarded in some companies. Okazaki (1989) in her recent 
study pointed that firms no longer favour 
graduates of prestigious universities who are thought to 
possess higher level of analytical ability but lack 
imagination and creativity. Also she observed that 
recruiters are -more interested in the personal qualities 
of potential candidates. Recruitment of fresh graduates is 
no longer the norm today. 'Headhunting' by some firms 
especially in the banking sector is on the increase. This 
is marked by the changing of jobs in 'mid-career, 
suggesting that the traditional recruitment system is 
breaking up. For instance some 2.5 million Japanese in 
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1987 changed jobs, something unheard of in Japan a decade 
ago. The reason for this was partly because of the 
economic boom in Japan during that period which saw many 
firms expanding, while the number of university graduates 
entering the market remained static. It was also found 
that from 1985 to 1986, Sumitomo Trust Bank recruited 40 
mid-career members as permanent staff and the reason for 
this was the shortage of specialised manpower it faced 
then. 
The recruitment policy which is practised in Japanese 
firms has merits and demerits. Accordinglyo a recruitment 
practice that only selects fresh graduates from high 
schools and universities once a year is good, so said a 
number of writers (Pucik, 1984; Cole,, 1971; Ouchig 1981). 
In the first place, it is more economical to conduct 
interviews and recruit many employees at one, time. 
Secondly, it is easier to train them all at the same time 
rather than having to train a handful of new employees who 
join at different times of the year. A-once-a-year 
recruitment exercise makes it possible for the employer to 
choose the best possible candidates from the pool of 
applicants 'who must compete, at the same time to ýthe 
company. Also, the hiring of recruits fresh from schools 
or universities enables the company to develop their 
workers much easier because a 'virgin' workforce' can be 
readily assimilated into the company's environment. The 
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process of assimilation is considered the cornerstone of 
career development in Japanese development. ý 
The special relationships that have, been cultivated 
between some companies and certain universities is a good 
way of getting at the best talents. Getting, the 
recommendation from professors in recruiting the right 
candidates is advantageous because the professors usually 
know which students have the best brains, the correct 
attitudes and the right personalities required for certain 
jobs. Most professors would surely recommend students whom 
they feel are suitable so as to enhance the status-and 
preserve the good name of their respective universities. 
The rigorous screening and selection process has to be one 
of the major strengths of the Japanese recruitment system. 
Japanese recruiters tend to select ý candidates. with 
qualities that can fit into their company's philosophy 
rather than ý look for specialised skills. This is 
understandable because Japanese workers are meant to be 
generalists rather than specialists. Therefore, the 
correct type has to be, identified because once they join 
in the company, they are going to remain there until 
retirement. 
On the negative side, the practice of some big firms in 
going only for graduates of certain universities or high 
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schools is unhealthy and unfair. This system results in 
an unnecessary tendency for students to enrol'at these so- 
called elite universities. Thus only those prestigious 
universities will gain while other institutes of higher 
learning, whose curriculum and students may be equally 
good are excluded. Unless of course, those' 'favouritel 
institutions really produce extremely good quality 
students, staffed by renowned faculty members, have 
exceptional educational , facilities and maintain the 
highest admission standards, this practice of recruiting 
graduates is not justifiable. If all or the majority of 
employees come from one institution only, it leads to 
inbreeding. 
The Japanese recruitment system -has been blamed for 
causing a rat race which causes many Japanese parents to 
become so obsessed about sending their children to 
prestigious schools and later to institutions of higher 
learning at all cost. From a tender ageq the Japanese 
children are drilled many hours in studying at school and 
then at tuition sessions so that they achieve good grades 
that would enable them to eventually enter the famous 
universities. Japanese parents consider this a passport 
for their children in securing work in big firms upon 
graduation. There is nothing wrong with this type of 
attitude, but if not properly controlleds can prove to be 
destructive. 
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5.5.1.3. Seniority-wage and Seniority-promotion Systems 
A salient feature of the lifetime employment scheme is the 
unwritten rule that as an employee grows older, he 
commands a higher income. Age and seniority command 
respect, higher salaries and perks in the seniority-wage 
system in Japan. It has been said earlier that new 
employees start at the bottom and are comparatively 
underpaid even though they may have more potential than 
their senior colleagues. According to the Ministry of 
Labour, a newly recruited employee in the 18-19 age group., 
earns a monthly'wage of 118,900 yen while an employee who 
is in the 55-59 age bracket and has worked for over 30 
years receives a monthly wage of 310,800 yen (the detail 
of monthly earnings of typical Japanese employees is 
presented in Table 5E). 
What happens in large - companies in Japan is that the 
Japanese managers are promoted apcording to a rigid 
seniority system until the age of 35, when merit becomes a 
deciding factor as well. Those not promoted for the keiei 
(top management) may then look to retiring at the age of 
55. The upper-level executives, however will continue in 
office as long as they are physically and mentally able to 
do so. There is no mandatory retirement age for top 
management (Long and Seo, 1977). 
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Table 5A(i): Average Monthly Earnings According to Age 
and Length of Service (1000 yen), 1983 (Male Workers) 
Age 
1-2 
Length of service (in manufacturing industry) 
3-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30 years 
or more 
18-19 118.9 113.0 - 
20-24 134.7 136.3 145.0 
25-29 158.3 168.3 173.6 180.9' - 
30-34 184.1 192.9 209.7 215.4 217.2 
35-39 197.8 209.8 219.9 248.2 254.3 253.9 - 
40-44 206.1 212.7 224.5 244.6, 290.3 290.2 284.2 - 
45-49 199.4 209.1 222.1 237.6 261.2 317.0 319.8 301.5 
50-54 192.7 205.4 210.7 225.5 248.1 284.9 339.7 322.6 
55-59 184.6 192.0 197.9 212.0 229.7 256.8 281.9 310.8 
Source: Japan, Ministry of Labor: "Year Book of Labor Statistics", 
1983, p. 115. 
Promotion under , the seniority-wage system- at the junior 
levels is largely a matter of advancement by age, but at 
senior levels, proven ability on the part of employees 
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becomes increasingly important. Subordinate members are 
expected to display a high degree of commitment in their 
work, to consciously monitor and ensure the quality of 
what they do, to accept willingly reassignment to other 
tasks, to display full cooperation to fellow workers in 
working methods, to accept direction of working overtime 
works, and to participate in a certain amount of after 
hours -socialising with their work colleagues 
(Smith, 
1984: p. 122). 
Another feature in the seniority-wage system in Japan is 
that executives hold ranks and titles based upon education 
and length of service rather than upon importance of their 
respective functions'. If by virtue of education and length 
of service, an executive is promoted into a position that 
he is not capable of handling, he may be quietly'shifted 
to an innocuous' position. His title and status in the 
hierarchy are not affected by this change, and in due time 
he may be promoted again. If a young employee were to try 
to push himself ahead of others in his classs he would be 
severely criticised and may be rejected by his peers. 
The most- positive element is the -fact that it 
theoretically takes away the often destructive competition 
between employees and promotes a more harmonious group 
relationship in which each employee works for the benefit 
of the entire group, secure in the belief that he will 
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prosper with the group and that., in due time, he will 
acquire the benefits that accrue for long and faithful 
service. The seniority-based system assumes -that longer 
experience makes an employee more valuable. 
There Is also a sense of security that develops within the 
seniority-wage system, according to Japanese employers. 
For"example, the worker knows that he is taken care of as 
long as the company survives. This knowledge gives the 
worker security and inspires the worker to ensure the 
survival of' the company so as to, in turn, ensure his 
security. 
The obvious attractiveness of the 1 seniority-wage system 
is , that no young and inexperienced person, even how 
talented he may be, will bypass the more senior and 
experienced colleagues as is the case in the West. 
Sometimes there is a lot of unhappiness caused to workers 
who have to accept an individual who is younger in age and 
junior in service as their boss. The promotion system that 
uses rapid advancement as a reward can result in back- 
biting, office politicking, nepotisml and bribery. These 
problems will not easily arise should an orderly promotion 
system be implemented like the one in Japan. Such things 
as 'superman' or 'blue-eyed boy' or' 'rising star' will 
normally not occur in such a setting. 
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There are however several weaknesses that come along with 
the seniority and slow promotion practices. The seniority- 
wage system no longer , provides the same motivation ý for 
young employees and as a result, more companies are'forced 
to promote according to talent, whilst at the same time, 
having overcome demoralisation among the older employees 
(Foot, 1986: p. 23). This is indeed the most significant 
weakness of the seniority-wage system. While the younger 
workers feel it unfair to ignore their abilities and not 
to reward (i. e. early promotion) their contribution, older 
workers believe '1t is justifiable to reward and promote 
senior workers first. It can be said that to a certain 
degree it is not practical to promote -a person to a higher 
position just because he ýhappens, to be ý older and was 
recruited earlier. , It is bad business to promote "dead 
wood". Young and talented people can easily be demoralised 
and this is said to be happening in Japan today. Problems 
of this nature could be a catastrophe to the 
organisation's survival. 
The drawback of the seniority-based system also' is 
associated with the difficulty in rewarding individual's 
creativity and excellence, thereby possibly 'reducing 
motivation among the employees. And since compensation is 
based primarily on seniority and not performance, 
companies may be paying higher wages to those who are not 
capable or competent. 
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A strict adherence, to promotion based on seniority has 
resulted in an organisation with many job titles as is the 
case in many Japanese organisations. In one firm, Kanebo, 
the fashion division has six sub-division managers. 
Throughout the organisation, such titles as acting 
manager, assistant manager, and manager equivalent are 
used at division and other levels (Yang, 1984). This 
obstructs and slows down decision-making process, and also 
causes diffusion of accountability and responsibility. , 
The fact that the promotion of an individual employee is 
relatively slow in Japan and can be very frustrating to 
the employees is proof of this system's weakness. It is 
not difficult to imagine the misery of waiting for at 
least 20 years for a fresh , graduate to 
become a bucho 
(department head) in Japan. In the USp a university 
graduate can easily assume. managerial position after 5 
years if he works hard and shows great leadership 
potential. The reason for this difference is that in 
Japan, age is the function of promotion while in the 
latter, promotion is based on capability and performance 
of an individual worker. Seen from this perspective, 
seniority-wage, and promotion systems in Japan do not 
appear to be appealing after all. 
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5.5.2. Industrial Training and Human Resource Management 
In Japan, unlike other countries, few organisations reveal 
their human resources development policy (Kishi, 
1986: p. 126). However, the education and training system 
charts clearly reveal the top management's basic policy on 
training. It shows the manner in which the organisation 
conducts human resource development and the themes and 
contents of training according to one ranking in the 
organisation and in one's specialised field. The chart 
reveals at a glance the type of training which ' the 
organisation expects its members to acquire through self- 
development. 
The Japanese'concept of industrial trainin g is interesting 
to study. It may be described as "horizontal training", 
for it encourages the' acquisition of a variety of task 
skills at the expense of skill specialisition. The 
individual'is trained in most, if not all, tasks 'at entry 
level; not within a single department, but throughout the 
organisation. This type of training system develops 
generalists, not specialists. Generalists are preferred by 
Japanese employers because they are more flexible and'are 
in aI position to undertake different assignments as 
compared to the specialists. 
Trainees can be classified under three headings namely; 
M the newly hired employees, (ii) the general employees, 
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and (iii) managers. Training for the newly recruited 
employees is mainly in the form of lectures and on-the 
job-training. At this stage., the employees are 
indoctrinated with company philosophy and taught basic 
technical skills by the senior members of the company's 
staff. The length of training varies from company to 
company, but normally it lasts about three to eight 
months. 
General employees are trained in functional technical 
skills and also in human skills. They normally undergo a 
number of training programs namely; On-the-Job Training 
(OJT), Off-the Job Training (Off OJT), Self -development, 
In-company Group Training and Pre-promotion Training. -ý 
5.5.2.1. On-the-Job Training 
On-the-Job training (OJT) is the most emphasised, and this 
is done with planned instruction by supervisors. It 
consists of educational, guidance provided at the 
workplace to enhance skills and knowledge needed in work. 
Essentially, said Gow (1988b: p. 32), OJT involves someone 
who possesses knowledge teaching one who lack that 
knowledge. It also includes personal coaching by 
supervisors and old-timers9 although not necessarily one's 
immediate, superior. Gow hypothesised that one possible way 
this form of training is popular with Japanese managers is 
because of the high esteem in which teachers are held in 
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the Confucian-oriented society of Japan. He went on to say 
that OJT is also popular especially with those who pass on 
the knowledge, because it made them more secure sensing 
that-their students wiil seldom be promoted ahead of them. 
OJT is a very powerful training tool for new employees as 
it forms the nucleus of early training programmes, and for 
existing employees and retraining on new jobs (i. e. job 
rotation) within the organisation. 
A key element of OJT is job rotation. It is a form -of 
training in personnel management. in Japanese corporations 
where employees are moved from department to department, so 
that they are made knowledgeable and skilful in the 
various jobs in their company. It can be said that this 
training system is a good system since it maximises the 
use.. of human resources. It also results in a more flexible 
workforce, as the employee is better able to handle tasks 
within the organisation. However to implement OJT 
successfully, certain procedures 'must be carried out. 
These, include (i). the identification of the specific'need 
for instruction; (ii). the setting of target or objectives 
for instruction; (iii). the development of an Instruction 
plan; and (iv). the evaluation of the result . 
5.5.2.2. Off-the-Job-Training (Off-OJT) 
The use of Off-OJT in Japan is increasingo according to 
the recent studies carried out by Okazaki (1989). In 
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terms of the total-amount spent on Off-OJT, the budget for 
1988 represented a 21% increase on the actual amount 
spent in 1987. This increased emphasis in such training 
may be the result of buoyancy of the economy and progress 
in technology, information and diversification, so it was 
claimed. 
Off-OJT is conducted in company training centres and in 
outside institutions and consists of, for , example, 
technical training classes and language classes. Such 
training is sponsored both by the divisions and - by the 
head offices. Manager training consistsýmostly of the off- 
OJT in the company's training centres and its purpose is 
to improve conceptual, skills and, human -skills. 
5.5.2.3. Self-Development 
Self -development is another important aspect of training. 
Self-development runs parallel with OJT and is 
increasingly , growing in popularity at all 
levels in 
Japanese firms. Miyoshi(1986) has in fact defined self- 
development as efforts manifested in the individual's 
educational and development activities which are targeted 
towards the smooth realization of an objective. The 
setting of the objective comes from self-knowledge, and 
the knowledge of one's ability. 
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A form of self -development which is increasingly popular 
and given the support by Japanese companies in Japan 
today, includes the supply of specialist knowledge and 
technology information, and assistance with obtaining 
official certifications. Professor Gow was of opinion that 
the increased importance of the latter category may 
indicate an acceleration towards a 'credential society' 
and 'portability'' of qualifications (Gow, 1988b: p. 37). 
Some of the most popular forms of self-development at the 
moment are the seminars and courses run by outside 
organisers; distribution of book lists and the provision 
of subsidies for the purchase of the recommended reading 
materials; and assistance given for expenses in 
undertaking correspondent courses mainly -aimed at 
obtaining recognised qualifications. 
An important element in self -development Japanese society 
is the reading habits of the Japanese. There are four 
daily, twenty-four page Industrial Newspapers as well as 
the equivalent of the Financial Times called Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun. In addition, there are masses of books about 
business often getting into the Best Seller's List in 
English or in Japanese. The Japanese do read voraciously 
at all levels of management; so the phenomenon Of"'give me 
everything on one side of a sheet of paper" 'is absent. 
The higher up the Japanese individuals go up the' 
management the more they read. 
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Correspondence courses are-also extremely popular and they 
are normally approved by the Ministry of Education. It is 
estimated that there are as many as 3000 ' providers 'of 
business-related, courses in Japan but the main ones are 
the professional associations such'as the Japan Management 
Association, the Nippon Administrative Management 
Association, the Japan Management School and Sanno 
University's Management Institute. 
Self-development training is quite successful'in Japan for 
for two reasons. -Firstlyg opportunities for frequent 
promotion and wages increases that usually come after the 
training have helped to stimulate the desire among 
employees for self -development. Secondly, , the company, 
realising that a knowledgeable workforce would be an asset 
to it, ý has gone out of its way to provide the necessary 
support in the form of, 'financial assistance. The third 
reason is the Confucian attitude of lifelong learning. 
5.5.5.4. Pre-Promotion Training 
Pre-promotion training is normally given to an employee 
who is about to be promoted to a more senior position. The 
training can be in the form of OJTj i. e. or Off-OJT. Pre- 
promotion can be considered a preparation for someone who 
will eventually assume a more responsible job. From the 
viewpoint of its purpose, it is similar to the one found 
in Western organisation. 
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5.5.5.5. In-Company Group Training 
In-Company Group training can be said to complement other 
forms of training. This form of training refers to the 
group discussion-type training where a group of employees 
(i. e. the section chiefs) are drawn together to highlight 
common problems or share information vital for Amproving 
their jobs. The emphasis, tends to be on the 'in 
basket/case studies' type, especially the studying of 
actual examples of problems. Methods of assessing the 
efficacy of such training naturally vary but there is 
growing evidence of a shift to written, detailed reports. 
The most popular teaching staff at all levels, of company 
for In-company Group training are the specialists from 
external specialist organisations. The companies 'also use 
their own executives who are experts in certain areas to 
do the training. University lecturers and visiting 
celebrities are also used although such method are on the 
decline., 
Based on the available literature review on Japanese 
Management Model, the industrial training and human 
resource development practices in Japan are quite highly 
rated, especially the On-the-Job training (OJT). The OJT 
schemes in Japan are meant to equip employees with broad 
knowledge about the mechanism in the organisation by 
focussing the training on practical knowledge of the 
various functional areas. This - benefits the workers in 
-270- 
the long run because familiarisation with the various 
activities of the different departments helps the 
employees see the overall operation of the organisation. 
Besides OJT, one aspect, of human resource development that 
also receives a lot of attention as well as admiration, -is 
job rotation of all Japanese workers. The intra- 
departmental and inter-departmental rotation provide 
useful training, making workers broad-sighted and 
flexible. This is because the rotation enables workers, to 
comprehend the entire overall working system in the 
organisation. It also allows an individual worker to see 
and understand other people's job situation given the fact 
that he has done the job before. As Near and Olshavsky 
stated:, 
'! ... rotation among jobs serves not only to train managers 
in needed skills, but also to socialize them in the norms 
and culture of the firm" (Near and Olshavsky, 1985, p. 16). 
Job rotation also cultivates the feeling of collective 
responsibility. Since each person is able to- fill all 
jobs, he can and is willing to help others and he feels 
obligated to do so. 
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5.5.3. Enterprise Unionism 
Japanese unions are characterised by enterprise unionism 
as opposed to craft or industry-wide unions. It has been 
said that an enterprise union gives both management and 
workers an identity of purpose and provides-an environment 
in which there is greater cooperation for the achievement 
of common goals (Sethi et al, -1984: p. 47). The membership 
extends to both blue-collar and white collar workers with 
regular or core employee status. White-collar employees 
up to the level of section chief are included. Union 
officials normally consist solely of the company 
employees. 
Clarification should be made regarding trade union 
scenario in Japan. There are such thing as federations 
which are loose coalition of enterprise unions in the same 
industrial sector. Also, there are national 
confederations, but these although important in 
organisations such as the ILO (International Labour 
Organisation), and therefore quite well-known 
internationally, do not have the major influence within 
Japan, except in such thing as spring wage offensive. 
As of 1983, it was reported that Japan has a total of 
34,539 unions with about 42 million members (refer to 
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. panese 
labour unions comprise of six Table 5C) and that, Ja 
major groups as depicted in Table 5B below: 
Table 5B: Members of Labour Unions 
by Major Organisation as of 1983, 
Labor Organization No. of Members 
(1000) 
General Council of Trade Unions of Japan(Sahva) 4508 
Japanese Confederation of Labor(Domei) 2193 
National Federation of Industrial Organizations 64 
(Sh! nSanbetsu) 
Federation of Independent Unions 1480 
Other National Federations 3784 
Others 1054 
Table 5C: No. of Unions and_Union 
Membership from 1975 to 1983 
1975 1978 1980 1983 
No. of Unions 33424 34163 34232 34539 
No. of Union Members(1000) 12590 12383 12369 12520 
No. of Emplayees(10000) 3662 3796 4012 4209- 
Unionization Rate(%) 34.4 32.6 30.8 29.7 
Source: Japan. Ministry of Labor: "Nihon no Rodo Kumlal no Genjo - Rodo 
Kumial Kiso Chosa Hokoku"(The Situation of Labor Union In Japan 
- Basic Sarvey on Trade Unions). 1984. P. 1 3. (in Japanese). , 
I 
-273- 
The key elements of this enterprise union are as follows: 
(a) Each company runs its own union and elects office- 
bearers from within the company, the company providing 
leave of absence and premises -for union officials. 
National Confederations and industry wide federations do 
exist but negotiating powers regarding wages, * working 
conditions, job design, etc rest almost solely with those 
at enterprise level; 
(b) The membership extends to both blue-collar and white- 
collar workers with regular status. White-collar employees 
up to the level of section chief are included (Gow, 1987). 
Like unions in the West, enterprise unions in Japan are 
consulted on matters pertaining to job responsibilities 
and design, training and promotions of workers. The public 
sector unions do not have the right to strike, although 
strikes are not uncommon. In fact, the unions in Japanese 
public sector have been in the early post-war period, very 
militant. In contrast to those in the West however, the 
duration of strikes is usually very short. 
Private sector employees in Japan have the full legal 
right to strike, but there the strike is more a 
demonstration than a prolonged test of economic strength 
(Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976). Japanese strikes rarely 
last beyond a day, and they come mainly during the spring 
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offensive. There are occasional longer strikes in Japan, 
but they are carried out mainly by a few 'strong national 
unions, the seamen's union in particular. Many national 
unions would like to mount more serious strike threats as 
a bargaining weapon, but they are sometimes faced with the 
reluctance of the local community to act against their 
companies. 
On the positive side, union-company relations tend to 
develop according to the realities of the enterprise. The 
participation of white-collar employees in particular, 
increases union knowledge about thi actual financial 
situation of the firm. The possibilityý is, thereby 
increased that there will be cooperation between the union 
and the company based on mutual trust. 
Another strength of this system of company-oriented 
unionisation is the stability it creates in the Japanese 
labour market. There is hardly any seriousq long strike 
launched in Japanese firms ý for the workers know that ý any 
interruption to work will mean a loss of revenue to the 
company, which in turn - will adversely affect them 
financially. Workers in Japan are already attuned to the 
belief that if the company prospers, they will also 
benefit and if the company loses, they will also suffer. 
Depending on how one looks at itq such philosophy can be 
very good or very destructive. In Japan, it has proven to 
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be very good: it results in a positive relationship 
developing between the employer and the employees. 
A serious weakness of this company-wide union system is 
that members have shown a strong tendency towards becoming 
over dependent on the fortunes of the-company. This strong 
identification with the interests of the company makes 
union members susceptible to company manipulation with 
such slogan as: 'Productivity Increase Movement'( 
Seisansei Kojo); 'Protect the Enterprise' (Kigyo Boei); or 
'Higher Wages Will Bankrupt the Firm'. Under these 
circumstances, it becomes difficult for the' union to 
effectively represent the interests of its members. I 
An enterprise union often lacks the interest in problems 
outside the enterprise. They are indifferent to theýplight 
of other workers in the same profession. This naturally 
weakens, the bargaining position of the workers nationwide. 
Another weakness of Japanese-style enterprise unionism-is 
the fact that union leaders continue to maintain their 
status as company employees and that their term of office 
are quite short. They therefore are --not union leaders in 
the real sense and not' as professional as their 
counterparts in the West. The Japanese union leaders tend 
to see their union activities as an opportunity'to provide 
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a service to the company as means of enhancing their 
promotion opportunities. 
5.5.4. Performance Evaluation 
Japanese organisations generally, have a fairly complex and 
detailed set of procedures for evaluating employees 
performance. 'The criteria used - in assessing performance 
vary, depending on the employee's position. Employees 
below the level of president are normally grouped into 
three categories namely the junior employees; the senior 
employees and the managers. Personnel in each category are 
evaluated twice a year 'by a group of supervisors 
(including one's immediate supervisor) on a set criteria 
specific to that level. -- I- 
At the junior employee level, the emphasis is on the 
ability to obey orders from the, superiort , team spirit or 
cooperation, and general aptitudes. Evaluation of volume 
of output is defined not in quantitative terms, but 
subjectively as to whether the output is "efficient and 
punctual". The employee receives a score on each of these 
criteria based on a four-point scale ranging from superior 
to inferior. Thus the junior employee is evaluated on work 
attitudes., including obedience, cooperation and 
responsibility; basic and conceptual abilities; and 
performance of work as measured by quality, volume, 
originality and leadership. The senior employees, are 
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evaluated along the same line, with perhaps some 
additional criteria such as responsibility and leadership 
quality added. 
The evaluation of managers have four major components 
namely ,a single achievement score; a six scores 
measuring job-related abilities such as human relation 
skills, business judgement, coordination, and planning; a 
two outstanding job-related attributes (selected from a 
list of eight such as creativity, leadership, reliability 
etc); and a two outstanding personality-related attributes 
from a list of twelve such as sociability, flexibilityl 
confidence etc (Pucik, 1984: p. 270). These items are first 
evaluated by -the employees' direct boss, then by at least 
two other higher-level managers or executives. 
The Appraisal- system of a typical big firm in Japan does 
not provide feedback to employees of what had been 
evaluated. In one survey made on the personnel managers 
of 34 of ýthe 100 top Japanese corporations in Japan, it 
was reported that only two of the firms had a formal 
policy recommending explicit performance feedback (Tawara, 
1980). 
The components of the performance evaluation system of 
Japanese-style management are well-designed but its 
weakest spot -As to be found in its feedback system. The 
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almost negligible feedback regarding the employee's 
previous performance contradicts modern management 
principles and could be viewed as the root cause of 
uncertainty and confusion. This may have something to do 
with Japanese culture, but even so, the advantages of 
having constant feedback will outweigh its disadvantages 
in any management system. It is a well-known fact that 
regular direct feedback about subordinates' performancesý 
by superior is the cornerstone of an appraisal and career 
development process in any organisation. 
In the author's opinion, if an employee is not performing 
up to the expectation required of him under normal 
circumstances, he needs to be told of his deficiency so 
that remedial action can be taken accordingly. Likewise, 
if his performance is satisfactory or superbt he ought 
also to be, also informed (i. e. a compliment) so that he 
feels good and strives to work more harder to maintain his 
good performance. 'A person who is not given feedback will 
become confused or even worse, complacent, because he does 
not know whether he is doing well or otherwise. 
5.5.5. Production Management 
The production management system used by the Japanese has 
been widely admired in the West. For example, the 
production planning of a typical Japanese firm is very 
comprehensive in which sub-systems of the organisation are 
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all linked to each other. The effect of this planning 
system is the reduction of material costs as well as other 
costs related to the manufacturing of the products. The 
production system used by Japanese firms has been proven 
to be effective in reducing costs significantly. Among 
other things, one also observes that in Japan production 
workers have a high level of education and technical 
training. Also, the technicians and engineers are 
available on the shopfloor to support the production 
workers. Wheelwright (1981: p. 69) said that in Japan, the 
integrity of the production system and strategic purpose 
come first. Waste reduction policies and energy efficiency 
are more- prominent in Japanese plants. Cleanliness on 
plant sites is very strongly stressed. Cleaning the floor 
is not the responsibility of the cleaning staffj but of 
the site workers and foremen. Clean workplaces are 
considered important both for improving quality and 
improving morale. 
Production management. in Japan has been often said to be 
responsible to a large extent for the high level of 
productivity of Japanese empoyees. As stated earlier, 
Japanese productivity is comparatively very highq i. e. it 
has increased at about 400% of the rate enjoyed by he US. 
The average annual percentage change in productivity 
during 1950-1970 for Japan was 7% compared to 1.7% for the 
US during the same period (Bolling and Bowles, 1982: p. 97). 
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Its national income had made a 50% increase in real terms 
over pre-war years. Similarly, its industrial production 
had increased two-fold over pre-war years. 
The productivity movement was launched in Japan in 1955. 
It is directed by the Japanese Productivity Centre which 
has a number of regional branches. The principal 
activities of the Japanese Productivity Centre are 
management education and modernisation of labour- 
management relations. Today, it arranges more than sixty 
seminars every year in which many thousands of managers 
participate (Parkinson; Rustomji and Sapre, 1984). 
Japanese industrialists, supported by the government have 
been constantly seeking ways and means of improving their 
productivity. As a result, the Japanese are said to be the 
most productive workforce in the world. ' It is a basic 
proposition in economics that productivity depends 
primarily upon knowledge and its application. Many Western 
analysts strongly believe the secret of Japan's 
productivity lies in the efficient production line of her 
factories. It has been observed there is a strong emphasis, 
on marketing which is linked to production and design. 
Product design and production layout is made simple and 
detailed attention is paid to engineering excellent. 
However, the success of the Japanese firms and the 
productivity of the labour force could not have been 
ý1. 
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achieved without the advanced, systematic production 
management practices that exist in Japan. Among the most 
important of these practices are the innovative production 
methods, -investment on modern equipments, quality control 
circle, total control circle, suggestion system, just-in- 
time and kanban system. 
5.5.5.1. Use of Innovative Production-Methods", 
The Japanese have been successful in areas of production 
management, said to be responsible for ' the high 
productivity of the workforce. According to Kono (1984), 
one of 'the* reasons for this-'success is the use of 
innovation, in, production . 'methods -ý namely; 
(a)., the 
computerised production planning, (b). the module 
construction system, and (c). automation. For example, at 
Mitsui Shipping, computers are intensively ! used to help 
it perform tasks ranging from calculatingýand ordering the 
necessary parts to the construction of a ship's design'. 
Instead of using the- conventional construction system 
whichý is not only dangerous but involves a slow welding 
process, Mitsui Shipping uses the module construction 
method and it applies mass-production principles, thereby 
enabling the company to achieve welding precision and 
operating efficiency. The use of automation is also 
evident from 'the widespread use of programmable 'robots in 
operations such as drilling, burning and furnishing., 
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Because robots can be developed and produced relatively 
inexpensively and are considered by Japanese 
industrialists to be an important tool - of future 
technology, many independent small companies , as well as 
large machine-tool and electrical equipment manufacturers 
have begun producing them. Japan's first industrial robot 
was produced by Kawazaki Heavy Industries Ltd. under 
license from the American firm, Unimation Inc. Since then, 
Japan has become the robot capital of the world, with'as 
many as 150 companies being engaged in robot production by 
1980. It is also estimated that, in the same year about 
76iOOO-robots were in operation in Japan (although some 
writers have correctly pointed out that the figure may be 
misleading since robots are defined differently in Japan 
and the US). Nevertheless, it is said that 70 Z of the 
industrial robots now in operation in the world are to-be 
found in Japanese factories (Sato, 1985). The real impact 
of robotics is the revolutionary change it has brought 
about in line production, where it has the potential to 
introduce mass assembly production cost savings to small 
lot production runs. 
Some scholars reasoned out that the high usage of 
industrial robots by the Japanese is due to their 
traditional emphasis on production, and the potential to 
rationalise operations in the face of specific challenges 
like labour shortages, ageing Population and also 
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behavioural problems in job design (Kono, 1984; Monden, et 
al, 1985). The increasing use of- robots in Japanese 
organisations is claimed to have reduced labour cost of 
between 5 to 10% (Near and Olshavsky, 1985: p. 17). 
5.5.5.2. Modernisation of Equipment 
Another characteristic of the successful Japanese firms in 
Japan is their aggressive investment. in modernising and 
expanding facilities. A survey by MITI found out that the 
average age of facilities of Japanese steel manufacturers 
in 1980 was about nine and half years, while those of U. S. 
manufacturers in 1979 'was about seventeen years (Nikkei 
Newspaper, November 3,1981). The level of modernisation 
and automation can be measured indirectly by the ratio of 
fixed assets per employee whereby the successful Japanese 
firms have higher fixed assets per employee ratio than the 
US companies (as shown in the Table 5D). 
The survey showed that the ratio of fixed assets per 
employee of '-Japanese selected companies is more than 
'twice, and up to five times, as high as that of some 
selected, American or European companies. As a result, the 
turnover ratio of net fixed assets of Japanese companies 
is lower than that of their-counterparts. 
iI 
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TABLE 5D: NET FIXED ASSETS PER EMPLOYEE AND TURNOVER 
OF FIXED ASSETS IN SELECTED COMPANIES 
N. F. A. P. E T. R. F. A. 
(1000 yen/person) (sales net f. assets) 
Nippon Steel 20596 
U. S, Steel 7379 
British Steel 5044 
Hitachi 2625 
GE 1996 
GE (U. K. ) 773 
Toyota' 7617 
GM , 2234 
Ford, 2831 
BL Car (U. K. )- 1015 
(Source: MITI, 1980) 
1.33 
1.76 
1.15 
3.39 
3.76 
4.23 
4.51 
5.50 
4.88 
6.14 
5.5.5.3. Quality Control System 
The Japanese realised that during the post-war period, without 
major resources, they would have to go for value-added 
manufacturing exports. One major -barrier to this was the pre- 
war image of Japanese goods being cheap but of poor quality. 
Therefore, they were very enthusiastic to develop goods which 
were'' both cheap and of high , quality. This was part of a 
domestically -inspired revolution in quality, control 
management. However, meeting the needs of the US Occupation 
-285- 
Forces, in term of the Department of Defence contract etc. was 
also a factor pushing the Japanese to improve their quality in 
order to get works from the Occupation Forces. Japan is a 
world leader in maintaining product quality. The Japanese 
prefer to-measure reject rates in parts per million (pmm) 
rather than in percentage (JETRO, 1984). The Japanese strategy 
in quality control is analogous to community medicine whose 
motto is: 'prevention is better than cure'. The -idea is to 
prevent defects occurring first because it is very difficult 
as well as very costly to rectify mistakes once they occurred. 
The modern concept of statistical quality control was 
introduced in Japan before World War II, but it was only the 
preserve of a few specialist academics. Statistical quality 
control in Japan took off in a widespread sense within the 
industry during occupation of Japan. The Japanese perfected, 
modified- and blended the western-oriented quality control 
concepts to suit their own organisational environments. The 
quality control activities in Japan started within General 
Command , Headquarters of , 
Supreme Commander in 
telecommunication. It was then taken up by Dr. W. E. Deming, 
Dr. J. M. Juran and others after 1947 when they wanted to build 
up Japan. They made many visits to Japan giving lectures on 
managerial aspects of quality control to Japanese executives. 
To encourage the development of quality control activities, 
the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE), a 
private organisation, took the initiative in instituting the 
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Deming Prize in Japan in 1951. The Japanese Industrial 
Standards (JIS) define quality control as: 
I#a system of production methods that economically produces 
quality goods or services meeting the requirements of 
consumers" (Ishikawa, 1985: p. 44). 
Today, the two important concepts of quality control system 
widely used in Japan are quality total quality control and 
quality control circle. 
5.5.5.3.1. Total Quality Control' 
Related to the QCC concept is the total quality control (TQC) 
or sometimes known as company-wide quality control (CWQC). On 
that, basis, the goal has been to broaden TQC, namely quality 
control upstream and downstream of the enterprise itself 
(Kobayashi,, 1981). Upstream, TQC involves the parts and 
component suppliers, who, in close cooperation with assembler, 
are expected to deliver their goods "Just-in-time" and thus 
without inspection upon delivery. Downstream, TQC involves the 
distribution channels, equally on the basis of 
interdependence. 
The concept of TQC is actually based on the fact' that quality 
is everybody's business, and ideally, everybody should help in 
making their company the best in its particular*field. This of 
course involves the management especially in the development 
,; 
I 
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of clearly defined procedures, the monitoring of performance, 
and the motivation as well as participation of the workforce. 
The main themes of TQC (Reilker, 1983) are M. ' it involves 
all functions that deal with the product; (ii). 'it involves 
everyone's job from the office boy to the president of the 
company; (iii). it stresses the responsibility for quality is 
to be shared by all employees; and (iv). it 'require's that top 
management must understand and support the concept especially 
in the development and then in implementation parts of the 
exercise. 
5.5.5.3.2. Quality Control Circle 
Quality control circle (QCC) has been considered a major 
factor in the Japanese success in increasing productivity 
while reducing expenditure and waste. It' has been so 
successful with the Japanese that it has created a tremendous 
amount of interest in management literature. The success of 
QCC in Japan may be related to three factors namely: the 
scarcity of natural resources, contributing to a greater 
concern with waste; the Confucian culture which calls for 
harmony and; the emphasis on groupism, according to Shenkar 
(1988: p, 26). He added further that education plays a role in 
the effectiveness of QCC in Japan, since the technique 
requires rudimentary knowledge in quantitative analysis. 
However the number of QCCs in Japan may be grossly exaggerated 
because there is no widely available data on failed QCCs 
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being produced by JUSE and other organisations. Indeed QCCs in 
Japan generally tend to be successful companies which have 
already a good quality system. They are therefore not so much 
something which causes quality but which gets even more 
quality out of a system which has already gone a long way 
along the line to get good quality. 
The practice of is very popular in Japanese companies. As of 
1980, it was reported that there are a total of 115,254 
circles involving over a million participants in Japan. Table 
5E below shows the number of QCC and people Involved in the 
circles since 1962. 
Table 5E: No. of QCCs and Participants 
in Japan 1962 - 1980 
Year No. of QC Circles No. 0f 
- 
Participants 
1962 23 
1964 1,051 - 
1966 7,307 90,829 
1968 17,416 212,134 
1970 33,499 388,543 
1972 51.615 551,643 
1974 65,477 664,458 
. 1976 
78,395 774,012 
1978 94,787 903,471 
1980 115,254 1,062.759 
Note: The number of QC Circles and partic ipants Includes all of those re- 
gistered at the QC Circle headquarters of JUSE. 
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What is meant by QCC? It -can be defined as a comprehensive 
program for improving productivity through improved methods of 
human resource management that stress employee development and 
employee involvement. in work area decision-making. It normally 
consists of a small group of employees under one supervisor 
and they meet regularly to identify, analyse, and solve 
product quality problems. The ideal size of a circle is eight 
to ten people (Reiker, 1977). 
The entire concept. of QCC is based on trustq respect and care. 
The individual worker is recognised as a human being with the 
intellect and desire to participate in solving work-related 
problems. To the benefit of both the employees' and the 
organisation, QCC provides participants , with an - opportunity 
for taking on greater responsibilities, utilising their 
capabilities more fully, doing interesting and challenging 
work. 
The following steps outline and summarise the QCC process: 
(a). to determine what problem is to be solved, and why that 
problem needs to be solved; 
(b). if it is a general problem, to choose a specific ýpart of 
that problem and find out as much as possible about it; 
(c). to analyse the data gathered about the problem to sort 
out the true cause from the non-contributory factors; ,I 
(d). to develop a plan for initiating-those actions; 
i. 
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(e). carry out the plan; that is to take corrective action (if 
authorised to do so); 
(f). to check to see if the problem is really solved; 
(g). to set a system to ensure the problem remains solved and 
lastly; 
W., to investigate and resolve other aspects of the problems 
if they are significant. 
What is central to the QCC concept as a practical tool is the 
set of techniques available for analysisq discussion and 
feedback. Among the techniques used are a variety of charts 
and diagrams which display statistical results of actual 
production. The mathematics involved is not very sophisticated 
although the' impact of the statistical analysis can be quite 
pronounced but circle members must be able to use and analyse 
them (Bolwijn and Brinkmen, 1987). Professor Kaoru, who is 
often called the father of QCC, insists that in order to 
implement the circle successfully, the group leaders must be 
trained, in the eight tools of QCC namely structured 
brainstorming, check sheet, pareto chartg histogram , scatter 
diagram, graph and control charts and stratification (Arbose., 
1980). 
The attitude of top management in ensuring detailed production 
planning system must be commented. Alsog the fact. that they 
are aggressive (growth and future-oriented) in introducing 
large scale production systems and in putting-huge amounts of 
money in the modernisation of equipment has to the most 
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important step taken by the Japanese in their quest for 
industrial supremacy. 
There are a number of benefits that can be obtained by 
implementing a well-planned and properly executed QCC. 
According to one writer; 
"the quality 'circle 
services by enabling 
and recommend changes 
1987: p. 32). -, 
improves the quality of products or 
employees to state their observations 
in an organized way" (Boissoneau 
QCC enables people at the lowest levels of the organisation to 
influence decisions. These are the people who know the product 
or service best and can, unlike some managers, observe the 
impact of the service firsthand. 
Also, employees who have never taken the opportunity to 
communicate with others in either a lateral or hierarchical 
direction can do so through quality circles. In addition by 
using quality circles, the organisation gains from better 
management-labour relations. Perhaps for the first' time, 
workers can see, hear and understand that management wants to 
produce a good product or servi6e and treat employees fairly. 
Viewing the organisation in such a Positive light motivates 
workers to perform at high level of effectiveness. ' The problem 
of absenteeism, tardiness and employee pilferage does not 
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normally arise with the introduction of control circles 
because the system itself enables- employees to improve 
themselves by engaging in personnel development. 
QCCs had been not always that useful, according to many 
analysts. Many disasters have been reported in American and 
British companies that try to implement QCC without 
considering other, factors necessary for its success. Some 
writers such as Cole has low opinion of QCCO , QCC requires many 
requirements, namely the willingness or readiness of workers 
and management group for such practice; strong commitment of 
the company to it; the relevant of the practice to the overall 
organisation structure and system etc. 
The , weaknesses are also numerous. For instance,, the 
introduction- of QCC can be very costly to the organisation. 
Time away from the job for meetings and the preparation time 
needed for the quality circle leaders, -facilitatorss steering 
committeei and top management add up to substantial amount of 
institutional resources devoted to the program. 
It must be remembered that in order to participate in the QCC 
successfully, the workers have to be . 
able to read and willing 
to do a little bit of homework to prepare for discussion with 
members in the group. Knowledge of the various tools such as 
histograms and pareto charts etc. is mandatory for group 
t, 
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members of QCC. A workforce in which literacy levels are low 
would not be able to cope with the demand of QCC. 
Another problem with the circles is the amount of time 
necessary to be devoted to the program. It is time consuming 
for those involved especially if everybody is new to the 
system as they have to learn what it is about before they can 
participate in it. Associated with this problem is the fact 
that not all workers are happy with the quality circle because 
it upsets their old ways of doing things which they have been 
used to for so long. People are normally not receptive to new 
thing especially if this change inconveniences them. 
Some people feel that QCC reduces productivity ' instead of 
increasing the productivity level. Critics are of opinion that 
the amount of time required for meetings and preparation by 
the people involved, takes too much time away from actual 
work. In their view, the amount of investment is not justified 
by the outcome. 
5.5.5.4 Suggestion System 
When talking about suggestion systemp one must not confuse 
individual suggestion with suggestion emanating from QCCs. The 
Japanese employees are encouraged to give suggestions. In this 
way, -they help their companies to give ideas or constructive 
comments to the management as how to improve their jobs and 
the company's performance. It is said that the suggestion 
-294- 
system dates back before the World War II, and became 
widespread in Japanese firms. in the later half of the 1950s 
(Takeshi, 1983)., The importance of the system was recognised 
as early as-. 1958 when the Nihon Teian Seido Kenkyukai (Japan 
Research Association for Suggestion Systeýns) was- formally 
established to coordinate suggestion system activities. Today, 
this. suggestion system is the cornerstone of innovative work 
methods, at many, Japanese production plants and it has brought 
about many new ideas to the benefit of Japanese firms. With 
the'encouragement of the management, suggestions by employees 
in Japanese enterprises 
I 
have been, growing 
, 
tremendously. In 
Toyota for example, the suggestions received from employees 
as of. 1980 amounted to 1,600,000. In 
'Nissan 
Motor Company, the 
number of suggestions received as of 1980, was 1,100,00,01 and 
the, number problems solved exceeded 160,000,. This resulted in 
savings of . 8.1 billion yen (Nissan Motor, Company Annual 
Report, 1980). The, 
-extent of the suggestion 
system in Japan 
was tabulated by-Inagami (1983), in Table. 5F below: 
-Table 5F: Suggestion System in-Japan 1977-80 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
No. of participants 355851 389128 485498 597519 
Participation rate (%) 
Total number of 
suggestions (million) 
Average'number of 
suggestions/employee 
Adoption rate 
Yearly total amount 
of economic benefits 
(one million yen) 
Yearly total amount 
of compensation 
(one million ven) 
456.6 
5748 
5.6 
69.3 
49476 
2614 3646 4912 
Source: Takeshi Inagaml 1983. pp. 65-68 
63.9 59.7 
8868 13499 
8.3 7.2' 
63.2 70.0 
81705 92560 
69.3 
23532 
12.8 
72.0 
225380 
8180 
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In 1981, the Japan Human Relations Association and the Japan 
Suggestion Activities Cooperative Association jointly 
conducted a survey regarding the extent of suggestion, system 
in which 1.83 million employees from 464 firms participated. 
It was interesting to see that an estimated 23.53, million 
suggestions had been submitted. What can be inferred from 
this? It indicates that the Japanese employees are a 
suggestion-oriented group. They are very creative too. This 
brings -the author to ask, "Are the Japanese 'employees rewarded 
with attractive financial rewards for the -ideas they 
contribute? " The answer is obviously "no". According to the 
same survey, the Japanese worker was awarded only an average 
of 44 yen per suggestion. It is very clear that the monetary 
reward was very small in this case. However, an indium who 
makes a suggestion is highly commended by his company. For 
instance, the company normally mentions his -name in newspaper 
for his contribution and in turn gives him prize or award 
(i. e. Man of the Week etc. ). It is deduced here that the 
Japanese workers have been rightly given the encouragement 
from the management - to, participate in matters concerning 
their work which resulted in employees giving suggestions at 
every available opportunity. The suggestion system has indeed 
been very useful as far, as the production management system is 
concerned because it has been used to'solicit ideas the for 
improvement and innovation at the plants. The, system, however, ý 
need notýbe confined to the production line only. 
ii 
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5.5.5.5. Just-in-Time Production 
Kono (1984) said that Just-in-Time (JIT) simply means, for 
example, that when a, car is being, constructed on an assembly 
line, the parts needed for assembly arrive beside the line at 
precisely the right time an& in the right amount. 
Consequently, the assembly plant stock, which is a physical 
and financial burden to the firm, is reduced to zero. This 
system of production has been possible due to the quasi- 
vertical integration of the Japanese firms in Japan. It is 
obvious then that the ultimate goal of JIT is to strive for 
one piece lot size -in production. This will enable . the 
manufacturer to have 'the flexibility to meet any order to 
serve more customers with minimal effort and costs. 
Abbeglen and Stalk said that: 
"The key elements of the 
sizes, reduced material 
inventory levels, and p 
These elements combine in 
the performance of a 
1985: -P9104). 
Just-in-Time system are small batch 
handling, level scheduling, low 
roduction control by kanban cards. 
subtle but powerful ways to enhance 
factory" (Abbeglen and Stalk, 
JIT is an approach in production management, which emphasises 
the -manufacturer's proximity to customers (Riehl and Kleinert 
1987: p. 4). Accordinglyt Japanese manufacturers run their 
machines only at the market rate of what is demanded rather 
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than at the machine's capacity. The JIT system is aimed at 
achieving greater flexibility and efficiency in manufacturing 
by reducing size lot. In doing so, a variety of customer's 
manufacturing needs are better served. Riehl and Kleiner 
further explained: 
"JIT focusses on efficiency by eliminating waste. In order to 
minimise excess production and high costs associated with 
maintaining excess inventory, JIT uses level production 
quantities. Reliable suppliers with, frequent deliveries and 
consistent high quality are necessary for JIT. There is no 
margin for contingencies, so suppliers play a key role in its 
effectiveness" (Riehl and Kleiner, 1987: p. 5). 
For a clearer understanding of JIT concepto the components and 
potential benefits of JIT is' shown in Exhibit 5'*2 and the some 
requirements for implementing JIT is shown in Exhibit 5.3 
below: 
Exhibit 5.2: Some Requirements for Implementing JIT 
Mainly uncontrollable Mainly controllable 
Training Management understanding and support 
of the system 
Long term planning Management and labour responsibilities 
JIT ýAý 
Stockholders (owners) n Production layout and work flow system 
Labour organisations (Unions) Department functions 
Government support Supplier management 
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Exhibit 5.3: Components and 
Potentials Benefits of JIT 
Kanban 
Reduced set-up time 
I 
Smaller lot size 
I 
Production smoothing 
Standardisation 
Uniform and invariable 
output rate 
Multifunction workers 
I 
Streamlined process 
design 
Flexibility and versatility 
Just-In-Time production 
system 
Better quality 
Less scrap 
Less raw material 
Less work-in-process 
Fewer finished goods- 
Increased teamwork 
Higher worker motivation 
Increased worker and 
equipment efficiency 
Saved space 
Increased productivity 
-ýII 
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In evaluating the effectiveness of the JIT management 
practice, ' the most important merit has been the reduction of 
cost in the manufacturing of products as a result of superior 
inventory management. In Japan, it is estimated, that the 
Japanese auto manufacturer holds a cost advantage of about 
US$2,200 per car (William et al, 1980). It is also claimed 
that Japanese firms which have used JIT for 5 years reported a 
30% increase in productivity, a 60% reduction in inventories, 
a 90% improvement in quality rejection rates and a 15% 
reduction in floorspace use (Aggarwal, 1985). 
JIT manufacturing appears to be a good system because it 
advocates the production of the necessary' units in the 
necessary quantities -at the necessary time. Toyota Car company 
showed a huge profit using their JIT and kanban system. For 
example, in 1980 they turned over their inventory every four 
days and reduced their break-even point to 64% of sales 
(Philipoom, 1986). 'Because the rationale of the JIT management 
is for the organisation' to have, no more material than it is 
absolutely necessary at its disposal, this system is a very 
valuable and practical approach to increasing production 
efficiency. The problems of space for inventory storage; 
inventory theft, fire occurrences, insurance charges etc. are 
eliminated by- this system. The same is true of 'the kanban 
system where the most benefit would be elimination of huge 
inventory. 
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The danger of'JIT management system on the other hand, is the 
vulnerability on the part of the manufacturer with regards to 
the supply of inventories. What happens if the supplier 
suddenly cannot supply in time? Or what happens if the 
supplier tries to sabotage the manufacturer by giving an 
inferior inventory which have to be rejected? The whole 
operational process will be affected and the manufacturer who 
has no sufficient inventory ', of 'his- own could, lose 
substantially. The point here , is that for it to be really 
successful, a strong relationship between the supplier and the 
manufacturer must first exist. ýI 
The danger of JIT (and also the kanban) system lies in the 
delay of stock delivery due to acts of God like heavy snow, 
flood or transportation problems due to landslides. There is 
no solution for these types of problems. 
5.5.5.6. Kanban System 
An extension of the JIT process is the kanban manufacturing 
sy'stem which also extends greater efficiencies in the 
manufacturing process. The -concept was originally developed in 
Japan by-Taiichi Ohno, a Toyota's vice presidento who named 
the system as kanban, after the cards that production workers 
find in their parts bin and 'use to call for fresh supply 
(Main, 1984). , 
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Monden described the kanban system that operates in Toyota 
company as follows: 
"A kanban is usually a card - put in a rectangular vinyl 
envelope. Two kinds are common: , withdrawal kanban and 
production-ordering kanban. A withdrawal kanban details the 
quantity ýthat subsequently process should withdraw, while a 
product ion-ordering , kanban shows the quantity that the 
preceding process must be produced. These cards circulate 
within Toyota factories, between Toyota and its cooperative 
companies, and within the factories of affiliated companies. 
In this manner, the kanban can contribute information on 
withdrawal and -production- quantities to achieve JIT 
production" (Monden, 1985: P. 76) 
The essence of kanban -is that the' manufacturer does not keep 
many inventories on hand but relies on suppliers to furnish 
parts in time for them to be assembled. In practice, the 
kanban manufacturing system uses special devices to indicate 
when a new batch of parts or materials is needed on the line. 
Voss and Robinson (1987: p. 52) define kanban as a pull system 
of managing material , movement comprising a mechanism which 
triggers the movement of material from one operation through 
to the next,, as contrasted with the push system such as MRP 
(Material Required Planning) and MRP2. It goes hand in hand 
with JIT and like JIT, it improves production efficiency,, 
reduces costs and therefore provides a better product at a 
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better price for the customer. This is the reverse of what is 
practised in the West where there exists the "Just-in-Case" 
system in which fat inventories are stored by manufacturers to 
ensure production is not be interrupted. The kanban system is 
often referred to as zero inventory movement. 
In the case of kanban, the greatest strength lies in it being 
a "pull" rather than "push" system. Like the JIT, kanban 
system eliminates fat inventories, thereby cutting''costs. By 
this method, planning, information-handling and supervision 
activities are lessened too. Unlike the material required 
planning system (MRP) which is widely adopted in the West, the 
possibility of material-ordering error which causes a 'pile- 
up' is eliminated too. 
5.5.6. Management of Supplier and Sub-contracting System 
Sub-contracting or the shitauke system is widespread in Japan. 
According to Survey of Medium and Small Business -by MITI in 
1979 of 1974,60.7% of all firms in manufacturing with less 
than 300 employees, participate in sub-contracting (Sato, 
1984: p. 3). It has been estimated by some writers thatthe 
percentage of manufacturing enterprises' employing 300 or more 
which use sub-contractors was 85%. -Some Western commentators 
have hinted the sub-contracting system is the major reason for 
Japan's high efficiency. 
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Freidman (1987: p. 360) described sub-contracting management 
practice in Japan as a long-term supply relations between 
suppliers of parts or firms with specialised processes, and 
large assemblers. There are many types of inter-firm 
relationships involved in sub-contracting in Japanese. The 
most common type of arrangement is in the form of a master 
company investing directly in the smaller company. The former 
therefore controls and regulates the former's management. The 
other type of sub-contracting system is the arrangement where 
the independent smaller companies deliver almost all of its 
output to the master company for a specific period of time 
which had been agreed upon by them. 
It has also been observed that sub-contract relationships are 
often more than simple two-level arrangements. The process 
often involves a pyramidal chain of relationships with a 
larger master firm at the top sub-contracting with a group of 
smaller firms who may in turn sub-contract to a group of even 
smaller firms (Oh, , 
1976: p. 23). For example manufacturers of 
electrical parts in Japan contract out much of their their 
minor cutting and initial assembly work to small firms and 
these small firms in turn, sub-contract some of their work to 
household enterprises. 
A survey in 1981 found that parent companies used sub- 
contracting enterprises for many reasons as shown in Exhibit 
5.4 below: 
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Exhibit 5.4: Reasons Why Parent Companies 
Use Sub-contracting Enterprise 
M 
60 - 
59 8 
r-I 54ý6 
52 
so 
4 
40 
30 
20 
10 
o 
S, 6 24 
1.1 32 4 
23 7 
28ý5 
1 29 9 
1 
M/ 
2 7.0 r" 
All manufacturing industries 
Parent companies %hich haýr 
introduced irnechatronic equipment 
17-7-71 Parent companies %hich ha%e nnt I- 
introduced nirchatronic equipment 
10.8 
2.2 
16 9 
11.3 
6044 
[J: jj; ýýO 0143H20 
05 06 (D (0 09) 
T Subcontracting enterprises have specialized trchnclog% and specialized equipment 
Parent comoan)'s production capacetý is insufficient 
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Sub-contractors began rallying around major corporations in 
the late 1950s and this activity spread rapidly in the early 
1960s (Tsuda, 1979: p. 10). The parent corporations base their 
relationship on economic motives and they therefore do not 
hesitate to severe relations with the later. during bad times 
(i. e. recession). Otherwise the relationship between the 
parent corporation and sub-contractor is said to be that of a 
close-knit relationship. It has been suggested that, the 
relation between parent corporation, whom he referred to as 
client, and sub-contractor as being similar. to a parent/child 
relation (Friedman, 1987: p. 361). The client is'normally both a 
larger firm and one who is technically more the sophisticated 
of the two. There exists some, sort of benevolence-in the form 
of finance or technical know-how or security of orders; and 
loyalty in the form 'of, priority treatment for more important 
client's work between the parent company and sub-contracting 
company. It is also not uncommon for staff interchange between 
client and sub-contractor to occur normally where employees of 
a big company (client) are moved temporarily to work for the 
sub-contractor but their wages are paid by, the former. This is 
usually done to assist the sub-contractor in- management or 
technical know-how and to promote production or sales. This 
arrangement is called shukko(Inagamit 1983). 
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The sub-contracting system works very well in Japan mainly 
because it is an important aspect of vertical technology 
transfer (and becomes a standardised system for technology 
transfer) as employees of large firms with advanced 
technical- knowledge, as well 'as employees of sub- 
contracting firms, branch out and form their own companies 
(Yoshino, 1984). It must be remembered that Japan is an 
industrial country and the development of machinery 
technology takes place through the initiative of large 
companies. - and as is often the case, 'these technologies 
are transferred vertically to medium and small 
enterprises. Yoshino further that Japanese society is a 
vertical society and as such is characterised by group 
behaviour, paternalism and transference of main reference 
group from extended family to company, all of which have 
allowed tyrannical , actions ý by parent 
f irms, drastic 
competition as well as co-existence and co-prosperity. 
The sub-contracting system that has been very successfully 
used in'Japan, is also the result of Japan being a land of 
limited physical space, but with an excellent road system, 
the combination of which has allowed the geographical 
expansion of-the of sub-contracting system. 
The most obvious benefit of, this sub-contracting 
management system is, the cost factor. The farming outý-of 
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work to sub-contractors means the parent company can 
reduce considerable costs in its operation (Bolwijn and 
Brinkman, 1987: p. 25). This is due 'to three reasons; 
firstly the companies in Japan become specialised and over 
time' they become, very efficient in mass production, 
thereby reducing overall production cost; secondly, the 
labour cost of the parent company is reduced when using 
the sub-contractor system since the wages of the sub- 
contractors's employees are lower by 30-50% and thirdly, 
the material cost is lower because the volume of stock and 
size of storage facilities incurred by the parent firm are 
smaller as stock is, held by sub-contractors and suppliers. 
In addition to that, the parent company' also gains in that 
payment periods are long. It is said that sometimes sub- 
contractors would only be paid for 'their work until the 
final product is eventually sold by the-main'company. 
Also the relationship that is developed between parent 
company. and, the sub-contractors is beneficial to the 
former because the later provides various information and 
data on the market. 
However, the system in itself can be said to be not 
favourable to sub-contractors,, who are always at the-mercy 
of the big and- strong parent companies who dictate the 
terms of business transaction to be carried out. Thus more 
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often than not They are always at the receiving end when 
the going get tough especially 'during economic downturn. 
This has to be the ugly side, of the system. 
5.5.7. Marketing Management 
Kono (1984) said the marketing, philosophy in Japan is 
well-developed, well-understood, widely accepted and 
effectively applied. Japanese marketing management has 
been described as a 'classic textbook case' of applying 
the marketing philosophy - carefully studying consumer 
wants and needs in international markets, developing 
products incorporating desired features; and putting 
effective marketing programs into practice to support them 
(Morita, 1983). Some important features of marketing 
management of the Japanese that are of -interest include 
the various strategies in identification of market 
opportunities, market entry, market development, pricing, 
promotion and sales channels. 
5.5.7.1. Identifying Market Opportunities 
Japanese firms have. been very good in identifying market 
segments that are ignored or poorly served by other 
international firms. What the Japanese would do is to go 
for the larger 'part of the market once -they have 
established themselves in the particular target market. 
For example, the Japanese identify market opportunities in 
small cars and small powered motorcycles; cheap and 
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portable radios or TV sets; or suitable copiers for small 
business (Kotler; Fahey; and Jatusripitak, 1985: p. 13). The 
Japanese participate in motorcycle market by selecting the 
ignored market segment; i. e. the small , lightweight 
motorcycle as their target while other competitors such as 
Harley Davidson, BSA, Triumph and Norton of the UK focus 
on the higher -price and bigger motorbikes. This marketing 
approach 'is called "provided opportunity"-, and the 
Japanese use it well. 
Another type of market 'opportunity is "created 
opportunity", , which the Japanese have invented through 
their own-research and technology development. Kotler says 
that "created opportunity" involves competing in, - existing 
product-market, where competition can be expected to appear 
quite quickly. The essence of created opportunity consists 
of searching and establishing new product-market niches in 
the face of competition. A good illustration of created 
opportunity is the watch industry. The major breakthrough 
by the Japanese 'watch-maker was 'in the early 1970s when 
Japanese quartz oscillation watches and clocks powered by 
small electric cells began to upgrade precision watch-ý 
making technologies and, replace conventional mechanical 
watches with longer-lasting and more accurate watches. Due 
to this technology as well as the slowness of the Swiss 
watch makers to respond to new challenges, the -Japanese 
created market opportunities and swept to - the top of the 
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world market. Citizen, one of the leading Japanese watch- 
makers, invented its own market niche by offering a highly 
accurate and sophisticated quartz crystal wristwatch. As a 
result of this innovation, it became one of the top market 
leaders in watch-industry. (Baranson, 1981). 
5.5.7.2. Market Entry 
To enter the international market, the strategy adopted, by 
Japanese firms-As to manufacture and export: (i). lower- 
cost products; (ii). innovative-featured products; and 
(iii). high-quality- product (Kotler et al, -1985: p. 58). In 
the lower-cost product category, Honda and Yamaha entered 
foreign markets by introducing smaller, cheaper and easier 
to operate motorbikes. In the innovative-featured product 
group, Japanese firms like Sony, and Matsushita have been 
successful in flooding international markets with multi- 
functional and remote-controlled hifi sets and video 
players which their competitors could hardly-match. This 
product strategy is frequently applied in the case of 
technical products that have short life cycles and where 
new product development is the key to success. For 
example, ý Casio offers various features in the hand-held 
calculators market - such as calculators with clocks, with 
melodies etc., (Ohmae, 1982). More often than not, the main 
purpose is to accelerate andýshorten the product life 
cycle to discourage competitors from following with 
similar products. The high-quality products of the 
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Japanese can be found in cameras - with famous brand names 
like Canon, Nikon, Minolta etc, 
5.5.7.3. Market Development 
The market development strategies used by successful 
Japanese firms have a common characteristic. The Japanese 
develop and modify their products with particular markets 
in minds (Business Week, June, 1981). Initially, they try 
to penetrate into the market that has been neglected but 
has promising potential. Once established in this 
particular market, they expand, into the larger segment of 
the market by spreading its presence both in lower and 
upper segments of the markets. For example, in the watch 
industry during the late 1970s, the Hattori group under 
the Seiko brand name began to stretch its product line by 
moving into both the upper and lowerýmarket ends. In the 
late 1970s, a market niche for lower cost but highly 
accurate digital watches began to evolve. Seiko penetrated 
downward to this lower market end by 'introducing a series 
of lower-priced watches under the name Pulsar. A set of 
higher-priced watches, produced by Jean La Salle, a 
Hattori-acquired Swiss subsidiary, was introduced. Later, 
a razor-thin watch costing around US$5,000 was-launched to 
compete on the high end of the markets whichýhad long been 
dominated by Swiss watch-makers (Business Week, June, 
1981). 
-312- 
5.5.7.4. Predatory Pricing, Dumping and Market Share 
The Japanese are always said to adopt a market share 
strategy in international market especially when selling a 
new product. This strategy basically means putting all 
effort into obtaining and commanding portion of the market 
by low cost, even if it means losing money and then when 
the competitor has been wiped out, the price is put up. 
During the early stages, i. e. in the 1970s, Japanese firms 
in their quest for market-control in international market, 
deliberately used a low entry price. For this reason, they 
were accused by their competitors of'-"dumping" their 
products, especially in the U. S. market. For example, as a 
result of the advanced production technology that 
resulted in cost efficiency, the price of steel from 
Nippon Corporation in 1980 was about 90% that of US Steel 
and 80% that of the price of ATH Steel of Westý Germany 
(Kono, 1984: p. 198). But with increasing competition, 
especially from the 4 newly Industrialised Economies 
(NIEs), Japan realised that, she had to review her low- 
pricing pricing strategy. So, she embarked on's strategy 
of offering products of high quality at 'a very 
competitive price and also establishing a network of 
after sales services centres within all areas where they 
sold their products. Todayl it is an open secret that 
Japanese products exported to-the world market are of very 
high quality and yet competitively priced. A good case in 
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point are Canon cameras* which are among, if not, the best 
in the world in terms of quality and value for, money. 
5.5.7.5. Sales Channels 
The, large and successful companies have strong sales 
departments or sales companies. They have local sales 
offices, and exclusive sales channels. Where durable 
consumer goods are concerned, an exclusive policy is 
commonly used by Japanese firms. In Japan, Toyota for 
instance has 320 dealers with 2600 selling outlets which 
sell only Toyota cars. They are legally independent but 
are controlled by the sales department , of 
Toyota (Kono,, 
1984: p. 201). 
At the, international level, it has been observed that in 
line with" the aggressive marketing strategy, ýa massive 
distribution system also has become the norm. Initially, 
Japanese entered the markets through large distributors 
and large retail chains that would give them the largest 
initial coverage. Then they would go down through the next 
level of retail outlets until finally reaching the small 
independent stores (Kotler et al, 1985: p. 59-60). I 
5.5.7.6. Product Development 
Once the Japanese had gained an initial foothold in the 
international market, they concentrated on filling out 
their product lines in order to reach a broader segment of 
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the total market (Kotler, et al, 1985: p. 60). Toyota's 
penetration into the US's market is sometimes used as an 
example, whereby the said company launched a sequence of 
, product introductions, many of which represented product 
line extension. 
The Japanese also have been using a product proliferation 
strategy where it introduced a' multiplicity , of product 
types or models at each point in the product line. The 
rationale for product proliferation is to allow the 
company to appeal to a large number of market niches for 
as the products proliferate, they appeal to different 
tastes, preferences, and income groups. Casio is a good 
example of a Japanese -company which is - highly successful 
in this product development strategy where it introduces a 
wide array of models of hand calculators with different 
styles, functions and features. In a year, many models 
appear sequentially. 
Japanese firms are also noted for making product 
improvements. They continue to improve on the performance, 
function, style, feature. and of course quality by reacting 
quickly to the consumers' complaints and feedback 
regarding existing products. 
5.5.7.7. Trading Company (Sogo Shosha) 
A discussion of Japan's marketing system will be not 
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complete without the the study of the the Japanese trading 
firms, - sogo shosha. As mentioned earlier, sogo , shoshas 
have contributed significantly to the rise of Japan as an 
economic superpower. They handle a large volume of 
business transactions domestically and internationally. 
The nine sogo shoshas had a total sales of 91.23 trillion 
yen for the fiscal year of 1987. The sales and profits of 
the 9 trading companies for 1987 was tabulated in the 
table below: 
Table 5q: Sales and Profit of SORO 
Shoshas of Japan for FY 1987 
Ranking 
Sales 
(Ybil. ) 
Gross operating 
profits 
(Ybil. ) 
Pretax recurring 
profits 
(Ybil. ) 
1. C. Itoh 14,922.0 (+ - 4.7) 189.0 (+ 6.4) 42.4 (+21.1) 
2. Mitsui & Co. 14,131.2 (+11.9) 222.7 (+ 3.3) 75.6 (+38.4) 
3. Sumitomo 13.693.1 (+ 6.0) 164.8 (+ 8-3) 49.1 (+ 6.6) 
4. " Marubeni 13,209.4 (+ 2.7) 164.6 (+11.2) 38.0 (+23.0) 
5. Mitsubishi 12,281.7 (+ 3.6) 209.1 (+ 6.2) 69.8 (-12.2) 
6. Nissho lwai 10,139.0 (+38.5) 113.5 (+12.9) 30.6(+ 3.0) 
7. Toyo Menka 4,625.2 (+11.2) 64.1 (+ 0-7) 13.4(+ 6.7) 
8. Nichimen 4,291.6 (+22.8) 52.7(+ 8-9) . 
15.7 (+39.2) 
9. Kanematsu-Gosho 3,888.5 (+20.1) 53.4( 0.0) 10.7 (+35.1) 
Note: The figures in parentheses are % changes from FY1986- 
Source: Suzuki, 1989; p. 232 
I- 
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The importance of sogo shosha is further seen in their 
sales by commodities,, and 'form of trading as depicted -An 
Exhibit 5.5. below: 
, Exhibit 
5.5: Sales by Commodities and Form of 
Tradingof the 9 Sogo Shoshas of Jap an for FY 1987 
Others 6.7 
Textiles 8.2---l 
Fuels 
12.6 
clstuffs Iffs 
10.6 
Metals 
!p ts 28.0 
9B 
Machinerv 
24.1 
Domestic sales 
By commodities 1%) 13y form of trading 
Note: 
"The 
data Is based on the half-year settlement to September 1988. 
Source: Suzuki, 1989; p. 233 
The history of the sogo shosha dates back to the early 
years of the Meiji Restoration in the 
1870s.., Mitsui's 
origin, for instance goes back to 
1673 (Roberts, 1973). 
These trading companies -were known as zaibatsu, in the 
early days. Because of their involvement 
in the Second 
World War efforts, they were disbanded by the Allied 
Occupation authorities following Japan's defeat., In the 
1950s, the former member firms of ^ zaibatsus were, once 
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again reorganised into the present day- form sogo shosha; 
the only difference is that in the -former zaibatsus, the 
majority ownership of shares was held by a few well-known 
families whereas in present , day sogo shosha most shares 
are publicly owned. 
Japan can be said to owe its rapid economic development to 
the'promoting functions of sogo shosha (Hiramatsup 1982). 
Sogo shoshas play -an', important role in commodity 
transactions in the Japanese economy, which serves an 
international clientele. A typical sogo shosha handles 
more than 20,000 items, ranging from industrial material 
to petroleum, consumer goods to fruits. The nine sogo 
shoshas handle more than, 50% of, Japan's total , foreign 
trade and 60% of domestic trade (Malay Mail, October 25, 
1982). They have four basic functions - trading, 
financing, providing information and organising. 
Hiramatsu also pointed out that besides acting as trade 
intermediaries, sogo--shoshas provide access to major 
distribution networks internationally and domestically. 
Acting as buffers between banks and credit-takers is 
another responsibility undertaken by them. The companies 
also have a superb credit'history and an ability to handle 
risks. The communication network of sogo shoshas acts as, a 
central nervous system., which'extends to the far corner of 
the globe. 'By handling exports and importsi they increase 
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the flow of information and contacts - thereby enhancing 
their ability to minimise foreign, exchange risks of 
trading activities. Consequently, they are able to deal 
with huge volumes of items and this permits them to 
operate with thin margins of profits. 
Japan's meteoric ascendancy within the world market is 
testimony to her superiority "in Japanese marketing 
management system. The low pricing strategy that is used 
to penetrate the new market has been highly successful in 
making Japanese products accepted worldwide and this ought 
to be its strongest point. The strength of Japanese 
marketing management can also be deduced from the fact 
that Japanese are selling quality products at a reasonable 
cost. 
The -very reason why Japanese, car manufacturers 
have been 
more successful than their, Western counterparts is' simply 
because the former ý, sell ,a much better car (i. e. better 
fuel economy) at a lesser price than their competitors. 
The use of sogo shoshas, has without a doubt has placed 
the Japanese in an advantageous position in the 
competitive world market. Sogo shoshas are well- 
established and financially strong and are in a position 
to, lend support in the marketing (i. e. distribution) as 
well as financing of domestic, and overseas markets. 
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5.5.7. The Future of Japanese-style Management 
The exalted 'status that Japanese-style management has 
enjoyed may have -come to an ýend. As more is-known about 
Japanese-style management, the intensity of interest 
regarding -Japanese-style, -management begins to dwindle. 
Many scholars can be said to have lost interest in 
Japanese-style management. It may be that to them, 
Japanese-style management is not unique after all. If 
outsiders'are beginning to express doubts about Japanese- 
style management as aýmodel, the problem is also beginning 
to manifest itself on the home front. Japanese companies 
are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain some 
management practices that used to work well for them. This 
has come 'about as a result of a rapidly changing 
environment that has recently developed in Japanese 
society and it poses a real threat. which, has a far- 
reaching effect on the survival and future direction of 
Japanese-stY*le' -management at home and abroad. What are 
these challenges? 
The first challenge facing Japanese 'Companies which has 
had some effect on their management system is Japan's new 
position -as a leader in invention and -. innovation 
(Abegglen, - 1984: p. 157-161). Japan has in the past done 
very well as a pursuer nation by taking advantage of 
Western technological development, perfecting it to 
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produce world class, quality goods. Now that- Japan is' on 
equal footing -or is even slightly, ahead of 'Western 
industrial nations, a, new era is beginning, in whichý she 
must become a source of scientific discovery and invention 
if she is, to maintain her economic growth. It is doubtful 
if such management practices like groupism are healthy-or 
appropriate any longer- in, the light of new developments. 
Abegglen warned that creative (scientists) are often of a 
type that do not fit-, well into large, group-oriented 
organisations. In view 'of this, questions pertaining to 
the future of stereo-type Japanese-management practices in 
the new era of, technological discovery and invention are 
bound to be raised. ýiý 
It is a well-known fact that 'Japan does not have natural' 
resources. She depends on other countries and to ensure 
regular supplies, the Japanese cement, their relationships 
with a number of countries by undertaking joint-ventures 
in some selected industries. There may come a day when 
these countries,. after having adequate technologies will 
severe their ties with the Japanese. Such prospect may, not 
be -likely,. in the near future, but if and whený it comes, 
Japan-will face a serious problem. What is implied here is 
that -there will have to ýbe a reevaluation of her 
business/management strategies. 
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There was indeed a strong anti-Japanese sentiment ., in a 
number of Southeast Asian countries countries in the 1970s 
but the Japanese have managed to improve strained 
relationships by providing economic aid and establishing 
fairer trading practices with these countries. The 
Japanese have been strongly resented because of- the 
ungentlemenly business tactics they used in these 
countries. Resentment - against the exploitive ugly 
Japanese I, as they were then calledq may appear again and 
this time it be could be of bigger magnitude. Top 
management groups in Japan have ý to acknowledge that time 
has come, --to start reassessing their management system. 
There are'scholars who are of opinion that Japanese-style 
management is only effective in the economic boom, as 
evidenced by the 1955-1970 era of high economic growth 
period (about 11%). When economic instability sets in, as 
was evidenced by the brief period of oil embargo in the 
1970s, it starts to crumble. 
The intense competition for world markets has in recent 
years -forced Japanese companies to invest aggressively in 
foreign countries. The globalisation of Japanese companies 
has also some effects on some management practices. For 
example, - it has -been found that not-all Japanese 
management techniques can be applied in foreign soils 
without taking into account local culture, political and 
economic backgrounds. In fact the Japanese are quick to 
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realise the benefits of adopting a hybrid of Japanese and 
'local management practices. There is yet another more 
important aspect of globalisationý of Japanese' companies. 
It has been, suggested- that if Japanese companies are to 
become ' international and integrated into the world 
economic system, then Japanese companies must learn how, to 
recruit, train and promote foreign employees - not ý as 
foreigners but- as integral ýmembers of the parent 
organisations. 
Based on statistics-provided by the-, Ministry of Welfare-in 
1985, more than 25 percent of the Japanese population will 
be over 65 years old by the year 2000. It 'means Japan will 
be a rapidly ageing industrial nation and this has serious 
implications* From the, management point of view, ' there 
will be initial problems of shortage of managerial posts 
as more and more old-timers, become eligible, by virtue' of 
age and years of service, for these positions. The company 
cannot -rationally give" all eligible employees managerial 
positions, for to -do so would be disastrous. ý The 
feasibility of continuing the practice of promotion based 
on seniority, for instance, is going to be seriously 
tested and lifetime employment and recruitment of fresh 
graduates, to name a few, may have to come to an end soon. 
From the financial point of view, mounting pressures will 
continue to affect the operation of Japanese companies 
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with a growing' number of ageing workforce since they will 
have to pay the employees more - because the average wage, 
will go up now that the average age of the workers 
increases (Iwata, 1982: p. 109). And yet, some scholars. 
observed- that corporate vitality may slacken due to the 
ageing of -the workforce. The --problem of an old society 
does not , stop here; the side effects from structural. 
changes in the workforce will cost more money. When older 
employees' are retired off it means that the retraining of 
workers for early retirement or secondment, redeployment 
to otherý firms in enterprise groups etc'ý will sap 
companies' resources considerably (Gow, 1988b: p. 49). 
As the result of her economic prosperity, Japan's 
population enjoys a high standard of , living- They have 
become arrogant, said many older Japanese. Compared to the 
olderT Japanese 'whose propensity to save is among the 
highest in the world, the younger Japanese is easy-going. ' 
careless and spends lavishly (the use of credit card in 
Japan is gaining a new height popularity! ). To maintain 
comfortable lifestyles, Japanese workers demand more pay 
and other perks like their western counterparts. 
Traditional values are - under threat. Traditional 
management practices will have to adjust to new 
developments. 
-324- 
Women have always played second fiddle -in' the labour 
market. This is because they are considered only good as 
part-time workers and their career usually end when they 
marry. As 'such they are among the most neglected lot -in 
the workforce of Japan,, despite the ýfact that they are a 
highly educated group. The time has come for this group to 
be accorded the role it rightly deserves. Today, Japanese 
companies cannot afford to ignore them. One reason is that 
Japan will soon face an acute shortage of workers as its 
society ages. Secondly, , Japanese women, like their 
counterparts in the West, are no longer contended to take 
the traditional role which - -confines them to the kitchen. 
They have shown that they are increasingly willing to work 
and raise families as well. Such. developments will add a 
new dimension to Japanese-style, managements which all this 
while has considered women only fit to work as temporary 
workers , and hence has given them less important 
responsibilities. The sub-contracting practice that uses a 
lot of temporary workers, for example, may have to be 
dispensed with. 
As is the case in the West, Japanese workers are beginning 
to spend more time in leisure and with ý their families. It 
is claimed that Japanese workers are among the most 
dissatisfied workers in the world. For instance, one 
Gallop survey stated that only 15% of Japanese population 
are happy with their lives versus 37% of Britain 
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(McCallum, 1986). It is obvious that like other workers 
throughout the world, Japanese workers at present are 
demanding better working'hours ', and privileges. This is a 
change that every Japanese employer will have to face and 
perhaps- realise that the era'' of the ''docile and subdued 
workforce is about to be over. A new approach to 
management must take place; 
In summary, it can be sai& that Japanese-style management 
practices, together with other factorss have contributed 
quite significantly to the ascendancy of Japan as a world 
leading economic and industrial power. -Like any 'other 
management system,, there are strengths and weaKnesses 
found in -the- Japanese management system. Some -features 
which are outstandingly beneficial are clearly worthy of 
emulation by outsiders while those -which are problematic 
should not be considered at all. However, the fact that 
Japanese management system is' currently facing new 
challenges and'having problems within and outside Japan as 
a result of the changing , internal and external 
environments to which it must react surely has caused some 
concern or doubt among foreign countries which had 
intention to import some Japanese management practices. 
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-- CHAPTER SIX 
TRANSFERABILITY ISSUES OF JAPANESE-STYLE 
MANAGEMENT TO SELECTED, FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
6.1*' Objective of-the Chapter 
This chapter aims to examine the transferability issues of 
Japanese-style management to a number of countries. 
Besides Malaysia' ,- the other countries selected for 
discussion are the'US and the UK representing the advanced 
countries of the West; and Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, commonly called the four dragons or the 4 
NIEs (Newly Industrialised Economies) representing the 
#lmini- superpowers" of the East. The experiences of some 
countries selected for the discussion here is considered 
relevant to' the effort by Malaysia to transfer Japanese 
management techniques to the country. Perhaps, there are 
lessons that Malaysia could learn from them as to how best 
to transfer some of the Japanese management practices into 
the country, t 
There does not appear to be any significant research, study 
made yet on the transferability of Japanese techniques 
into the public enterprise sectorg resulting in very 
little material on the subject matter available. There is 
however, an abundance of literature concerning the'efforts 
by Japanese-owned firms as well as Japanese Joint-venture 
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companies operating in foreign countries to introduce 
Japanese management practices to their employees. There is 
also a modest amount of research studies and journalistic 
articles on non-Japanese organisations in the private 
sector especially in the US and the UK experimenting with 
some Japanese management techniques. The discussion in 
this chapter will therefore be more based from the 
experiences of those firms in private enterprise sector 
(both Japanese-owned companies as well as non-Japanese 
firms) rather than those in the public sector. The author 
recognises that this imposes a limitation on the 
discussion. Nevertheless, the discussion is considered 
very relevant and useful to the reader prior to the 
eventual discussion on the transferability issues of 
Japanese-style management in the Malaysian public 
enterprise 
, 
sector. After careful consideration, it was 
decided that, the subject of joint-ventures and takeovers 
of firms by Japanese would not be dealt with in any depth 
whatsoever in term of transferability, given that they 
present really a much more complex cultural confrontation 
between two cultures. Although a worthy subject of 
research study, it is best, in the author's opinion, that 
they are dealt as a separate unit byýthemselves. 
6.2. Introduction 
Before introducing an analysis of the issues involved in 
transferability as reflected in the literature, a number 
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of important areas have to be effectively delineated. The 
first is the paucity of real , studies on the 
transferability from the private to public sector even 
within the Japanese context and language. The second is 
the distinction between advanced and, newly industrialising 
economies. The group that have been selected here include 
both the US and the UK partly because Malaysia is hoping 
eventually to compete with them and any new advances in 
management such as taking on Japanised ideas should be 
important and also Malaysian management has been extremely 
influenced as, the author has discussed earlier,, by British 
and American management techniques and systems. Thirdly, 
on the other - hand Malaysia is hoping to become a., direct 
competitor to the existing NIEs. - The fact that NIEs are 
regarded by Malaysia as her directý competitors and 
themselves have a major Japanese presence, and at the same 
time experimenting with Japanese-style methodology, is 
clearly important. Lastly, there is the fact that they are 
in fact Asian countries and have considerable elements in 
common with Japan and to some extent, with Malaysia. 
Therefore, we will move on a spectrum from Taiwan through 
South Korea to Hong Kong and Singapore. 
In- the literature review on Japanese-style management, 
there are two major schools of thought on transferability 
of Japanese-style management to other countries. One 
school contends that Japanese-style management can be 
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transplanted to other countries. In this- school, the 
overwhelming opinion is that selected features of 
Japanese-style management are culture-free and 
transferable although they may have to be modified in view 
of the differences in environmental settingsýinvolved. The 
other school maintains that Japanese-style management is 
culture-bound and this being so, Japanese-style management 
cannot be successfully transferred to other countries. 
In the last two decades, the transplantation of Japanese- 
style management to other countries has been attempted via 
two modes; namely: M. through Japanese-owned companies 
or subsidiaries (or joint-ventures) , with Japanese 
interests that operate abroad where, as much as, possible, 
try to introduce some practices of their parent companies 
in -Japan; and (ii). through the initiatives' of locally- 
owned organisations (either' private firms or government 
agencies) of foreign countries as in Malaysia which 
endeavour to run their operations along the lines of 
Japanese firms in the hope of achieving the so-called 
Japanese'economic "success". Let us begin with-experiments 
with Japanese-style management in the UK. 
6.3. Japanese-style management in the United States (US) 
The US is among 'the first superpower to recognise the 
great 'Potential- to be found in Japanese management 
techniques and immediately attempts to learn more about 
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them. The, adoption of Japanese-style management 'in 
America, like the pattern observed in the UK, has been 
disseminated mainly through two vehicles namely the 
Japanese firms operating there, and the American firms. 
Like their counterparts elsewhere they began'to experiment 
with only some 'selected features''of Japanese-style 
management. 
The , mushrooming of Japanese , firms that began in the mid 
701 s 'in the US was mailnly been, due to the fear of the 
Japanese that ý their products in the American market would 
be subject to tariff etc. , In order-'-to remedy' the 
prevailing tense trade relation and-appease the Americans, 
who were becoming increasingly anti-Japanese, and in 
order not to lose their very strong position in the 
lucrative American 'market, the Japanese began direct 
investment, era by setting- up manufacturing plants there 
and also forming business joint ventures with established 
American firms. It is - these firms that first introduced 
Japanese-style management. 'The success 'of the Japanese 
firms and joint-venture companies began to' attract tI he 
attention of the American firms and some' began to 
incorporate Japanese work approaches in their operations'. 
The- popularity and, subsequent- adoption of a 'selected 
features of Japanese-style- management in the American 
firms therefore can be said to be the result of their 
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desire to emulate the success enjoyed by the Japanese 
firms and those firms that have Japanese interests. 
The literature on the Japanese-style management and the 
feasibility of adopting such practices in the US is very 
extensive. The views and comments - expressed by 
distinguished scholars and researchers on the subject 
matter are varied and divided; but one view seems to unite 
them all - that is, some Japanese management features are 
suitable and therefore transferable (Johnson, 1977; 
Johnson and Ouchi, 1974; Takamiya, 1979; Amano, 1979) and 
some other Japanese practices are not compatible with the 
American system and therefore not possible to transplant 
in the country ( Cole, -1983; Sethi et'al, 1980Y. 
6.3.1. Japanese Subsidiaries 'ý- .-;; 
Johnson (1977: p. 32) commented 'on the staffing policy of 
Japanese subsidiaries in the US where he said the typical 
arrangement seems to be that a Japanese national occupies 
the top position. The Japanese fill the middle management 
positions of accounting- and industrial engineering the 
remaining staff comprising the managers, supervisors and 
ordinary employees with Americans. There are also few 
Japanese technicians who are brought from parent companies 
in Japan. It has been also observed that- the top 
management structure of Japanese organisations is layered 
with Japanese and and American managers., The typical 
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setting is one that 'sandwiches' local managers between a 
Japanese assistant to the department. The local division 
manager is part of the next sandwich consisting of his own 
Japanese assistant, himself, and assistant to the local 
vice president. This is one way perhaps to effectively 
promote Japanese management practices among the locals who 
may need to be familiarised with the style of working of 
their Japanese counterparts. Tsurumi (1976) has described 
such an arrangement as an integrator between Japanese and 
locals. 
Johnson and Ouchi (1974: p. 66) remarked that Japanese 
companies in the US have a "bottom-up" approach in which 
information would flow from the lower echelons to their 
superiors (and vice-versa) and that Japanese managers 
appear to believe that changes in the organisation should 
be initiated from those who were most likely affected by 
the changes. It is specifically not mentioned if this 
amounts to the ringi system but nevertheless, there is 
evidently some evidence for a significant input into the 
decision-making proces on a participative basis by those 
in the lower echelon. 
It is also found that Japanese subsidiaries in the US have 
often stressed the development of the "wall spirit and 
worker's loyalty among employees (Takitani, 1973). This 
attitude has been clearly observed, according to Takitani 
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at Hitachi plant, in Michigan and at the Sanyo plant at 
Forest City, Arkansas. He observed that this attitude has 
not been consciously imposed, but instead has evolved as 
business and personal relationships become closer. 
Decision-making by consensus -has been, adopted in some of 
the' subsidiaries. At the Sanyo plant for, example, 
committees were formed to ensure that the lower-level 
managers 'can channel their ideas to top management group 
(Business Week, December 12,1977). It was stated however 
that the ringi system per se has not appeared. 
The policy of not laying off workers is to a great 
extent-, being implemented in -Japanese subsidiaries as is 
observed , at Kikkoman Foods in Wisconsin (Ishida, 
1977: p. 37) and also at, United Motor Manufacturing Inc 
(NUMMI), a Toyota/General "Motor joint venture (Brown, 
1987: pý24)., However, it has been agreed upon by the 
management and their employees that layoffs will be 
carried out only as a- last resort and only when the 
company is compelled to do so by severe economic 
conditions that threaten the long-range financial 
viability of the-company* 
There-is also a study of Japanese subsidiaries abroad that 
supports the 'can transfer' phenomenon of Japanese 
management practices with regards to long-term, profit and 
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growth, aggressive capital investment, modernisation of 
plants, emphasis on quality control, job enlargement,, -job 
rotation, participation on many levels, and respect for 
people (Kono, 1982: p. 90-102). Japanese-style management 
has also been introduced with considerable success at 
. Sony where it is, mentioned that the company is treated as 
a 'whole person' rather than as so many productive units 
and as a result of this wholistic approach 'to the 
employees, not only is productivity high but also 
absenteeism and labour turnover are low (Johnson and 
Ouchi, 1974: p. 63). 
Even -on the industrial relations front; Japanese-style 
management has indeed made some progress in America. This 
is clearly seen in the, team concept thatý is manifested at 
NUMMI' (Brown, 1987: p. 24-25). The, collective bargaining 
between the management of NUMMI and the union body, UAW 
provides, that employees will work in teams, and as far as 
practical, rotate jobs within the team. This has led Brown 
to comment that Japanese methods can work in the American 
unionised setting. 
Torrence (1983: p. 3-7) in his study of the Kawasaki plant 
in Nebraska has singled out three main elements of 
Japanese-style management that have been implemented 
successfully namely the non-laying off of employees, the 
just-in-time system and seniority-wage system. He also 
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found that there is good communication among the workers 
and the management and morale is said to be high among 
employees. 
6.3.2. American Organisations 
In the case of American companies (i. e. those with no 
Japanese interests), there are a number of success stories 
in trying to implant Japanese-style management, although 
the degree of such successes are confined to limited 
firms, i. e. the Type Z organisations (Fukuda, 1986). Ouchi 
(1981), in his interesting book entitled Theory Z# refers 
to Type Z organisations as successful American- companies 
which have many characteristics similar to companies in 
Japan- (however he has not shown if these companies had 
actually consciously learned from the Japanese). The most 
widely practised one is QCC. A study in 1982 by the New 
York Exchange showed that 44% of all companies with more 
than 500 employees have quality circle programmes (Lawler 
and Mohrman, 1985: p. 66). It was also observed that over 
90% of the Fortune "500" companies have, such programmes in 
their structure. The popularity of QCC is attributed to 
the success of high quality Japanese products at 
competitive prices in the US and the Americans see this 
concept of management as a way for their companies to 
achieve competitiveness. It has ' been also suggested by 
some observers that QCC has been successful in the US 
perhaps because QCC was invented there. 
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6.3.2. American Organisations. 
The recruitment system of the Japanese has been tried at a 
number of American companies. Hiring very selectively to 
get an elite force is said to have been experimented at 
Hewlett-Packard where it 'maintains stringent standard' in 
hiring production workers and yet avoid discriminations by 
following carefully guidelines on the percentage of 
minority employees it will recruit (Weiss, 1984: p. 119) 
A growing number, of organisations in the United States are 
now switching to JIT management. A few go a step further 
by developing and implementing their own version of JIT 
under a different names such as ZIPS (zero inventory 
production system), MAN (material-as-needed), NIT (nick of 
time (Walters, 1984). The success of JIT technique in 
America was clearly seen at Harley Davidson (Philipoom, 
1986). Using JIT technique, the-company had reduced its 
break-even point by 32% and in-progress inventory from 
US$23 million to just over US$8.5, million. Ansari (1984) 
conclusively found that the JIT philosophy can be 
successfully implemented in US companies "given the 
significant time, resources, '. support, management 
commitment and leadership. 
According to a study made - by JETRO (US) - (1981), on 
Japanese companies (i. e. subsidiaries), it is common for 
Americans, to be in charge of production, industrial 
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relations and wage negotiations, and marketing; while 
Japanese expatriates were given the responsibilities of 
decision-making, liaison with Japanese parent companies in 
Japan and finance and accounting. The study also revealed 
that most Japanese subsidiaries particularly those which 
originated through - mergers ýwith, . -or -purchase of 
established US firms or those combined ventures with US 
firms, in which Americans held management leadership, 
follow 'top-down' pattern of decision-making rather than 
the collective pattern, based on consensus, favoured by 
the Japanese. A similar study conducted a' year later 
(JETRO (US) 1982) concluded that there is some evidence to 
suggest that localisation of management practices in 
Japanese subsidiaries has taken place. - I 
There are many problems in the process of adopting 
Japanese-management practices in the US, environment faced 
either by" Japanese firms as well 'as -in Japanese-American 
joint venture firms or by American firms. Johnson and 
Ouchi (1974: p. 68) were of opinion that in Japanese 
subsidiaries, the Japanese have problems managing American 
workers because of, the culture. For example, authority in 
American context, is always equated with hierarchical 
positioning and as O'ne climbs higher, one is expected to 
have more say in decision-making. They added that while 
Japanese are concerned about people, the Americans just 
care about the product , and results. The American values 
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the obstacles facing the Japanese managers in the process 
of introducing their brand of management system to their 
American staff. A number of scholars on Japanese 
management, are in agreement that there are problems in 
trying to transfer the true form of Japanese management to 
Japanese companies in the*US (Tsurumi, 1978; Peterson and 
Shimada, 1978; Takeuchi, 1981). Examples of some specific 
problems are communication problems resulting from a 
different way of thinking and interactingg inadequacy of 
non-financial rewards, high turnover among middle managers 
lack of involvement on the part of employees-with company 
activities. Tsurumi (1978) lamented- the fact -that the 
various problems mainly come from American managers rather 
than employees. He concluded by saying American managers 
are not eager t'o accept the Japanese style of management 
because they feel deprived of the prerogatives like 
private officesq private secretariesp executive dining 
rooms and executive wash rooms etc. 
Attempts to introduce some Japanese-style management such 
as lifetime employment and seniority-wage systems faced a 
lot - of problems because of cultural differences between 
the Japanese and the Americans, according to, Torrence, who 
explained that: 
"Japan is,, -, relatively speaking, a highly- disciplined, 
closed; mono-religious, and homogeneous' culture while, the 
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United States is a heterogeneous, multi-religious, ý non- 
confirming, litigious society" (Torrence, 1983: p. 10) 
This comnent- is, obviously true in general, 'although of 
course, one should be aware that the Japanese are not 
mono-religious but actually are pantheistic. As such, the 
concept of family and group in Japan is most valued while 
the concept of 'self' and 'self-fulfilment' predominate in 
American -, culture. A professor of, Management at California 
State University cautioned that imitating Japanese-style 
management without taking into account of their cultural 
and demographic consideration can be disastrous (Maher, 
1985b: p. 34). 
The 'cultural difference' hypothesis was also highlighted 
by Weinshall (1986: p. 40). Because of the , different 
cultural setting in. America, Weinshall argued that ringi 
and lifelong employment systems are not transferable to 
the Americans. He supported his argument by saying that 
the Western structure is notýused to the luxury of time 
that ringi system requires in decision making. Nor do most 
companies in the US think they have the 'required normal 
and informal structure for such time-consuming process of 
politicking and manoeuvring behind the scene at every 
level of the organisation to achieve consensus. Lifetime 
employment according to Weinshall, is "anachronistic to 
Western habits and practices". Maher (1985a: p. 26) joined 
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in the attack on lifetime employment by 
cannot be indiscriminately transplanted to 
the US culture) which is ego-oriented, 
and competitive. Even in Japant he 
especially the young are beginning to f: 
with such a system. Whilst excessive and 
there is some value in his comments. -, 
saying that it 
a culture (i. e. 
individualistic 
added, people 
ind many faults 
oversimplified, 
The issue of transferability of Japanese-style management 
is even more problematic for the American firms. Despite 
the earlier popularity that QCC generated, Cole (1983) 
mentioned in his article that they have "become a dirty 
word in many companies". QCC is difficult to practice in 
American firms according to Cole, because unlike in Japan, 
the nature of peer pressure on behalf of organisational 
goal cannot be mobilised in America. The reason for this 
is due to the adversary relationships that predominate 
between labour and management in American work system. Thel 
management group considered the system as a threat to 
their authority and the ordinary employeest especially, the 
older workers according to Cole's findings, resisted QCC 
because they do not think they are likely to change the 
way things have always been. Another reason for the 
resistance towards QCC has to do with the educational 
level of workers concerned. They do not have the required 
mental framework to do it in terms of the ability on 
mathematics etc. 
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mental framework to do it in terms of the ability on 
mathematics etc. 
It is clear f rom the discussion above . that the 
transferability of Japanese-style management is a tricky 
issue. for the American emulators. It appears that the 
Americans should be selective about what elements they can 
apply in their. corporations, given the understanding of 
Japanese management and the constraints imposed by 
different ecological, cultural and institutional 
environment (Cool and Lengnick-Hall, 1985: p. 16). A number 
of other scholars have registered agreement with them. 
Peter Drucker, considered a renowned management guru said 
that it would be a folly -for managers 
in the West to 
imitate Japanese management blindly. He explained that to 
practice Japanese decision-making by consensus in American 
firms "will lead to indecision and politicking or atýbest 
to an innocuous compromise which offends no one but. solves 
nothing". He also commented that lifetime employment is 
too costly for American, firms to-maintain since they have 
already paid a high degree of 'income maintenance' for 
their workers (Drucker, 1971: p. 110-121). 
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There are others who maintained that for a transplantation 
of Japanese management methods to be successful -in 
America, a rapid implementation of certain - environmental 
changes such as tax and anti-trust laws must come first so 
that'' the necessary infrastructure is there for 
organisations to focus on long term utilisation of human 
resources based 'on the orientation of Japanese 'management 
system. 
Dunning (1986) commentedi that "Japanese style labour 
practices' are less in evidence in US, than in European 
factories%- The introduction-, of- work flexibility, i. e. 
Job-rotation, is Iess acceptable to US workers; plans and 
policies regarding layoffs are much less specific (JETRO, 
1981). Because of , the more individualistic nature, of the 
American workers as compared, to their European 
counterparts, the introduction of the Japanese-style 
management in toto is unlikely to be successful. But on 
one hand, claimed Dunning, many Japanese-style 
recreational activities had been introduced into American 
factories. Other features that are widely practices 
include the employee loyalty, information dissemination 
and QCC. 
6.4. Japanese-style Management in the, United Kingdom (UK) 
6.4.1. Japanese Subsidiaries 
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As early as 1983, Japanese companies had some 35 ventures 
in Britain ranging from TVs and VTRs- factory plant making' 
fish rods in Scotland (Stafford, 1983). Today, the number 
of Japanese concerns ranging from banks to trading 
companies in the UK is about 450 (List of ' 'Japanese 
Companies' Addresses in Europe, 1989/1990: p. 75-106). This. 
trend towards inward investment in the UK and elsewhere 
has been driven by a number of factors' which might be 
described, as "push" factors and "pull" factors. In term 
of "push" factors, the Japanese, first of all, ý initially' 
moved into underdeveloped world for - a-, comparative 
advantages in labour cost, land. - easy- access to raw 
materials etc. In the developed-. world, the first aim was 
in fact to preempt any kind of tariff measures which might 
have been developed because of the outcry against' the 
flooding of the market by the 'Japanese. 'The second reason' 
why the Japanese increasingly have moved overseas, in the 
case of Britain etc. 'is because of the potential access to 
the European Economic Community (EEC). The third reason, 
whichýis in common with America, for opening up companies' 
overseas by the Japanese is the strengthening of 'the yen 
makes it more profitable to make products in overseas 
countries and sell them in the said countries and that it 
is so profitable even the Japanese can can reexport back 
to Japan. Finally, increasingly 'the advanced industrial 
countries -are actually offering workforces which are 
cheaper than those in Japan. 
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countries are actually offering workforces which are 
cheaper than those in Japan. 
The Japanese, for these reasons have been. keen to 
establish subsidiaries or joint ventures or increasingly, 
in the US and Europe, undertake takeovers of existing 
firms. For- example, one - of Japan's largest car 
manufacturers, Honda Motors immediately linked up with the 
state-owned British Leyland. Nissan followed suit by 
having its automobile plants built- in Wales in 1986 and 
recently, in 1989, Toyota had announced that it is to 
build a plant at Durham. At presentp Mitshibushi Electric 
is expanding its television plant in Scotland to 
manufacture video tape recorders (VTRs); Sanyo Industries 
in Lowesoft is also expanding its TV factory to produce 
VTRs; and Hitachi-Maxwell is opening a plant to make VTR 
cassettes. Japanese trade officials in London said Britain 
and Ireland were popular because of the language and 
access to other Common Market countries. In the process of 
carrying their operating in the UK, these firms have 
introduced a number of Japanese-style management 
practices. 
Japanese manufacturing firms in Britain have been found to 
have been implementing the Japanese approach to 
management,, although sometimes in a modified form, with 
considerable success according to a survey conducted by a 
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as it is regarded an incompatible with local values and 
practices. QCC, suggestion system, zero defect ýmovement 
and consensus decision-making are introduced, only in a 
few companies and are absent in others as these practices 
are considered ill-suited to the British setting which is 
strongly oriented towards individualism and social 
stratification, according to Tomita (1986: p. 5-6). He also 
observed ' that policies relating to the quality of life 
have been strongly emphasised. These include 
harmonisation, team spirit and sharing corporate 
information. There is enough evidence to suggest that 
status differences, between managers'and their subordinates 
are minimised, through the use of company uniforms, -common 
canteen and toilet facilities and similar fringe benefit 
schemes. These policies are reinforced by job security, 
flexible management, internal and promotion schemes. 
These findings concurred with those of White- (1983: p. 25) 
who conducted a study on Japanese firms in the UK9-whereby 
it was found -that there had been indeed practices of 
Japanese-style management in the Japanese subsidiaries 
operating in the UK., 
It is quite clear from the available literature -that the 
transfer of, management practices to the UK, ý have been 
transmitted in the following ways: 
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(i). the appointment of Japanese expatriates as general 
managers or directors, and one or two senior 'expatriates 
who practise Japanese management practices as carried out 
by the parent companies in Japan. 
(ii). the sending of some key line managers and 
supervisors, the majority of whom are British, to Japan 
for induction and, training in the parent companies; 
(iii). the systematic introduction -of some- selective 
Japanese -management practices such as emphasis on loyalty 
(wearing *of company's uniforms), ' bottom-up decision-making 
(ringi) and groupism (suggestion box and QCC)'to British 
workers by'Japanese expatriates. 
According to White's study, -, the extent ýto which these 
methods 'of transferring ''Japanese-style management varies 
substantially from one firm to another. An earlier study 
by Thurley 'from , 1979-81 regarding the issues ', of 
transferability of Japanese-style management to Western 
Europe indicated that Japanese elements of management are 
also present in Japanese companies in-Europe but that only 
some key systems are adopted and that 'they are practised 
with some modifications 'as is clearly illustrated by the 
Toshiba' factory (Thurley, 1983: p. 124)ý For example, in 
personnel management, the Japanese firms try* to adopt 
local customs and practices. 
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with some modifications as is clearly illustrated by the 
Toshiba factory (Thurley, 1983: p. 124). For example, in 
personnel managementp the Japanese firms try to adopt 
local customs and practices. 
It was observed that Japanese companies follow a dual 
employment system for expatriates and local staff. There 
are few Japanese-style personnel policies and techniques 
employed for dealing with local staff especially in 
recruitment and employment, training, welfare provisions, 
remuneration policy, consultation - and collective 
bargaining. It also mentioned that direct-recruitment from 
schools had been reported in a number of manufacturing 
establishments. Grading systems for factory workers, with 
regular appraisal and upgrading were found in several 
larger manufacturing concerns. Modified bonus systems were 
practised in ýsome firms, particularly for managers. 
Regular direct consultation sessions between supervisors 
and workers were also observed in a number, of factories. 
Uniforms were used for factory and office staff and 
management and that there was evidence of canteens, 
toilets, etc, being provided on a single status basis. 
From the findings of this study, there, is some basis to 
conclude that there has been aýcertain degree of success 
achieved by Japanese firms in the UK in transferring the. 
Japanese practices of their parent companies in Japan. 
Thurley's 1983 study also concluded that not all Japanese- 
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style management had been transplanted in the UK and that 
some of those being transplanted were a hybrid version of 
Japanese management. Other writers also expressed the 
sentiments that Japanese firms are usually cautious, 
pragmatic and not anxious to reproduce a whole package of 
employment practices once operating outside Japan (White 
and Trevor, 1983) 1 
Oliver and Wilkinson (1989: p. 76) in a recent study, 
seemed to confirm earlier research studies whereby they 
found that some Japanese management practices were 
prominently executed by employees in Japanese subsidiary 
companies although the degree of their practices varied 
from company to company. However, there was an obvious 
absence of the use of temporary workers perhaps because 
according to them, the subsidiary companies were still in 
the infancy stage. 
Other interesting recent 'findings on Japanese management 
practices in the UK included the fact that the majority of 
Japanese subsidiaries in the country have more clearly 
defined and professional marketing strategies. They are 
systematically committed in their market share objectives, 
strategically focused on volume expansion and always 
targeted at higher value-added market sectors (Wong, 
Saunders and Doyle, 1987; p. 61). It is further observed 
that they are more oriented to long-term market share than 
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Japanese subsidiaries against existing firms having 
difficulties of changing market ranges and strategies. 
Another, area of interest on Japanese-style management 
concerns the organisational structure in the production 
subsidiaries. In some of the Japanese firms, a system of 
task pairing is employed whereby a Japanese expatriate 
works closely with a Western manager in a given role or 
function. This type of structure often leads to a 
'sandwich' situation where alternate layers of the 
organisation, or of an aspect of that firms first has a 
Japanese manager, then, a British managers etc. ,, 
Among those Japanese practices- that can be applied 
successfully to the UK according'to Dunning (1986) are: 
I#no status-related differences, in employment, hours of 
work, holidays, working conditions, social facilities, 
etc.; open plan space usage; no separate offices, except, 
perhaps, for most senior -executives and meeting rooms; 
open door attitude; the willingness for discussions and 
consultations between people at all levels; good 
communication; tell the people all the time the facts of 
industrial life; reduction of job grades to absolute 
minimum; incorporate flexibility of work clauses into 
contracts; pay special attention to recruitment and 
selection methods and criteria; increase attention to 
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encouraging workforce top give their best without -always 
expecting an immediate financial rewards; try to do 
without formal incentives, but,. through- promotion and 
gifts, reward good workmanship; and encourage,, promotion of 
single company, rather than several crafts union". 
It is believed that the Japanese managerial style and 
pattern of labour relations have been transferred more 
completely. to the United Kingdom than- other parts of 
Europe (JETRO, 1983). 
Like other , writers on Japanese-style management, 
Wong, 
Saunders and Doyle (1987) :. found that , some elements that 
were practised in Japan were not carried out in their 
subsidiaries in the UK. They said; 
" Our present findings suggest that many of the 
conventional theories about Japanese organizations do not 
apply to their subsidiaries in Britain. They were not more 
committed to lifetime employmentp to training, or to 
imbuing shared values, and company culture in personnel" 
(Wong, et al, 1983: p. 61) 
Obviously, those elements , of ýmanagement which were not 
introduced to their workers in the UK are those that are 
considered - difficult to implement or are bound to, be 
rejected by the British workers. 
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It is alsoý suggested that Japanese companies operating 
overseas including those in the UK do not appear to be 
particularly generous with bonuses or sick pay schemes. 
Deals with single unions are, often accomplished, but this 
does not mean the unions have been made into enterprise 
unions. (Dickens and Savage, '1988.: p. 62). Regarding in- 
house or enterprises unionism, the Japanese have found 
that this is the most difficult practice to introduce 
because the British union movement in the country is very 
strong. Joint ventures and subsidiaries , which are 
unionised are run by British managers mostly on the 
British lines. Where there is a green field siteg it is 
preferred to use a single union shop modelO'" ' 
Contrary to the normal practice in Japan of hiring 
graduates direct from universities and training them in 
the specific skills required, Japanese subsidiaries found 
themselves obliged to hire people with past working 
experience. Woronoff (1981: p. 14) explained that it was 
obvious that the Japanese did not recruit entirely or even 
largely, by taking 'staff directly on graduation from 
school, or universities'as in the' case in Japan. If they 
tried to do so, 'it would have taken 'thirty years of such 
recruitment to 'fill , the ranks from the bottom to top. 
However, 'a more important reason is that recruiting fresh 
graduates only is not feasible in the UK, because when 
4i 
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the Japanese set up a green field site, they cannot afford 
the luxury of everybody with no work experience. 
The'same concern about work attitudes manifested itself in 
the evaluation for promotion or salary revision. While not 
all companies used appraisal sheets where they were used 
and had, been prepared under the supervision of Japanese 
executives additional criteria on employee . attitudes were 
introduced. Japanese managers were particularly. strict on 
lateness, -absenteeism, smoking and drinking (Inohara, 
1980) 
One of the greatest problems in transferring Japanese 
management, practices abroad, is that they - are part of ,a 
system (White and Trevor, 1983). Thus a piecemeal transfer 
is unlikely to be successful. An effective transfer would 
require an overhaul, perhaps a complete re-orientations of 
the eptire - Western management system. Since Japanese 
managers are reputed to concern themselves with specific 
details, while many British managers prefer not 'to "get 
bogged down with details". There are, likely to be 
difficulties in carrying out the transferability -of 
Japanese practices to the UK (Buckley and Mirza, 1985). 
But nevertheless, Buckley and Mirza went on to declare 
that Japanese management practices can be transferred to 
Western firms because much of the Japanese approach is not 
the result of unique, cultural factors., They stressed that 
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Japanese management is successful because of attention to 
detail and a "common sense" approach. I 
Another problem in trying to implement Japanese-style 
management stems , from- the fact that the bulk of the 
British workers are 'still so used to the Britishý way of 
doing things. It is true that key workers and managers are 
sent for familiarisation -and -training, to Japan (it is' 
known that about two-third of the'Japanese firmsýin the UK1 
send -their staff to Japan). This practice seems to 
indicate that these trips are more a sort of a, reward for 
the loyal workers and that is ýon anýad hoc basis. 
Another difficulty encountered in practising Japanese- 
style management according to British ý workers is that 
definitions, of role and jobs are typically left vague in 
most Japanese firms and this createsýnumerous problems for 
any job evaluation system. There is often a problem of 
utilising a communication , system based -on tacit 
understanding (as in Japan). Personnel management in 
Japanese firms in the UK can be said to-represent a set of 
often uneasy compromises. There are many problems and the 
possibilities of utilising and integrating ideas from'both 
national traditions in this field. 
(ii). Non-Japanese Organisations 
Besides the effort by Japanese firms and subsidiaries ý to 
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possibilities of utilising and integrating ideas from both 
national traditions in this field. 
6.4.2., Non-Japanese Organisations 
Besides the effo'rt by Japanese firms and subsidiaries to 
transplant their management practices, there are also 
attempts to introduce Japanese-style management to the UK 
by British firms themselves. The "Japanisation" of-British 
industry through this method has intensified and the 
magnitude of transfer or the approach used in transferring 
the Japanese elements into the'companies is not the same 
as those used 'for Japanese companies in the UK. In the 
opinion of the author'. British companies only adopt 'those 
features that - they feel can contribute to the 
organisations' efficiency and 'effectiveness, and hence 
profitability. , Among the most common ones that are 
popularly practised are' quality control circles, 
suggestion systems and paternal relationships (Smith, 
1988; Egan, 1985; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; Dore, -1982). 
Other features like JIT and sub-contracting system have 
been considered by some adventurous British companies but 
with limited success (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988: p. 86; 
Basset, 1986). 
Of QCC9 there was initially a great enthusiasm about it 
among British workers but it was'not' so well-received by 
the middle and sometimes senior management group and also 
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clerical staff. It has been observed that QCC was 
considered as a threat ýby the management group and 
therefore it was natural for them, to be suspicious of such 
practices (maybe because of the - suspicion that they have 
to come up with the answers to some problems in the 
organisation). White and Trevor (1983) were of opinion 
that whereas Japanese managers believe in collective 
responsibilities and joint achievement of clear work 
targets, British managers are inclined towards developin& 
individual career advancement in the form of increasing 
individual job responsibility. Also, it has been 
contented that the failure of QCC in British firms has 
been due to the opposition from the unions which believe 
that such a practice could threaten the role of shop 
stewards (Smith, 1988). Thus, the formal union responses 
to QCC and other briefing methods have been negative in 
the other, - British- automobile companies in the early 
19801s., QCC, according to this study was the least 
favourable feature rated. A leading authority on Japanese 
management bluntly stated; . "Quality circles are a menace 
to- the British way of life and should be suppressed" 
(Dore, 1982: p. 12). Howeverg strangely enoughq in at least 
one British major company, Jaguars QCC has proved to be a 
popular and successful programme in the company (Isaac, 
1984). Also, it is clear that QCCs have been successful in 
companies long associated with quality such as Wedgewood 
and Rolls Royce. 
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In assessing the success and failure of, paternalistic 
practice of Japanese-style management in British industry, 
there has been a mixed feeling among scholars. For 
example, in Jaguar, the success has been evident, while in 
Ford, ýsuch a policy has not materialised (Friedman, 
1987: p. 352). 
With regards to the JIT system, Oliver and Wilkinson 
(1999: p. 86) concluded that it is not gaining ground in, the 
UK. This is mainly dueýto the fact thatýBritish firms face 
a- much more uncertain ý market than do Japanese companies 
and without a position of dominance, there are real 
problems in creating the conditions of relative stability. 
For a JIT system of -supply to work effectively, the 
suppliers should be concentrated in one place and this is 
not the case with the British where there seems to be a 
geographical dispersion of component suppliers. But things 
are beginning to change and there'has been a revolution in 
sub-contracting which has been influenced by the needs of 
British companies to win contracts from Japanese 
subsidiaries (White and Trevor, 1988). 
There has been not much inroad being made regarding a 
Japanese-style communication network in the UK. It has 
been earlier mentioned that Japanese managers and workers 
are quite happy to work in open office. The British 
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managers and workers are not prepared to -accept this 
office structure for- they ýfind difficulties working in a 
community that may be noisy, thus disturbing their privacy 
at work. To them, especially the managers who are so used 
to privacy, that "openness" is a problem. This occurs when 
a superior wishes to deal formally with his subordinates 
who are not working to standard or when, the manager wishes 
to work upon secret documents. 
There are also some difficulties in adopting the sub- 
contracting system in British industry. The problem 
concerns the slow delivery and quality, by suppliers 
(Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988). The other problem is that 
the companies who try this system more often than not 
realise they must have the proper infrastructure first in 
order to make sub-contracting system works. 
There is no question regarding the fact that enterprise 
unionism is ýalmost impossible to implement in British 
firms, at least for the time being. It must be pointed out 
that although enterprise unionism is not possible and 
therefore not practised, some form of changes in unionism 
have been witnessed of late in the wave of "Japanisation" 
of the British industry. One element Of the new approach 
of Japanese subsidiaries, which is often regarded, as 
Japanese, is the strike-free deal (Basset, 1986). However, 
this is infact erroneous because the strike-free is not 
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unions in Britain who wish to win a single union deal with 
the Japanese firms. By 1987, twevle British companies were 
known to have strike-free deals. 
In the area of appiaisal system, British companies still 
favour individual merit appraisal. Where training 
employees is concerned, the Japanese approach is of ten 
not accepted because of high mobility of labour and hence 
high turnover of staff. This observation is supported by 
Ackroyd; Burrell; Hughes; and Whitetaker study (1988) 
which argued that 
"the British cannot adopt Japanese practices in that they 
are powerfully constrained in their behaviour because they 
are part of British economy" (Ackroyd, 1988: p. 21). 
The Japanese management practices which are not considered 
suitable for the British environment will not have any 
impact in the UK because all forces will combine to reject 
them. This can be explained in light of the following: 
Firstly, there is a major difference in the conception of 
job functions and boundaries between Japan and the UK The 
Japanese conception is that of the generalist; the British 
go for an individual with specific Job knowledge and 
responsibilities. It is asserted that British managers 
clearly distinguish work and non-work roles and do not 
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generally expect to socialise with colleagues outside 
workplace. There are differences in styles of decision- 
making, delegation of authority, and accountability 
between British organisations and their Japanese 
counterparts. High productivity in Japan is based on the 
cooperation, as a group, of managers and workers. This is 
seldom found in the UK, because of cultural differences and 
the trade union structure. 
Secondly, ý the UK has different cultural setting than that 
of Japan. Kassem observed that Britain' 1. 
"is a country dominated by an individualist ethic which 
starts with the person as the ultimate source of 
individual and"'social values. According to this ethics, 
the "atomistic"" person, 'acting intelligently in pursuit 
of his own interest, will eventually contribute the most 
to the gooUof the group" (Kassem, 1974: p. 42). 
Thirdly, the Japanese system is vastly different - 
culturally, economically, socially and politically - from 
other systems in the world, and so it cannot be 
transplanted into other alien system. Since the Japanese 
companies themselves have had to modify their management 
system to succeed, or-just be accepted in overseas 
subsidiaries, it is a bit pointless'proposing that foreign 
countries should adopt the Japanese management , system 
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(Wonoroff, 1981). He also mentioned that with all the 
differences it must-be obvious that the Japanese companies 
operating- abroad have not transplanted their system on 
foreign soil. If they did so, it would probably fail to 
grow. What most Japanese firms have actually done is to 
seek -a compromise. Working under the direction of parent 
company in Japan, naturally some Japanese methods had to 
be maintained. 
6.5. Experiences of Japanese-style management in the 4 
NIEs (Taiwan, South Koreat Hong Kong and Singapore) - 
The Orientals are always simply lumped together on the 
assumption that people from a neo-Confucian realm share 
common cultural traditions which make them similar in 
orientation and action. If this is true, the 
transferability and applicability of Japanese-style 
management should not find so many problems in the other 
oriental countries, particularly the 4 NIEs (Taiwang South 
Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) because -these four 
countries can be said to share common oriental values and 
cultural traditions with Japan. This is far from being the 
case as can be seen from the ensuing discussion of 
current literature review. 
6.5.1. Japanese-style Management in Taiwan. 
A number of studies on Japanese-style management in Taiwan 
have been, carried out (Chen, 1982; Lin, 1977; Ishida, -1984 
I 
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and Ito, 1985). A survey on 300 Japanese subsidiaries in 
Taiwan in 1983 carried out by Ito (1985: p. 95) found that 
the Japanese practices such as emphasis on managem ent 
philosophy and objectives; employment stabilisation, 
smooth relation, group decision-making, seniority-wage, 
job-rotation etc are strongly established in the Japanese 
firms in Taiwan. The emphasis on the management philosophy 
and objectives of Japanese firms seem to be influenced by 
Confucianism, that is commonly shared by the Japanese as 
well as the Taiwanese. Accordingly, of all the firms in 
the study, 81% of them practice stabilisation policy; 67% 
report the use of employment stabilisation; 45% practice 
seniority-based wage system; 39% report the use of job 
rotation; 32% adopting group decision-making. In addition, 
it has been reported that 56.8% of of labour unions in 
Japanese subsidiaries are in the form of enterprise unions 
(Ito, 1985: p. 100). 
There are visible signs to suggest that the Japanese have 
always attempted to modify their management practices 
where necessary to fit into the Taiwanese environment. In 
fact, Ito reported that the majority of the Japanese 
subsidiaries in Taiwan use a combination of seniority and 
merit systems for promotion well some others use the merit 
system alone. In the area of trainingo the study by Ito 
indicated that Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan - send 'a 
higher percentage of local managers to parent companies in' 
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merit system alone. In the area of training, the study by 
Ito indicated that Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan have 
sent a higher percentage of local managers- to parent 
companies in Japan than do Japanese subsidiaries in Asean 
countries. This' may reflect a more positive attitude 
towards Japan., It also may be due to their proximity to 
the Japanese and the fact that -they can afford to. , 
Of all Asean countriess the practice of Japanese-style 
management in overseas Japanese subsidiaries seemed to be 
most successfully applied in Taiwan. Ito explained 'that 
this may be due to the,, fact that Taiwan is 'much closer I to 
Japan in terms of both I distance and culture than the ASEAN 
countries and that more local in Taiwan can converse in 
Japanese language than, in the ASEAN countries. It is also 
explained by the historical close relations between Japan 
and Taiwan. Formosa (the other name for Taiwan)v which was 
formally a colony of'Japan from the late 19th Century. 
How acceptable is the Japanese-style- management to the 
local firms in Taiwan? It has been observed by 'some 
writers that managers in Taiwan are said to be very 
practical and individualistic, making it quite difficult 
for Japanese-style management , to succeed there. On the 
other hand, they are said by the Japanese to display a 
more caring attitude towards their subordinates than other 
managers, in Asean countries, implying that the paternal 
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aspect - of Japanese-style management is - infact being 
accepted there. However, the overall picture as dipicted 
by the current literature review is not very positive. 
In the first place, there is a sense of distrust and 
dissatisfaction among the Chinese in Taiwan towards the 
Japanese and such a sentiment is an obstacleý to the 
Japanisation of Taiwan industry. It has been mentioned 
that Taiwan's manufacturers are angry and distrustful-of 
the Japanese who they regard as lacking in sincerity 
especially in technology transfer into Taiwan and they are 
reluctant, to do business with them (Chen, 1982: p. 17). The 
Investment Commission officials in Taiwan said -that local 
companies had painful experience with Japanese firms in 
the past two decades-, rating-, them as not genuine teachers 
in terms of technological transfer. The Japanese just 
teach you- how to produce the product and do not teach you 
the design and'operational criteria, complained on general 
manager of a Taiwanese firm (Chenj 1982: p. 17). The All- 
feeling created naturally has affected the -effort to 
disseminate either directly or indirectly Japanese-style 
management into the country. 
The feasibility of transplanting Japanese-style management 
to Taiwan also faces problems as there is a vast 
difference between Japan and Taiwan in as far as 
interpersonal relationships between leaders and 
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subordinates is concerned. It is true 'that the Chinese 
are family-oriented like the Japanese, but they are not 
social-minded like the Japanese. - It has been described 
that the Chinese family mind is only a form of magnified 
selfishness, and team-work is not as common as those found 
among the Japanese society. Their nation is like !a tray 
of loose sands', each grain not an individual but a 
family, while the Japanese nation is welded together like 
a piece of granite (for detail, refer to Silin., 1976 and 
Lin, 1967). - 
Fukuda said that the Chinese normally emphasize rational 
commitment to leaders, rather than emotional ties as in 
Japan (Fukuda, 1983: p. 21)ý Any attempt at' creating a more 
informal affective atmosphere on the part of subordinates 
are interpreted by'Chinese leaders as efforts to undercut 
leaders' prerogatives. Chinese leaders in general maintain 
a considerable distance in their relations with 
subordinates. - They neither admit their dependence on 
subordinates nor do they lead through maintaining group 
harmony. 
In making' an 'important decision.. a Chinese manager 
typically instructs his subordinates to work out several 
alternative' proposals themselves before submitting one 
final proposal. As a general rulep the manager tries not 
to get involved in the preparation of initial proposals. 
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However, he makes sure his opinions are heard by 
frequently attending meetings held by subordinates and 
instructing them to send the minutes of their meetings for 
his comments. Such approach seems to suggest a 'bottom-up' 
process but actually it is since -as 
there is always 
influence from the top to make the whole thing a decision 
of the boss. 
Fukuda (1982: p. 225) also said that Chinese managers 
generally believe in teamwork and collective .. efforts just 
like Japanese managers. But unlike Japanese -firms, the 
Taiwanese firms operate heavily on formal channels of 
communication for exchange of information. While the 
official minutes of meetings are widely circulated 
horizontally across departments as well as vertically 
across various levels of management, Chinese managers tend 
to keep much, information to themselves and are reluctant 
to reveal any matters which are considered as of no direct 
concern to others. As a result, many managers have 
confessed they do not really know how much information 
other people are actually giving out. There is clearly a 
lack of informal communicationg hindering through 
dissemination of information. Thus, in many respects, 
Chinese management practices are somewhat closer to that 
of Western, management styles. II 
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there. However, over 80% of those companies in the survey 
said they have to adapt their management practices to 
local conditions. One major feature of Japanese-style 
management that is found in the majority of Japanese 
subsidiaries in Korea is the strong emphasis on human 
resources (Yoshihara, 1985: p. 79). A significant number of 
Japanese' subsidiaries also attempt towards employment 
stabilisation by carrying out careful recruitment of 
employees, and the provision of continuous education and 
training. Such an'emphasis has been given priority because 
in Korea, labour turnover is high and Koreans prefer to 
switch jobs when there is an opportunity for better wages 
or career prospects. 
About 90% of Japanese companies in Korea practice 
suggestion schemes and about 80 percent practices control 
circles, according, to Yoshiharals findings (p. 80). He 
further observed that about 70% of the Japanese 
subsidiaries in Korea mostly promote their workers based 
on a combination of seniority and merit. Most Japanese 
companies in Korea use a fixed system, and some combine it 
with an incentive system. The practice of paying bonus of 
about four months' salary is also a common feature in 
Japanese firms in Korea and that most Japanese companies 
give lump-sum grants when their employees quit or retire. 
Internal promotion is also popular in which about three 
quarters of the Japanese subsidiaries are said to be 
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using. With respect to training, the most commonly form is 
that of OJT. It has been observed by Yoshihara that there 
is a high degree, of participatory management among Korean 
middle managers in Japanese firms. 
Evidently, Japanese firms have some success in 
transplanting the management practices of their parent 
companies in Japan to Korean soil. This leads one to ask 
if Japanese-style management has been introduced and 
accepted in Korean firms. It has been suggested by many 
authors that there are some similarities in attitudes and 
approach to work between the Japanese and the Koreans. 
Like the Japanese managers, Korean managers are said to 
prefer the open office system. They also eat together 
with their subordinates and they do not feel it is 
necessary to have different facilities (i. e. canteen) for 
different categories of workers. Just as is the case with 
the Japanese, ý paternalism; loyalty to organisation, family 
and friends; respect for those in authority and those who 
are senior in age are strongly found in the Korean 
management system (Lee and Yoo, 1987: p. 74-76). 
It is also said by Lee and Yoo that the Korean trading 
companies are patterned afterý the Japanese "sogo shosha" 
and that like the Japanese, many Korean enterprises owe 
their success to government 'support and good relationship 
between them. Whereas in Japan, the close government- 
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business relationship is called "Japan Incorporated", in 
Korea, it is known as "Korea Incorporated". If the Koreans 
have indeed copied the management-style from others, there 
is strong evidence to suggest that they have copied 
considerably from Japan. But despite the similarities, 
many Koreans express their dislike for the Japanese- 
oriented personnel policies such as no lay offs and no 
severe punishment policies. 
Slow decision-making is also not popular among the 
Koreans. In a typical firml important decisions are made 
by the top executive and his management and it is sent to 
the lower level for execution. The subordinates will 
normally accept what has been decided 'which is in 
conformity with Confucian ethics that entails paternalism, 
loyalty, and respect for elders and seniors. This view. is 
supported by other writers who said that Korean 
organisations practice top-down management and usually 
that the founder-president usually exercises strong 
leadership. Also unlike the Japanese, most Koreans prefer 
to be given specific individual responsibilities assigned 
to them. Because of such characteristic of Korean society, 
Japanese-style management experiences difficulties in 
penetrating the Korean organisations. It is in fact the 
contention of some authors (Kelly, et al, 1986: p. 59-69) 
based on one study that there are significant differences 
between Japan and Korea. The Koreans, from the managers to 
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ordinary workers are individualistic and assertive. It is 
said that when there are differences of opinion, they are 
not good at settling their differences. In fact, top 
management has to use bureaucratic controls in the forms 
of rules, policies, - and procedures to resolve inter-group 
conflicts. Teamwork as is displayed in Japanese 
subsidiaries, is not easily achievable in Korean firms due 
to the individualistic tendencies of the Koreans. 
6.5.3. Japanese-style Management in Hong Kong 
The Chinese in Hong Kong today do, in factv share with the 
Japanese the same 'national slogan -"Export or Perish"- 
because of a common lack of natural resources, and. heavy 
dependence on the export-oriented manufacturing industry. 
Hong Kong Chinese still carry with them a traditional 
value system similar in some ways to that found in modern 
Japan, and their support 'and defence of the traditional 
style of behaviour is clear and unmistakable (Chin, 1972). 
For example, a man must not "lose face" because he would 
be losing his status -'and self-respect (Redding and Ng, 
1982: p. 201). But despite similarity of cultural traditions 
and races and geographical proximity, "Fukuda (1982: p. 121) 
pointed out that''it is wrong to think that Japanese and 
Chinese management practices are the same. Previous 
studies have shown that it is also misleading to assume 
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that Japanese-style management can be easily transplanted 
in Hong Kong on the basis of their similarity. 
The intensive study on the Japanese management by Japanese 
subsidiaries by Tomita (1985: p. 61) showed that the issue 
here is not whether Japanese, management practices can be 
carried out in Hong Kong, but rather to what extent has 
Japanese-style management been practised in the country?. 
Indeed many features of Japanese methods are practised but 
modifications have also been made in their implementation. 
This is because of the problems of total transplantation 
which is not possible in Hong Kong. Firstlyp the Hong Kong 
employees,,, having- been under British influence, are 
basically individualistic. Workers are said to move from 
job to job in search of more money and'-prestige. Tomita 
observed that as many as 88.9% of local middle managers 
have had job experience in other organisations and that 
they have changed their job (i. e place of work) an average 
of 2.6 times with the highest being seven times. Among the 
practices promoted by the Japanese in Hong Kongq the most 
emphasised is stable employment fortified by annual pay 
rise. This, according to Tomitap indicates that 
stabilisation of employment is a pressing issue for 
Japanese management faced with mobile labour. 
In the field of 'training., 
provide training but thiE 
the Japanese subsidiaries also 
is 'not so much aimed at 
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developing them ýas their 'company men' but more at 
preventing a quick turnover to facilitate smooth 
operation. The training is much shorter and , is given -to 
the extent which makes them proficient to handle their 
jobs. The Japanese realising the mobility pattern of 
workers, feel it is not necessary to train local employees 
beyond what is actually needed. 
As far as promotion is concerned, Japanese subsidiaries 
normally ensure that a vacancy is filled internally. New 
recruits are first placed at the bottom of the corporate 
hierarchy as a rule, in accordance with their educational 
attainments. There is- also attempt, to emphasise 
collective-oriented , management but it was extremely 
limited, compared to Japanese subsidiaries-in other Asian 
countries. It is evidently clear that although Japanese 
management practices 'are carried out in Hong Kong, they 
have been modified to a certain extent to conform to the 
realities of, Hong Kong communities. Tomita concluded that 
Japanese management in Hong Kong is not a cultural 
extension of parent corporation as the "ethnocentric" 
hypothesis asserts, but rather more associated with the 
"community-influence" hypothesis. The "ethnocentric" 
hypothesis asserts that the management of corporations 
which are wholly owned by foreign nationals isl in effect, 
a cultural as well as an economic extension of the parent 
corporation (Perlmutter, 1972: p. 20-50)- ý while the 
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"Community-influence" hypothesis states that the 
management has to adjust its practices to social and 
cultural realities of the communities in which it operates 
(Parker, 1967: p. 65). 
6.6.4. Japanese-style Management in Singapore 
The Japanese subsidiaries in Singapore have evidently 
introduced practices such as ringi, no layoff'policy, QCC 
and suggestion system (Ek, 1987). All Japanese 
subsidiaries have been seen to keep their workers in times 
of slack demand suggesting that they are following their 
parent companies' tradition. In -times of high demand, 
company prefer overtime to hiring new employees. Japanese 
subsidiaries also sponsored recreational activities such 
as picnics and sports events for the employees to mix 
around. All Japanese subsidiaries in Singapore indicate 
that they would avoid individualistic personsý in their 
recruitment exercises irrespective of ability. They also 
tend to recruit workers fresh from 'universities, 
polytechnics and schools and provide them with the OJT 
training. 
The "Japanisation" of the Singaporean workforce by the 
Japanese employers has not been'smooth sailing. They face 
problems in trying to implement some elements of Japanese- 
style of management because of environmental conditions, 
according to EK (1987: p. 150-258). Singaporean workers are 
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considered by the Japanese as having lower education, 
lacking in good attitude towards the person in authority, 
lacking in teamwork, and work skills. The Japanese 
subsidiaries face difficulties in adopting the same 
management philosophy as their parent companies and -have 
to make major changes to suit the Singaporean workforce. 
EK, in the same study, was said to conclude that the 
difficulty in introducing the Japanese-style management to 
Singapore is due to the fact that the Singaporean employee 
is presently self-centred and too individualistic 0 when 
compared to his Asian counterparts such as Korea, Taiwan, 
and in particular, Japan. His survey ýindicated that 
Japanese-style management is still unpopular even after 
adaptations were made to suit the Singaporean workforce, 
implying that culture has an influence in the 
transferability of- management system. This observation 
clearly supported earlier contention by Aliston (1986) 
which pointed out the impact of culture in the 
transferability issue of management practice from one 
country to another. - 
Japanese subsidiaries have been seen -to therefore adapt 
themselves , to local environment. For instance, the 
Japanese subsidiaries, contrary to normal practice in 
Japan, accelerate promotion of workers to keep the better 
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employees. The criterion for promotion is more stressed on 
the basis of performance rather than seniority. 
The difficulties in transmitting Japanese-style management 
to Singapore have been admitted by the Japanese themselves 
in one study whereby among other things, it was said: 
" The management practices of Japanese companies in 
Singapore are not necessarily the same as those of parent 
organizations in Japan .... and the Japanese companies 
believe that they cannot transfer their home country 
practices without drastic modifications because of the 
differences in language and the diverse education 'levels 
of Singapore's cosmopolitan population" (Putti and Chong, 
1985: p. 107) 
Putti and Chong went on to suggest that the statutory 
requirements of compulsory contributions to the Central 
Provident Fund and Skills Development Fund and the fact 
that labour turnover is very high in Singapore have caused 
the Japanese to hesitate in introducing their management 
practices on. a full scale basis. Attempts whereby Japanese 
are modifying their management practices in their 
Singapore subsidiaries is also supported by Choy and Jain 
study (1987: p. 73-89). The adaptation of Japanese practices 
to the local situation suggests the validity of the 
contingency thesis. 
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In addition, Choy and Jain (p. 83) were of the opinion 
that there seems to be a convergence of human resource 
management practices between the Japanese firms in Japan 
and the Singaporean firms in Singapore. This is due to the 
fact that Japanese firms - particularly in overseas are 
adopting more' Western practices, while the already 
Westernised Singaporean firms tend to adopt more of the 
Japanese practices. ' 
In his Ph. D's thesis on the study of Singaporean 
executives, Thomson (1984: p. 6) pointed out that by 1983, 
industrial leaders in Singapore began to look Eastwards by 
asking their followers to adopt Japanese practices. He 
went on to say that with the, encouragement from the 
Singaporean government, the adoption of QCC has become 
widespread among local companies. 
Japanese-style management has -not found easy acceptance 
in Singapore (Thomson, 1984; Deyo, 1976), although some 
elements of Japanese management system have gained 
foothold in the country. Singaporean managers in Chinese- 
owned companies have - indicated that they preferred 
impersonal relationships with their subordinates 
(Wimalasiri, 1983; Wimalasiri and Ng, 1984; Thomson, 
1984). They seem reluctant to indulge in personal 
relationships and would like greater social distance. The 
explanation for - such a preference for distance 
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relationship between the management and subordinates may 
have been due to the Western influence of the British who 
ruled the country before her, independence. 
6.5.5. Japanese-style Management in Malaysia 
The popularity of Japanese-style management in Malaysia is 
quite a recent phenomenon. Japanese practices began to be 
considered seriously immediately after the "Look East" 
policy was introduced in Malaysia in 1981. Before then, 
Japanese management practices were not really well-known, 
although some of these practices, had been implemented by 
Japanese-owned companies operating in, Malaysia. 
I 
6.5.1. Japanese Subsidiaries in Malaysia 
A -study on Japanese firms in Malaysia by Lim and Ping 
(1979: p. 76) before the, "Look East" policy period began 
indicated that Japanese-style management were used -to 
some extent in Japanese firms in Malaysia. According to 
that study, Japanese firms in Malaysia followed the 
management practices of their parent companies in Japan 
with some adaptation when and where necessary as required 
by local situations. According to top executives of these 
firms (who were without exceptiong Japanese nationals), 
they Introduced the Japanese management techniques when 
feasible. The transplantation of Japanese management 
practices had been made more possible because the top 
management positions were all held by Japanese nationals. 
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Japanese management features commonly found Japanese 
subsidiaries in Malaysia have been identified by Lim and 
Ping (1979: p. 76-80) as follows. 
The Japanese work ethic was strongly emphasised amongst 
the Malaysian workers. For example, -the Nippon Electric 
Company (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., an electrical -Japanese 
subsidiary, placed a lot of weight on the quality, of its 
product. Quality control had been introduced and adhered 
to zealously. All workers, white-collar and blue-collar 
alike, wear the white uniforms before entering production 
areas. QCCs were also formed among workers to enable 
workers to improve their work techniques. 
Workers in Japanese firms in Malaysia were always 
encouraged to give views on how to handle their jobs. 
There existed suggestion boxes in most Japanese firms for 
workers to put forward new suggestions or comments for the 
improvement of their work methods. Managers in these firms 
claimed they had regular contact with workers freely. For 
example, in one survey, it was revealed that 78.2% of the 
managers in the Japanese firms said they had their -lunch 
together with workers in a single-status canteen (Nakano, 
1985: p. 114). Most of them also said that they normally 
participated in games and club activities that are 
organised by their workers. 
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Most Japanese firms have training programmes similar to 
their parent companies in Japan for the local employees in 
that they provide on-the-job training, although the the 
degree of such training practice is much less frequent 
than those workers in Japan. Some'firms had sent their key 
employees to their parent companies for exposure from time 
to time. ' According to these firms, at- present, such 
training policy is still going on and will continue to be 
observed in the future as part of their human resource 
development programs. 
It was also observed that Japanese firms were relatively 
centralised. Japanese firms tended to use operational and 
managerial control rather than equity ownership to control 
their subsidiaries. -Control had been maintained through 
the appointment of Japanese personnel in the subsidiary 
companies and the retention of authority in decision- 
making by the head office. Targets and budgets were set 
by the head offices, usually after lengthy consultations 
between head offices and subsidiaries. Consultations were 
made during personal visits by officers from head offices 
to the subsidiaries and vice-versa. Other characteristics 
of, Japanese management being adopted in Japanese. firms in 
Malaysia included the practices of bottom-up 
communication, promotion from within policy and preference 
for hiring fresh graduates. 
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The study by Lim and Ping concurred with an earlier study 
made by Sim (1978: p. 33-60) who found out that subsidiary 
companies (irrespective of their origins) operating in 
Malaysia normally adopted the management style of their 
parent 'companies. Sim noticed that the-, management 
practices of parent companies were observed in Japanese 
subsidiaries in Malaysia. However they were not rigidly 
followed and adaptation to the Malaysian environment was 
required to make the practices more acceptable to local 
workforce. 
A research study (Imaoka, 1985: p. 9-25) commissioned by 
JETRO in 1982 regarding Japanese firms operating in 
Malaysia provided an , interesting picture regarding 
Japanese-style management in Malaysia. The study revealed 
some useful findings'. 
It was found that the top executives of Japanese 
subsidiaries are always Japanese personnel. Imaoka said: 
" These top, executives seem to consciously apply Japanese- 
style management in Malaysian subsidiaries or joint- 
ventures within the sphere of their authority" (p. 18-19) 
It was revealed that all top positions were occupied by 
the Japanese and less important management Positions were 
often given to locals, especially if the firms are joint 
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ventures with the Malaysians. The ordinary workers were 
recruited from the local population although a high 
percentage of Japanese personnel held key positions such 
as foremen and senior technicians. To implement Japanese 
personnel management successfully, the Japanese firms 
realised that it is very essential-to keep highly mobile 
local workers and staff as long as possible. Towards this 
end, the Japanese companies' emphasised 'policies such as 
in-firm promotion system, seniority-wage system, good 
relations between workers , and management, long-term 
oriented OJT, commendations for long services-and generous 
welfare services. 
Imaoka- (1985: p. 21) also commented that with regard to the 
remuneration systems Japanese subsidiaries followed their 
parent - companies in Japan quite closely. Howeverg the 
amount- paid may or may not necessarily be in line with 
those practices in Japan. Comparatively lower pay was 
given to local employees in Japanese subsidiaries. Most 
firms are quite consistent in 'giving bonuses of 1.8 
months' wages per year for administrative and supervisory 
staff and 1.5 months' wages per year for workers. 
The welfare facilities noticed in the -Japanese companies 
operating in, Malaysia include the provision of staff 
cafeterias, company housing and dormitoriesq commuter 
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buses, medical treatment, sport facilitiesq locker rooms 
and company uniforms. 
According to some observers, the problem faced by Japanese 
firms in trying to adopt Japanese practices has stemmed 
from the different cultural background of the workforce in 
Malaysia. For instance'. Ibrahim -and Moktar (1979: p. 59) 
observed that most skilled and unskilled workersý in 
Malaysia go for extrinsic factors like pay, job security, 
fringe benefit etc. than intrinsic factors- to motivate 
them. This is the opposite of what Japanese employees are 
said to preferred. t 
The most challenging task faced by Japanese firms is 
therefore to persuade their employees to accept Japanese 
approaches which are different from the already existing 
pro-western system. This has not been easy for either the 
Japanese executives ý or the Malaysian employees. The 
communication barrier between them have been identified as 
one of the main causes of the problem. Most Malaysians do 
not understand the Japanese language adequately to permit 
the close relationship with Japanese superiors like the 
one that develops between employees and their superiors in 
Japan. The Japanese expatriates in Malaysia also make it 
worst by their tendency to form a close and exclusive 
circle. Unlike the relationship that exist in their 
parent companies in Japan, no personal relationship 
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outside the workplace between Japanese staff and local 
staff is in evidence in Japanese firms located in 
Malaysia. Although there is evidence in Western 
industrialised countries of the creation of specific areas 
where- Japanese live together (i. e. Japanese-style 
community), they do not mix much with Westerners. The 
Japanese both in terms of the attitude towards exclusivity 
by Western community ought to mix more, so said some 
observers. In Southeast Asian countries, the tendency of 
Japanese to distance themselves from the locals is even 
more prominent and it , seems to reflect more 
of the 
arrogance and possible superiority of the Japanese towards 
Southeast Asian people. ý 
Until the advent of the "Look East" policy; most workers 
in Malaysia tend to be registered members of industry-wide 
unions. However, the "Look East" policy contains also an 
encouragement to develop enterprise unions in public 
sector which led to more enterprise unions being formed 
towards the end of the 1980s. (see later page). Japanese 
firms did not really make much effort to introduce this 
element in Malaysia. 
Also, Japanese firms in Malaysia had not attempted to 
introduce life-time employment practices among their 
workers even though they never lay off workers. This is 
because job-hopping is common in Malaysia and employees do 
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not feel, in any way, obliged to consider the interests of 
the employers. Japanese firms in Malaysia also do not 
attempt to utilise the recruitment system which their 
parent companies in Japan normally use. For example, 
workers were not recruited once a year as in Japan, but 
were recruited when and where necessary as is the norm in 
Malaysia. 
There is no doubt that some form of Japanese management 
practices and policies of parent companies in Japan are 
also carried out in their 'subsidiaries operating in 
Malaysia, *although some modifications are both common and 
numerous. It can be further added that the Japanese 
management practices that are considered, not suitable or 
relevant yet in the Malaysian context have been carefully 
avoided. 
6.5.5.2. Malaysian Organisations (Private Firms and 
Government Agencies) 
Whether or not it is possible to transplant some Japanese 
management techniques to Malaysia is not the issue. 
Japanese firms in Malaysia had in fact used a number of 
practices already. What about the efforts within 
Malaysian firms? Generally, private enterprises in 
Malaysia appear somewhat hesitant and slow in adopting 
Japanese management practices. Perhaps, they are 
comfortable enough with the present management practices 
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they use. Or perhaps, they are just adopting a "wait and 
see" attitude. It is in the public enterprises sector that 
most , Japanese-style management seems to be making 
encouraging progress. There are, of course, some reasons 
for this. It is a known secret that, the government has 
been a powerful force behind the efforts to replicate 
Japanese management practices via its "Look East" policy. 
Since the inception of the policy, a sudden shift in 
preferred management approach from Western-influenced to 
Japan-influenced has been witnessed in government 
agencies. Seminars on QCC were frequently, conducted by 
National Productivity Centre (NPC) and managers of public 
sector managers who -had returned 
from training in Japan. 
The government has been sending a large number of 
observations and educational-type missions to Japan to 
observe Japanese practices under the guidance of such 
organisations as the, Asian productivity Centre, JICA etc. 
It was observed that by the end of 1982, the total number 
of QCC practised in government agencies was estimated to 
be between 300-350 (Far Eastern Economic Review, June, 14, 
1984). Today, almost all public enterprises and government 
agencies throughout the country have QCCS. The success of 
QCC has been widely reported in public enterprises such as 
Malaysian Rubber Development Corporation (MARDEC), 
Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) and Liquidified, National 
Gas (LNG). 
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Besides QCC activities, other Japanese practices were 
vigorously introduced (based on the number and contents 
seminars/workshops reported) to the Malaysian public 
sector immediately after "Look East" policy was announced. 
These. includedý a different work ethic and stricter 
discipline at work. The "Japanisation" process begins with 
the call to every Malaysian worker to be loyal to his 
organisation. In line with this, the use of name tags with 
the logo of the organisation, has become mandatory in all 
government agencies. It is believed that by wearing a name 
tag, an individual has a sense of , belonging to his 
organisation. -It is also' one way to make workers know the 
names of those in the- same organisation and hence creates 
a more family-type atmosphere** 
During the same period, the punch card system was also 
introduced by the Prime Minister, Dr. - Mahathir. He was 
very critical of the lack of punctuality shown by 
Malaysian workers when reporting for work. It may be of 
interest to point at this juncture that it has been the 
style of Malaysian workers to report for work late and 
head for home earlier than specified time allowed. This 
"disease" is not confined to ordinary workers but also to 
those holding management positions. For example, there 
have been cases of a number of department heads who came 
to their offices as late as one hour because they have to 
send their wives to the market or dispatch their children 
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to schools first. Punch card system is implemented to 
check such abuse whereby all Malaysian workers (including 
the Prime Minister) has to clock in before 8.00 AM and and 
clock out after 4.15 PM during each working day. This may 
not be exclusively Japanese, of course,, but nevertheless, 
there is clearly an attempt here to try to achieve the 
level of punctuality that are witnessed in Japanese 
organisations. 
The "open door" policy was also introduced in government 
departments and public enterprises across the country. 
This is based on the Japanese open office system. The 
purpose of this concept is to increase accessibility 
between., managers 'and subordinates regardless of their 
status. It is hoped that the communication barrier between 
them will be broken down too. It is further suggested 
that by working in an open, space, workersý can be monitored 
effectively by their immediate superiors. Conversely, the 
workers also can observeý the movements of their, superiors, 
although this not the most, important reason why it was 
introduced. 
Because of the intensive government campaigns following 
the launching of the "Look East" policy, it was reported 
that by the end of 1982, in-house unions made up of 47% of 
all trade unions in Malaysia. There were about 133 in- 
house unions in'the public sector and this constituted 75% 
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of the total, in-house unions. (Labour-and Manpower Report, 
1982). 
It is widely believed that Japan's industrial success has 
been attributed, to some extent, by government support and 
guidance as -epitomised in the phrase, "Japan 
Incorporated" (i. e. cooperation between' business- and 
government). This led the Malaysian government to follow 
suit by establishing a Malaysia Incorporated". It is 
specifically modelled on its Japanese equivalent and 
stresses the need for cooperation between the Malaysian 
business community and the Ministry- of Industrial 
Development-Authority (MIDA). On the trading and marketing 
front,,, Malaysia also established her own sogo shoshas. 
A number of problems have been identified in the 
"Japanisation" process. A substantial number of Malaysians 
are, said, to . oppose the. introduction of 
Japanese management 
system into their organisations because it upsets the 
existing system. There are some who find Japanese 
management practices culturally unsuitable. There are yet 
others who feel Japanese-style management does more harm 
than good. The transferability problems will be discussed 
in detail in chapter 8 when the analysis of the survey's 
findings is examined. At this stage, it can be said that 
despite the problems faced, transferability of Japanese- 
style management to Malaysia has taken place through the 
-388- 
Japanese companies operating in the country and , 
through 
the initiatives of the Malaysian government via the "Look 
East" policy in the Malaysian public sector. 
In summary, it is clear that Japanese-style management has 
succeeded in establishing itself in a number of foreign 
countries. But this success is limited to a number of 
selected practices only. Whether it is the US and UK of 
the West or in South Koreag Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore in the East, the transferability of Japanese- 
style management practices from Japan to foreign countries 
encounters many problems. Cultural, historicalt political 
and economic factors are among the cause of these 
problems. Surprisingly, however, similarities in culture 
between some countries with that of Japan do not 
guarantee automatic acceptance of Japanese-style 
management in these countries as has been observed in 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. 
FII. A IR'r 'rWC> 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
7.1. Objectives of the Chapter. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present the 
approach used and the rationale for employing it in this 
study., This involves a brief discussion of research 
objectives; survey instruments for collecting data; 
sampling techniques; and other related matters in a normal 
research survey, ý exercise. With such a discussiont it is 
hoped that the reader will be able to, 'follow the coming 
discussion in the next chapter on the findings and 
analysis of the ýresearch survey, regarding Japanese-style 
management and the issues transferability to Malaysian 
public enterprises. 
7.2. General Approach in the Study-i 
A methodology must be developed to present a meaningful 
and credible xesearch study. A research methodology is 
defined-as the application of scientific procedures 
towards acquiring answers to a wide variety of research 
questions (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985: p. 16). It applies 
a systematic approach, - to problem. solving and, - data 
collection to ensure that one has useful data that the 
results be understood by others and that the procedures 
can be carried out by someone else at a later time. .- 
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In as far as the research methodology is concerned, the 
general approach used in this study will be that of a 
descriptive research study. The descriptive method is 
chosen because it is considered ideal for this particular 
study for two reasons. - 
Firstly, the main purpose of the study relates closely to 
the basic purpose of a descriptive research. Isaac and 
Michael (1974) stated that the basic purpose of a 
descriptive research is'to identify conditions and factors 
related to a particular phenomenon. They further explained 
that descriptive research is the accumulation of a data 
base that is solely descriptive and it does not 
necessarily seek or explain "relationshipsp test 
hypothesis, make predictions, or, get at the meanings and 
implication, although research aimed-at these purposes may 
incorporate descriptive methods. The above statement 
regarding descriptive research is in line with the major 
research objective of this, study, i. e. to describe 
elements of, the Japanese-style management and then to 
ascertain if they can be transplanted into the public 
enterprises in Malaysia. 
Secondly, the descriptive research approach is preferred 
because the' study of Japanese-style management and the 
issues of its transferability to Malaysia is a new area 
that 'has not seriously" been attempted in Malaysia. 
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According to Berger and Patchner (1988), descriptive 
research is often used when we have, no theory to work 
from, or when we are beginning to explore a new area that 
has not been researched before. The- purpose -of the 
research, they argued, may be simply to describe ýa 
phenomenon so that we will be better able to study it in 
the future and perhaps others can benefit later' in 
creating theories and hypothesis for future, research. This 
is also what the author has hoped to achieve in 
undertaking this study. 
The data used in this study is collected from both primary 
and secondary sources. As has, been observed in the 
previous chapters, the concepts of Japanese-style 
management, their strengths and weaknesses are discussed 
by mostly taking references, from the vast pool of 
current literature on Japanese management. The coverage on 
transferability of Japanese-style management to a number 
of countries is briefly highlighted by drawing on the 
experiences of some of those countries who have 
experimented with Japanese-style managementt the materials 
of which are also mainly collected from secondary sources 
of journals, newspapers and management textbooks. In 
addition, the discussion on public enterprises with 
special emphasis on the Malaysian enterprises and their 
common problems is based solely on secondary sources, and 
it attempts to provide a supplementary background-to the 
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study proper. However, the study proper regarding the 
feasibility of transferring management practices used by 
the Japanese firms in Japan to the public enterprises in 
Malaysia, which to the knowledge of the author has never 
been carried out before, is carried out mainly by 
conducting an actual research survey in Malaysia to obtain 
the necessary first-hand primary data. Relevant secondary 
data, when available, is also used as a supplementary 
source of information in making an analysis. 
7.3. Research Objectives. 
The main objectives of the research survey carried out in 
this study is to find out possible answers- to the 
following questions: 
(a). Are Japanese-style management practices transferable 
to the Malaysian public enterprises? If so, what 
evidences are there to indicate that such practices are in 
existence following the government's "Look East" policy to 
emulate, the Japanese 
(b). What is the extent of adoption of Japanese management 
practices in Malaysia as a whole and Malaysian public 
enterprises, in particular? I 
(c). What are the present and future problems of and 
resistance against, if any, Japanese-style management 
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(c). What are the present and future problems of and 
resistance against, if any, Japanese-style management 
which are experienced in the Malaysian public enterprises 
since'the implementation of "Look East" policy? 
(d). Can the Japanese management, techniques that are 
imported from Japan be readily transplanted in their 
pure form? If the practices are not transferable in pure 
form., what are the necessary adaptations or modifications 
which have to be made in order to- fit these management 
practices into the public enterprises in Malaysia? 
(e). What are the various -strategies which can contribute 
to the implementation of Japanese-style management, in the 
Malaysian public enterprises? -, 
7.4. Research Instruments. 
There are- a number of research tools that can be employed 
in carrying out a descriptive research. Three available 
methods are observations, experiments and surveys. The 
observation method -is considered not suitable for this 
study because of the relatively limited time in which the 
author has to complete the study. Furthermoreq, the study 
does not attempt to observe human behaviour or attitudes, 
for which observation method would be the best method of 
collecting dataý 
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The experiment method is also ruled out because being a 
descriptive research study, there is nothing to experiment 
about - throughout this study. The author also does not 
intend to experiment with the variables of the subject 
matter in the study, because being an exploratory study, 
it is considered best -to leave such methodology so as not 
to complicate the basic issues. ý 
This leaves the - author ' with the choice of the survey 
method of' doing research. Initially, i. e. before carrying 
out pilot-testing., the author planned to use either 
personal interview or mail questionnaires. Telephone 
interview was not , considered because - of -the problem of 
lack of phone facilities in, ýMalaysia. The rationale for 
using mail questionnaire, and personal interview surveys as 
research instruments on the other hand, was taken after 
seriously taking account of the, -strengths and-defects of 
research-surveys. 
A mail questionnaire survey is, a quick method of 
conducting a survey. It certainly takes little time to 
send'out questionnaires, and the bulk of the returns will 
probably be received within two weeks (Sellitz; Johoda; 
Deutsch; and Cook, 1959). 
It is more economical to' conduct and it provides- larger 
samples for lower total costs. It. is less--time-consuming 
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and does not involve travelling. With no interviewer 
presento there is no likelihood of interviewer 'error or 
bias effect. It is said that- the respondent is free from 
any pressure of being observed (Bailey, 1978: p. 135). 
However Bailey (1978: p. 136) did also point out that the 
danger with mail questionnaires is that items'-are often 
omitted and replies to open questions are vague or 
illegible. Few people have the necessary patience or 
degree of motivation to write as fully as they would 
speak, especially if the questionnaire is a ýIengthy one., 
Another serious drawback of a mail questionnaire survey is 
that the answers have to be accepted as final, unless 
rechecking or collection of questionnaires can be 
afforded. There is no opportunity to probe beyond the 
given answer, to clarify an ambiguous one, "to overcome 
unwillingness to answer. a particular question or appraise 
the validity of what ýa respondent said in light of -the 
hour he said it (Sellitz et al, 1959). It has been 
cautioned that a questionnaire method should be used 
after the questions have been constructed sufficiently 
simple and straight-forward to be, understood with the help 
of the printed instructions and definitions. 
There is also the problem, of a low -, response rate 
associated with mail questionnaire. It has been found that 
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mail questionnaires seldom achieve a response 'rate 
greater than 50% unless the subject matter is of direct 
interest to the recipients or their level of education is 
higher than average (Gardner, 1978: p. 98), 
The personal interview is a -much. more flexible instrument 
than a questionnaire. Here - the interviewer has the 
opportunity to explain to the respondents any ambiguities 
that might emerge. He may also be able to explore in depth 
any given area of the study. More importantly,, he may-come 
out of the interview, with important ideas, that might lead 
to corrective changes in many of the propositions involved 
in the study (Philips, 1966: p. 107-110). I 
However, Bradburns and Sudman (1974: p. 66) mentioned that 
personal interview is potentially more open to bias than 
other forms of impersonal data collection such as mail 
questionnaire. They, were of opinion that interviewees tend 
to give favourable answers that they believe ý interviewer 
wants to hear. Mouly also shared this opinion by making 
the following comment; 
"Usually the the respondent will orient his answer towards 
the sociable and courteous rather than simply towards the 
truth -- 'especially if - the investigator is ý a' pleasant 
person. If on the other hand, the interviewer is curt, the 
respondent is likely to evade questions or even 'to 
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disagree just to register his annoyance". (Mouly, 
1970: p. 266) I 
Lastly, personal interview may be hard to conduct when 
people are reluctant to participate. Some individuals are 
frightened or not at ease of being interviewed, perhaps 
for fear of personal questions being asked. There is a 
number of people who simply refuse to grant an'interview 
for reasons best known to themselves but *prefer other 
methodsý of providing information. There are yet others 
who do not mind giving an interview but are, too busy to 
entertain a researcher. Unless a properly -planned and 
scheduled appointment - is arranged well in advance, the 
personal interview method of conducting a survey -will run 
into difficulties. k 
Eventually, in the actual survey, the author chose to use 
only mail questionnaire in collecting the data. -The 
experiences -obtained from ýthe pilot-testing indicated 
that there are many problems -associated with personal 
interviews in Malaysia, among the most important being 
reluctance of respondents to- participate. - time 
constraintsqý extensive , travelling and therefore, - high 
expenses at reaching the selecte&respondents. Being given 
a limited time (i. e. study leave) to complete the research 
study by the sponsor, the author, could not afford to take 
such risks associated with an interview method. The 
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decision to use mail questionnaire over personal interview 
has been') to a great extent, influenced by several studies 
(Knudsen et al, 1967; Montero, 1974; see also Selltiz et 
al, 1959) which have shown that mailed survey is superior 
to the interview for gathering data information on 
sensitive or socially undesirable subjects. 
The questionnaire design used in this research study is a 
closed ended one. Except for the first two questions, each 
questionnaire provides a multiple choice type of responses 
to every question asked. This approach As adopted to 
ensure- ýconsistency and to avoid a variety An answers so 
that analysis and interpretation of the answers given by 
respondents can be easily arrived at. It is feared that a 
wide variety of answers may complicate the the objectives 
of the study. 
There are some shortcomings to be found in this type of 
questionnaire because it obviously restricts respondents' 
freedom of answering, questions exactly the way they feel. 
The answers provided in the questionnaire may not 
necessarily be the exact answers or the exact shade of 
their meaning'e (White, 1982: p. 115; see also Rossi et al, 
1983). To minimiseýthis problem, when and where deemed 
necessary, in, some questions, requests for respondent's 
additional own, answers and comments are always encouraged. 
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The questionnaire developed for the study ý has a total of 
63 questions , comprising of -ý three , sections namely (i) 
respondent's profile, (ii) respondent's organisation, and 
(iii) Japanese-style Management. The details of the 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
7.5. Sampling-Process. 
7.5.1. Sampling Techniques 
There are two main types of sampling normally used in a 
research, survey namely (a). the probability sampling and 
(b). the nonprobability sampling. There are four subtypes 
of probability sampling namely; (i). 'simple random 
sampling, (ii). stratified - random sampling, (iii) 
systematic sampling, and (iv). -- 'cluster sampling. 
Nonprobability sampling - can be , divided- into (i). 
accidental sampling, - (ii). quota sampling, and (iii). 
purposive sampling. 
Lin (1976) in his book, -Foundations of Social Research, 
gave a very, good description of - the different types -of 
sampling Here is the summary of his description: , 
(a). Probability sampling 
(i). Simple random sampling -a sampling method where each 
element- in the population has an - equal chance of - being 
selected in the sample. 
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(ii). Stratified sampling -a sampling process where the 
population is divided into subgroups or . strata by 
population characteristics such as raceq Ancome and sex. 
Then a simple random is drawn for each of subgroup or 
stratum. If the number of elements sampled in each 
subgroup As- proportional to its- representation in the 
population, it is called proportional stratified sampling. 
The stratified sampling where elements selected do not 
reflect the proportions in the population is called 
nonproportional stratified sampling. 
(iii). Systematic sampling -a sampling method whereby an 
element. in a sample is picked systematically. For example, 
if a researcher picks 10 out of a row of 100 houses in a 
particular area during his survey exercise, and that when 
he chooses every 10th of the 100-houses for his sample, he 
is doing a systematic sampling, 
(iv). Cluster sampling ,- It is a method of sampling 
similar to stratified sampling, the only difference-being 
that the population 'is broken down' into clusters (groups) 
according to some specific criteria very often 
geographic in nature. 
(b). Non-probability sampling - as the name 'implies-, it 
does not use random samples and is-normally not a reliable 
form of sampling process. 
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(i). Accidental sampling - In this, method, elements 
(respondents) for the sample 'are taken as they become 
available or they are included as they happen to be 
around. ' 
(ii). Quota sampling -a sampling method in which quota is 
assigned for certain elements - that , has relevant 
characteristics to be included in a sample. 
(iii). Purposive sampling -a procedure of sampling which 
is, similar to quota sampling,, but it does not used 
specificý predetermined quotas. Infactt - subjects are 
handpicked by researchers in order, to serve the purpose of 
a particular study. (Lin, 1976: p. 145-162). 
The sampling method used in this - research 'survey is that 
of'random sampling. As has been mentioned, random sampling 
is a procedure for drawing a, sample from a population so 
that every element in, the population has an equal chance 
of being selected for the -sample. This method is 
considered most appropriate by the author because by 
introducing the randomness into the selection of elements 
for the sample, we minimise our biases and -other 
systematic factors. that may make, the sample differenvfrom 
the population from which it was drawn. Although random 
samples tend to- be representative, and although random 
sampling is usually the best way, to get a representative 
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sample, there is no guarantee that random sampling will 
produce a representative sample (Berger and Patchner, 
1988). This being the case, effort have been made to 
ensure that the sample is as representative as possible. 
7.5.2. Sampling units and sample size 
Two separate samples are used in the research survey. The 
first sample consists of 150 senior managers from 150 
public enterprises randomly selected from the list of 170 
public enterprises obtained from the Ministry of Public 
Enterprises. The author managed to , get back , 104 
questionnaires for this sample. -These senior managers 
represent the top management -group - of their, re-spective 
organisations and because they 'would play a very 
significant role -in -the government's call in adopting 
Japanese-style management in their organisations, their 
opinions are considered to- be very important. -, The 
majority. ofýthose senior managers in the sample are chief 
executives with the rank, or designation of director or 
manager, but, in cases where they are not availables the 
immediate subordinates (i. e. deputy manager or the person 
most senior in line of management hierarchyg stand in 
their'place to represent their organisations. To ensure a 
valid sample*, the author ran a double check on 
respondents - who filled the questionnaires on behalf 'of 
their bosses and "those found to be below the senior 
management ranks were subsequently excluded from the 
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sample. In this particular respect, five of the completed 
questionnaires were rejected- becauseý respondents were 
found to be of middle-level managers and hence failed to 
meetý the 'senior ' manager' criterion. However, ' the 
organisations concerned when told of'this, had all kindly 
cooperated in answering fresh questionnaires ýagain 
through their"senior managers. 
The second group' of sample units is supposed 'to comprise 
of-150 public enterprise, employees who have been to Japan 
for on-the-job training and industrial, --, attachment; 
attending short courses and seminars; 'and undergoing 
technical apprenticeship and management', studies at 
technical schools, colleges and universities. -The 
respondents who returned their questionnaires for this 
sample totalled 112. This group comes from different ranks 
consisting of blue-collar workers, clerical and technical 
staff, engineers, managers etc. The main criterion'used in 
the sample'to determine the eligibility of each respondent 
is that he or she must has some exposure or undergone 
some sort training in Japanese-style management in Japan. 
The respondents of this sample* have been randomly 
selected from the list of some 2,000 Malaysians provided 
by the Division of-- 'Look East' Policy Programme of the 
Malaysian Public Services Commission which sent them for 
some training to Japan since 1982. 
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The group of respondents included in the second sample is 
considered to form an important sample in providing 
opinions on issues of Japanese-style management and its 
transferability to Malaysian public enterprises. This is 
because they represent Malaysian employees who had the 
actual practical exposure as - to knowý what the Japanese- 
style management is all about. The authorýreckons that if 
the views of the top management group alone were -to be 
considered in this study, there may be, a serious bias 
since not all of those in this managerial group have 
exposure-. or practical training , in Japanese-style 
management. In fact, as the survey revealed later, about 
53.4% of the senior managers have never been to Japan 
themselves. All they know about Japanese-style management 
have been either through self-reading or from attending 
seminars and lectures which were conducted mostly fellow 
Malaysians in Malaysia. This contrasts strongly with the 
sample unit of the second group which consists of 
respondents -who have been trained in Japan and who are 
theoretically'- familiar with Japanese culture and are even 
able to converse and write -in Japanese language. In 
addition to this, if the sample isý confined to one 
particular group only, there -may be element of bias in 
attitudes or opinions. 
By using two sample units of different respondentsq the 
author hopes - to blend -their views and opinions and ýuse 
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them as the basis for the concluding, remarks of 'this 
thesis. 
7.6. Pilot Testing. 
In order to -test the validity of the questionnaires used 
in the' survey, they were pretested. The pilotrtesting is 
vital before an actual research is launched because, it' 
provides guidance on' the , following (Moser and - Kalton, 
1971: p. '48-49): 
a. the 'adequacy of the sampling frame from which it is 
proposed to select the sample; 
b. the'variability within the population to be surveyed 
to*determine an efficient sample design as the decision on 
sample size requires ý some knowledge of the variability of 
the population; 
c. the non-response rate to-ý be expected so that the 
probable ýnumbers of refusals and non-contacts can be 
roughly estimated; 
d. the suitability of the - methods to collect data with 
their costs, accuracy and response rates; and- 
e. the adequacy of the questionnaire in terms of the ease 
of handling them in the field, the efficiency of of its 
layout, the clarity of its definitions, wordings etc. 
The mail questionnaires were sent to 40 public enterprises 
in Malaysia to be filled, ýby their senior managers sometime 
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in November, 1988. Only 15 senior' managers responded. In 
addition, the same questionnaires were extended, to 57 
government officers who attended a one-day workshop an 
management conducted by the author for Chief Minister's 
Office 'at Sarawak Training Centre in early January, 1989. 
The author took the opportunity to, request the workshop 
participants to fill the questionnaire's since about half 
of them came from public enterprises. For the purpose of 
pilot-testing process, only the feedbacks of 25 
respondents who came from public enterprises , were 
analysed., 
The same'questionnaires were-pilot-tested, this time using 
the personnel interview method. A total of 25 respondents 
were invited for such exercise but only five of them 
agreed to participate. The mock interviews were carried 
out in the second week of January, 1989 with 3 senior 
managers and 6 employees of public enterprises. 
From the pilot-testing processesg a number of minor 
problems were found. Two questions which were discovered 
to be too sensitive to respondents were deleted. Some 
questions which are either difficult or ambiguous to 
respondents were rephrased. Some important questions were 
added. The total number of questions was increased from 59 
to 63. Another problem identified was that the response 
rate from the senior managers by mail questionnaire survey 
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was not that encouraging and of those who responded, the 
majority returned the questionnaires after two reminders. 
Regarding -the interview method, most managers, refused to 
be interviewed giving an excuse that they were then very 
busy. It was also realised that employees were equally 
not keen to be interviewed. The majority of them insisted 
that prior permission was to be obtained from their 
immediate superiors -before they can 'give an interview. On 
the whole, it can be said that it is very difficult - to 
elicit the cooperation from a large sample, of respondents 
in a relatively short period of time., It is due to this 
consideration that finally led the -author to decide on 
between 200-300 respondents only and that the survey is to 
use mail questionnaire. 
In summary, to a large extent, the choice of research 
methodology selected for this particular study has been 
taken for the appropriateness ýof the approach and ease it 
has provided the author in achieving the objectives of the 
study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
TRANSFERABILITY OF JAPANESE-STYLE MANAGEMENT, 
TO THE MALAYSIAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY 
8.1. Objective of the Chapter. 
This, chapter attempts to discuss the findings and 
subsequently the , analysis of the survey on the 
transferability of Japanese-style management to ý the 
Malaysian public enterprises as viewed by their senior 
managers and ordinary employees. In the analysis section, 
some 'possible explanations regarding the -findings will be 
made. 
8.2. Introduction 
This chapter is considered, the most important part -of the 
study, as -it contains some significant findings regarding 
the issues of transferability of Japanese-style management 
to the Malaysian public enterprises, the subject matter of 
which the study intends to explore. The survey has been 
framed to explore the feasibility of transferring 
Japanese-style management, to Malaysian public enterprise 
sector by, examining the opinions of senior managers and 
ordinary employees of the public enterprises. 
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The findings are based on the feedback of 216 respondents 
who are divided into sample A and sample B during the 
survey exercise. Sample A consists-of respondents who are 
the chief executives or in their absence, the next most 
senior managers of the respective public enterprises. The 
most important characteristic which- forms the criterion 
used to qualify the respondents to be included in this 
sample is that they must represent the top management and 
are decision-makers of the public, enterprises; i. e. they 
are the managers. For the purpose, of this study, they are 
called the senior managers, 
As has been explained in the chapter on Research 
Methodology, for sample A, a total of 150 questionnaires 
were sent to the 150' chief 'executives of public 
enterprises, but only 104 of those questionnaires were 
completed and returned. The sampling frame in which these 
respondents were chosen is considered the most suitable to 
obtain the sample unit because most of the major public 
enterprises are under the Ministry of Public Enterprises 
and, therefore the inclusion of their senior managers in 
the sample will provide a strong valid representation of 
opinion as far as the study is concerned. The response 
rate'of sample A's respondents is about 69%. From a survey 
point of view, this could be considered a high response 
rate especially when one takes into account that these 
respondents are high-level executives who are ' very busy 
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with their responsibilities in running their respective 
organisations. Most social researchers feel that, for a 
survey -of the general public, a response 'rate of 50% or 
higher in a questionnaire survey is ad6quate; 60% or 
higher is good; and more than 70% is very good (Lin, 
1976: p. 241). The representation of public enterprises 'is 
quite - well-balanced in that no single category of 
enterprises can -be said to dominate the sample. The 
breakdown of public enterprises as represented by their 
senior managers is in Table 8A as below: 
Table 8A: Breakdown of Senior Managers According 
-To Public Enterprises They Represent 
Category-of Enterprises - No. of Respondents 
Agricultural Development 13 
Land Development 12 
Urban Development and SEDCs - 10 
Commercial & Manufacturing 19 
Banking & Financial Institution 11 
Welfare and Social, Services 12 
Transportation 12 
Research & Educ. Institution 15 
Total 104 
Percentage 
12.5% 
11.5% 
9.6% 
18.3% 
10.6% 
11.5% 
11.5% 
14.4% 
100.0% 
For Sample B, a total of 150 questionnaires were handed 
out to a group of randomly selected employees of public 
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enterprises. As also mentioned in the Research Methodology 
chapter earlier, not all of intended respondents handed 
back their questionnaires and as a result, sample B of 
the research survey comprises of only 112 respondents. - 
These respondents can be classified as a stratified 
sampling group --in that they are selected from public 
enterprises' employees who had undergone some sort of 
training in some aspects of Japanese-style management 
under the "Look East" policy. The main characteristic used 
to qualify a respondent to be eligible in this sample is 
that he or - she must be a public enterprise employee, 
regardless of rank, who had been sent to Japan for some 
sort of ýtraining in--Japanese-style management, in Japan. 
This being the case, the respondents from this sample 
therefore come- from ý both -management and - non-management 
ranks, ranging from a' personnel manager to a technician. 
For the purpose of this study however, they are called the 
employees of public enterprises. The breakdown of the 
employees according to the level of their position is as 
follows: 
Table 8B: Breakdown of Employees 
According To Management GrOup 
Mgt. Group 
SeniorýManagement 
Middle Management 
Line Management 
Respondents 
19 
58 
20 
Percentage 
17.0% 
51.8% 
17.9% 
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Non-Management 
Total 
15 13.4% 
112 100.0% 
The names of those who had been picked up for the sample B 
were taken from the "Look East" Policyý Division of 
Malaysian Public Services Department. The sample frame 
which drew respondents from the "Look East" Policy 
Division is considered the most appropriate because 
almost all government public service personnel who had 
been sent to Japan for a training stintý were either 
sponsored or endorsed by this department. The response 
rate of respondents from sample B is 74.7% and based on 
Lin's response rate criterion (1976: p. 241), this is indeed 
considered, aý very good rate. Howeverp unlike that of 
sample Aý--the representation of public enterprises is not 
well-distributed in the sense that most of the respondents 
from sample B tend to come from the commercial and 
manufacturing enterprises. It is also necessary to mention 
here that a number of respondents are found to have come 
from the same organisations. This can be explained by the 
practice of the government that usually sends employees in 
groups from the same manufacturing enterprises to train 
together in Japan. Hence some employees randomly selected 
for this sample happened to come from . the same 
organisation. ý In this particular survey the number of 
respondents from the manufacturing public enterprises 
seemed to outnumber respondents from other organisations 
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by a ratio of 4 to 1. The reason for this, lies in the 
fact that most of those who-had been sent to Japan by the 
government through the "Look East" policy have been 
selected purposely from the manufacturing sector which is 
in line with the country's desire towards 
industrialisation. The overall breakdown of respondents of 
sample B is as in Table 8C below: 
Table 8C: Breakdown of Employees According 
To Public Enterprises They Represent ,I 
Category of Enterprises 
Agricultural Development 
Land Development- -, 
Urban Development and SEDCs 
No. of Employees 
Commercial and Manufacturing 
Banking and Financial 
Welfare and Social Services 
Transportation , 
Research and Education 
Total 
9 
7 
9 
50 
12 
3 
14 
8 
112 
Percentage 
8.0% 
6.3% 
8.0% 
44.6% 
10.7%, 
2.7% 
12.5% 
7.2% 
100.0% 
8.3. Respondents' Profile. 
8.3.1. Racial and Religious Background 
The racial composition of the respondents that represents 
sample A (senior managers) comprises of Bumiputras: 83.7%; 
Chinese: 12.5%; Indians: 1.9% and others: 1.9% respectively. 
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The reason explaining the dominance of Bumiputras in the 
top management group of Malaysian public sector is due to 
the government policy through the NEP which gives 
preference to this racial group in the recruitment of 
personnel' at management- level. The breakdown of the 
respondents' religion is as follows: those who practise 
Islam constitute 72.1%; Christianity 15.4%; Buddhism 7.7%; 
Hinduism 1.9% and other religions 2.9%. The fact that the 
majority of the Bumiputras comprises of Malays explains 
why the percentage of those who practise Islam as their 
religion is very high. In Malaysia, all Malays are Muslims 
by birth. The official religion in the country is Islam. 
In sample B (ordinary employees), the Bumiputras also 
dominate the group comprising 81.2%. The, Chinese and 
Indians comprise of 13.4% and 5.4% respectively., The 
breakdown of employees according to religion is - as 
follows: - Islam - 72.3%; Christianity - 17%; Buddhism - 
7.1%; and Hinduism -3%. The Bumiputras is the majority 
group and this is explained by the fact that more than 80% 
of the total public sector employees in Malaysia are 
Bumiputras. 
8.3.2. -Age Background 
The senior managers are relatively young with about 83.7% 
of them below 45 years old and that 45.2% are in fact in 
the age bracket of 36 to 45 years. As, for the -employees 
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who are representing the sample B, it is also revealed 
that they are also relatively young with about 93.8% under 
45 years old. It is also found out that about 55.4% of the 
employees are from the age group of 25 to 35 years and 
another 33.9% are from the 36 to 45 years category. It can 
be said that on the whole, the respondents -participating 
in this survey representing the two-different samples have 
one consistent feature, namely that, they are-young. 
The actual picture of the respondents' age from sample A 
and sample B is depicted Table 8D below: 
Table 8D: Breakdown of Respondentsby Age Group 
Age Group 
Below 25 
25 - 35 
36 - 45 
46 - 55 
of, Respondents from: 
Sample A Sample B 
1.9% 4.5% 
36.5% 55.4% 
45.2% 33.9% 
16.3% 6.3% 
8.3.3. Educational Background 
The majority of Malaysian senior: - managers as represented 
in sample A -are highly educated with 96.2% having 
attended universities and colleges. About 63.5% of the 
respondents have Bachelors degrees; 18%' have Masters 
degree; and another 5.8% have doctoral degrees. As for the 
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Malaysian public enterprises' employees who represented 
sample B, it is found out that they are also quite highly 
educated-with about 44% having obtained Bachelor degrees 
and 9.2% having Masters degree. " The percentage of those 
having Diplomas is, 31.2% as compared to, -8.7% in sample A, 
while those who have High School Certificates only in the 
employees' group, (sample B) consist of 16.1% as compared 
to 3.8% from the senior managers' group (sample A). The 
places of study during' tertiary education for senior 
managers are as follows: 50% had studied at local 
institutions; 27% had been - educated in'- overseas 
institutions; and 23% had studied at universities and 
collegesý locally an& then overseas, or vice-versa. As for 
the ordinary employees, 69.6% of them had their tertiary 
education locally; . 18.8% at -institutions overseas and 
the 
remaining 11.6% were educated both at local and overseas 
institutions of learning. In terms of educational levels, 
the senior managers are better, educated and have more 
overseas exposure than their employee counterparts. 
8.3.4. Japanese Language Proficiency 
Of the total senior managers who participated in the 
survey,, only 6.7% can speak'Japanese language'and-only 2% 
can read, and write in Japanese. On the other hand,, * from 
the employees I group, 41.9% - said they can communicate in 
Japanese language and 20.5% claimed they are able to read 
and write in Japanese language. The 'fact that more 
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respondents from sample B than those- in sample A can 
speak as well as read and write in Japanese, language is 
because all the employees participating in the survey have 
been to Japan, ýundergoing training and that they must 
undergo a Japanese language course before their departure 
to Japan. Another reason for' the employees' higher 
proficiency level in the language as compared to the 
senior managers is - due to the employees' training 
requirement (especially the training involving more than a 
year) whereby they must master oral and written Japanese 
language in order to communicate with the Japanese 
trainers. Upon the completion of their training period, 
they- naturally become quite well-versed in the Japanese 
language, orally or otherwise. As for the senior managers, 
not all of -them have gone for training, to Japan for it 
was revealed-later that a number, of them had been to Japan 
not for training stints but for either pleasure trips or 
on official missions representing organisations which have 
business dealings with'the Japanese. " 
8.3.5. Visits to Japan 
Accordingly, only 48 of the senior managers or 46.6% of 
them have been to Japan, ý but not necessarily for training 
purposes. On the length of their stay in Japan, 55.1% of 
them said they were in Japan for less than a week; 40.8% 
stayed for 1 to 8 weeks; 2% stayed for 9 to 16 weeks and 
another 2% stayed for a period, of more than 25 weeks. It 
-418- 
was further revealed that of those who , said they have 
been -to Japan, 67% have been there because they were 
either on training, - attachment, seminar and undergoing 
tertiary studies and 33% went there because of business 
trips . (i. e. to represent ý their organisations in trade 
mission or negotiations). About 23% of the same group of 
senior managers had gone to Japan for holidays which range 
from one day to one week. 
As for the employees, it-was earlier mentioned that all of 
them have "been to, Japan for some sort of training in 
Japanese-style management. Some of them, in addition to 
the visits made to Japan because of their training, have 
also been to Japan 'as holiday-makers and there are others 
who had 'gone -there ýattending conferences and seminars. On 
length of stay in Japan, -it was ýrevealed that 46.4% have 
stayed in Japan for ý less than a week; 28.6% for , one to 
eight weeks; 8.9% for nine , to sixteen weeks; 7.1% for 
seventeen to twenty five weeks;, and the remaining 8.9% for 
more-than 25% weeks. 
8.4. Opinion on the "Look East" Policy 
All the senior managers in the survey know something about 
the - "Look East" policy and the rationale behind ý it being 
implemented by the government. When asked if the "Look 
East" policy is a good policy, 72% said it was a good one; 
9Z said it was not a good policy; and 18% were not sure if 
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it was good or otherwise. -Privatelys however, a number of 
the senior managers said that with new problems constantly 
cropping up as a result of implementing the policy, they 
had second thoughts about it and - some in fact expressed 
that their enthusiasm for such a policy had somewhat 
dwindled. 
All public enterprises' employees in the survey also 
claimed , they knew' what "Look East" policy was about and 
what it stood for. The response regarding the policy was 
that- 76.8%, considered it is good; 4.5% thought it is not I 
good and 18.8% exprýessed the "don't know" answer. 
8.5. Familiarity-with Japanese-style Management. 
Of the various practices of Japanese management, the most 
familiar to the senior managers, are company loyalty, open 
office, group responsibility, job-rotation, QCC and 
lifetimeý employment while the . least 
familiar are JIT, 
kanban, and ringi respectively. Like their senior 
managers, the employees are most familiar with QCC, 
lifetime employment,, , 'open office system, group 
responsibility, company loyalty and job-rotation, while 
those aspects that are not 'so familiar, to them are JIT, 
kanban, 'and ringi. The detailed responses regarding the 
familiarity, of respondents from sample A and IB with 
selected aspects of Japanese-style, management are recorded 
in Table 8E (refer to next page). 
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Table 8E: Familiarity of Respondent To 
Selected Japanese Management Features 
Japanese Mgt. Features 
Quality Control Circle 
Sub-contracting 
Seniority-Wage,, System 
Lifetime Employment 
Enterprise-wide Union 
Paternal Leadership 
Job Rotationý 
Ringi 
Just-in-Time System 
Kanban, 
Less Dependence on Manual 
Open Office 
Group responsibility 
Company Loyalty 
of Respondents Being Familiar 
Sample A sample B 
83.0% 96.4% 
57.1% 59.4% 
75.0% 66.7% 
83.0% 82.4% 
72.7% 70.3% 
76.0% 69.0% 
83.7% 79.4% 
27.1% 26.8% 
45.4% 55.3% 
26.0% 31.4% 
49.0% 60.0% 
95.0% 91.6% 
91.9% 93.5%- 
96.0% 96.2% 
8.6. Sources of Learning the Japanese-style Management 
Regarding the Japanese- management practices the top 
management group claimed they know, most of, them said 
they had learned them either from the workshops or 
seminars which they had attended either in Japan or in 
Malaysia or from reading Japanese-style management 
articles in the journals and books. The actual picture as 
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to how the senior managers come to know about Japanese- 
style management is stated in Table 8F below: 
Table 8F: Source of Learning Japanese-style 
ManaRement of Sample A's Respondents 
Learn From: 
Training/Attachment 
Workshops/Seminars 
Books/Journals 
Working colleagues 
Mentors/Immediate-Superiors 
Others , 
Z of Respondents of Sample A 
23.0% 
46.0% 
80.0% 
6.0% 
-, 3.0% 
14.0% 
In the case of the employees,, all of them- quoted their 
training and attachment in Japanese firms inýJapan as the 
place whereý they learned some aspects of Japanese-style 
management. , In addition, some also said they become 
familiar, with, the Japanese management techniques from -the 
workshops and seminars they had attended; by reading books 
and journals; and lastly by learning from superiors and 
friends at their. workplace,, etc. The actual percentages as 
to where, they learned elements of Japanese-style 
management is shown in Table 8G (refer to next page). 
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Table 8G: Sources of Learning Jap anese-style 
Management of Sample B's Res pOndents 
Learn From: 
Training/Attachment 
Workshop/Seminars 
Books/Journals 
Working Colleagues 
Mentors/Immediate Superiors 
Others - 
Z of Respondents of Sample B 
100.0% 
43.5% 
30.3% 
10.0% 
25.0% 
30.0 
8.7. The Extent of Japanese-style Management Being 
Practised'in-Malaysian Public Enterprises 
The most widely practised' Japanese-style ' management 
according to senior managers and employees alike are QCC, 
job-rotation, open office, group responsibility and 
company loyalty. The Japanese management techniques which 
have not really gained the foothold yet are kanban, ringi, 
less dependence on manual system, sub--ýcontracting, 
lifetime employment and seniority-wage system. The extent 
of actual practising of of Japanese-style management in 
percentage form, according to the two groups of 
respondents is tabulated as in Table 8H (refer to next 
page). 
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Table 8H: The Extent of Japanese-style Management 
Practised in Public Enterprises 
Sample A Sample B 
Is the Following Yes No Yes No 
Being Practised 
Your Organisations? 
QCC 79.7% 20.3% 84.1% 15.9% 
Sub-contracting 10.1% 89.9% 12.2% 87.8% 
Seniority-wage 13.9% 86.1% 9.8% 90.2% 
Lifetime Employment 13.9% 86.1% 11.0% 89.0% 
Company-Union 13.9% 86.1% 17.1% 82.9% 
Paternal Leadership 17.7% 82.3% 15.9% 84.1% 
Job-rotation 55.7% 44.3% 52.4% 47.6% 
Ringi 1.3% 98.7% 2.4% 97.6% 
Just-in-Time 12.7% 87.3% 15.9% 84.1% 
Kanban 2.5% 97.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
Less-Depend-on Manual 15.2% 84.8% 13.4% 86.6% 
Open Office 70.9% 29.1% 69.5% 30.5% 
Group Responsibility 74.7% 25.3% 54.9% 45.1% 
Company"Loyalty 60.8% 39.2% 47.6% 52.4% 
Annual Sports 55.7% 44.3% 37.8% 62.2% 
8.8. Feasibility of Adopting Japanese-style Management 
When the top management group as well as the employees of 
public enterprises were asked as to whether the Japanese- 
style management could be practised or not in their 
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respective- organisations, the following opinions were 
recorded: 
Table 81: Opinion of Respondents ý 
About Japanese Management Practices 
Sample A Sample B 
Can the Following Yes No Yes No 
Being Practised 
Your Organisations? 
Quality Control Circle 74.0% 26.0% 67.9% 32.1% 
Sub-contracting System 7.7% 92.3% 11.6% 88.4% 
Seniority-wage 8.7% 91.3% 16.1% 83.9% 
Lifetime Employment 10.6% 89.4% 15.2% 84.8% 
Company Union 7.7% '92.3% 9.8% 90.2% 
Paternal, Leadership 18'. 3% 81.7%' 12.5% 87.5% 
Job Rotation 46.2% 53.8% 40.2% 59.8% 
Ringi System 3.8% 96.2% 4.5% 95.5% 
Just-in-Time 11.5% 88.5%, 12.5% 87.5% 
Kanban 2.9% 97.1% 3.6% 96.4% 
Less Depend on Manual 13.5% 86.5% 13.4% 86.6% 
Open Office 46.2% 53.8% 45.5% 54.5% 
Group Responsibilities 60.6% 39.4% 50.0% 5000% 
Company Loyalty 56.7% 43.3%' 49.1% 50.9% 
Annual Sports Day, 45.2% 54.8% '38.4% 61.6% 
There seems' to be a very little variation in' opinion 
between the senior managers and the employees when their 
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views were asked as to whether the Japanese-style 
management can be practised or not in their, organisations. 
The views from the two groups on the said issue showed a 
clear consistent pattern in that the Japanese practices 
that are considered practisable by the majority of senior 
managers are ýalso considered practisable by the majority 
of employee's and vice-versa. Specifically, QCC, Job- 
rotation, open office, group responsibilities, company 
loyalty have been chosen among the most common Japanese- 
style management. practices that are considered 
practisable in public enterprises by both the senior 
managers and employees of public enterprises in Malaysia. 
On the other hand, it- was said that ringi, kanban, sub- 
contracting, and enterprise unionism have been considered 
not practisable, according to the -two groups of 
respondents in the survey. 
On the whole, 1; 9% of - the ý senior managersý and, 2.7% of the 
employees* were of opinion that all aspects of Japanese- 
style management can be adopted in Malaysia. However, 
88.3% of the senior managers and 86.6% of the employees in 
the 'survey , believed that only some Japanese-style 
management can be adopted, in their workplaces 
respectively. The reasons given by both groups why not 
all, but, only- some Japanese management practices can be 
adopted in Malaysia are recorded in the-Table 8J (refer to 
next page). 
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ý Table 8J:, Reasons Why Some Japanese Management -, 
Practices Are Not Practisable in, Public Enterprises 
Sample A Sample B 
Difference in Technology Bet. 43.3% 50.0% 
Japan and Malaysia 
Malaysia's Organisations Too 
Strongly Western-structured 44.2% 42.9% 
Management Group Not Yet Ready 31.0% 38.4% 
for Japanese-style Management 
Workers Not Yet Ready forý 22.0% 24.1% 
Japanese-style Management 
Japanese-style Mgt. Conflict 55.8% 43.8% 
with Religious and Cultural Values 
Japanese-style Management Creates 2.9% 4.5% 
New Problems for Malaysian Enterprises 
8.9. -Japanese-style Management Which Are Highly Desired 
The top management group as well as the employees that 
comprise the survey's sample provided some interesting 
feedback as to which practices of the Japanese-style 
management they preferred to imitate. Favourable practices 
which are desired and recommended by the majority of 
respondents, for their organisations are QCC9 Job-rotation, 
open office, company loyalty and group responsibility. The 
Japanese management practices which are very lowly rated 
and subsequently not recommended by both groups are 
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kanban, JITv ringi, lifetime employment, seniority-wage, 
and sub-contracting. Table 8K below shows the detailed 
opinion of senior managers on the said matter : 
Table 8K: The rating of Japanese-style 
Management Practices By Sample A's Respondents 
Recommend Don't'Recomm. No Comment 
QCC, 70.0% 4.8% 25.0% 
Sub-contracting 18.3% 9.6% 72.2% 
Seniority-wage 19.2% 20.2% 60.6% 
Lifetime Employment 24.0% 24.0% 51.9% 
Enterprise Union 26.9% 14.4% 58.7% 
Paternal Leadership 25.0% 13.5% 61.6% 
Job-rotation 57.7% 6.7% 35.6% 
Ringi System 9.6% 1.9% 88.5% 
Just-in-Time System 19.2% 8.7% 73.1% 
Kanban 5.8% 3.8% 90.4% 
Less Depend on Manual 8.8% 8.7% 62.5% 
Open Office . - 
47.1% 13.5% 29.4% 
Group Responsibility 73.1% 5.8% 21.2% 
Company Loyalty 75.0% 3.8% 21.2% 
The responses from the employees on the same matter are 
reproduced in Table 8L below: 
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Table 8L: The Ratin g of Ja panese-style 
Manag ement b y Samp le B's Respondents 
Recommend Don't-Recomm. No Comment 
QCC 77.7% 4.5% 17.8% 
Sub-contracting 18.8% 16.1% 65.2% 
Seniority-wage System 28.6%' 10.7% 60.7% 
Lifetime Employment 26.8% 19.6% 53.6% 
Enterprise Union 28.6% 8.0% 66.4% 
Paternal Leadership 29.5% 9.8% 60.7% 
Job-rotatiori 55.4% 8.9% 35.7% 
Ringi 9.8% 4.5% 85.7% 
Just-in-Time 24.1% 3.6% 72.3% 
Kanban . 8.9% 1.8% 89.3% 
Less Depend on Manual 21.4% 19.6% 59.0% 
Open Office 55.4% 11.6% 33.1% 
Group Responsibility 8.8% 4.5% 26.8% 
Company Loyalty 67.9% 1.8% 31.4% 
8.10. Problems, Associated With the Implementation of 
Japanese-style Management ,I 
Both senior managers and employees in the survey were of 
the opinion that it is not easy to implement Japanese- 
style management in their organisations. The 'survey 
consistently showed the two groups have unanimously agreed 
that there are a- number of problems which are faced in 
transplanting the Japanese-style management. To a question 
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consistently showed. the two groups have unanimously agreed 
that there are a number of problems which are faced in 
transplanting the Japanese-style management. To a question 
"Do you, see any problem In trying to implement Japanese- 
style management in, your organisation? ", the following 
responses in Table 8M were obtained: 
-Table 8M: Degree of Problem in Practisin. & 
Japanese Management Practices in Public Enterprises 
Responses 
No Problem at all 
Only some Problems 
A lot of Problems 
No Response ,, 1 11 
% of Respondents From: 
Sample A Sample B 
11.5% 8.9% 
54.8% 58.9% 
27.9% 24.1% 
, 5.8% 
8.0% 
It appeared that the root cause of- the problems in 
trying- to introduce Japanese-style management stems from 
mainly anxiety and suspicion on the, part of- workers as 
well as some management group within the organisations to 
change in the existing working, system. ' As Japanese-style 
management is a new phenomenong it is 'considered as a 
threat to both workers and managers alike. Specifically 
the problems as quoted by the respondents are recorded in 
Table 8N (refer to next page). 
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Table QN: Nature of Problem in Practising 
Japanese Management Practices in Public Enterprises 
Problems in Trying to Introduce, , Sample A Sample B 
Japanese-style Management 
Workers' suspicion due to lack of 38.5% 33.9% 
understanding. of Japanese-style mgt. 
Workers' preference for existing 31.7% 26.8% 
management practices 
Uncommitted Effort by Mgt. Group 31.7% 45.5% 
to implement Japanese-style mgt. 
New Problems cropping up as a result 24.0% 15.2% 
introducing Japanese-style mgt. 
8.11. Positive, Attributes Desired by Senior Managers and 
Employees 
The rationale for introducing Japanese-style management to 
the organisations especially the public enterprises in 
Malaysia is to improve the performance of the workforce 
through the practising of so-called "good" practices 
Japanese management and the positive attributes that come 
together with these practices of the Japanese people. When 
a- question was asked which positive attributes of 
Japanese-style management are most preferred, the, senior 
managers and employees alike again do not vary much-in 
their preference of attributes they hope to gain from the 
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"Japanisation" process. The positive' attributes , 'are 
tabulated in Table 8P below: 
Table 8P: Preferred Attributes of Japanese 
Management Practices By Respondents 
-- 
Attributes Desired Sample-A Sample B 
High Productivity 65.0% 50.9% 
Loyalty'to organisation 63.0% 50.9% 
High quality of work 63.0% 49.1% 
High Work Ethics & Discipline 55.6% 39.3% 
Absence of Strikes 16.0% 9.8% 
Others 2.5% 2.7% 
8.12. ' Difficulties Encountered in Implementing Japanese- 
style Management 
Although'ý all respondents in the -survey are very impressed 
by Japanese economic success'whichi many believe, has been 
linked to the effective Japanese-style management, they 
do not think ýthat all Japanese-style management practices 
are good for Malaysia in general, and the public 
enterprises in particular. They consider ýsome Japanese 
management practices, - as having a number of weaknesses 
when applied to the Malaysian situation. This, is why some 
Japanese-style management'' techniques have to be rejected 
outright, they claimed. A question was 'asked in the 
survey regarding serious defects of Japanese-style 
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management which may have caused the Malaysians to reject 
it. The responses to this question is reproduced Table, 8Q 
below: 
Table 8Q: Defects of Japanese Management Practices 
X of Respondents From: 
Sample A Sample B 
Defects: 
Uncomfortable with Cultures, 
Religion & Social Values 96.8% 59.8% 
Slow Promotion forAchievers 29.5% 25.0% 
Costly & Not Practical 27.4% 20.5% 
Limit Career Change 26.3% 27.7% 
Slow Decision-making 4.2% 9.8% 
8.13. Strategies to Transfer Japanese-style Management - 
Regarding how best to transfer the Japanese-style 
management to Malaysian public enterprisess the most 
common ways believed by senior managers in which, -Japanese- 
style managementý can be transferred are by appointment of 
chief executives ý and top , management with adequate 
knowledge of Japanese management; the systematic training 
of all public enterprises' employees in Ja'panese-style 
management and the introduction of only suitable features 
of Japanese-style management. A "Yes/No" format of 
question was asked regarding the issues *of such 
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transferability of Japanese-style management, and the 
following in Table 8R are the responses obtained from the 
said survey. 
Table 8R: 'Methods of Transferring Japanese 
Management Practices to Public Enterprises 
Transferability Methods % of Respondents From: 
Sample A -Sample B 
Yes No Yes No 
Through "Look East" Policy 7.5%, 72.5% 20.5% 79.5% 
Training for Managers 43.1Z 56.9% 52.7% 47.3% 
Training for Workers 52.9% 47.1% 58.9% 41.1% 
Introduce Compatible 
Elements Only 52.9% 47.1% 50.0% 50.0% 
Secondment of Japanese 10.8% 89.2% 11.6% 88.4% 
Adopt Jap. Education 5.9% 94.1% 1.8% 98.2% 
Other Measures, 7.8%, 92.2% 2.7% 97.3% 
It is interesting to' note that the -Japanese personnel who 
have been sent to Malaysia (mostly by arrangement through 
governments of Japan and Malaysia) supposedly to teach 
advanced technology specifically and - Japanese-style 
management generally have not been considered as an 
effective tool of transferability. Observations made by 
the senior managers and employees, suggested that their 
Japanese counterparts were not that enthusiastic about 
-434- 
teaching it to the Malaysians. For example, when asked 
about those Japanese personnel who had been seconded to 
public enterprises in Malaysia, the senior managers -and 
employees alike expressed anger and frustration as to 
their selfish behaviour. Among the complaints were that 
the Japanese are not sincere enough about, transferring 
their knowledge to the locals; the Japanese were arrogant 
and considered themselves superior to other races and 
that what they taught was not that beneficial -to ýthe 
locals. This confirmed the earlier discussion of the 
literature on the problems of transferring Japanese-style 
management to other developing countries. This type of 
problem was said to be quite critical in the private 
organisation sector especially those involving joint 
ventures where the Japanese personnel who were supposed to 
provide advanced knowledge were found to have transferred 
outdated technology or expertise. The Malaysians were 
naturally outraged and ill-feeling developed, 
8.14. Preference of Management Style 
The senior managers were also asked what is their 
preference of management in running their respective 
enterprises. It is found that 11.8% preferred Japanese- 
style management; 4.9% went for Western management style; 
68.6% chose the''present style of management practised in 
Malaysia; 12.7% said their management preferences depended 
on the situation they were in; and the remaining 2.0% 
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claimed they have no preference at all. In fact when asked 
which management style suited their organisation, 63% of 
the respondents said that the mixed type of management 
style was the most suitable one. The respondent from 
sample B-i. e. employees, were also requested to state 
their preference of management style. It was found that 
17.9% opted for Japanese-style management; 1.8% preferred 
Western style management; 64.3% chose the present style 
of management; 8.9% said they prefer the "it depends on 
situation" style and the remaining 7.2% did not have any 
preference at all. 
8.15. Transferability of Japanese-style Management 
Both senior managers and employees as represented by the 
two different samples of the survey said Japanese-style 
management can be transferred but not all of them would be 
accepted. The majority of the two groups of respondents 
felt that only some elements are transferable. It was also 
pointed out that to be successfully transplanted into the 
Malaysian soil, the Japanese-style management may have to 
undergo some modifications as not all of its elements are 
suitable for local people. The opinions obtained during 
the survey's exercise regarding the Possibility of 
transferring Japanese-style management to the public 
enterprises' sector in Malaysia are being reproduced in 
Table 8S (refer to next page). 
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Table 8S: Opinions on Feasibility of Transferring 
Japanese-style Management to Public Enterprises 
% of Respondents From: 
Sample A Sample B 
All elements of Jap. Mgt. 2.9% 1.8% 
can be transferred in pure form 
Only some elements of Jap. Mgt. 88.5% 97.3% 
practices can be transferred and may have 
to be modified to suit local environment 
All elements of Jap. Mgt. 8*, 7% 0.9% 
cannot be transferred either in pure or 
modified form. 
It was revealed further that although most -respondents 
believed some aspects of Japanese-style management are 
transferable to Malaysia, not many of them (i. e. only 
22.9%-of senior managers and 22.0% of employees) believed 
it would dominate the public enterprise sector. Of the 
small number of respondents who said it would dominate 
the public enterprises, when asked when such domination 
would take place, most of them said it would take place 
in the 1990-1995, period. 
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Clearly Japanese-style management practices have not 
really gained much inroad in the - public enterprises so 
far. If ever it is to become a dominant feature in the 
public enterprises in future, it would take 'quite 
sometimes for, it to be accepted in the cautious Malaysians 
for out of those who believed Japanese-style management 
practices are transferable, slightly one-fifth, i. e. 22.9% 
from the senior manager group and 22.0% from the employee 
group respectively said that Japanese-style management 
will dominate the public enterprise sector in future. They 
predicted the period of 1990-1995 will be when Japanese- 
style management will become a dominant force in Malaysia. 
8.16. Analysis of the Research Survey 
The research survey, to some extent, evidently indicated 
that elements of Japanese-style management can be 
transferred from Japan to another foreign country. In the 
case of Malaysia, the survey clearly showed there is no 
question about the transferability of some major Japanese 
management techniques to the public enterprises' sector. 
Selected Japanese management practices have been 
incorporated in the majority of these enterprises as a 
result of the government directive to emulate the 
Japanese. Caution must be exercised however, because only 
some practices have been successfully. carried out. A 
number of Japanese practices have not been easily 
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transferable while others are not transferable at all. 
This finding confirmed the conclusions of earlier studies 
regarding the feasibility of transferring Japanese-style 
management to countries like the UK, the US and the four 
NIEs (refer to Chapter 7). The transferability of 
Japanese-style management to Malaysia, as had been 
experienced by- other countries, cannot be made in toto 
and this means well-tailored modifications to suit the 
local environment must be devised to make such transfer 
more-readily accepted. 
The survey also suggested clearly that although some 
practices, of Japanese-style management can be transplanted 
into, Malaysia in as far as the public ' enterprises are 
concerned, the process - of such transplantation has never 
been plain sailing. The survey's findings identified 
three major issues regarding the responses from Malaysia 
public -enterprises to the introduction of Japanese-style 
management, namely; 
(i). that some Japanese management practices are well- 
received and therefore they are currently being practised 
earnestly - i. e. easily transferable Japanese management 
practices; 
(ii). that some Japanese management practices are less 
popular but nevertheless they are being experimented with 
and adopted with caution - i. e not easily transferable 
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Japanese management practices; 
(iii). that some Japanese management practices are 
considered not suitable for the, Malaysian organisations 
and therefore they are being rejected outright - i. e. not 
transferable Japanese management practices. 
One finding which emerged from the survey is that a number 
of management techniques which are practised successfully 
in big Japanese firms in Japan such as kanban, ringi 
system, and JIT are relatively unfamiliar to the majority 
of- the top management group in public enterprises in 
Malaysia. For example, only 26% of senior managers are 
familiar with kanban, 27.1% - with ringi; 45.4% with JIT. 
Naturally enough, these, -management practices have not 
been adopted , in the majority of Malaysian public 
enterprises. It could be that these practices are not 
relevant ýyet to their organisations to warrant their 
adoption. For example, the JIT manufacturing system which 
is the cornerstone of successful Japanese firms is almost 
absent in Malaysian public enterprises. A possible reason 
could be because the majority of Malaysian public 
enterprises are not manufacturing concerns* Even in 
manufacturing-oriented enterprises, JIT would not 
practical to apply in view of the environment which is 
still dominated by the pro-Western set-up. , 
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Another -reason for the not-so-enthusiastic response 
towards some Japanese practices may be found in the low 
number of Malaysian senior managers who have had exposure 
to Japanese-style management. For instance, as discussed 
earlier, the percentage showing'those who can speak, read 
and write , in the Japanese , language, ' among the senior 
managers is not' substantial. Not all senior managers have 
the benefit of training exposure in Japan as was the case 
with their employees counterparts. The impression one gets 
here appears to suggest that senior managers in the 
survey's. sample are less knowledgeable in Japanese-style 
management than the employees in as far as formal training 
is concerned. It is the assumption of the author here that 
had all- those comprising the top - management group been 
sent for a more adequate formal training in Japanese-style 
management, they could become knowledgeable in the said 
area and would be motivated to be more enthusiastic about 
or supportive of the process of "Japanisation" of public 
enterprises. As it is now, the majority of senior managers 
(i. e, 80%) ýhad learned Japanese-style management 
techniques from books and journals (please note that they 
are not in Japanese, but in the Malay and the English 
languages) which they had read; and about half of them 
(i. e, 46. %) had 'learned about the Japanese-style 
management from seminars and workshops that they had 
attended. In contrast, only 23% stated having formally 
learned the subject' matter through training and 
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attachment. There is nothing wrong with self-study, but a 
formal training would have been more appropriate. 
The impact of Western influence is still very strong among 
senior managers in Malaysia, although according to the 
survey, many of them do not necessarily prefer Western- 
style management. The Western -influence As less evident 
amongst the younger and lower echelon managers and among 
the ordinary employees. However, as long as the present 
structures of their organisations continue to be patterned 
along the line of West, the tendency towards traditional 
Western ways of doing things continues to dominate in 
Malaysian - organisat ions. The drive for the "Japanisation" 
in the, public-enterprise sector would be an uphill battle 
and would-be a time-consuming process. 
In a number of cases, attempts to introduce Japanese-style 
management in public enterprises have met with fierce 
resistance from those who feel only comfortable, with the 
old-establishment. This has been the direct result of the 
educational background of the respondents whereby ýit is 
found that 50% of the senior managers, and 69.6% of the 
employees have been educated- at Western-orientated 
institutions of higher learning in their own country; and 
27% of the senior managers and 18.8% of the employees of 
public enterprises had their tertiary education in the 
West (mostly in the UK and the US universities). These 
-442- 
statistics have ý'indeed shown a strong correlation with 
yet another finding of, the same survey which revealed a 
high proportion of senior managers and employees in 
Malaysia having being inclined towards the management 
styles that are either a mixture of various . management 
techniques which are pro-Western or a modified Western- 
style management. It is argued here that because their 
earlier, education- and subsequent training have been based 
on a Western curriculum, the older generation of 'managers 
in Malaysia do not 'easily accept the Japanese management 
practices even though they had been formally instructed by 
the government to do things "the Japanese way" via the 
"Look East" policy that was embarked upon in 1982. This 
is shown by the feedback of the survey whereby senior 
managers who preferred Japanese-style management, comprised 
of only 11.8% as compared to the 68.6% who chose "mixed" 
management style as their management preference. 
It may be necessary to explain at this juncture what a 
mixed type of management really means. The author defines 
a mixed type of management practice that is practised in 
Malaysia as a combination of various management techniques 
which have been viewed as a Malaysian management style and 
more often than not, modified to suit the Malaysian multi- 
racial and multi-religious environment. This system of 
management is often called the rojak type of management 
style in Malaysia, which literally means a bunch of a 
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different management ýsystems blended together. -It must be 
stressed also that most features of this tvDe of 
management are similar to that of Western-style 
management; the only difference being that some of the 
western-style management has been at times further altered 
or refined to reflect local context. 
The preference for a mixed type of management style which 
is predominantly Western-oriented, by senior managers in 
Malaysia can be, explained by a number of historical 
factors. 
Malaysia--was under the British rule for many years until 
her independence in 1963. The educational system in the 
higher institutions of learning in Malaysia where almost 
half of the senior managers had graduated from, is still 
patterned along the Western curriculum. In addition, the 
fact that out of the 27% of , senior managers who had 
studied overseas, all of them studied either in the US or 
the UK inevitably has resulted in them and possibly their 
junior management colleagues in Malaysia to practise the 
management styles that are similar to Western-style 
management but later, when some of them are "found 
difficult or unsuitable- to implementt these managers 
eventually modified and refined them into the so-called 
rojak style of management* 
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It has pointed out that of those ''who had 'their tertiary 
education overseas, all had studied in either the US or 
the UK and that none of them had studied in Japanese 
universities. One may wonder why these managers had not 
gone to study in Japanese institutions? Af ter analysing 
the historical development of Japanese -managementp it is 
found out that the reason for this is that the popularity 
of Japanese management worldwide is a recent phenomenon 
and the craze for the Japanese-style management in 
Malaysia only began in the 1980s. Since the majority of 
senior managers in the survey are either in their late 
thirtiesland early forties, their tertiary-education and 
their early ý, managerial training must be in the period 
prior, to the golden era of Japanese management in 
Malaysia. - This", explains why, these managers did not study 
at Japanese institutions, but instead at Western 
institutions. "Hence their management style 'is very much 
pro-Western, rather than pro-Japanese style. It is widely 
acknowledged ' in Malaysia that the older generation of 
managers, run their organisations along Western lines. A 
recent separate survey, conducted on 47 Malaysian managers 
by the author for Sarawak Shell Company Limited, supports 
this observation (Yasin, 1989). Another important reason 
why the Malaysian managers have not gone to Japan for 
tertiary studies in, say business or management studies, 
is the'fact that the Japanese do not really have business 
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schools for business - studies are taught in companies and 
not in universities. There is a linguistic barrier too. 
When Japanese-style management made its way to Malaysia 
through the government's directive of the-, "Look East" 
policy in 1982, it was observed that Malaysianý managers 
tended to pick those-features that are applicable to their 
organisations and whenever necessary, modified them first 
before they are 'incorporated into the existing management 
system. Since Dr. Mahathir who, unlike his two 
predecessors, had not been educated in the West (and 'is 
reputed to be anti-Western), , took over the premiership of 
Malaysia, , the ý process of inculcating, more of oriental 
values especially those -from Japan over Western values 
among the Malaysian ý'government employees has been 
accelerated. This was the official period of the "Look 
East" policy when suddenly government agencies in Malaysia 
were instructed to minimise overtly Western orientation 
and instead learn from the Japanese and to a lesser extent 
also, from the successful Koreans. Managers of public 
enterprises were of no exception for they were told to 
adopt, Japanese management style which was considered more 
compatible with the Malaysian value system, It was 
observed that the Japanese and Malaysians share a similar 
oriental culture and since the former had progressed 
tremendously, Malaysia can also progress by emulating her 
management -techniques. It was widely assumed then, there 
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would be no major problems in doing so - because of the 
similarity in culture. 
However, the process of this reorientation from the 
Western-orientated style to the Oriental style involves 
careful planning and can be time consuming process. This 
being so', even though efforts have been vigorously made 
to pursue the educational system that reflects-more of 
oriental culture and values (based mainly on the Islamic 
principles), there is clearly a, problem encountered in 
trying to change the long established Western curriculum 
whichý had been strongly implanted and therefore widely 
used in'the country's educational system especially in the 
institutions of higher learning. The present managerst in 
the opinion of the author, are the product of era - the 
era where many choices of management styles are available. 
This may explain why many of them prefer the mixture of 
management styles. 
As'mentioned earlier, the lack of training in Japanese- 
style management; the inability of the vast majority 
senior managers, to converse or write in Japanese 
language; their limited ' exposure to the Japanese -culture 
as indicated by the number of visits to Japan, strongly 
suggests that the program to promote Japanese-style 
management in as far, as the managers is concerned has not 
been satisfactory. The weakness is very ýobvious for only 
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6.7% of senior managers involved in the survey can speak 
Japanese; 2% can read and write in Japanese and that only 
46.6% have been to Japan. Of those who had gone to Japan, 
only about 30% have been there for training purposes. Such 
a background on the part of managers would certainly not 
help much towards the realisation of adopting Japanese- 
style management in Malaysia. As stated earlier, of the 48 
senior managers who had visited Japan, 55.1% stayed there 
for less than a week. It is reasonable to argue that these 
managers would not absorb much of Japanese, culture and 
values in general, and Japanese-style management , in 
particular given that type of exposure and short duration 
of stay in Japan. 
The majority of the managerial group in Malaysian public 
enterprises are Muslims (72.1% as compared to 26.9% non- 
Muslims) and because some features of Japanese-style 
management are considered to be lunislamic', these 
elements naturally enough, are avoided. Many efforts are 
made by the Muslim managers to incorporate Islamic values 
in running the government agencies. Being Muslims, it is 
natural for them to inculcate Islamic values when and 
where necessary and at the same time avoid elements that 
are in conflict with the religion of Islam. It is assumed 
that even if the chief executives of the public 
enterprises in Malaysia are not themselves Muslims, the 
Japanese-style management features - that are deemed 
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contrary to the Islamic religion would be avoided as the 
majority of public enterprises' - employees are of 
Bumiputras origin who practise the Islamic faith. 
In addition, the present 'government also ý strongly 
encourages the injection of Islamic values by managers in 
management of their organisations. In fact, at the time of 
writing, the Islamic revivalist movement in the country is 
getting stronger and some states in Peninsular Malaysia 
have, passed Muslim laws. The recent controversy in which 
eight , Chinese assemblymen in Selangor State Legislative 
Council resigned en masse arising from the 'dispute 
regarding the enactment of newest , Muslim-oriented 
Legislation is a classic example of the winds , of' Islamic 
change in Malaysia (Borneo Post, 3rd. December, ' 1989). 
Since, the majority of those occupying the top management 
group in public enterprises are Muslimst it follows that 
Islamic-orientated management style is most widespread in 
public sector organisations as compared to private 
enterprise organisations in'Malaysia. 
The Western management style is slowly losing its grip 
among the present management group as more and more of 
the-, 'existing cadre of younger managers are trained either 
locally or at some non-Western institutions overseas (i. e 
Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, etc. ). Currently, in 
Malaysia, the Western management system can be said to be 
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experiencing the lowest ebb of its popularity .. because 
some western techniques have often proved disastrous when 
applied to the local situations partly because of 
differences in culture and traditions between the West 
and the East. This, in the judgement of the author, has 
led to the preference of the Malaysians, managers or 
otherwise, for 'the middle of the road' type of management 
style , which saw bits and pieces of various management 
styles being combined, integrated and refined - for 
application to suit the Malaysian's culturally unique 
environment. The essence of a hybrid management style, 
according'. to the survey, has been found to be very 
prominent - and -well-accepted 
in - Malaysian public 
enterprises. The Western management style especially that 
of-Americans however, is still popularly. practised in the 
private, tirms especially those of multi-national standing 
where many of, their top management executives comprise of 
Western expatriates. 
Elements of Japanese-style management are extremely 
attractive to the Malaysian government and Malaysian 
public -corporations. This is a product both of a 
government policy on one hand, and the phenomenal success 
of the Japanese on the other. However, as a totality, the 
Japanese management system cannot be- transferred since 
only some elements are preferred or considered suitable 
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for Malaysians. What will eventually emerge is a new rojak 
which has a Japanese element of management practices. 
It may take the new breed of managers - i. e those who are 
currently studying in the Japanese universities plus those 
who study at local institutions which are beginning to 
provide more Japanese management exposure - to take over 
the rein of the present top management in order that more 
Japanese "management styles can be vigorously--, implemented 
as well as readily, accepted - by , their subordinates. - The 
fact, that-the majority of the present top managers are not 
well-conversant,, in -, Japanese language (either speaking or 
writing) explains, to some extent, why the penetration of 
Japanese-style, management at management level ` in Malaysia 
has not been as successful as 'the government would desire. 
It, is true that one does not necessarily have to possess 
speaking or writing abilities in the Japanese, language to 
manage Japanese-style management successfully, but 
nevertheless, it can be said that if one has such 
additional abilities, - such a background can provide more 
incentive and greater motivation to practise or propagate 
Japanese management practices. Likewise, a person who is 
handicapped in the Japanese ý language may be at -a 
disadvantageous position and display less motivation to 
carry out or implement Japanese management system in his 
organisation. 
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It was pointed earlier there is not much difference in 
opinions between the managers and employees with regards 
to the feasibility of transferring Japanese-style 
management to Malaysia. This happens despite the two 
distinct differences in the background -of the'two groups 
namely; 
(a). that all employees have been sent to Japan to learn 
some aspects of Japanese-style management while only 46.6Z 
senior managers have been to Japan (not necessarily, ý for 
training purpose); and 
I 
(b). -that all, senior managers are all decision-making 
group of public, enterprises, while of total the employees 
participating in the survey, 40% are in the management 
category (although not necessarily in the decision-making 
group). 
On the surface, it would be reasonable to expect senior 
managers who have less exposure to Japanese-style 
management to be less optimistic than the their employee 
counterparts about the feasibility of , transferring 
Japanese management practices to Malaysia. This is not to 
be the case. -The result of the survey revealed both groups 
saying that, only some aspects of Japanese management 
practices are transferable to Malaysia. It can therefore 
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be argued that regardless of whether the participants in 
the survey been exposed to Japanese culture /language or 
not and regardless of whether they are knowledgeable or 
otherwise in Japanese-style, management, the effect of such 
exposure or knowledge does not contribute to any 
significant difference in as far as - opinions regarding 
the transferability issues of Japanese-style management to 
Malaysia is concerned. 
.0 
By reason of logic, senior managers, the majority of, whom 
are Western-trained compared to their employee 
counterparts (who - are trained more in Japanese-style 
management)', - would -be expected to favour the Western 
management style. By the same reasoning,, the employees 
would, favour 'the Japanese-style management. The survey's 
analysis proved that this is not true. Instead, both 
groups' have shown their preference towards the rojak 
management- style or the mixed type of- management style. 
This leads the author to suggest the following'reasons: 
Theý present employees- of Malaysian enterprises, like the 
their superiors have been exposed to four major eras of 
management evolution. , The earliest period is the British 
rule era whereby British -managers brought in Western- 
style management. However, the British era merges into an 
era of ý transition where more and more Malaysians were 
influenced by American -business schools (i. e the sending 
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of students to America in the late 1970s) 'and even - the 
British ý institutions to which Malaysia were sending 
people were influenced more and more by American-styled, 
Harvard case study. Then, came a period of nationalism 
that resulted in the country's independence from British 
rule which witnessed the nationalistic movement calling 
for more local values. The next wave of managerial 
development was the period which saw the birth of the 
"Look East" policy which exhorted Malaysians to'emulate 
oriental values and Japanese-style management. This was 
followed by the Islamic 'revival period,, i. e. the present 
era which witnesses the rising insurgence of Islam 
whereby Islamic-oriented values, in management have been 
emphasised among all Malaysians regardless whether they 
are Muslims or not. 
The public enterprises under the first era, i. e., in the 
1950s, were managed under the British rule. The British 
style of- management was the norm. When British managers 
left the country, the British-style management , ýwas 
continued by, localýmanagers who had been groomed by their 
British masters. 'When Malaysia became independent in 1957, 
the, period when the tide of nationalism was, at'its height, 
more local content and oriental style were emphasised and 
hence incorporated into the already established Western 
management practices. The prevalent management-style then 
was a, 'hybrid of British and local management styles. In 
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the late 1970s and early 1980s the, era of'learning. -from 
the East -began, with the - government directing- all- its 
employees (including the public enterprises' employees) to 
emulate the-Japanese-style management. 'This of course did 
not mean forsaking 'the previous management- style; - rather 
blending the compatible Japanese'management practices with 
the already existing management techniques. The management 
system in Malaysia became more varied and rich in style 
and appropriately named as the rojak management style. 
The vigour of, the "Look East" call has not fully subsided 
yet when another phase of management, the so-called 
Islamic-style management -era appeared at ' the Malaysian 
scene. The proponents of the Islamic group, encouraged by 
the Muslim-dominated government, call for more Islamic 
practices to be included in- the management practices of 
government. agencies. As a result of this -new development, 
more and more of ý the Muslim workers are demanding for 
suraus (prayer places) at work; increasingly Muslim female 
workers are putting on purdah (veils) and more functions 
conducted in organisations are done along the line of 
Islamic teachings, i. e the doa selamat ceremony (the 
reading of koranic -verses before any major function 
begins). 
Generally speaking, Malaysian society is now undergoing 
two eras simultaneously, i. e. the era of the "Look East" 
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policy and the era of "Islamisation" of public 
enterprises. It is still not clear what will emerge out 
of this. Nevertheless, theý continuous development of 
management evolution in Malaysia for the last five decades 
has indeed moulded the Malaysians into being more 
receptive to a variety of management styles and has 
inevitably resulted An their preference for a mixed 
management styles that suit themselves at workplaces. This 
is why they prefer to be managed under the present 
existing management practices (i. e the mixed type of 
management) according to the survey. 
The training *, stint of public enterprises' ýemployees in 
Japan: does not- seem to have affected their preferences. 
Before embarking on the survey, the author had expected 
them to be more favourably inclined to Japanese-style 
management, ýbut the evidence from the survey's results 
clearly does not support this expectation. One-factor that 
may have, accounted for such a tendency is that the 
training period ýhad been too short- to have any 
significant impact. It has been observed from the survey 
that the average number of days of stay An Japan was 
about one week. Out of the 112 employees involved in the 
survey, less than 10% had stayed in Japan for 25 ýweeks on 
training assignment. On the contrary, 83%, had been 
undergoing some sort of training -in Japan for a period 
ranging from one to eight weeks. Obviously they could not 
-456- 
learned much in such a short span of training stint. Also, 
the aspects of training may not be comprehensive enough to 
be really effective. For example, it was-found that 
despite going to Japan, the employees did not ý know much 
about ringi, kanban and JIT. It is suspected that those 
who-were sent for training were only sent to learn the job 
that was most related to their jobs. The -Japanese 
organisers who have been entrusted with the training of 
Malaysians; either - because of time constraints "or -other 
reasons best known to themselves, must have chosen not to 
furnish the trainees with an overall view of Japanese- 
style management'. Thus the training of Malaysian employees 
in, Japan is confined to areas concerning their jobs and 
that other, relevant management techniques are neglected. 
Also, - the author is of opinion that ý like their senior 
manager counterparts, employees in the public enterprises 
have been the products of a myriad of management styles 
through, the passage of time. Against this backdrop, it is 
not possible for anyone to stick to one style only or for 
one particular style to dominate them because the choices 
of management styles have been in abundance. The wave 
of change obviously made Malaysia susceptible to many 
new management approaches. As a result, it 'soon becomes 
apparent that, one -style which is appropriate at one time 
may be obsolete at other times. This, is in conformity with 
the changing tastes of the versatile Malaysian society 
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which is constantly invaded with the tides of change since 
the Independence from the, British rule. This, in. the 
opinion of the author,, accounts for ýthe strong 
preference for the rojak-style management by the 
employees, even though all of them have 'been exposed, to 
some sort of training in Japanese-style management, in 
Japan. It seems -that --their prior exposure to other 
management styles (i. e. before- they are exposed to the 
Japanese-style management) hasi to a large extent, 
affected their existing management preference. 
The transferability of acceptable Japanese -practices to 
Malaysian public enterprises - would not be difficult to 
carry out. It is also, the view of the author that the 
future generation of employees -in Malaysian- public 
enterprises are the best potential ý candidates for 
Japanese-style management. Ifý the Japanese-style 
management is to make an inroads, it is this future group 
thatýshould beýtargeted. 
The employees in the , Malaysian public enterprises 
according to the survey, are relatively young with 59.9% 
being under 35 years of age. This can be interpreted to be 
a good sign for the 'Japanisation' process as it would be 
more readily accepted by the younger Malaysians. However, 
resistance among the older Malaysiansq especially from the 
die-hard employees who are content with doing things the 
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old ways, will continue to cause problems to the 
implementors of Japanese management techniques. ' The older 
employees- would have to -go first for 'Japanese-style 
management to be established firmly because as it is now, 
the opposition to Japanese-style management come 'mostly 
from the 'old hats', to quote one general manager of a 
financial public enterprise. ý.. However, with more receptive 
younger employees, it is believed that less problems will 
emerge from the exercise to transplant Japanese style. into 
the public enterprises. This is bound to happen provided 
the "Look East" policy will continue to remain a national 
policy in many years to come. In other words, the 
Japanisation of -the -Malaysian public enterprises can be 
real ised, -- more' rapidly when more of the older employees 
who are pro-Western, would have been - retired and replaced 
by the-younger group of employees. Managed by the 
supposedly younger and theoretically more flexible group 
of . managers, 
the majority of whom must have been 
undergoing , training in Japanese management or studying 
Japanese-oriented, curriculum locally and/or in Japan, it 
would not be a hard task any longer to practise Japanese- 
style management in Malaysian public enterprises in the 
near future. 
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Another factor that strongly favours the practice of 
Japanese-style management in Malaysian public enterprises 
is what is termed as the cultural similarity factor. 
Although Malaysian society is not homogenous like the 
Japanese society, there are some similarities in culture 
and values between these two countries. One similarity 
concerns the deep respect for elders and those in 
authority in both Malaysian and Japanese cultures. The 
Japanese highly respect the elders in their families and 
those who are in authority at their workplaces. They are 
loyal to their organisation because the organisation they 
work for is considered to be like their own family who 
cater for their needs just as their families do. Whatever 
happens to their family affects every family member and 
therefore everyone of them must stand by their 
organisation. They "swim and sink together". 
The boss in a Japanese organisation is synonymous with, the 
head of the family. The workers, like ordinary members who 
must , be obedient to the family headp are therefore 
expected to display strict obedience to their superiors 
as , the superior is the one with the highest authority, 
looking after their welfare and needs. The history of the 
Samurai being loyal to his master has been linked to the 
loyalty phenomenon of the present day employees in the 
Japanese firms (Nakane, 1973: p47-60). This element of 
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respect for elders which goes hand , in hand, ', with -the 
culture of exhibiting total obedience to the, superiors or 
and undivided loyalty to the head of a, family-or community 
is still very strong among the Malaysian society. 
The Malays (who form the dominant group of Bumiputras of 
the early days were very'loyal -to their' Sultans, (kings) 
who were - supposed- -to, protect , them. This was - depicted in 
the Malay folklore of the hero warrior, Hang Tuah -who was 
willing to be killed because of his blind loyalty to the 
sultan. , This blind loyalty ý to the leader, has its parallel 
in Japan with the blind loyalty of the samurai to, fuedal 
lord, and of -course, through the fuedal lord to the 
Emperor. However, the British rule-destroyed the Sultanate 
system but-., the attribute of talat setia (loyalty) to those 
authority remains intact in the Malay community. The 
loyalty element is still in theirýblood as evidenced by 
the lives in a typical Malaysian home-today. ' The elders 
are -always well-respected and it is unimaginable and of 
great shame for them, to send their parents to the so- 
called senior citizen homes as is the popular practice in 
Western, society. Those in authority are' never to be 
questioned in public by those below them even if they are 
seen on the wrong'. The Malays for example strongly believe 
it is durhaka (betrayal), to go against someone older than 
them. At the workplace, it is considered kurang ajar(ill- 
mannered) to -go against someone more senior in rank or 
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even someone lower'in rank but senior in age although that 
person may have done something terribly wrong at hislwork,. 
As for the 'other Malaysian ethnic, groups, the- show for 
loyalty., ýthe showing for respect and love and affection 
for the elders and superiors are the foundation of the way 
of life especially among- , the , Chinese- in line- with 
Confucian ethics. The Chinese clans and Chinese triad 
societies which were rife at one time in Malay-States, are 
further, examples -of how sI trong the extent of, loyaltism 
amongi the Chinese community has been. -In the Indian 
community, -Indian parents always teach their young to be 
respectful of the elders, i. e. the senior members in 
their family, and, that they -are asked ýto display loyalty 
and'obedience' to those they work for (refer to' earlier 
discussions in Chapters 2 and 3). 
There is also another encouraging sign regarding' the 
issues of -transferability of Japanese-style management to 
Malaysia, Malaysia at present- has many similarities with 
Japan during her modernisation period because Malaysia is 
in fact adopting a "catch-up" mentality and is' operating 
in a pursuer mode trying to catch up with the 'advanced, 
industrial nations of-the West, Japan and also NIEs. The 
only, differenm being that the Malaysians are , learning 
from the Japanese themselves, instead of learning -from 
the Westerners, to achieve their *goal. -As -such the 
learning process will be made easier because in theory the 
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Japanese know what the Malaysians are looking for from 
them. Also, the process of learning will be much -easier 
because there is more similarities than dissimilarities 
in culture between the Japanese and the Malaysians. 
Another aspect of considerable importance which can pave 
the way for the desired ý, transfer of Japanese-style 
management to Malaysia is the special relationship between 
the two countries. As was said in the previous chapter,, 
the trade figures between the two countries in the last 
decade, have been significantly increasing with Japanese 
products flooding Malaysian- markets -at a- volume never 
before , witnessed; ' The author feels that from the 'trading 
point of view, ' ' -Japan needs --Malaysia more than: Malaysia 
needs Japan (i. e. as indicated by the. discussion. in 
Chapter 2). This is because beside finding Malaysia a 
ready market for consumer and industrial, goods, Japan 4s 
fully aware that Malaysia is rich in natural resources 
which Japan badly needs. When Malaysia decides to go to 
Japan for , help in acquiring new technology and learning 
management techniques, Japan must surely find this an 
opportunity to strengthen the ties she has been hoping to 
have with Malaysia. In return for providing the necessary 
technology including the transfer of management techniques 
to Malaysia, Japan's interests in Malaysia is further 
strengthened. This means, even if Malaysia is not too 
enthusiastic about the Japanese system of-management, the 
-463- 
Japanese with many subsidiaries located in Malaysia would 
have, to eventually 'sell' their management system to 
Malaysia, perhaps initially. through their subsidiaries, 
then to the private enterprises and finally to the public 
enterprises. ýý, Gi; ven such a scenario, it is the contention 
of-the author-that Japanese-style management can be-easily 
transplanted-into Malaysian public enterprises. 
The strong ties between the two countries especially in 
tradei- 'investment-, education , and - also, technical 
cooperation have, been to- some extent -forged, by4 two 
powerful bodies namely the Japan-Malaysian Economic 
Association (JAMECA) and the Malaysia-Japan Economic 
Association (MAJECA). These organisations were formed in 
1977 and since their inceptionp have organised Joint 
Conferences annually either in Tokyo or Kuala Lumpur 
involving leading businessmen, rich investors and high- 
ranking officials (MAJECA Report, 1988). 
It has'now, become clear that the issues-of transferability 
of'Japanese-style management to the public enterprises in 
Malaysia as provided by the -feedbacks from 216 respondents 
in, the survey can be categorised into three groups 
namely: 
(i). those consisting the Japanese management techniques 
thatýare easily transferred; 
(ii). those consisting the Japanese management techniques 
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that are not so easily transferable; and' 
(iii). those consisting the Japanese management technique's 
that are not transferable at all. .1 
8.17. Transferability Criteria. 
Three main criteria are used in this study to determine 
whether Japanese-style management can - or cannot be 
transferredInto the public enterprises in Malaysia. These 
are; 
(i), -the extent of Japanese management practices; - 
(ii). the compatibility factor of Japanese management 
practices with Malaysian culture and values; and 
(iii). ' the-rseriousness--of problems arising'-from the 
attempts in adopting the Japanese-style management. 
Based on these criteria, the transferability issues can be 
identified as: 
(i. ) Type I-'The type of Japanese-style management which 
can be easily transferable. This particular group of 
Japanese management practices" has been and will continue 
to be adopted widely in the public enterprises since the 
inception of the "Look East" policy; - 
(ii). Type II -- The type of Japanese-style management 
which is transferable, but. not as easily as Type I. This 
particular group of Japanese management practices -is 
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generally acceptable because it is considered compatible 
enough ýwith Malaysian culture and values of Malaysians. 
The extent of use of these practices vary from one 
organisation to another. andýnormally are not expected to 
be practised widely; 
(iii). Typeý III -- Japanese-style management , is not 
transferable at all because they bring many problems with 
them. ýThis. ýcategory of Japanese management practices is 
considered problematic or 'not suitable and is not adopted 
at all by public enterprises in Malaysia. 
8.18. --TransferableýJapanese-style Management - Type I' 
By using the three criteria above, the survey clearly 
shows that the Type I Japanese ýmanagement, practices, i. e. 
those management practices from Japan which can be and 
have been transferred successfully to Malaysian public 
enterprises are QCC, company loyalty, open office system, 
group responsibilities and job-rotation. 
8.18.1. Quality control Circle (QCC). 
QCC has been transferred to many public enterprises and 
has ýbecome part of, the-organisation's work procedure. It 
has been found that 79-. 9% of the chief executives of 
public enterprises in the study said QCC is being 
practised'in their organisations. The percentage of senior 
managers recommending QCC forý adoption by their 
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organisation is 70.0% and this is ýconsidered very high. 
The number of employees recommending the use of " QCC in 
their organisation-is even higher, i. e. -77.7. %, confirming 
therefore that QCC is'the in-thing in Malaysiaýnow. 
In practising- 'QCC, some public enterprises in Malaysia 
have been more successful than the others while others 
have encountered a number of problems. The greatest 
problem faced when implementing QCC is the anxiety it 
brings to employees especially the line managers who feel 
their position is being eroded by the new working 
arrangement of - this work practice. Their anxiety stems 
mainly from thefact that their traditional role as a, head 
is being undermined now that the workers have more freedom 
to, put forward their., views relating to their work by -QCC 
process. The QCC requires-that workers and their immediate 
superiors must discuss problems together and decide 
appropriate solutions after adequate 'consultation. This 
may not be enthusiastically welcome by line managers who 
have previously enjoyed, the the privilege of some 
decision-making by himself. 
However, -- with more'supervisors and junior managers being 
educated' and trained in the -mechanics of QCC, the 
benefits , -of QCC is being recognised. An earlier 
questionnaire, survey on a group of 37 supervisors and 
foremen of one big public enterprise in 1986 by the, author 
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convincingly revealed the widespread acceptance of QCC 
(Yasin, - 1986)'. About 89% said they agreed' that QCC should 
be practised in'their organisation to improve productivity 
and 75% said that QCC can be - be practised ý with not much 
problems. The survey also found that 90% of the same 
supervisors and foremen had initially not been supportive 
of 'the QCC exercise when it was first introduced in their 
organisation. 
What -is the most critical problem in carrying out QCC? A 
major problem regarding this management practice is to, be 
found with the Malaysian workers who are not evenly 
educated-as compared to the Japanese workers. - It is 
naturally'easy'for Japanese organisations-to'practice QCC 
since Japanese'workers are highly educated and should have 
no problems in 'participating in 'QCC and using' the 
techniques. In Malaysian organisations, although an 
increasing number of blue'ý-collar workers can read , and 
write, the level of education is low and the majority 
come from primary and lower secondary schools. Some have 
never attended school. This represents a great handicap 
to the, QCC process-because one has to be'quite educated to 
understand the tools such as pareto, charts, histogram, 
cost-and effect diagram etc. used in the process of QCC. 
Another problem is the suspicion of the line managers who 
feel threatened by this system. These findings support 
earlier - conclusions - in earlier studies about the 
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acceptability of QCC technique in the US and the, UK 
companies (refer to discussion in chapter -5 and also 
chapter - 6). The suspicion of, -these group must be 
eliminated first before QCC can become 'a more' acceptable 
practice in the Malaysian public-enterprises. 
8.18.2. Company Loyalty. 
Company loyalty refers to the acts of employees who-place 
the interests of, their,. organisation above their own 
personal interests. This means that employees would make 
personal sacrifices so that the organisations' they work 
for will continue to prosper. ' The Japanese employees have 
been praised as being very loyal to their employers (Kono, 
1982). In contrast, it , is widely acknowledged that the 
Malaysian workers - especially in public sector are 
generally individualistic- and do not hesitate to leave 
their employers for better opportunities elsewhere. This 
explains the low degree of company loyalty in Malaysian 
enterprises. 
The Malaysian workers are generally not, loyal to their 
organisations. -This worries-the government for it strongly 
believes that productivity, and efficiency can be achieved 
by -workers being loyal , to their organisation, in the form 
of -workers being more responsible in their pay claim 
towards the , employers; workers being more - supportive of 
employers to control wastage of resources and time during 
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difficult times; and positive attitudes of "swim and sink 
together" with the company. This ýmessage had been 
repeatedly stressed under, the "Look East" policyý and the 
response is quite positive. The, survey's results testify 
that, 75.0% of -senior managers in the survey 
enthusiastically recommend this type of, Japanese import 
to their organisations. The employees in the survey also 
strongly supported the adoption ' of company loyalty 
practice for the ý survey revealed that 67.9X of the 
employees recommended this Japanese practice for their 
organisations. --But, the question is: can it ýwork in 
Malaysia? It is not difficult to inculcate the sentiment 
of -loyalty in Malaysian society. Historically,, the Malays 
have -ý been said to - be very loyal to their Sultan. Also, 
they are loyal, to their family members and will-come ., ýto 
the- assistance of their relatives in time of need. This 
loyalty can be , extended to their organisations. . Western 
individualism that has been introduced through the Western 
concept of management may be to blame for the 
individualistic workers in-' Malaysia today. - Now , that 
individualism is being idiscouragedg the selfish Malaysian 
workers who like to job-hop$ can be made to be more 
responsible workers who would treat the place , of their 
work as belonging to their family. The. fact that this had 
been the real' culture of the- Malaysian' society leads the 
author to -believe that-with proper planningg this loyalty 
can be revivedý among the, new' generation of Malaysian 
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society. and extended to the workplaces. ý In addition to 
the above, the inculcation of loyalty through the company 
to the - nation, is something that can be, learned from the 
Japanese, since in the past, the Japanese converted their 
samurai-into serving the state through industries. 
Another encouraging factor that leads the author to 
believe that this element of company loyalty can work 
among Malaysian employees, apart from the cultural point 
of view, is that in Malaysia jobs are now becoming scarce 
and that with the unemployment rate reaching more than 
10%, people cannot become choosy any longer and , that 
those who already have jobs cannot easily jump'from one 
job to another as the job market- has become more 
competitive. The employees would become more realistic 
about their position and this perhaps educates them to be 
more, supportive and caring towards their organisation. 
An even more important development is that the Malaysian 
government has officially insisted that all government 
servants emulate the Japanese in being loyal to the head, 
to the organisation, ý to the nation. A chairman of a 
public enterprise commented- in the survey questionnaire 
that the loyalty attribute can be instilled-into Malaysian 
workforce now that government has-provided the framework 
for it -to be carried out thereby forcing employers like 
him to be sensitive to workers' needs and in return the 
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workers become more sensitive and appreciative to 
employers I expectation' by being hardworking and-, loyal to 
their organisation. He went on to say that the latest 
development carried out by the government in embarking the 
semerak (the emphasis, on loyalty to one's organisation) 
makes thisý type of Japanese management practice going to 
stay for a long-time in Malaysia. 
There are 'bound to be some problems along the way, 
especially with the changing of die-hard attitudes. This 
will be the-most difficult hurdle in -Malaysia. - Also 
Malaysia -faces a 'problem of having a completely different 
history from that of Japan. As has been mentioned earlier, 
company - loyalty, in, Japan, is more of 'a byproduct of the 
hiring-and employment -systems' there' and also because of 
the strong tradition of groupism that pervades all aspects 
of Japanese society. In Malaysia, because -of the British- 
oriented industrial system, the-labour workforce is highly 
mobile., Although traditionallyp the multi-racial 
Malaysian society used to be group-oriented like the 
Japanese'. today -they have changed and become more 
individualistic. For, example, it, is true that Malaysians 
still display the tradition of helping each - other but 
cooperation is confined mainly at the village levelý'If a 
such spirit''is brought to' the, workplace (as the Japanese 
have transferred village values to the workplace)t the 
existing direction in which the Malaysians are heading 
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needs to-change course again. This may not be easy to, do, 
and even if it could be done, it will take time -to have 
any I meaningful effect'. 
8.18.3. Open Office System 
The -open office system is already an established practice 
in Malaysia', especially in the private sector and it is 
increasingly practised in the public sector. As mentioned 
by the senior managers in the survey, the percentage of 
public enterprises practising open office is very high, 
i. e. 70.9%.: The open office concept makes sense to the 
public: enterprises in view of the huge workforce in the 
public sector. The latest figure estimated that public 
sector employees in Malaysia account for about 65% of the 
total Malaysiant workforce (Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986). In 
earlier times, it was common for those holding, say, a 
chief clerk post and above to occupy one room each. At 
that time it is easy to accommodate this pattern of office 
arrangement as , the size of the organisation is small. 
Today, 'with the size of employees in public sector getting 
larger (about 815,000), thereby making working spaces 
scarce, coupled with the increasing costs to maintain 
many compartmentalised offices, it is only proper to go 
for -the open office system. It is necessary to dispense 
with- , the established tradition of having many separate 
rooms for ý staff of management ranksl even if', it means 
demotivating some of them. A open office system must be 
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the logical answer. The survey in this study supportsýthis 
contention for it found out that 55% of employees and 
47.1% of senior managers respectively agreed with the idea 
of open, office system for their organisations. They are 
quick to realise the many advantages associated with the 
open office. -,, system (referýto the discussion in Chapter 5), 
the most important being that the control mechanism it 
provides. By having many employees working together in, one 
room with their immediate'superior, both the employees and 
their immediate superior ; can check each other. However, 
the open office system, both for the subordinates and 
managers is a most effective monitoring and open learning 
system. 
Like'ý others, this Japanese management technique is not 
problem-fre'e. The problem with, this system- can come from 
the junior management 'group who 'feel their status may be 
curta: iled by such arrangement. It must be remembered that 
their colleagues, - *in earlier ' years had enjoyed the 
privilege of separate rooms and such a notion can be 
demoralising to this particular group. ' If the' public 
enterprise could afford it, as an interim measure, perhaps 
it would be wise to' provide a separate room for -junior 
managers not necessarily to be used separately or occupied 
permanently. The idea is that if for example, -a, superior 
gets tired of sitting at his place together with their 
immediate subordinates, - or- works on something 
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confidential, he can retreat to this 'management- group' 
room. In this , room ', he would not be alone, for he may 
occasionally be joined; by colleagues who, like him 
sometimes prefer to do do work in this room. 
8.18.4. Group Responsibility. 
Group responsibility refers to theý sharing of 
responsibilities by workers in a particular organisation 
in ensuring the successful completion of an assigned task. 
This popular practice of-Japanese-style management can be 
successfully transferred to Malaysian workforce as is 
supported by the results of the survey. Although Malaysian 
employees have been criticised for lacking group 
commitment and that-most prefer to claim individual credit 
so as to enhance their own career, an -earlier discussion 
has - pointed out that traditionally, Malaysians have been 
known to be a group-oriented people. 
The Western -influence, which is characterised by 
individualism and independence is cited for the cause of 
deterioration in groupism among the Malaysians of today. 
However at their ýown community level, the group 
responsibility still, pervades the Malaysian society 
especially in the rural areas. In constructing a house or 
a wooden bridge, every able bodied individual in a village 
will come to help. As in Japan, -during-the rice harvesting 
season, the farmers, arrange the gotong royong (performing 
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task together in a group). As mentioned in the earlier 
chapter, the supportive spirit in the Malaysian community 
has been also witnessed in certain ceremonies like 
weddings, or when there is a mishap like an accident or 
death in theýfamily. Others come voluntarily bringing with 
them'some cash or goods to help'the affected, family. This 
lowell spirit which is the cornerstone of oriental, 
especially Japanese, culture, in the author's opinion,, can 
be transferred to the Malaysian public enterprises in the 
same manner the Japanese have transplanted it to their 
companies. I- I 
What is the likely problem here? Again it has to do with 
the' individualistic nature of the Malaysian workforce. 
As was pointed earlier, in Japan, a person's status or 
position is always defined in relation to, the group. As a 
member of a group, the individual is expected to conform 
to prescribed norms, assume given responsibilities, and 
dispense certain obligations in accordance with 
hierarchical position in the group. A Malaysian worker is 
individualistic and ýthe system of work in 'Malaysian 
organisation does not encourage Malaysian enterprises to 
operate along the lines of familialism. In Japan, as have 
been' seen, employees are regarded as protected and cared 
for'by their employer. For this'reason, employees in Japan 
are said to be very, supportive and 'responsible in 
discharging their duties as this is a means to reciprocate 
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to their organisation. Employers in Malaysia hardly 
protect their employees beyond what is legally necessary. 
It is argued that because of such treatment, the Malaysian 
workers also do not place the interest of their 
organisations above their personal interests. The number 
of public enterprises providing housing and other related 
benefits is increasing, but the amount of 'the bene , fit is 
far from what is being provided for by those in Japanese 
organisations. To emulate this Japanese feature,, the' 
existing attitudes in the employers and employees have to 
be changed or discarded completely; ' perhaps, -with the' 
employer making the first'move in this'direction, 
8.18.5. Job-rotation. 
Job-rotation has been widely used in the government 
service before the "Look East" policy whereby a worker is 
transferred from time to time at, the direction of the top 
management or at his own'reques't. Týe_"Look East" policy 
therefore helps to 'intensify its use and make it more 
systematic. In 
, as far as the '-public enterprises 'is 
concerned, the statistics' from the ' survey indicate the 
wideýiprea'dl of - the job-rotation practice in 'public 
enterprises and this proves that the integration of the 
Japanese-style job-rotation is indeed feasible. For 
instance, of the senior managers involved in the survey, ' 
55.7% said their' organisation practised job-rotation. 
Asked if they would recommend this practice, 57.7% of them 
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said 'yes' to its implementation in their organisations. 
The 
-employees were also receptive 
towards this Japanese 
technique whereby 55.4% were said to have recommended job- 
rotation system for adoption in their organisations. This 
favourable reception from the senior managers as well as 
the employees strongly supports the earlier study in 1986 
made by the author on the the feasibility of this practice 
in the public sector where 67% of scale C and D employees 
of a public enterprises said they supported job-rotation 
exercises. It was found that in the same study, a typical 
Malaysian worker in public enterprise had been rotated to 
different jobs for an average of 2.5 times in every 5 
years within the department. 
8.19. Not-So-Transferable Japanese-style Nanagement Type 
It has been experienced in many, 
_ 
countries I 
that Japanese7 
style management may not be easily transplanted. at will as 
evident in the UK (Wonorof f, 1981; Dore, -, 
1982; Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1988), in US (Torrence,, 1983; Cool and 
Lengnick-Hall, 1985; Weinshall, 1986; ) and in Southeast 
Asian countries (Chen, - 
1982; Tomita, 1983; Putti and 
Chong, 1985; and Ek, 1987). As... Yamada explained; 
",,, since Japanese-style management is a unique system 
formed,, within Japanese society and-. culture, to take and 
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put it into ýpractice overseas produces resistance and 
friction... o, "(1981: p. 10). 
The Japanese management practices which are difficult (but 
not- impossible) to bring to Malaysian enterprises as seen 
from the survey include ringi, less dependence on manual, 
paternal leadership and enterprise unionism. They can be 
transferred when, in the opinion of the author, the 
climate to accept them have been adequately created. At 
t. he moment, they are not appealing yet as was evidenced by 
the, opinion of the workers and senior managers alike. 
8.19.1. Ringi 
Ringi is not likely to be transferred, according to the 
managers and -workers. Only 3.8% of senior managers and 
4.5% of employees thought this practice was transferable 
to Malaysian public enterprises. A logical reason for 
this is the fact that the two groups have rejected it may 
be not so much they do not like the system, but it may be 
due to ignorance as to what the mechanism involves. The 
author found out that of the senior managers in the 
survey, only 27.1% -is being 
familiar with it while those 
of the employees, only 26.8% were said to know what ringi 
is all. about. 
The - author, however, strongly believes ringip and also 
nemawashi are already being widely used by the Malaysians 
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without" themý realising it. The Malays for 'example always 
seek nasihat (guidance) from the wise and the Dayaks have 
baum(meeting/discussion) to resolve some matters 
affecftng-ý" their 'lives in their 'village-. These are mini- 
versions of Japanese nemawashi. There, isý a strong case, to 
suggest that ringi together, with-nemawashi, can be- a 
practisable form, of management feature, in Malaysia. The 
fact -that ý the Malays ý are so used to, mesyuarah (group 
discussion) and, gotong royong (performing together in ý, a 
group)- at-- work,, makes this management-practice easily 
acceptable. 
But now, with the management system that underlines a 
philosophy 'whereby the- management group- decides-and 
subordinates carry out the-actiong this ringi system could 
not -be easily ' implanted in the existing-system as- yet. 
There is yet another problem. The, line management group 
has not-been too receptive to ringi. One" supervisor who 
wrote'lý a supplementary note' in one ofý the survey's 
questionnaires ''openly stated -that the- disapproved the 
concept , of 'ringi because , being so used to having 
authority, 'he - naturally would prefer not to share 
whatever little power he had with his subordinates as is 
required-of the ringiý system. Thisq he reasoned, was why 
he opposed ringi system'. The problem here indicates that 
supervisors -consider sharing opinion or discussing with 
subordinates would mean diminishing their power. This is a 
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of course a misconception and it ought to be corrected in 
order to to make ringi more readily acceptable. 
8.19.2. Less Dependence on Manual (Rule Book) 
The administrative, scene in public enterprises at. present 
is characterised by a high degree of bureaucratic red- 
ýtape. There is a clear division of functions, and rules 
and regulations for everybody. The rigid structure ýhas 
resulted-in Malaysian workers being a manual-oriented 
society and to lack initiative to do anything extra than 
what is defined by, the official job description. This has 
been said to be the product of Western style management. 
However, ýwith the new line of thinking at top management 
level , especially in governmentl which -is currently 
reassessing-the appropriateness of Western ýstyle of 
management, there is a widespread realisation among, many 
senior managers that-the dependence on work manual at the 
work place is not a productive ýand healthy practice. A 
working approach that is flexible but yet effective is 
what is needed to solve the present bureaucratic problems 
found in Malaysian organisations. _This Japanese-style 
management 'which does not require a person to - consult 'a 
work manual as long as he gets the job done therefore 
makes sense. This is the reason why the' author firmly 
believes-in the great potential of this Japanese system, of 
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management although at present itf has not been able to 
gain substantial support yet in Malaysia 
8.19.3. Paternal'Leadership 
The paternal leadership Japanese-style is - feasible for 
Malaysian public enterprises according to 17.7% of senior 
managers and 18.3% of 'them' recommendý it for' their 
organisations. The employees are less favourable towards 
this Japanese-style management in that 12.5% think. -it can 
be' applied to 'their organisations but interestingly 
enough, 29.5% recommend it , for introduction into their 
organisations. The' reason why employees are not so 
confident: about its feasibility but nevertheless' more of 
them recommending -its use may 
be because - they know, this 
system is a useful- system. -Paternal leadership means the 
employers treat -, employees more like their own family 
membersýproviding'their family's needs. In return, workers 
are expected to strongly identify with the company. It can 
be ' said' that in Japan, - the paternal leadership type of 
management - has developed as a result of lifetime 
employment. ' Viewed from this perspective, it is not hard 
to understand why the system cannot be easily assimilated 
into ' the Malaysian scene. "As has been mentioned, the 
philosophy of work in Malaysia is different from Japan and 
in the opinion of the'author, unless Malaysia incorporates 
also the 'so-called lifetime employment,, it is difficult 
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to see how paternal leadership practice can fit into the 
Malaysian system of management. 
8.19.4. Enterprise Unionism. 
This form of Japanese practice has been opposed by-certain 
quarters in the - industrial relations that has - been a 
historical product' of British colonial administration. In 
this particular survey, senior managers who think this 
practice can be introduced and accepted by their employees 
constituted a mere 7.7%. The participating employees in 
the survey, - who said enterprise unionism -are practisable 
consisted of only 9.8%. The main reason for this lukewarm 
attitude-is-the fear that the workers will be exploited, by 
the unscrupulous employer for under enterpriseý 'unionismý 
the union -members in different firms within that -industry 
will not have the collective strength to bargain better 
wages and terms of employment with employer anymore., - 
- r- - 
The results of the survey indicating the not-so-positive 
response towards enterprise unionism seems to contradict 
the popularity and increasing number of enterprise unions 
that have been formed as reported by the statistics, from 
the Manpower Report of the Ministry of Labour, 1987-1988 
which stated that enterprise unions form 75% of the total 
trade unions in public enterprise and 47% of the total 
trade unions in the country (refer to the discussion -in 
chapter 6). -An explanation for the poor rating of this 
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Japanese practice by senior managers and employees of 
public enterprises despite the fact that enterprise unions 
form a substantial percentage of the trade unions in-the 
Malaysia (especially after the launching of ý the "Look 
East" policy), -is that the industrial - relations scene in 
the country is still pro-British. It'is also believed that 
after becoming members of the newly created enterprise 
unions, the workers now realise that the British-type 
craft unions' rather than enterprise unions appear r to be 
more stronger in protecting and representing their 
interests. It is also argued that the proliferation of 
enterprise unions in the public enterprise sector has been 
due to a response by employers of public enterprises to 
the government's call to look "East". It is suggested here 
that these employers are only too happy to oblige by 
forming enterprise unions to replace the powerful 
craft unions which always cause, them problems. 
Judging from the present trend of industrial relations in 
Malaysia which emphasises on cooperation rather than 
confrontation and based on the growing number of 
enterprise unions, the author believes*enterprise unionism 
is slowly gaining ground and can become one of the 
important features in the Malaysian industrial relations 
scene. This optimism is also supported by the survey's 
finding in which 13.9% of the senior managers mentioned 
that enterprise unionism is practised in their 
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organisations. Clad (1984) mentioned that in-house-union 
comprised slightly more than 15,000 members which is a 
quarter of the total union membership. He also mentioned 
that most in-house unions (133 by June 1984) were found in 
the public sector as compared to private sector (only 
36). This means the "Look East" policy, can be said to be 
quite successful in this particular area. 
8.20. Untransferable Japanese-style Management - Type III 
The practices that are obviously not going to succeed in 
penetrating. Malaysian public enterprises based on the 
survey feedbacks are sub-contracting system, , kanban, JIT, 
lifetime employment and seniority-wage system. 
8.20.1. Sub-contracting. 
Sub-contracting is not popular and less familiar to many 
senior managers and employees, making it very difficult to 
gain acceptance in public enterprises in Malaysia. Those 
sent to Japan for training probably were not exposed to 
sub-contracting system may be because -they were only to 
be trained in areas relevant to their jobs. Another 
reason for the low level of familiarity with the sub- 
contracting system by senior managers as well as employees 
is because many public enterprises in Malaysia are non- 
manufacturing firms. Since sub-contracting is more widely 
used in manufacturing or production-oriented 
organisations, such technique takes a backseat. Another 
0 
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likely reason ý for its rejection is the fact -that the 
organisational structure of Malaysian public enterprises 
is too- Western-oriented and there is no way ' the sub- 
contractingýsystem can be used in the present arrangement. ' 
8.20.2. Kanban. 
This Japanese management-style is not readily accepted for 
the same reason that the sub-contracting system is not 
well-received. Besides the unreadiness of the public 
enterprises to have it, the fact that senior managers are 
not well-trained,,, in this method adds, to the obstacle in 
the implementation of such practice in publicenterprises. 
Even- if the-kanban system is -, transferable from that 
perspective, its application would be restricted to 
manufacturing-'ý enterprises like Proton,, '%Hicom,, -etc, while 
in 'the-majority-of 'service-oriented -enterprises, they 
would be of no re'levance. Most manufacturing-activities, in 
Malaysia are ý in the hand, of private firms' and that 'those 
manufacturing activities -run by public enterprises are 
mostly going to be privatised soon. In-- light, of this, 
kanban would not feature prominently either in a private 
or-public sector. 
8.20.3., Just-in-Time (JIT)., 
Like kanban, -there is not much need to have JIT in most 
public- enterprises for unlike the private sector, the 
public enterprises mostly do not require this management 
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style.. With most of the public enterprises -carrying out 
service-oriented activities, 'JIT, will not be appropriate 
for use at present. The existing system, (i. e. philosophy 
and structure) of public- enterprises in Malaysia is not 
conducive to use JIT too. 
8.20.4. Lifetime Employment. - !- 
In theory, Lifetime Employment in which employees work for 
only one organisation until. retirement in return for 
security ' assurance, sounds very attractive to the 
employees but yet -the survey's result of this study 
indicated convincingly employees do not want it to be 
implemented-, for - them. The senior managers also express 
views-stating they did, not fancy -this Japanese system. In 
the first- place, the Malaysian management system is too 
committed to the : existing system that it is almost 
impossible to follow this practise, so say the senior 
managers. They further insist that this system cannot work 
as long as the employees , themselves still prefer to be 
mobile in pursuing their career and insist on freedom to 
chart their own career objective. Specifically, if Job- 
hopping ýis not legally stopped or heavily penalised (i. e 
heavy "penalty imposed on leaving employees as well as 
their' new, employer), - it , is hard to see how lifetime 
employment would fit into the Malaysian public 
enterprises. 
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A-number of factors are against this management practice 
in: the Malaysian context. In the first place, it cannot 
fit into the present employment system in Malaysia. 
Secondly,, for, the employer, the lifetime employment system 
is costly to maintain and considering the fact that public 
enterprises in Malaysia have large workforces, the 
organisation will find this system a liability rather than 
an asset-. Thirdly, for employees the system will restrict 
them to an organisation they no longer want to be 
associated with. The system offers no recourse for someone 
who likes to change career at a later stage of his working 
career because his experience will be not valued and that 
no other organisation readily takes him in the lifetime 
employment system. - It is not surprising to learn that 
the-percentage of senior managers saying this practice can 
be practised constituted only 10.6%, while their employee 
counterparts constituted 15.2%. When asked if they would 
recommend the practice in their respective organisations, 
both groups are also less enthusiastic about it. For 
instance, from the senior managers' group only 24.0% 
recommended it and from the employees' side, only 28.6% 
gave their support to it. 
8,20.5. Seniority-wage System. 
Seniority-wage system in Japan is seen to being 
complementary the lifetime employment. The unpracticality 
of Lifetime Employment to Malaysian labour force's 
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environment also means that seniority-wage system cannot 
not, be brought to Malaysia. The results of the survey in 
which only 8.7% of the senior managers viewed it a 
feasible practice and 19.2% of them ý recommended it for 
their organisationý just shows the, degree of its 
unpopularity in - Malaysian public enterprises. The 
employees-also expressed their rejection of'seniority-wage 
system as only 16.1% thought it a feasible practice and 
that , less that one-quarter (20.2%) recommended the 
practice for use in their organisation. It should be noted 
that although both groups reject this Japanese management 
practice, the employees seem more favourable towards it. 
8.21. Summary of the Survey 
Senior managers and ordinary ý employees both unanimously 
agreed that elements of - Japanese-style management can be 
transferred to Malaysia. But''not all of the practises are 
transferable'to as well as practisable in Malaysian public 
enterprises. Those which are practisable are the 
techniques which -are considered most- likely to bring 
positive contributions, (i. e. , good attributes) to their 
employees like the high standard of work ' ethics, 
discipline, company loyalty, and industriousness; those 
that do not conflict with their culture and values 
(especially religious values). Those practices, that would 
not bring new- problems to the existing set-up of the 
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present organisations are also considered easily 
transferable practises. 
The management practices that can be easily transferred to 
Malaysian public enterprises are QCC, company loyalty# 
open office system, group responsibility and job-rotation. 
The not-so-easy to transfer. techniques include the ringip 
less dependence on-manual system, paternal leadership, and 
enterprise union. The most difficult, if not impossible 
Japanese management imports to transplant into Malaysia 
are sub-contracting, "kanban, ringi, lifetime employment 
and seniority-wage system. " 
The survey reveals clearly that in order , to transfer 
Japanese-style management , successfullyt some Japanese 
features may have to be modified. They have to work in 
tandem with the existing practices, because Malaysia has 
been ' exposed to and in fact is currently practising -a 
combination of the' management practicesjý which ar. e 
basically ýpro-Western. It is further noted that, in 
addition to this complex situation, Malaysia is different 
from ýJapan culturally, socially, economically, ý and 
politically. Whereas Japan is a homogenous society, 
Malaysia is a multi-racial and multi-religious society. 
This background has ' to be given serious attention in 
considering the 'Japanisation' of Malaysian public 
enterprises. 
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There -are consequently many factors, influencing the 
transferability issues of Japanese-style management into 
Malaysia., Among them are the British rule,, the rich 
multi-racial traditions and cultural heritage, the 
Islamic* revival movement, the present nationalistic 
educational*system, the educational background'as well as 
earlier -training of management elites and lastly 'the 
established system operating in Malaysia. Howeverg the 
"Look East" policy will tip the balance in its favour. 
The "Look East" policy has been having a difficult time. 
The survey reveals a number of problems in attempting to 
import Japanese management practices, of which among them 
are: (i). strong resistance from the older generation of 
Malaysians; (ii). inadequate knowledge of Japanese 
management techniques on the part of implementors; (iii) 
problems of unreadiness of public enterprises themselves 
to change; and (iv). new problems not anticipated as a 
result of practising Japanese management practices, These 
problems are made worst by the unhelpful attitude of the 
Japanese who have been invited to assist in the "Look 
East" policy , but were found to be unhelpful in imparting 
their expertise and knowledge to the Malaysians. 
It is concluded that although Japanese management 
practices (some of them of course) are beyond doubt, 
transferable to Malaysia and can be (in fact have been) 
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practised in the Malaysian public enterprises, they will 
not dominate in the country. The Japanese-style management 
will be just another addition to, the already varied old 
fashioned collections ', of Malaysian managers. Those who 
think otherwise, boldly predict that if it will become so, 
it is' expected to take place somewhere between 1990 to 
1995. It remains to be seen when -, this will actually 
happens. 
L 
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. CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1. Concluding Remarks 
After discussing the current literature and also the 
findings of the research survey and its analysis on 
Japanese-style managementp the author would like to 
summarise- his views by making the following concluding 
remarks: 
l. -This study-confirms earlier studies that Japanese- 
style-- management 'isp to a considerable extentj culture- 
-bound. It is 'difficult, but not impossible 'to transfer 
Japanese management practices to foreign countries whose 
cultures -are different from Japan. Examination of the 
current literature reveals that Japanese-style . management 
in its totality cannot be easily transplanted to countries 
such as -the US and. the UK , where there are vast 
differences in the cultural settings. Even in countries 
such as Taiwan and South Korea which share some common 
cultural heritage, i. e. Confucian cultureq with Japan, it 
has been- discovered that the majority of -Japanese- 
management features do not- transfer easily* -The survey in 
this study has again proven that the cultural element is 
among-the most important factors that has toýbe recognised 
-493- 
in the transferability of Japanese management practices to 
Malaysia. However, it must be pointed out that some 
Japanese features can be transferred to and practised in 
foreign countries successfully as had been seen in the 
the US and the UK. Specifically QCC, job-rotation and open 
office practices are the major features of Japanese-style 
management which 'have been widely practised without much 
difficulty in these countries. 
2. In the case of Malaysia, this study reveals that some 
elements of the Japanese-style management are transferable 
'to the Malaysian public enterprise sector. Based on the 
research survey, sufficient evidences have emerged to 
support this- contention. One major observation, is the 
widespread adoption of techniques such as QCC among the 
Malaysian public enterprises. This can be considered an 
acceptance of Japanese-style management by Malaysians. 
Also, the fact that the job-rotation system forms a major 
feature in the majority of organisations in Malaysia is 
another clear indication that Japanese management practice' 
has transferred quite successfully to Malaysian public 
enterprises already. The trend towards the open office 
system in Malaysian organisations in which management and 
non-management group commonly work together in open spaces 
is also'proof that some elements Japanese-style management 
have firmly established itself in Malaysia. It 'can -be 
further argued that the establishment of Malaysian trading 
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companies -- by the Malaysian government along the ý line of 
sogo shosas is also a direction towards, as well as an 
acceptance of, the Japanese management system 'in the 
country, 
On theý whole, there appears to beý some commonality 
regarding the transferability issues. In fact the 
interesting thing is that most of the things that would-be 
acceptable in America and Britain and other developing 
countries are acceptable in Malaysia. However, two 
fundamental differences -between these countries and 
Malaysia have been identified. On one hand, Islam possibly 
provides a more stronger barrier than either Christianity 
or the variations of Confucianism found in China-led 
countries (although it must be pointed out that a number 
of elements "of Islam are -also conducive as well), 'and on 
the 'other ýhand, with the possible exception of', Singaporep 
there does not appear to be a government-led Japanisation 
process in the other countries. There is a "push" by the 
government and therefore people's response (in Malaysia) 
to Japanisation may be coloured more by the fact that it 
is government-led than by the fact that it is ýwhat they 
want. 
3. The number of , problems relating especially to 
inefficiency which besets the Malaysian public enterprises 
cannot be, totally blamed on the past or existing 
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management system currently in operation. Malaysian public 
enterprises are facing serious problems such , as 
accumulating heavy financial losses, mismangement, 
bureaucratic red-tape, corruption, and demoralised 
employees etc. which are, of course, also found in public 
enterprises in Japan and other parts of, the world. 
Japanese-style management could not be the only solution 
to these problems. It is further concluded that the 
problems in public enterprises in Malaysia, as experienced 
by their counterparts elsewhere have been caused by a 
combination of factors such as socio-economic, financial, 
political ideology and government policies. Having been 
exposed , to the limitations of Japanese-style management 
earlier, it would be a fallacy to pin too much hope in 
Japanese-style 'management to solve these problems. 
Malaysian public enterprises cannot therefore be expected 
to use Japanese-style management as a panacea for the 
problems- they 'are facing presently. This is because, 
public enterprises being created by the government,, will 
continue to be used by it to achieve its desired 
objectives (i. e. political), which are more often than not 
contrary to the "universal principles" of management. As 
long asý public enterprises continue to remain government 
instruments-, and cannot free themselves from government 
interferences, no matter what model of management - is 
applied, it will not work. Even the public enterprises 
such as JNR in Japan (refer to discussion *in chapter' 4) 
-496- 
where, Japanese-style management is practised, have 
problems, similar in nature and magnitude to their 
counterparts in other part of the world. This -is a clear 
proof that,, although highly effective in a number of some 
big private Japanese companies, Japanese-style management 
has been -ineffective when used in Japanese public 
enterprises. It would be pretentious to hope that the 
Japanese management model can be effective, for the public 
enterprises in Malaysia when even in the country of its 
origin, it has a record of having failed. 
4. For- Japanese management techniques which are well- 
accepted in Malaysia, the author feels ýtheir role should 
be seen as additional management features supplementing 
the existing management practices found in Malaysia. This 
being the case, ýattempts should not be made to replace the 
already well-established system of mixed management 
practices in Malaysia because it upsets rather than helps 
the situation. ; It is strongly believed that in the 
immediate future, the Japanese-style management will not 
or" cannot replace existing management practices because 
of the strong preference for Western management style 
among the older generation managers and also because 
Islamic values have gained a footing among the younger 
managers in the country. ý In many casesp Japanese-style 
practices -would have to -undergo modifications before they 
can be adopted in the . country. Malaysia, being a, multi- 
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racial* and multi-religious society can tolerate the 
varieties in management styles as -long as they do not 
undermine their traditions, culturesq values and most 
important of alL theý national religion- of. the country. 
This explains the, management preference of the majority of 
Malaysian managers and employees who, according to the 
survey, said they prefer the rojak or mixed type of 
management style rather than Japanese-style management., In 
the author's -opinion, what will emerged is a newly 
modified rojak incorporating-, the latest strengths of the 
nation (Japan) of which the Malaysians are aspiring to 
catch up and surpass. The author will call this new hybrid 
form ofmanagement as the -"rojak-Japanese" -or RJ style- 
management. 
5. -The Japanese management practices such as QCC j" company 
loyalty; ' 'open office' system, which have been considered 
suitable for use in Malaysian public enterprises can help 
to create- a productive Malaysian workforce, if they are 
applied properly and with dedication. The main - problem 
with the' Malaysians now is that they seem to discard the 
group mentality featured prominently among the older 
generation of Malaysians during earlier times and as a 
result, ý the Malaysians of today ý are becoming too 
individualistic, too opportunistic and somewhat contented. 
The Japanese-style management can reawaken in them again 
to return to traditional communal values. It -is in this 
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role-that Japanese-style management, can be of considerable 
significance to the public enterprises in Malaysia. 
6. There are many problems in transferring elements of 
Japanese-style management to Malaysia in general and to 
the -Malaysian public enterprises in particular. One of 
them is ýthe unreadiness of Malaysian workforce to take 
Japanese techniques seriously because they are so used to 
the present existing management system. The author is of 
the opinion thatý top management people have ýto make the 
firstýgenuine move to lead their subordinates. The attempt 
to adopt, Japanese-style management has suffered serious 
setbacks in Malaysia because so far, most the Malaysian 
managers"are not well-versed "with Japanese management 
techniques. This is why -some of them appear- to pay lip 
service only to the call of the "Look East" policy 
although they agree it is a good policy. 
The study suggests it has also to do with their 
backgrounds. A majority ýof - of them are Wes tern- trained. 
There are also some problems due to cultural 
differences. Some are simply prejudiced against Japanese 
management methods, while others are always suspicious of 
change that can uproot their traditional, values and 
religion. Malaysians do not easily forget the damage that 
Westernisation had inflicted upon them. Also Japan and 
Malaysia are two nations which are different in many 
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respects - politically, economically, socially and 
culturally. The effort of bringing in Japanese-style 
management to'Malaysia is an uphill battle because of the 
already "ugly Japanese" image held by the people -in the, 
Southeast Asian region. This is further accentuated by the- 
insensitivity and lack'of understanding by the Japanese 
towards local people with whom they come into contact 
with. The Japanese have been accused of as being not good 
teachers'. Evidences from this study suggest they simply do 
not -try hard enough to disseminate their expertise. Some 
Malaysian managers and workers even accuse them of being 
selfish and arrogant. 
7. The "Look 'East" policy will be the most important 
determining factor in seeing that the "Japanisation" of 
Malaysian public enterprises will survive in years to 
come,., If the next Prime Minister who replaces Dr. Mahathir 
(he is rumoured to stepping down soon) changes priority 
and suddenly decides to abandon the policy, it will be the 
end of Japanisation in Malaysia. But this is not to say 
that without the official policy by the government- 
Malaysian managers will not implement elements of the 
Japanese-style management. What is meant here is that 
without the government's strong backingp Japanisation in 
the public sector would have not seen the intensity--and 
magnitude it has seen today. In the judgement of the 
author, it is not likely that Japanese-style management 
-500- 
will be thrown out by whoever takes over the reins of the 
present leadership in the country. The timing for such 
action would be considered premature for the stakes (i. e. 
Proton Car Project) are too high to change gear now . Why 
should it change when there are a lot of benefits to be 
accrued from Japanese expertise? 
8. It is too early to say Malaysia has fully achieved the 
objectives of her "Look East" policy to replicate Japan's 
success by adopting Japanese-style management. It is also 
not'accurate to claim Malaysia has successfully emulated 
Japanese ýmanagement' techniques which are said to be 
responsible, for the successful formula of Japanese 
economic dominance. It must be reiterated again that the 
technological or economic success of Japan has been shown 
to be not solely due to her management system (refer to 
discussion in chapter 5). At best, Japanese-style 
management techniquesq especially those of personnel 
management has been very effective in developing a 
conducive environment at work which consequently results 
in high productivity and strong commitment from the 
workforce. - 
There - are some obvious weaknesses in the system, 
especially when applied to the different environment 
settings which are alien to Japanese culture. As of now, 
the impact of "Look East" policy has not been that evident 
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yet,, for many Malaysian managers of the older generation, 
as we have found out from the survey, do not appear too 
enthusiastic about Japanese management techniques. It will 
not-dominate the public sector in the near future. 
However, one -thing is quite clear: the transferability of 
Japanese-style management to Malaysia is and has been 
feasible as indicated by the extent of its use in public 
enterprises and that this has been, to a large extent, 
made a lot easier by the implementation of the 
government's" Look East" policy. 
9; After systematically analysing the facts, the author 
finds''that there is no'such thing as "secrets" to be 
found in Japanese-style management. It can be further said 
that Japanese-style management is after all not "unique" 
as has been portrayed. On the contrary, some of -the 
techniques'. ýare more of common sense which include 
management principles which are already known In the West 
but not practised by Western managers. On the other hand, 
the Japanese observed and applied them with consistency. 
For example, to increase workers' morale and to improve 
productivity, Japanese managers ensure that everyone in 
the organisation understands the ýpurpose of what they are 
doing and why they are doing it. Workers are asked to work 
as a team or in groups i. e. QCC. ' They are encouraged to 
bring in ideas i. e. suggestion system; and they are asked 
to participate in decision-making which affect their work 
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i. e. ringi ýsystem. Also, status differences between 
managers and workers are de-emphasised -i. e. wearing of 
common uniforms and eating in the same canteen. In the 
words of, one- writer, these are "the basics of business 
which- are taught in first year of any North American 
business program" (McCallum, 1986). ýThe lifetime 
employment is not unique because its origin was a response 
to the war-torn nation which has to have that type of 
employment system and also because it is only enjoyed by a 
minority of Forkers; i. e. 30% of total workforce. There is 
nothing special -about the seniority-wage because with an 
ageing workforce problem in Japan today, Japanese 
companies . find , it a 
liability rather than an asset to 
them. - The, author would like to conclude - by saying that 
Japanese-style. , management 
is not that special and not 
that unique. it is just another management systeml having 
strengths and also weaknesses. 
9.2. Recommendations .1 
The author would like to make the following 
recommendations. - 
10- - The ý "Look East" policy , should 
be continued as a 
platform to transfer the Japanese management practices 
which are most relevant to the Malaysian needs in line 
with -the Malaysian government's intentions ý to create a 
productive workforce necessary for the countryls 
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industrialisation programme, Without the , strong 
encouragement of and backing by the governmentq attempts 
to bring'Japanese-style management could be futile in view 
of the, strong Western establishment among the public 
enterprise sector in the country. This involves the 
provision of funds for selected employees , of Malaysian 
workforce to undergo training in Japan; the setting-up of 
training programmes in Japanese management; and also the 
overseeing of "Look East" policy. Such tasks should not 
be difficult because presently the major source of finance 
and -the training programmes of the "Look East" policy are 
handled by the "Look East" Committee of the Prime 
Minister's Department at the higher level and- by the 
Division of the "Look East" Policy Division-in the Public 
Services Department at the lower level. What needs to be 
done is for these two bodies to develop a systematic plan 
and constantly improve their "Japanisation" programmes 
from time to, time. In this way the transferability of some 
relevant Japanese management practices to Malaysia in 
general and to public enterprises in particular will be 
more effective. Right now, the solid support from the 
government is still needed to carry out the transfer of 
the said management system to the country. 
2. Malaysian public enterprises should continue to . be 
selective in- adopting Japanese-style management practices. 
To replace the existingý management system entirely with 
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the Japanese management system would not be a possible 
option in view of the already established Malaysian rojak 
management, system. A change of direction is not in the 
best interest of the country, because it will involve, the 
a, complete restructuring of the present public 
enterprises. It will be a very costly and time-consuming 
process to-. embark on such exercise. Furthermore, such a 
drastic step is unwarranted because,, as this study has 
indicated, not all management techniques from Japan are 
useful or, applicable to Malaysia. The task of determining 
which Japanese management practices are to be transferred 
or not should lie with the top management of public 
enterprises. These-- practices must meet some agreed upon 
criteria - for, instancet ones which are beneficial to the 
organisations, in which they are to be used; ones which are 
highly acceptable to the majority of employees; and ones 
which are flexible enough to co-exist with the current 
management practices in Malaysia. Based on the survey's 
findings, potential features to be adopted would be open 
office system, QCC, job-rotation and company loyalty. 
3. It ý is further recommended that Malaysia should not 
attempt to "Japanise" -too aggressively in the public 
enterprises because it can backfire, bearing, in mind that 
many managers and employees prefer the present management 
practices (the mixed type of management). Government 
officials who are entrusted with the "Look East" policy 
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must also not mislead the people to believe that the 
Japanese-style ýmanagement can be used as the solution to 
solve, their problems at work. They should however, insist 
that these practices can be used as one of 'the many 
alternatives to improve or minimise the problems faced in 
public enterprises. 'It has been made clear that there is 
after all no such "secrets" of Japanese-style management. 
Many of the management practices from Japan are-universal 
management concepts but they had been cleverly refined, by 
the Japanese who claim now these are their management 
style. What the Malaysians should do is to continue with 
what they are doing now,, , i. e. '- to COPY the appropriate 
Japanese-style, management techniques and refine them to 
the Malaysian needs. The transferability of Japanese-style 
management is more likely to achieve , success if it is 
allowed to appear naturally in the eyes of the, Malaysian 
public and' that selective management , practices with 
perhaps, some modifications are introduced. This would be 
the most ideal approach to use to transfer Japanese-style 
management , successfully to- Malaysia. It -is further 
suggested - that Malaysians should emulate the Japaneseý 
attitude of observing the basics - that is', to do things 
they know should be done: ' the discipline, the hard work, 
honesty, -the 'willingness and ability to adapt to changes 
etc. -_ ý to achieve the success that had been achieved by 
the Japanese. After a119 this is what the"Look East" 
policy is all about. 
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4. When attempting to introduce elements of Japanese-style 
management, the concentration should be'aimed notýonly at 
the employees but also the management level too. The 
survey has shown that about', half of public enterprises' 
senior managers are still not exposed adequately to, the 
Japanese management techniques. The -resultý has far- 
reaching effects on the "Look East" policy. The senior 
managers involved in the research survey have shown they 
are not, avid practitioners of Japanese-style management. 
It has been suggested that this is due *to their little 
training exposure in Japanese-style management. More 
managers' in the future should be sent for attachment or 
industrial - posting -in Japan. It is also felt that the 
practice of sending Malaysians (managers or ordinary 
employees) to-Japan to learn specialised technique should 
be carried out -from time' to time and that the training 
should be long enough to be of significant value to the 
trainees. A time span of one-year for the general training 
in the form -, of industrial secondment is suggested. The 
basic' concepts, oU Japanese management should not be 
learned in' Japan. ýRather, special institutions -similar to 
INTAN or the National Productivity Centre should be 
established to teach the theoretical aspects of Japanese- 
style management. It is recommended that this proposed 
Institute be managed by the people who are experts in 
Japanese management, preferably those from the Japanese 
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industries and as well as from academic field who would 
be employed on a contract basis or secondment basis. 
5. As for the industrial training stint of employees in 
the public enterprises, special arrangement ý with 
Japanese firms should be made at the government level 
whereby Malaysian , public enterprises employees can be 
sent for training in Japanese subsidiaries located in 
Malaysia. This suggestion is based on the assumption that 
these Japanese subsidiaries are managed under Japanese- 
style management (with some modifications of course). Why 
should the industrial training in Japanese management be 
done far away in Japanese firms in Japan when it can take 
place in one's own backyard? It must be' remembered that 
many employees -detest being sent to Japan ýIto undergo 
training for many boring monthsl with their family members 
left behind. This -sort of training arrangement will come 
as a big, relief to many who fear, having to endure the 
feeling of loneliness in a foreign land. This approach-of 
transferring Japanese-style management is a viable one not 
only to Malaysia but to also other parts of the world. It 
will surely cut costs and most important of all, the 
people who are selected for training would be happy to 
undergo the training 'close to their homes. 
6. In the , process of trying to transfer eIements of 
Japanese management into the country, the government as 
-508- 
the1nitiator of the "Look East" policy, must take account 
of-many factors'especially the historical events that had* 
developed to form her present day's management system. It 
will be useful to know why Japanese are willing to work 
very hard for and very loyal to their company (i. e. they 
have to in order to survive and also because the nation 
lacks natural resources); it is beneficial, to understand 
how'' enterprise unionismo lifetime employment and 
recruitment practices were formed (i. e. due to the 
shortage of labour after the war);, it is necessary to 
study the reasons for using ringi and nemawashi systems 
and -it -would help to trace the origin of -groupism in 
Japanese companies. Imitating, Japanese management 
techniques without accounting for its historical, 
political, cultural, 'socio-economic background is an 
invitation-to disaster. In view of the fact that Islam is 
the official, religion in Malaysia and that the 
incorporation of Islamic values at work is increasing 
e. mphasised, the author strongly recommend that the 
government 'policy-makers should take the elements *of a 
Japanese' technique and see if they reproduce it - as an 
Islamic management technique. 
7. The Malaysian public enterprises may have everything to 
gain by making - more effort and greater investment in 
training Japanese-style because it has been seen from this 
study that Japanese training's philosophy and methods 
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(OJT and Off-OJT) have proven to be highly effective in 
creating a highly skilled labour force. The government of 
Malaysia can also model on Japanese education system in an 
effort to make a well-balanced, educated workforce of the 
future. Japanese government has made a tremendous 
investment in education, making Japanese people the most 
literate people in the world. Malaysia should follow the 
Japanese example in this respect. 
8. It has been pointed out that Japanese-style management 
alone cannot cope with the problems faced by-Malaysian 
public enterprises. Other means have to be found to solve 
these-problems. Corruption and inefficiency can be tackled 
by introducing a attractive formula of remuneration (i. e. 
giving bonus and profit sharing during profitable year) 
that is attractive and competitive with the private 
enterprise sector. The government should consider enacting 
law or public'enterprise act towards this direction. Also, 
Malaysian, public enterprises should consider privatisation 
as was done by JNR in Japan in order to improve their 
financial position and earn profit. If public enterprises 
are privatised, perhaps the problem of bureaucracy may be 
minimised. The practice of politicians holding positions 
as -chairman or board of directors in public enterprises 
needs serious reevaluation because examination of public 
enterprises's problems showed that mismanagement in public 
0 
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enterprises have often caused by politicians or political 
appointees misusing their power. 
9.3. Implications of Study. 
This study is- an exploratory study on Japanese-style 
management and its transferability to Malaysian public 
enterprise sector. In the Malaysian context, it is a new 
area of studies and its findings can be considered an 
additional contribution to existing management literature. 
it provides some interesting openings for future 
researchers who wish to study Japanese-style management 
with regards to certain aspects of the transferability 
issues in Malaysia. For instance,, future researchers can 
examine the transferability issues from the aspects of 
costs or strategies used; or a comparative study on the 
transferability of Japanese management techniques to 
public enterprise sector versus the private enterprise 
sector etc. It is hoped that others can picked up from the 
point where the author stops. 
The findings from this study will surely be of special 
interests to those senior government officials in Malaysia 
who are entrusted with the task of carrying out "Look 
East" policy in the country. This study can assist them in 
their evaluation of the present programs under the "Look 
East" policy. 
-511- 
To a lesser extent, this study provides a good insight of 
the mechanics of Japanese-style management. This thesis 
has summarised in a simplified form the features, 
strengths and weaknesses of Japanese-style management for 
the reader. Many of the myths about the Japanese-style 
management can perhaps be uncovered from this study. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 
UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING 
STIRLING, SCOTLAND FK9 4LA 
TELEPHONE: (0786) 73171 
TELEX: 777557 STUNIV G 
FAX 0786 63000 
,, December 15,1988. 
Dear Respondent, 
RE: RESEARCH SURVEY 
I am conducting a survey for, my thesis on the Japanese-style 
management and its practices in Malaysia with regards to the 
following aspects: 
a. The major features, strengths and weaknesses of 
Japanese-style management; 
b. The feasibility of adopting Japanese-style management 
and its implications; and, 
C. The prospects, problems and related issues of transfer- 
ability of Japanese-style management into the public 
enterprises in Malaysia. 
I need your whole-hearted support in this research survey by 
providing appropriate answers to all questions in the 
questionnaire enclosed. 
I believe that you are aware of our government's recently 
launched "Look East" policy which calls for Malaysians to 
emulate the Japanese. This research can provide insights 
into some of the issues regarding the transferability and 
applicability of Japanese-style management to Malaysia. 
Your participation in this survey would surely be of great 
significance because you are contributing a part in the 
governments' call to look "East". 
Please be rest assured that your identity as well as your 
opinions and views recorded in the questionnaire will be 
accorded the highest confidentiality. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
Sinceýeily yours, 
Mohd. Trudin Hj. Yasin, 
Department of Business and Management. 
Head of Department: Professor Tom Cannon 
MUCTION TO RESPONDENT: PLEASE JNSM 11 TIN BLANK SPACES PROVIDED. VER91 
TIRKAff" ANSMS All GIVEN, PLEASE CHOOSE THE MOT APPROPRIATE ANSVES(S) OF PUTTING A 
JCL1 TO THE ILMHEr BEFORE RACE ANSWER. HERE NECESSARY, YOU CAN PICI NORS THAN ONE 
ling to CERTAIN QMTIOKS. 
Nestion Variable Computer 
lusher Code/Column 
DO mot grTs HERS 
81CTIOM 1: 91SPONDINTIS PROFILE 
1. Tour Job's Title: 
2. Name of Your Organisation: - 
3. Your Race: 
A. Buiputra 6 
b. Chinese 
c. [ad! " --, i. Others; Please specify 
4. four leligiol 
a. Islas 
b. Christianity 
0. Buddhism 
1. Maims 
e Others; Please specify 
5. Your Ige Group; 
a. Belov 25 years 9 
b. 25-35 years old 
C. 36-41 years old 
d. . 46-55 Years old 
e. lbove 55 years old 
6. low long have you been in the present job ? 
A. Less than I year 
b. I year 
C. 2 years 
d. 3 years 
e. 4 years 
f. 5 years and above 
7. Prior to assuming this position, bov long have you been in other 
managerial position ? 
a. Less than I Year 
b. I year 
C. : years 
d. 3 years 
e. 4 years 
f. 5 years and above 
DO Nor FRITI MR 
1. fiat is your area of respofis! bill tieslduti to at present ? 
A. general Administration 
b. Iccountini and Finance 
C. Personaellfrainiag 
d. Salellmarketing 
e. Production/Engineering 
f. Others; ? lease specify 
9. Hick category would your job be classified 
a. Senior Hanagement Group 
b. Kiddle Nuagement Group 
C. Line/lower lanageseAt Group 
16. Vhat type of educational background do you have ? 
A. lave completed primary education 13 
b. lave completed secondary education 
C. lave completed tecinical/commercial colleges and institutes 
d. Have completed university 
11. If you kave completed collegetuniversity education, can you list 
your diplomas and degrees and areas of your speciallsation. 
Vase of Diploma Degrees Ireas of Specialisation 
9, 
b. 
C. 
d. 
It. Here did yu undertake your tertiary jeollege and uoiversity) 
education ? 
a. Local institution 
b. United Kingdom 
C. United States of Imerica 
I 
d. Ja ? an 
e. TALV&A 
f. Middle list 
Others: please specify 
13. Please list your Irotegsional qualifications, if any, 
A. 
d. 
14. Can you speak tie Japanese Language I 
a. No IF 
b. I little 
C. Reasonably well 
d. Very well 
DO Mor WIM HERE 
15. If You have chosen to T, Y or Y as your answer in Q. 14, 
where and Ay did you learn to speak tie language ? 
a. from school/college university as part of tie curriculum 16 
b. From the Intensive Course Program which I attended before 
I was sent for traininglcourse in Japan 
c. From the Language Correspondence Course which I took to 
assist me in communicating better with my Japanese 
counterparts. 
d. From private tuition as part of my iaterest in studying 
foreign language. 
e. From the Foreign Language class at 1, ocal institution that 
I took in order to prepare myself as a better executive 
in the light of the 'Look last' policy by tie government. 
f. Others: please specify 
11. Can you write in and read the Japanese Language 
a. go 
b. I Little 
C. Reasonably Well 
d. Very Well 
17. If you lave chosen Y, Y or 'd" as your answer in Q. 16, please 
tell where and why you learned to write in and read the 
Japanese language? 
A. From school/college/aniversity as part of the curriculum 
b. From the Intensive Course Program which I attended before 
I was sent for training/course in Japan 
c. From the Language Correspondence Course which I toot to 
assist me in communicating better with my Japanese 
counterparts. 
d. From private tuition as part of my interest in studying 
foreign language. 
e. From the Foreign Language class at local institution that 
I took in order to prepare myself as a better erecutive 
in light of the 'Look last' policy by the government. 
f. Others: please specify 
Is. Dow many times have you been to Japan ? 
a. Never 
b. Once 
c. two Times 
d. Three Times 
e. Four Times 
f. Five or sore Tines 
19. If you had been to Japan, please indicate the sininim 
duration of your stay there. 
a. Less than I Week 
b. I-8 Weeks 
C. 9- 16 Weeks 
- d. 17 - 24 Weeks 
e. 25 Weeks and Above 
2O. "If you had been to Japan, what was the nature of your trip ? 
a. Undergoing training/attaciment/course I "I 
b. Wending Conference/Sevinar on Japanese Kanagesent 
C. Doing my tertiary education there 
d. Business trip 
e. Holiday 
SICTION B: YOUR ORGANISAFIO 
21. Under which category of corporation does your organization 
belong to ? 
a. Federal Public Corporation 
b. ' State Public Corporation 
DO NOT WTI Hill 
22. Under which type of Public Interprise lCorporation) is your 
organisation categorised? 
A. Departmental-fors Interprise 
b. Statutory Body 
0. Governsent-owned Cospaajý 
(Note: Department-fors enterprise is in-fact it government departnent 
suci air Ilectricity Board (LLN), Civil Aviation, etc; Statutory bodl 
refers to a public corporation that is torted under different statutes 
boti at federal and state levels such as SNDC, NARA, etc.; Goverament, 
owned- coNpany is a public enterprise establisked under tie Company Actý 
Isis such as MAS, PITIONAS, etc. ) 
thte; 0.21 and Q21 are to be answered if you have chosen 'c' as your 
answer to Q 2: ) 
23. Is your organisation a joint-venture witl foreign firm(sl 
a. Teg 
b. No 
24. If yes, which country or countries kas/have iaterestg in 
lour organisation ? 
a. U. S. A . 
b. U. I. 
0. Japan 
d. Others; please specify 
25. Mat is the size of your orwisation ? 
A. Less than 100 employees 
b. gore this 100 but less than 200 employees 
C. lore than 200 but less than 300 employees 
d. gore than 300 but less than 100 employees 
e. gore than 400 but less this 500 employees 
f. Note than 500 employees 
SICTIOI C: APINISS STYLI KINIGMIr 
DO for FRITI 1121 
21. Do yoa know viat tie 'Look list' policy is *11 about 
fes 
b. No 
21. In your opinion, is the 'ýook list* policy a good idea for your 
Organisation ? 
1. Tea 28 
b. No 
0. Don't know 
Is. Please indicate your familiarity witi tie*folloving elements of 
Japanexe-style management by placing a circle to tie oubei 
provided after eack answer. 
(Use tie key belov in wlevering tils question) 
Key: I- Not familiar at all 
2- Know a little 
I- rang rpaRnash1v Vol] ------------- 4- how very well 
Familiarity' 
2. Quality Control Circle 1234 
b. lab-coatraotiax system I: 3A 
C. Sesiority-Vage system 1234 
d. Lifetime employment 1231 
0. Company-oriented Union 1234 
f. Paternal Leadership Style 1234 
9. Job-lotation Policy 1234 
i. Riaggi Olsten 1234 
i. -Jilst-ia-Time system 1234 
J. Inban listen I: 311 
k. Leis Dependence on Nasual 1234 
1. Open Office Sides 12A -I I 
a. Group Responsibility 1234 
A. Loyalty to Company 1231 
: 1. Please indicate how you knew about those elements of 
Japnese-style management that you are familiar with by 
placing a circle to a number after each answer of your cioice: 
(Fire tie kel below in answering His questionj 
Key: I- Learned from workskop/sesinar/course that I attended 
I- Learned from my mentor/iinediate superior- ". 
3- Learned through discussion with my working colleagues 
4- Learned while on attaciment/secoadment/iodvgtriaI 
training at Japanese firm 
5- Learned from bookg/journalgleevspaper articles that I read 
6- Others 
Learn From 
a. bality Costrol Circle 12 3 4 5 1 
b. Sob-coatractiag system 12 3 U 1 6 
e. Sesiority-Vage system 12 3 4 6 6 
d. Lifetime employment 12 3 4 5 6 
e. Compul-oriented Union 12 3 4 5 1 
f. Paternal Leadership Style 12 3 1 6 6 
9. Job-gotatioa Policy 12 3 4 5 6 
L-jo 
L-i3i 
L. 
-132 L_j33 
L_134 
L-i35 
L-ji 
L.. 137 
L-in 
L. 
_139 
L__j47 
L. 
-LIS L 
--- j. 
4 9 
I 
DO lor Hill Hill 
Questlom It - continued 
1. liaggi 171tes 
' 
0 
i. Just-in-Tise System 1234 16 L jI 
j. hoban System 123151 _ 
k. begs Dependence on Racial 123456 
1. Open Office Olsten 123456 L. J 
A. Group Responsibility 123456 15 
A. Loyalty to Company 123451 
"30. Regarding those elements of Japanese-style management tkat you are 
familiar with, what is your personal comment? ? lease circle the 
number that represents the best answer ud use the following key 
is asovering tie question: 
ley: 
I- I would recommend this style of Japanese management to my 
organisation 
I would not not recossend this style of Japanese management 
to my orguisatioe 
3- No comment 
Congest 
A. Quality Control Circle I: 3 L_157 
I b. Sub-contractiag writes 123 L__j 8 
c. Begiority-vage system I: 3 
d. Lifetime employment 123 Lj 0 
e. Company-oriested Union 123 
f. Paternal Leadership Style 123 
1. Job-Rotation Policy 123 
k. RiAggi system 13 
i. Just-ia-Tiae System 123 
j. lasbu System 113 
i. Less Dependence on Racial 123 1 167 
1. Open Office Systea 3 
1. Group Responsibility 123 _-. 
69 
1. Loyalty to Cospuy 3 0 
31. To your knowledge, is your organ isation consciously promoting 
gone elements of Japaxese-style muAlement 
A. leg 71 
b. No 
32. If so, which features of Japanes e-style masatemeot do you 
prac tise in your organization 
2. Quality Control Circle 
b. Sub-contracting system L_L73 
C. Seniority-Vage system L__L7 4 
d. Lifetime employment L.. ils 
e. Cospaay-oriented Union L.. j76 
f. Paternal Leadership Style 7 
Job-Rotation Policy 
k. Riaggi System 
i. Just-ii-Tise System 
J. Ischia System 
1. Less Dependence on iaaval L-in 
1. Open Office System L-in 
S. Group Responsibility L--ji 
6 
DO lor "M #M 
elestion 32 - Continued 
z. Loyalty to Company 
0. Inval sports Dal L.. 186 
Others: Please specify 7 
33. Regarding those features ikat have been practised, when were 
they first implemented is your organization ? 
Date/Itk/Yr. 
A. Qiality Control Circle a 
b. STC01trUtill 178tel L-i89 
0. Seniority-late system 
d. Lifetime employment 
6. Company-oriented Union 2 
f. Paternal LeadersUp Style L.. i93 
Job-Rotation Policy I 
1. Biaggi System Lj 5 
i. Jost-it-Tise System 
1"bas system 
k. Less Depeadeace on Inual L_j 8 
1. Open Office System 9 
S. Group Responsibility 0 
A. Loyalty to Company 0 
0. Issual sports Day L-1102 
P. Others: please specify 3 
34; Vbick of the above features have been dropped or discontinued 
and when? II 
Date/Itk/Yr. Discontiaged 
a. Qlality Control Circle 
b. Sub-contracting system 
C. Seniority-Vale system 06 
d. Lifetime employment 
e. Company-oriented Union 08 
f. Paternal Leadership Style 1109 
1. Job-Rotation Policy 0 
k. Biaggi system L-im 
i. Just-in-Tise System L__LI 12 
J. habn System L.. 11 13 
k. Less Dependence on Knoll 
1. Open Office System 
0. Group Responsibility 
it. Loyalty to Company 17 
0. lasual Sports Day 
P. Others: please specify I 
35. Is a measure of employment stabiligatios, wkick of tke 
following measures live your orgamization adopted ? 
a. Improvement and expansion of welfare facilities 
L I Pessioa sclese 
0. Seniority-Based wage 
d. Internal promotion L. -LI 
23 
e. Job-Rotation L-11 
14 
7 
, I, ,ý, DO mot WRITI Hill 
Question 35 - con tinned - 
f. Good relationship between workers and tie suagesent group "its 
9. Commendationi/lvard for long service L-ille 
1. Stall Group Ictivitles 
i. Continuous Training 28 
Hill-Productivity-ligh Vain Policy 
k. Others; please specify 30 
36. Is n effort to increase productivity, which of the following 
measures have your orgasisation adopted ? '. 
a. Suggestion ockese 131 
b. QC Circles- 
C. Zero-defect Novement 
d. Others; please specify 
37. Viat is the criteria that your orgaoiiation uses in detersining 
the wages and salaries of the esployees ? 
1. Job categiry 
b. Kerit 
C. Seniority 
d. Overall rating 
e. Others 
38. Do you have a trade anion is your orguisatios ? 
a. Yes 1V 
b. No 
39. If you do, what type of union is it I 
a. Industry-wide union 134 
b. Craft Union 
0. Cospany-oriented union 
40. Ire you a member of a trade anion I 
A. Yes 135 
b. No 
41. If so, ins tie union be very beneficial to you is 
safe-guarding your interests 7 
A. Very beneficial 
b. Reasonably beneficial 
I bit beneficial 
d. Not beneficial at all 
It. Who had been responsible for ietroduciag the practices 
of Japiaese-style management in your organisation 
a. The Government through the 'Look last* policy 
b. The Previous Chief liecative Officer 
C. The Top Management of this organisation 
d. Ny ovo initiative and recommendation 
e. The initiatives of some of the vorkera is this organisation 
A 
DO for WTI HIRE 
43. Do you gee any major problems is trying to implement the, 
Japanese-style management in your organisation ? 
A. No 
b. Only gone problems 
0.1 lot of problems 
14. If there are problems, what are the most common ones ? 
2. Vorker's suspicion about Japnese-style management 
due to lack of understanding of its' concept 139 
b. Vorker's preference for existing va; ýgement practices 
C. Lack of commitment on the part of tI Kanagesent group in 
the organisation to implement the JaOnese-style management 
d. Mew problems crop up as a result of practising 
Japanese-style management 
e. Others; please specify 
15. In your personal opinion, can Japanese-style management be adopted 
in your orguisation 7 
a. In 
b. Yes, but only some aspects of Japanese-style management- 
can be adopted 
0. Yes, all aspects of Japuese-style management can be adopted 
Please OAIY Ansver Q-46 If rou isd picked *b', sg your respouse 
to Q. 15.1 
46. Tie reason(s) that may explain why ONLY certain aspects of 
Japnese-ityle management cam be practised in my organisation 
is/are; 
A. Halaysis, and Japan are at a different stage of technological 
development 
b. ffoot orgazisations in Ralaysia have strongly structured along 
western pattern I 'T 
C. The top management is most organisations in Nalaysia are 
western-trained and therefore not ready for 
Japanese-style management 
d. The workers are not ready for Japanese-style management. 
e. Some Japanese-style management not suitable because 
they are In conflict with the cultures, traditions and 
religious values of tie majority of tie Malaysian workers 
f. Some Japanese-style management will bring mdre problems 
than benefits to valayiiaa orlanisationg 
It. Personally speakint, do you believe that Japanese-style 
sanagesent is apropriate -for use in your orianisation ? 
A. Yes 
b. , No 
0. lot sure 
141 
II 
14 
Do Nor "M mi 
11 you believe in using Japanese-style managemest, for. - your- 
orguisation, which positive attributes of Japanese-style 
eanagement would you desire to achieve in your orgazisation I 
(Tils question is call to be answered by tioie who bad picked 'a' 
As tieir response, to Q. 11) 
a. The loyalty of workers to their organisation 143 
b. Tie kith standard of quality produced by the workers 
0. The high ethics ji. e. low absenteeism) of workers 
d. Tie absence of strikes by workers 
a. The high level of productivity by the workers 
f. Others; please specify 
49. IA your personal opinion, which of the Japanese-style management 
can be successfully practised is your organisation ? 
a. Quality Control Circle 
b. Sub-contracting system 11114 
c. Seniority-Vage system 1145 
d. Lifetime eaployseat 
4. Company-orieBted Using 47 
f. Paternal Leadership Style 
Job-lotation Policy 
b. Riagli System 50 
i. Jost-io-Tive System 51 
lasban System ---- LI k. Legs Dependence on vassal 
1. Open Office System 
3. Group Responsibility 
A. Loyalty to Company 
a. Instal Sports Day 
P. Others: please specify 58 
50. Vky mould you tkink they caa be practised ia your organisation 7 
a. Tkey can be easily adapted to tieexisting system 159 
b. Uey are practical to use and easy to implement I 
C. They do not conflict with the cultures, traditions and relitious 
values of the majority of vorkers is, my organisatiou 
d. Tkey mill be readily accepted by both the NanageseAt 'and 
voriers because of, tke enormous benefits they provide 
e. Others; please specify 
51.1 It Japnese-ityle management im to be successfully transferred 
to the Malaysiax public enterprises in general and to your 
orguisation in particular, Ant are some of the best vars to 
achieve this objective ? 
a. Strict enforcement of tie government's 'Wok last' policy 
b. 1PpoiAtmeAt of Chief liecutive Officer aid the top management 
troop vko are adequately trained in Japanese-style 
management as vell as highly committed to Implementing Japanese- 
style management to all public enterprises 
10 
Question 52 - continued 
C. I regular, systematic training for all employees of 
Japanese-style management for all employees of public 
enterprises 
d. Introduction of only those elements of Japanese-style 
management that are compatible vith Nalaysian culture 
and religious values 11 4 
e. Secondoent of Japanese personnel to public enterprises 
for a certain period of tine to speed up the transfer of 
Japanese technology and knov-bow 
f. Idopt Japanese educational system 
g. Others; please specify 
DO lot vRfT8 BERN 
52, Ire you impressed by the technological and economic success of 
the Japanese ? 
a. Yes 161 
b. No L--" 
$3. from a score ranging from I to 5, which factors do you think 
have contributed to the Japanese success as a superpower today ? 
Please circle the appropriate number by using the following key: 
ley: 
I- Did not contribute at all 
2- Contribute a little 
3- Contribute reasonably 
4- Contribute strongly 
5 -L Contribute very strongly 
a. The Japanese-style Management I I -3 4 6 
b. The Government Support 1 2 3 4 5 
c. ldvanced Technology 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Survival Theory Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
e. The Industrial Vorkforce 1 2 3 4 6 1166 
f. Business I Trade Tactics 1 2 3 4 5. 167 
g. Japanese culture 1 2 3 4 5 1168 
h. Japanese Education system 1 2 31 4 5 
i. catbh-up Mentality 1 2 3 4 5 
(hte: Survival Theory means that tie Japanese people bare to 
work very lard is order to survive because they bare to do go, 
since their country is poor in natural resources while Catch- 
up Neat&lity refers to tie determination of tie Japanese 
industrUlists to catch up with the West) 
$4. With regards to management style, what is your preference in 
running an orgaoisation ? 
a. Japanese-style Management 
171 
b. Vestern-style Management 
C. The present Management Style 
d. It depends on situation 
e. No preference at all 
DO for WTI HIRI 
55. To year knowledge, iave, tbere been say Japanese personnel attachei 
to your orgazigation especially is transferring Japanese 
technology and know-bow under tie. "Look last' policy 7 
1. Yes 
b. Yes, but they have left 
C. No 
d. Don't knov/sot sure 
it. If so, how sany of then have been seconded to your orlanisatioa ? 
A. Legs than 5 persons 
b. Less tin 10 persons 
C. Less than 20 persons 
d. Less than 30 persons 
.e 
Less than 40 persons 
In your observation, are tie Japanese sincere is transferring 
their teckoology and know-how to the Nalaysians ? 
a. No, they hold back many things 
b. Only some are sincere; others only teach what Nslaysi&Ag 
already know or those that are not relevant to Nalaysia's seeds 
C. Yes, they are eager to teach the Malaysians their expertise 
St. Regarding those Japanese personnel who have been or are still 
seconded to your organisation, in what capacity are they seat for 
a. Is Consultants 
b. Is Ingineers 
C. Is Technicians 
- d. Is Senior Irecutives 
e. Others 
59. If it is possible to practice Japanese-style management in Malaysia, 
mien do you tbink Japanese-style Management vill dominate tie public 
enterprise sector in Malaysia 
a. By 1990 176 
b. By 1995 
C. By 2000 
d. Not sure 
e. It vill. not dominate the public enterprises at all 
60. Is your judgement, vhich management style suits your orgiaisation 
a. The British Management Style W 
b. The Isericaa Management Style 
0. The 'Incorporation of Islamic Values' Management Style 
d. The mixture of various Management Styles 
e. ? be Japanese Management Style 
11. Rat is your opinion regarding the transferability of Japanese- 
style management to Malaysia ? 
a. All eleseats of Japanese-style management can be 
transferred in its pare form 
b. Only some elements of Japanese-style manacement 
can successfully be transferred and that they may 
have to be modified to suit local environment 
C. All elements of Japanese-style management cannot 
be transferred in either pare or modified form 
I,. 
. DO Nor VEM yogi 
Vkat to your mind, are some of tie serious defects of Japanese- 
style management that say cause it to be rejected in Nalaysia 7 
a. It restricts freedom to change career 179 
b. It provides slow promotion prospects for high achievers 
C. Practice like riaggi system is time-consuming 
d. Practice like lifetime employment is costly to maintain 
e Some aspects of Japanese-atyle management are not compatible 
vitk tie cultures, traditions and religions practised in 
Nalaysit 
f. Japanese-style management is just a fad 
Others; please specify 
63. Do you think there is any difference betvees the management 
style that is practised in tie public enterprises and the 
management style adopted in the private enterprises in Japan'? 
a. I think there Is a lot of differences 180 
b. I think there is some differences 
C. The management style used in public as veil as private 
enterprises in Japan is the sane 
d. I do not really know 
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 
UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING 
STIRLING, SCOTLAND FK9 4LA 
TELEPHONE: (0786) 73171 
TELEX: 777557 STUNIV G 
FAX 0786 63000 
,w 
me 
"Wo 
IN* 4 
I op 
(Ilk (0) 
*41; or 
9th. Aug. 1989 
May I humbly introduce myself. I am a faculty member of 
Institute Teknologi MARA, Malaysia and I am now at the 
University of Stirling working on my Ph-D dissertation on 
Japanese-style Management. I came across your name from one 
of the articles written by you about Japanese-style 
Management. 
I consider you an expert in the field of management in 
your country and would like to seek your opinion on Japanese- 
style management practices in public as well as private 
enterprises. I would be most grateful if you would fill the 
questionnaire enclosed and return it to me as soon as you 
possibly can. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely yours# 
90a00-0a0000*00000 
Mohamad T. Yasin 
Head of Department: Professor Tom Cannon 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Your Job Title: 
Your Organisation: 
Instruction: Where alternative answers have been provided, please select the 
most appropriate one by putting a circle to the number representing the 
respective answer. In cases where personal opinion has been requested, 
please feel free to give unrestricted comments in the space provided, If 
necessary, use additional paper to write your comments. Than* you. 
Q. 1. To your mind, are there any differences between the management styles 
practised in the private enterprises (firms) and those practised in the 
public enterprises in Japan? 
I. The Japanese-style management In private enterprises as well as public 
enterprises are more or less the same. 
ii. There are only some differences in the management styles between the 
private enterprises and the public enterprises in Japan. 
III. There are a lot of differences In the management styles between the 
private enterprises and public enterprises in Japan. 
iv. I do not really know. 
Q. 2. Using the key below, which of the management practices are adopted in: 
(a). Private Enterprises (b). Public Enterprises 
I. Quality Control Circle 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
2. Sub-contracting System 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
3. Seniority-Wage System 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
4. Lifetime Employment 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
5. Enterprise-Wide Union 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
6. Paternal Leadership 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
7. Job-Rotation Policy 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
8. Ringgi System 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
9. Just-In-Time System 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
10. Kanban System 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
11. Less Dependence On Office 
Manual and Procedures 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
12. Open Office System 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
13. Group Responsibilty 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
14. Loyalty To Company 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
15. On-the Job-Training 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
16. Mentoring System 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Key :I- Not adopted at all 1 2- Adopted to a certain extent by only some enterprises 
3- Adopted quite extensively by the some of the enterprises 
4- Adopted quite extensively by the majority of the enterpri ses. 
Q. 3. In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of the management practices 
found in the public enterprises in Japan? What would be your suggestions 
to rectify or minimise them? (You may answer in Japanese Language) 
Q. 4. Do you think the problems associated with management practices in the 
public enterprises are also experienced by the private enterprises In 
Japan? 
i. Yes 
i i. No 
Q-5. Can the management practices in the private enterprises which are 
said to have been used successfully in acheiving Japanese economic miracle 
be adopted in the Japanese public enterprises? Why do you think so? 
(You may answer in Japanese Language) 
APPENDIX C 
List of Malaysian Public Enterprises from 
-Respondents of the Survey Come From 
Agriculutural Development Enterprises 
1. Malayan Pineapple Industry Board (MPIB) 
2. National Tobacco Board (NTB) 
3. Pepper Marketing Board (PMB) 
4. Malaysian Rubber Develoment Corporation (MARDEC) 
5. Malaysian Rubber Exchange and Licensing Board (MRELB) 
6. Pali Oil Registration and Licensing Authority (PORLA) 
7. National Padi and Rice Board (LPN) 
8. Farmers Organisation Authority (FOA) 
9. Federal Agricultural Marketing Board (FAMA) 
10. Muda Agricultural Development Authority (MADA) 
11. Kemubu Agricultural Development Authority (KADA) 
12. Fisheries Developement Authority (MATUIKAN) 
13. National Livestocks Development Authority (MAJUTERNAK) 
14. Sabah Rubber Fund Board (SRFB) 
15. Sabah Fish Marketing Authority (SFMA) 
16. Pahang Agricultural Development Corporation (PADC) 
17. Rubber Industry Smallholders Developemnt Authority (RISDA) 
Land Development Enterprises 
18. Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) 
19. Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) 
20. Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) 
21. Sabah Land Development Board (SLDB) 
22. Sarawak Land Development Board (SLDB) 
23. Land Custody Development Authority (LCDA) 
24. Johore Tenggara Developement Corporation (KETORA) 
25. Terengganu Tengah Development Authority (KETENGAH) 
26. Pulau Pinang Regional Development Authority (PERDA) 
27. Kelantan Selatan Developement Authority (KESEDAR) 
28. Kedah Regional Developemnt Authority GEDA) 
29. Tengka Development Board (JENGKA) 
30. Pahang Tenggara Development Board (DARA) 
Urban Devlepoment and State Economic Development Enterprises 
31. Urban development Authority, (UDA) 
32. Bintulu Development Authority (BDA) 
33. Sabah Housing and Town Development Board (SHTDB) 
34. Sarawak Housing Commission (SHC) 
35. Sabah Economic Development Corporation 
35. Sarawak Economic Development Corporation 
36. Negeri Sembilan Development Corporation 
37. Terengganu Development Corporation 
38. Perlis Development Corporation 
39. Perak Development Corporation 
40. Pulau Pinang Development Corporation 
41. Pahang Development Corporation 
42. Kelantan Development Corporation 
43. Malacca Deveopment Corporation 
44. Kedah Development Corporation 
45. Johor Development Corporation 
Zourism. Tradinir. Marketing and Manufacturiniz EnterDrises 
46. Tourist Development Corporation (TDC) 
47. Sabah Tourism Board (STB) 
48. Malaysian Handicrafts Development Corporation (KRAFTANGAN) 
49. National Filem Development Corporation 
50. Sabah National Parks Board of Trustees Promtion Corporation 
51. Sabah Sports and Cultural Board 
52. National Limited Corporation (PERNAS) 
53. National Petroleum Corporation (PETRONAS) 
54. Council of Trust for Indigenous People (MARA) 
55. Sabah Forestry Development Authority (SAFMA) 
56. Malaysian Timber Industry Board (MTIB) 
57. Sarawak Timber Develoment Corporation (STIDO 
58. Sabah Marketing Corporation 
59. Tin Industry Board 
60. Food Industry of Malaysia Authority (FIMA) 
60. Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) 
61. Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (FIMA) 
Banking and Financial--Enterprises 
62. Bank Negara Malaysia 
63. Bank Malayan Banking 
64. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Malaysia Bhd (BBMB) 
65. People Bank Malaysia 
66. Malaysian Industrial Bank 
67. National Savings Bank (BSN) 
68. Development Bank of Malaysia 
69. Agriculture Bank of Malaysia 
70. Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) 
71. Sabah Development Bank 
72. Sabah Bank 
Welfare and Social Services EAerprises 
73. Social Security Organisation (SOCSO) 
74. Employees Provident Fund (KWSP) 
75. National Family Planning Board 
76. Pilgrims andSavings Board (LUTH) 
79. Malaysian Lotery Welfare Board 
80. Musuem Board 
81. National Electricity Board (LLN) 
82. Sabah Electricity Board (SEB) 
83. Sarawak Electricity Board (SESCO) 
84. Yayasan Sabah 
85. Yayasan Sarawak 
86. Yayasan Johor 
Transportation Enterprises 
87. Malayan Railway 
88. National Shipping Line Corporation 
89. Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC) 
90. Klang Ports Authority 
91. Sabah Ports Authority (SPA) 
92. Kuching Ports Authority (KPA) 
93. Rajang Ports Authority (RSA) 
94. Bintulu Ports Authority (BPA) 
95. Tphor Ports Authority (SPA) 
96. Miri Ports Authority (MPA) 
97. Penang Ports Commission 
98. Sabah Shipyards 
99. Malaysian Shipyard and Engineering 
100. Malaysian Highway Authority (LLM) 
101. National Containers 
Educational and Research Institutions 
102. University of Malaya (UM) 
103. National Uiversity of Malaysia (UKMO 
104. University of Technology of Malaysia (UTM) 
105. Northern University of Malaysia (UUM) 
106. University of Agriculture of Malaysia (UPM) 
107. University of Science of Malaysia (USM) 
108. International Islamic University (UIA) 
109. Institute Technology MARA (ITM) 
110. Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia (PORIM) 
111. Malaysian Agricutlural Research Development Institute (MARDI) 
112. Rubber Institute of Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA) 
113. National Industrial Training & Trade certification Board 
114. National Library of Malaysia 
115. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 
116. Standard and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) 
117. Malaysian Rubber Research and Development Board (MRRDB) 
118. Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (RRI) 
119. Tin Industry Research and Development Board 
